ORDER : VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the writ petitioners, calling in question the sanction for prosecution accorded by the third respondent vide proceedings No.10556/F3/2004 dated 19.1.2005 and the consequential prosecution launched thereto, culminating in CC No.195 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (JFCM), Gajwel, Toopran Mandal, Medak District. The petitioners seek quahsment of the aforesaid proceedings and consequential reliefs as prayed for. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 2. The Petitioner No.1 is employed as a Stenographer in the Instant Coffee Division of M/s. Tata Coffee Ltd., formerly known as Consolidated Coffee Ltd., a Public Limited Company having its registered office at Pollibetta, Kodagu, Karnataka, and the Petitioner No.2 is the Licensee of M/s. Tata Coffee Ltd. The prosecution was initiated by in C.C. No.195 of 2005, against the Petitioners and is pending on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gajwel, Medak District, Telangana. The Respondent No.2 is a Gazetted Food Inspector and the Respondent No.3 is the competent Food Authority under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short ‘the PFA Act’), who has accorded the impugned sanction for prosecution, pursuant to which, the said criminal proceeds have been launched. Therefore, all the respondents are arrayed as parties to the present writ petition. 3. M/s. Tata Coffee Limited is engaged in the cultivation, sale and export of coffee and had acquired a 100% Export Oriented Undertaking (100% EOU) situated at Brahmanapally, Toopran Mandal, Medak District, Telangana, which was originally established by Asian Coffee Limited. Pursuant to a scheme of amalgamation between Asian Coffee Ltd., Coffee Lands Limited and Veerarajendra Estates Ltd. with Consolidated Coffee Limited, as approved by the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Company Petition No.199/98 dated 7.9.1999 with effect from 11.8.2000, the said 100% EOU stood transferred to Consolidated Coffee Limited. Thereafter, the name of the Company was changed to M/s. Tata Coffee Limited, as evidenced by the fresh Certificate of Incorporation dated 11.08.2000. The Industrial Licence of the said 100% EOU, acknowledging the change of name, was approved by the Government of India, Ministry of Company Affairs and Industry, vide proceedings dated 12.09.2000. The Development Commissioner, Visakhapatnam Export Processing Zone, extended the EOU status for a period of five years from 8.04.2000 to 07.04.2005, and further extended the same from 8.04.2005 to 07.04.2010. The Industrial Licence of the said 100% EOU, acknowledging the change of name, was approved by the Government of India, Ministry of Company Affairs and Industry, vide proceedings dated 12.09.2000. The Development Commissioner, Visakhapatnam Export Processing Zone, extended the EOU status for a period of five years from 8.04.2000 to 07.04.2005, and further extended the same from 8.04.2005 to 07.04.2010. It is stated that from 03.10.1986, when the Letter of Intent was originally granted by the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, the Unit has at all times been engaged in 100% export of its product, namely, Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality, strictly in accordance with the Import and Export Policy in force. 4. On 25.05.2004, the Food Inspector, Medak District, collected samples of Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality, Mysore Gold Coffee Beans and Roasted Coffee Beans from the first Petitioner. Thereafter, Respondent No.3 issued a show cause notice dated 4.1.2005 stating that the Public Analyst, State Food Laboratory, Nacharam, Hyderabad, declared the sample as misbranded on the ground that the label did not contain the complete address of the manufacturer in English or Hindi, alleging violation of Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. The petitioners submitted their explanation on 08.04.2005, contenting that the unit is a 100% EOU functioning for over 15 years and that the product is exclusively meant for export to the Russian market and therefore the labels were printed in Russian language. 5. Subsequently, the Petitioners received a notice under Section 13 of the PFA Act, along with the analysis report and sanction for prosecution, pursuant to which prosecution was launched in C.C. No.195/05 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gajwel, Medak District, Telangana, and cognizance was taken on 28.4.2005. The analyst’s report does not allege any defect in the standard or quality of the product and merely opines violation of Rule 33 on the ground that the label is not in English or Hindi. Summons were issued posting the case to 01.07.2005. It was stated that the entire action of the respondents is vexatious, baseless and an abuse of the process of Court, compelling the petitioners to approach this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate writ reliefs. 6. Summons were issued posting the case to 01.07.2005. It was stated that the entire action of the respondents is vexatious, baseless and an abuse of the process of Court, compelling the petitioners to approach this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate writ reliefs. 6. Heard Sri T.S. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri Tandra Ramesh, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Medical, Health and Family Welfare and perused the record including the grounds based on which the petitioners are claiming the reliefs. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: A. