ORDER : SANJEET PUROHIT, J. 1. Present writ petition is filed challenging order dated 16.08.2018 passed by Assistant Mining Engineer, Balesar cancelling the quarry licence issued in favour of petitioner, so also order dated 11.12.2019 passed by Additional Director, Environment & Health, Mines & Geology Department, Udaipur, dismissing appeal preferred by petitioner against cancellation of his quarry licence. 2. Explaining facts of the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner states that quarry licence No. 321, Village Somanada, Tehsil Balesar was transferred and approved in favour of petitioner on 04.06.2012. Since thereafter, petitioner has continuously been undertaking mining activities upon the area in question. 2.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner has always undertaken mining activities in compliance with the provisions of law. However, petitioner has been served with order dated 16.08.2018 wherein it was mentioned that even after the fifteen days’ notice dated 06.05.2014, petitioner has not deposited lease rent, hence, quarry licence issued in favor of petitioner was cancelled, in exercise of powers under Rule 28(3) (x) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 ( “Rules of 2017”) 2.2 Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that order dated 16.08.2018 was assailed by petitioner by way of filing an appeal under Rule 63 of the Rules of 2017, on the ground that the impugned order for cancellation of quarry licence has been passed without following the statutory requirement of mandatory thirty days’ notice as provided under Rule 28(3)(x) of the Rules of 2017. It is also contended that service of notice dated 06.05.2014 has not been effected upon petitioner in the manner mandated under Rule 86 of the Rules of 2017, and that the order of cancellation was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to petitioner. 2.3 Appellate authority – Additional Director, Environment & Health, Mines & Geology Department, Udaipur, vide its order dated 11.12.2019, dismissed appeal preferred by petitioner and upheld the order dated 16.08.2018, passed by respondent No. 4. 2.4 Challenging the orders dated 11.12.2019 and 16.08.2018, present writ petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that order of cancellation of quarry licence is in clear violation of the provisions of Rules of 2017, so also in gross violation of principles of natural justice. 3.1 It is contended that initial notice dated 06.05.2014 was issued to a wrong address and the same was never served upon petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that order of cancellation of quarry licence is in clear violation of the provisions of Rules of 2017, so also in gross violation of principles of natural justice. 3.1 It is contended that initial notice dated 06.05.2014 was issued to a wrong address and the same was never served upon petitioner. Respondent–authorities after a lapse of four years, without granting any opportunity of hearing to petitioner, cancelled the quarry licence, which is not justified in any manner. 3.2 It is contended that appellate authority has proceeded in a pre-determined manner and, without considering and adjudicating the grounds of appeal, dismissed the same by way of a non-speaking and unreasoned order. 3.3 Learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon judgment dated 06.11.2017 passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14717 of 2017 (M/s Sojat Lime Company vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors . ) which came to be affirmed by Hon’ble Division Bench vide judgment dated 08.07.2019 passed in D.B. Special Appeal Appl. Writ No. 200/2019 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. M/s Sojat Lime Company) 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents stated that cancellation of quarry licence of petitioner is in consonance with the provisions of Rules of 2017 as the petitioner had been guilty of breach of conditions stipulated in the licence, which remained unremedied in spite of serving due notice upon petitioner. 4.1 Learned counsel for respondents contended that notice, as required under the provisions of Rules of 2017, has been sent to petitioner through registered post and same has not been received back and thus, service of notice was duly presumed. 4.2 Learned counsel for the respondents further stated that breach of licence condition on the part of petitioner was well- established as counsel representing petitioner before the appellate authority has clearly admitted that in case, the licence is restored, the due amount will be paid by petitioner. 4.3 Learned counsel for the respondent – Department stated that order passed by appellate authority is based upon a sound reasoning and appreciation of the arguments advanced by both the parties and therefore, same does not call for any interference. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 6. 4.3 Learned counsel for the respondent – Department stated that order passed by appellate authority is based upon a sound reasoning and appreciation of the arguments advanced by both the parties and therefore, same does not call for any interference. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 6. Impugned order dated 16.08.2018 is challenged primarily on the ground that same has been issued without giving/serving the required thirty days’ notice upon petitioner as mandated under Rule 28(3)(x) of the Rules of 2017 and thus, the order impugned is not sustainable on the ground of non-compliance of said mandatory requirement, which is meant to ensure adherence to principle of natural justice i.e., audi alteram partem. Learned counsel for petitioner also questioned presumption of service as drawn by respondent – Department with regard to notice dated 06.05.2014. 