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the factory from which the sample was taken is admittedly a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) and the product in question, namely, Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality, is exclusively an export product and not meant for sale in the domestic market. It is contended that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 , as evident from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, is intended to protect the consumers in India from adulteration of food and, though it extends to the whole of India, it has no extra-territorial operation, consequently, the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, including Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, apply only to manufacture and sale of food products within India. It is argued that despite this being specifically brought to the notice of the respondents, and despite the respondents themselves noticing that the sample analysed was of export quality, the third respondent acted arbitrarily in issuing the show cause notice dated 04.01.2005 calling upon the Petitioners to change the label in conformity with Rule 33. 8. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the Public Analyst has not alleged any adulteration or deficiency in the quality or standard of the product. The sole opinion rendered by the Public Analyst is with reference to the alleged violation of Rule 33 on the ground that the label is not in English or Hindi. The respondents failed to appreciate that the product is manufactured exclusively for the Russian market, and therefore, the label is printed in the Russian language. The sole opinion rendered by the Public Analyst is with reference to the alleged violation of Rule 33 on the ground that the label is not in English or Hindi. The respondents failed to appreciate that the product is manufactured exclusively for the Russian market, and therefore, the label is printed in the Russian language. The Petitioners placed reliance upon the letter of the Export Agent dated 24.12.2003, which clearly confirms that the product belongs to the Russian market and that domestic sale in India is not permitted. It is contended that without application of mind to these admitted facts, the respondents have proceeded to initiate prosecution, rendering their action wholly unsustainable. 9. The learned counsel further submits that the sanction for prosecution dated 19.1.2005 granted by the third respondent, the consequential notice issued under Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the prosecution launched in C.C. No.195/2005 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gajwel, suffer from total non-application of mind and are arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The respondents failed to appreciate that there is no allegation whatsoever in any of the proceedings or in the complaint that the product in question was sold in India. Under the Export and Import Policy, a 100% EOU is prohibited from selling its products in the Domestic Tariff Area without specific permission from the competent authority, and no such permission or domestic sale is alleged by the respondents. 10. It is further submitted that the Food Inspector appears to have obtained cash receipts from the first Petitioner, who is merely a Stenographer/Personnel Assistant in the factory and is in no way concerned with the manufacture or sale of the product. The first Petitioner merely permitted the taking of samples and, without realising the implications, signed the documents at the instance of the Food Inspector. Therefore, there is no incidence of sale as contemplated under the Act. The samples were taken from the factory premises, which is a custom-bonded warehouse, and hence, it cannot be said that the goods were manufactured for sale in India or were being sold in India. The allegation in the complaint that the Food Inspector “purchased” the sample is a complete misnomer, rendering the sampling under Section 10 of the Act unauthorised and invalid. 11. The allegation in the complaint that the Food Inspector “purchased” the sample is a complete misnomer, rendering the sampling under Section 10 of the Act unauthorised and invalid. 11. Learned counsel further submits that Part IX of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules , dealing with packaging and labeling of foodstuffs, must be construed in the light of the object of the Act and can apply only to food articles manufactured and sold in India. The rule-making power under Section 23(1)(d) of the Act is intended to prevent the Indian public or purchasers from being misled as to the nature, quality or quantity of food articles and has no application to export goods. Similarly, provisions relating to food injurious to health necessarily refer to the health of citizens of India. The interpretation placed by the respondents on Rule 33, the sanction granted and the prosecution launched, are therefore, wholly misconceived and ultra vires the powers conferred under the Act and the Rules. Even Section 7 of the Act, which prohibits manufacture, sale, storage or distribution of food, applies only in relation to domestic market activities and has no application to food meant exclusively for export. 12. In the above circumstances, it is submitted that the prosecution launched against the Petitioners and the cognizance taken by the Learned Magistrate in C.C. No.195/05 are totally ultra vires the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Continuation of the criminal proceedings would cause serious prejudice and harassment to the Petitioners, when on the face of the complaint and the preliminary material produced by the respondents, no offence is made out. The continuation of the proceedings would therefore amount to a sheer abuse of the process of law, warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents (state) 13. Per contra, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the Respondents submits that Sri R. Laxmaiah (LW1), who lifted the sample and instituted the complaint, is a duly notified and competent Food Inspector, empowered to exercise duties and powers under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, in terms of G.O.Ms.No.452, Medical, Health and Family Welfare (L1) Department, dated 07.09.1994, and is also specifically authorized to institute prosecutions under G.O.Ms.No.62, Medical & Health (L1) Department, dated 30.01.1985. It is further submitted that the Senior Food Inspector, re-designated as Gazetted Food Inspector under G.O.Ms.No.87A dated 09.03.1994, functions as the Local (Health) Authority, and that the Director, Institute of Preventive Medicine, Public Health Laboratories and Food (Health) Administration, Hyderabad, has been notified as the State Food (Health) Authority for the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 01.01.2004 under G.O.Ms.No.46 HM & FW (L1), dated 07.09.2004. 14. It is contended that on 25.05.2004, between 11.30 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., the Food Inspector (LW1), under the supervision of Sri K. Sri Rama Murthy, Gazetted Food Inspector and Local (Health) Authority, Medak District, inspected the premises of M/s. Tata Coffee Limited, Instant Coffee Division, Brahmanapally Village, Toopran Mandal, Medak District. At the time of inspection, Sri S. Nagaraju, Personnel Assistant, disclosed that the unit was manufacturing instant coffee for marketing in India and abroad and that the unit was holding a licence under the PFA Act. During inspection, roasted coffee beans, Mysore Gold Coffee beans and Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality packed in sealed packets and tins were found. Suspecting the quality, the Food Inspector purchased specified quantities of the said items by paying the prescribed amounts and obtained cash receipts, which were attested by Sri K.V.P. Sarma, Production Assistant, examined as LW2. 15. The learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that the samples were collected, divided into parts, sealed, labeled, and packed strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules, in the presence of mediators and the Personnel Assistant, and a panchanama was drawn. One part of each sample along with Form VII bearing specimen seal was sent to the Public Analyst, State Food Laboratory, Nacharam, Hyderabad, on 26.05.2004 by registered post, while the remaining parts were deposited with the Local (Health) Authority, Medak District. The Public Analyst analyzed the sample of Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality bearing Code No. 053/MDK/DII/1953/2004 and submitted Analysis Report No.321/2004 dated 05.07.2004, opining that the label did not contain the nature of the sample in English or Hindi, as required under Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and therefore declared the sample as misbranded. 16. 16. It is further contended that on submission of the detailed report by the Food Inspector, the State Food (Health) Authority, in exercise of powers under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, read with G.O.Ms.No.62 dated 30.01.1985, accorded written consent dated 19.01.2005 for institution of prosecution in public interest. Pursuant thereto, prosecution was launched against Sri S. Nagaraju, Personnel Assistant, and Sri A. Sengupta, Licensee of M/s Tata Coffee Limited., for offences punishable under Sections 7(ii), 2(ix)(k) and 16(1) of the Act read with Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, alleging sale of misbranded Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality. 17. The learned Assistant Government Pleader contends that the statutory authorities have acted strictly within the powers conferred upon them under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules, that the procedure prescribed for sampling, analysis and sanction has been duly followed, and that the finding of misbranding is based on the expert opinion of the Public Analyst. It is therefore, submitted that the initiation of prosecution is legal and valid, and that the writ petition is devoid of merit and does not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. III. POINTS FOR THE DETERMINATION: 18. On the basis of the pleadings, rival contentions and the material placed on record before this Court, the following issues arise for consideration: (i) Whether the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder apply to products manufactured exclusively for export, and whether the alleged violation under Rule 33 justifies initiation of prosecution? (ii) Whether the prosecution against the petitioners is arbitrary, ultra vires, or amounts to an abuse of the process of law? IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: Point Nos. (i) and (ii) 19. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the record. 20. The reason assigned by the respondent authorities for initiating prosecution against the petitioners is that the label pertaining to the food sample did not contain the nature of the sample in English or Hindi, as required under Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. On that basis the sample was declared as misbranded. 21. There is no dispute that the respondent authorities have obtained samples of food product namely, Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality from the premises of the petitioners. On that basis the sample was declared as misbranded. 21. There is no dispute that the respondent authorities have obtained samples of food product namely, Grand Instant Coffee – Export Quality from the premises of the petitioners. It is an admitted fact that the analyst’s report in respect of the said food sample does not disclose any adulteration or deficiency in the quality or standard of the product. 22. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the food sample obtained by the respondent authorities was exclusively meant for export to Russia, the provisions of Rule 33 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 and consequently Section 7 of the Act, would have no application to the facts of the instant case. The offences alleged against the petitioners are under Section 7 (ii) and 2 (ix) (k) punishable under Sections 16 (1)(a)(I) of the Act read with Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. It is the specific case of the petitioners that Section 7 of the Act, which prohibits manufacture, sale, storage or distribution of food or articles operates only in relation to domestic market for consumption within India and has no application to goods manufactured solely for export. Consequently, the very foundation for initiating prosecution is stated to be absent. On the other hand, it is the specific contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Medical, Health and Family Welfare that since the product was manufactured within Indian Territory, compliance with the provisions of the Act is mandatory notwithstanding the fact that it was intended for 100% export. 23. The scope of the Act in relation to processing units manufacturing goods for export fell for consideration before the Bombay High Court in the State of Maharasthra v. Vishwanathappa , 1979 SCC Online Bom 77 , wherein the Court held as under: “That the factory in question was a processing factory is amply established even by the admissions given by the Food Inspector. The said finding of the learned Magistrate also, to an extern, receives corroboration from the personal inspection of the said factory carried out by the learned Magistrate himself. The said finding of the learned Magistrate also, to an extern, receives corroboration from the personal inspection of the said factory carried out by the learned Magistrate himself. There is also an admission on record of the Food Inspector that though he was in the factory for over 1 1/2 hours, he did not find a single customer coming to the factory for the purpose of purchasing any article from the said processing factory. There is also no other evidence to show that at any other time any customer has ever gone to the processing factory of the accused for purchase of any article. The conclusion, therefore, that this is a processing factory and not a place meant for sale of any article is irresistible” 24. A similar view was taken by the Kerala High Court in Food inspector v. Suwert and Dholakia (P) Limited, 1982 SCC Online Ker 70 , wherein it was categorically held that where the evidence establishes that the food article was stored solely for the purpose of export, the provisions of the Act governing local sale would not apply. The Court clarified that although export may incidentally involve the sale or consideration, the expression “export” bears a wider meaning signifying the act of taking goods out of India to a place outside the country. It was further observed that: “15.There is no case for the complainant that the tea of which the samples were taken in the instant case was meant for local sale or sale inside the country. On the other hand, the evidence is categoric that the tea was stored in the godown for blending for the purpose of export. Though the word export may at times involve an element of sale and payment of consideration the expression has a wide import. The meaning given to the word in Concise Oxford Dictionary is "send out (goods) to another country." The Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1973 defines the word in S. 2(h) as follows: "Export", with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means taking out of India to a place outside India. 16. Under S. 3(f) of the Tea Act, "export" means to take out of India by land, sea or air to any place outside India other than a country or territory notified in this behalf by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette. 16. Under S. 3(f) of the Tea Act, "export" means to take out of India by land, sea or air to any place outside India other than a country or territory notified in this behalf by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette. It follows that the term need not necessarily imply a sale of the article. 17. The argument put forward by Shri. Rama Shenoi is that the Act applies only to articles of food meant for consumption inside the country and has no application to articles of food meant for export. There is considerable weight in the contention.” The Kerala High Court further held as under: “It is only proper to point out in this connection that while S. 5 of the Act prohibits import of adulterated and misbranded food there is no provision prohibiting export of such food. S. 16 provides for penalty on persons who "whether by himself or by another person on his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food". While there is a specific mention about import, there is significant omission of the word 'export'. This also is an indication to show that the purpose of the Act is confined to providing unadulterated articles of food to the people of the country and has no application to commodities meant for export. 25. The Court thus, held that once it is established that the goods are meant for export, the Food Inspector lacks jurisdiction to take samples and launch a prosecution merely on the ground that the product does not conform to the domestic standards fixed under the Act. 26. In the instant case, the respondents have failed to place any material on record to establish that the food sample collected from the petitioner’s premises was intended for sale in India. There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the product was being offered or sold to consumers at the premises, from which the sample was obtained. Once it is established that the product was manufactured exclusively for export and intended for consumption outside India, the initiation of proceedings under the Act is without authority of law. Consequently, the prosecution launched against the petitioners cannot be sustained. 27. Once it is established that the product was manufactured exclusively for export and intended for consumption outside India, the initiation of proceedings under the Act is without authority of law. Consequently, the prosecution launched against the petitioners cannot be sustained. 27. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Food Inspector exceeded his statutory authority in obtaining cash receipts from the first Petitioner, who is admittedly a Stenographer/Personnel Assistant in the factory and has no role whatsoever in the manufacture, sale, storage or distribution of the product. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon and others , (1976) 1 SCC 546 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court observed as under: “14. From a conjoint reading of the above referred provisions, it will be clear that the broad scheme of the Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale, or import, manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated article of food. The terms "store" and "distribute" take their colour from the context and the collocation of words in which they occur in Sections 7 and 16. "Storage" or "distribution" of an adulterated article of food for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within the mischief of this section. That this is the right construction of the terms "store" and "distribute" in Section 16(1) will be further clear from a reference to Section 10. Under that section, the Food Inspector, whom the Act assigns a pivotal position for the enforcement of its provisions, is authorised to take samples of an article of food only from particular persons indulging in a specified course of business activity. The immediate or ultimate end of such activity is the sale of an article of food. The section does not give a blanket power to the Food Inspector to take samples of an article of food front a person who is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of sub-section 1(a) or sub- section 2. The three sub-clauses of sub-section 1(a) apply only to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential, of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him. The three sub-clauses of sub-section 1(a) apply only to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential, of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed for sale. It follows that if an article of food is not intended for sale and is in the possession of a person who does not fulfill the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or storer for sale such as is referred in sub-sections 1(a) and (2) of the section, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In short, the expression "store" in Section 7 means "storing for sale", and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under Section 16(1)(a).” 28. The issue that thus arises for consideration is whether the Food Inspector was competent to obtain a sample from the manufacturing unit of the petitioners, more particularly by obtaining cash receipt from petitioner No.1, who is working as a Stenographer – cum - Personal Assistant. It is to be seen that Section 10 (1) of the Act authorizes the Food Inspector to take samples only from [i] a person selling the article of food; [ii] a person who is in the course of conveying, delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consignee or [iii] a consignee after delivery of any such article to him. The statutory power is therefore, clearly confined to persons connected with sale or delivery of food articles. 29. As noticed earlier, in the instant case, the respondent authorities obtained the cash receipt from petitioner No.1, who is neither a seller nor a manufacturer, nor otherwise engaged in sale, delivery or distribution of the food article. The Petitioner No.1 does not fall within any of the categories enumerated under Section 10 (i) of the Act. Consequently, the act of obtaining the sample through such person is beyond the scope of authority conferred upon the Food Inspector and renders the sampling and the prosecution founded thereon legally unsustainable. The Petitioner No.1 does not fall within any of the categories enumerated under Section 10 (i) of the Act. Consequently, the act of obtaining the sample through such person is beyond the scope of authority conferred upon the Food Inspector and renders the sampling and the prosecution founded thereon legally unsustainable. Circulars Governing Export-Oriented Food Articles: 30. The learned counsel for the petitioners had drawn the attention of this Court to Circular No. 1/2002-Cus., dated 8 th January, 2002 in F.No.450/21/98-Cus.IV (Vol.II) issued by Government of India Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), Central Board of Excise & Customs. The said circular, issued in consultation with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, clarifies the applicability of the PFA Act, 1954 to food articles imported or manufactured by Export Oriented Units (EOUs) or units in EPZ/SEZ. The circular records the clarification of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare that the provisions of PFA Act are not applicable to the food items meant exclusively for export. The relevant portion of the said circular is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “I am directed to refer to Board's Circular No.58/2001-Cus., dated 25.10.2001 on the above mentioned subject. In the said Circular, it has been provided that all the consignments of imported food items are to be referred to Port Health Officers for testing under the PFA Act, 1954. A reference has been received from the trade stating that the food items imported by EOUs for subsequent export after processing should be exempted from the mandatory testing under the said Act. 2. The matter has been examined in consultation with the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare. It is observed that there is no provision in the PFA Act to exempt food items imported by EOUs or units in EPZISEZ from testing under the said Act. It has, however, been clarified