6.1 To appreciate the said ground of challenge, this Court deems it appropriate to take note of the statutory provisions of Rule 28(3)(x) as well as Rule 86 of the Rules of 2017. The same are reproduced below, for ready reference: “ Rule 28: Terms and Conditions of mining lease or quarry licence ….. (3)(x) If the licencee commits breach of any terms of the licence or any provision of the rules or fails to comply with the directions given by the Mining Engineer or Assistant Mining Engineer concerned within the period specified by him, the Mining Engineer or Assistant Mining Engineer concerned may after giving thirty day’s notice to remedy the breach or to comply the directions, may impose penalty upto rupees ten thousand or may cancel the licence after obtaining prior approval from Superintending Mining Engineer concerned and forfeit the security deposits and licence fee: Provided that decision of termination of licence on breaches other than dues shall be taken by the Director on the recommendation of a committee comprising Additional Director Mines (HQ), Deputy Legal Remembrance and Superintending Mining Engineer (HQ), concerned. Provided further that decision of termination of licence shall be taken only if the licencee has failed to remedy the breach, after serving of a thirty days’ notice. “ Rule 86: Service of notice .- (1) Every notice to the holder of mineral concession, permit, contract etc. Provided further that decision of termination of licence shall be taken only if the licencee has failed to remedy the breach, after serving of a thirty days’ notice. “ Rule 86: Service of notice .- (1) Every notice to the holder of mineral concession, permit, contract etc. under these rules shall be given in writing in person or by registered post at the address recorded in lease deed, licence, permit or contract or such other address as may be, from time to time, intimated in writing by such person, to the authorities concerned having jurisdiction. (2) The service of such notices on any adult member of the family, agent or any other authorized person shall be deemed to be proper and valid service and shall not be questioned or challenged by him. An endorsement by postal employee that such persons refused to take the delivery or non-availability of the person at the last known address shall be deemed to be prima-facie proof of service. (3) Where the concern authority is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the person concern is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the notice cannot be served in the ordinary way, the notice shall be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the concern office and also upon some conspicuous part of the house or mine in which the person is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the concern authority thinks fit.” 6.2 The unambiguous language of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that any order for termination of mining lease or cancellation of quarry licence can be passed only after serving mandatory thirty days’ notice. Requirement of service as stipulated under Rule 86 of Rules, 2017 is that a notice be served upon the party either by serving notice in writing in person or by way of a registered post sent on the same address as shown in the mining lease/quarry licence. 6.3 In view of the documents annexed and shown to this Court, it is clear that in the quarry licence, address of petitioner is shown as, “ Smt. Bhawari Devi, Sanjay Colony, Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur ”. 6.3 In view of the documents annexed and shown to this Court, it is clear that in the quarry licence, address of petitioner is shown as, “ Smt. Bhawari Devi, Sanjay Colony, Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur ”. In view of specific requirement of Rule 86 of the Rules of 2017, notice ought to have been served upon the same address, however, a perusal of notice dated 06.05.2014 (Annexure-2) clearly reveals that same has been issued to an incomplete address, i.e., “Bhawari Devi, Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur”. 6.4 It is also pertinent to mention here that even in the final order, i.e., impugned order dated 16.08.2018, complete address of petitioner has been mentioned, whereas notice has been sent to incomplete address. 6.5 Moreover, Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Section 119 of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 creates a rebuttable presumption that service shall be deemed to be effected if it has been properly addressed, pre-paid and sent by registered post. The said provision of General Clauses Act, 1897 is extracted herein below: “ Section 27. Meaning of service by post. —Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post , a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 6.6 As discussed above, since initial notice dated 06.05.2014 was not sent to the correct and complete address, it cannot be held that service was duly effected. It is further significant to note that the said notice was returned by Postal Department with the endorsement “address is incomplete”. Despite such remark, respondent no. 4 failed to resend the notice to proper and complete address, rather presumed proper service which is clearly against the statutory requirements. 6.7 This Court in Kailash Chand v. Hemlata reported in 1997 SCC OnLine Raj 587 has held that presumption of service only arises when the notice is sent to complete address by registered post. The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “22. 6.7 This Court in Kailash Chand v. Hemlata reported in 1997 SCC OnLine Raj 587 has held that presumption of service only arises when the notice is sent to complete address by registered post. The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “22. The learned District Judge has committed an error of law in raising presumption about service of refusal on the basis of Ex. 5, on which correct address of the defendant- appellant was not written. In fact, the question of raising presumption under Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec. 114 illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act arises only when correct address of addressee is written on the envelop 23. From the aforesaid discussion, it is held that on the basis of registered envelop Ex. 5, upon which correct address of defendant-appellant is not written, therefore, the question of presumption under Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act does not arise and a finding contrary to it recorded by the learned trial court is not sustainable.” 6.8 Moreover, as stated above, Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 provides for two modes of service of notice i.e., either it should be given in writing in-person or be sent by registered post. In the present case, respondent no. 4 failed to effectuate service upon petitioner through any of the modes prescribed under the aforesaid provision. Mere dispatch of a notice by registered post, without ensuring that it is sent to proper address i.e., address as recorded in the quarry license, cannot be construed as valid or effective service in the eyes of law. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Court conclusively finds that notice dated 06.05.2014 was not effectively served upon petitioner, and therefore, the mandatory requirement of serving 30 days’ notice before passing of order of termination of license was not complied with in the present case. Hence, the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand. 7. Petitioner has also assailed the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by appellate authority on the ground that the same is an unreasoned and non-speaking order. 7.1 A bare reading of the said order dated 11.12.2019 (Annexure-5) shows that appellate authority, after recording the facts as well as submissions of both sides, proceeded to decide the appeal in a single para. 7. Petitioner has also assailed the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by appellate authority on the ground that the same is an unreasoned and non-speaking order. 7.1 A bare reading of the said order dated 11.12.2019 (Annexure-5) shows that appellate authority, after recording the facts as well as submissions of both sides, proceeded to decide the appeal in a single para. For ready reference, findings/operative part of the order dated 11.12.2019 is quoted hereinbelow: 7.2 A perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-3) shows that appellate authority rejected petitioner’s appeal through a wholly cryptic and non-speaking order. Appellate authority failed to even advert to the grounds specifically raised by petitioner, much less assign any cogent or sufficient reasons for such rejection. The impugned order thus reveals a complete non-application of mind and falls short of the requirement of a reasoned adjudication. 7.3 This Court is of the considered view that if such mechanical disposal of departmental appeals is permitted or allowed to become the norm, the very object and efficacy of appellate remedy would stand defeated. A statutory appeal cannot be reduced to an empty formality; it must involve due consideration of the grounds urged and a proper decision supported by reasons. 7.4 Courts have consistently held that recording of reasons forms an indispensable part of administration of justice. The requirement to provide reasons is not a mere formality, but a fundamental facet of fair adjudication, ensuring transparency, accountability, and enabling parties to understand the basis of the decision rendered. 7.5 Hon’ble Apex Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 opined that the requirement of providing reasons is based on the broader notion of fairness in decision-making process and reflect the application of mind by appellate authority. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below: “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.” 8. So far as the validity of sole reason for rejection of appeal assigned by appellate authority is concerned, this Court finds that undertaking given by petitioner to deposit any due amount was in fact to express her bonafide intention that in case, the appeal is allowed, due amount (if any) will be deposited by petitioner. Such undertaking on part of petitioner cannot be a justified ground to dismiss the appeal. Moreover, even if the said undertaking is considered as an admission of default in payment of due lease rent, it alone is not sufficient to cancel the quarry license since Rule 28 of the Rules of 2017 expressly stipulates that cancellation can be effected only if the breach is not remedied after valid service of thirty days’ notice. 8.1 Since it has been established that no notice has been validly served upon petitioner to remedy the breach (if any), mere undertaking cannot be a sufficient ground to justify the cancellation of quarry licence. 8.2 Thus, taken from any stand point, order impugned passed by appellate authority is not justified and is in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Rules of 2017. Therefore, the same is declared illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. This Hon’ble High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14717 of 2017 (M/s Sojat Lime Company vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors . ) which came to be affirmed by Hon’ble Division Bench vide judgment dated 08.07.2019 passed in D.B. Special Appeal Appl. Therefore, the same is declared illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. This Hon’ble High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14717 of 2017 (M/s Sojat Lime Company vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors . ) which came to be affirmed by Hon’ble Division Bench vide judgment dated 08.07.2019 passed in D.B. Special Appeal Appl. Writ No. 200/2019 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. M/s Sojat Lime Company) stressed upon the significance of providing opportunity before cancelling the mining license. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below: “Thus, it appears that the respondents were in a hurry to cancel the lease deed. An opportunity should have been granted to the petitioner to pay the amount along with the penalty in terms of the Rule 18 (21) (a) of the Rules of Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 In view of the above, the result is that this writ petition is accepted and the impugned order dated 17.11.2016 of cancellation of lease deed of the petitioner is quashed. However, the petitioner shall be allowed to proceed with the mining subject to his deposit of the balance amount along with the penalty etc. as calculated by the respondent-authority in terms of the Rule 18 (4 of 4) [CW-14717/2016] (21) (a) of the Rules of Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986. The said amount shall be determined within one month from today and the petitioner shall deposit the said amount within one month thereafter.” 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, present writ petition is hereby allowed. Impugned orders dated 16.08.2018 and 11.12.2019 are quashed and set aside. The Mining Department is directed to restore the quarry licence No. 321 of petitioner forthwith and to permit petitioner to operate the quarry in accordance with law. 11. However, it shall be open to respondent – Department to initiate fresh proceedings, if so advised, strictly in accordance with law after issuance and proper service of show-cause notice and after affording opportunity of hearing. 12. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.