by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare that the PFA Act is not applicable for food meant for export. Therefore, in case the Commissioner of Customs is satisfied that imported food items, after their processing in EOUs or units in EPZ/SEZ, shall be exported and no part thereof shall be sold in India, he may allow clearance of such food items without mandatory testing under the said Act. Therefore, in case the Commissioner of Customs is satisfied that imported food items, after their processing in EOUs or units in EPZ/SEZ, shall be exported and no part thereof shall be sold in India, he may allow clearance of such food items without mandatory testing under the said Act. The Commissioners may take an undertaking from the EOUs or units in EPZ/SEZ importing the food items to the effect that the imported food item or any product manufactured therefrom would not be sold in the Domestic Tariff Area under any circumstances.” Legal Effect of the Circular 31. A plain reading of the aforesaid circular, leaves no manner of doubt that the competent authorities of the Union Government has unequivocally recognized that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act does not govern food articles exclusively meant for export. It is also evident from the above said circular that in case the Commissioner of Customs is satisfied that imported food items, after their processing in EOUs or units in EPZ/SEZ, shall be exported and no part thereof shall be sold in India, he may allow clearance of such food items without mandatory testing under the said Act. In the present case, there is no allegation much less any material, to suggest that the food products in question were intended for sale within India or diverted to the domestic market. In the absence of such foundational facts, the invocation of the provisions of PFA Act by the respondents in the instant case is without any authority or sanction of law. V. CONCLUSIONS 32. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is a regulatory statute enacted to control and prevent adulteration of food articles intended for sale or distribution for human consumption within the domestic market. The applicability of the Act is not automatic but is conditioned upon the existence of jurisdictional facts expressly contemplated by the statute. It is well settled that where such jurisdictional facts are absent, the statutory machinery cannot be set in motion on mere assumption or suspicion. 33. The power conferred upon a Food Inspector under Section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is not plenary but conditional in nature. Such power can be exercised only where the food article is sold, exposed for sale, stored for sale, or intended for sale for human consumption in India. 33. The power conferred upon a Food Inspector under Section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is not plenary but conditional in nature. Such power can be exercised only where the food article is sold, exposed for sale, stored for sale, or intended for sale for human consumption in India. The existence of these foundational facts is a sine qua non for the assumption of jurisdiction. In their absence, any action purportedly taken under Section 10 is rendered ultra vires the Act. 34. Rule 33 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, read in consonance with binding executive instructions issued by the Government of India, makes explicit the legislative intent that food articles manufactured or handled exclusively for export, without any element of domestic sale or intended sale, stand excluded from the regulatory sweep of the Act. It is equally well settled that subordinate legislation and executive instructions, when consistent with the parent statute, are binding on statutory authorities and cannot be disregarded at their discretion (see: Union of India v. K.P. Joseph and others , (1973) 1 Supreme Court Cases 194 ). 35. In the present case, the material on record unequivocally establishes that the food product in question was manufactured solely for export and was never intended to enter the domestic stream of commerce. There is neither any allegation nor any material to suggest sale, storage for sale, exposure for sale, or diversion of the said product within India. The factual substratum necessary to attract the provisions of the Act is, therefore, wholly absent. 36. In the absence of the jurisdictional facts mandated under Section 10 of the Act, and in view of the express exclusion contemplated under Rule 33 of the Rules, the respondent authorities lacked the statutory competence to draw samples, accord sanction, or initiate prosecution. It is trite that when the very assumption of jurisdiction is flawed, all consequential proceedings are rendered void ab initio (see: Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others , (1954) 1 Supreme Court Cases 710 ). 37. The impugned proceedings are thus founded on an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction and are dehors the statutory framework of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder. Their continuance would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cannot be sustained. VI. RESULT: 38. 37. The impugned proceedings are thus founded on an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction and are dehors the statutory framework of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder. Their continuance would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cannot be sustained. VI. RESULT: 38. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. 39. The sanction for prosecution granted by the third respondent and all proceedings emanating therefrom, including C.C. No. 195 of 2005 pending on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (JFCM), Gajwel, Toopran Mandal, Medak District, are hereby quashed. 40. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in the writ petition, shall stand closed.