ORDER : NUPUR BHATI, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following reliefs: “(i) Be pleased to quash the charge-sheet Annex. 4 dated 13.08.2013. (ii) Be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order of punishment (Annex.16) dated 22.01.2016 passed by the respondent disciplinary authority, the Chief Manager, RSRTC, Phalodi Depot. (iii) Be pleased to exonerate the petitioner from all the charges leveled against him by way of charge sheet (Annex.4) dated 13.08.2013. (iv) Be pleased to direct the respondent Chief Manager to pay the remaining salary to the petitioner for the period of suspension with interest @ 12% with all consequential benefits. (v) Any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of the humble petitioner. (vi) Cost may kindly be allowed in favour of the humble petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as a Conductor in the respondent–Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “RSRTC”) on 04.08.1984 and was initially posted at Jalore Depot. Upon successful completion of probation, he was regularized in service by order dated 21.01.1986 (Annex.1). The petitioner served the respondent-Corporation with sincerity and dedication at various places. Lastly, he was posted at Phalodi Depot and was deployed on Phalodi–Jodhpur–Phalodi route. To the utter surprise of the petitioner, he was placed under suspension vide order dated 19.07.2013 (Annex.2) passed by the respondent-Chief Manager, Phalodi, without assigning any reason therein. 2.1. The suspension order was served upon the petitioner when he returned to Phalodi after completing his duty on the said route. On inquiry, no cogent reason for suspension was disclosed to him, except stating that an enquiry would be conducted. Subsequently, the Zonal Manager, Bikaner, by communication dated 31.07.2013, forwarded the Bus Checking Report (BCR) (Annex.3) to the respondent-Chief Manager, indicating that the bus of which the petitioner was the Conductor was checked on 19.07.2013 by respondent Onkarmal Jangid and N.S. Rathore. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 13.08.2013 (Annex.4), along with the statement of driver Luna Ram, was served upon the petitioner. 2.2. The respondent-Chief Manager ordered a departmental enquiry under Rule 35 of the Standing Orders for RSRTC vide order dated 02.09.2013 (Annex.5) and appointed Shri M.L. Sharma as the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 13.08.2013 (Annex.4), along with the statement of driver Luna Ram, was served upon the petitioner. 2.2. The respondent-Chief Manager ordered a departmental enquiry under Rule 35 of the Standing Orders for RSRTC vide order dated 02.09.2013 (Annex.5) and appointed Shri M.L. Sharma as the Enquiry Officer. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his detailed reply to the charge-sheet along with the Conductor Booking Report, Electronic Ticketing Machine (ETM) slips and electronically generated daily sale account (Annex.6), denying all allegations and asserting the charges to be false and malafide. In the reply (Annex.6), the petitioner specifically submitted that the bus departed from Phalodi at 10:33:09 on 19.07.2013 with seven passengers on board and, as per ETM data, the bus was at Bus Stand, Sirmandi at 12:19:58 noon, about 30 kilometers away from Osian. Hence, the alleged checking at Osian Bus Stand at 11:30 AM was factually impossible and the allegation of misbehavior was baseless. Respondents Onkarmal Jangid and Narpat Singh Rathore examined themselves as prosecution witnesses and were cross-examined by the petitioner (Annex.7). 2.3. One Luna Ram, driver of the bus, on whose statement the second charge was framed, was also examined (Annex.8). The petitioner further examined defence witnesses Naresh s/o Suganchand and Yogendra Singh s/o Gordhan Singh (Annex.9). The petitioner himself was examined and cross-examined before the Enquiry Officer (Annex.10). After conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 21.08.2014 (Annex.11), wherein the charges leveled against the petitioner were not found fully proved. Copies of Annexures 3 to 11 were obtained by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act. The petitioner thereafter requested the respondent-Chief Depot Manager, Phalodi, to provide the enquiry report and to release subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% after completion of 90 days of suspension. However, by communication dated 08.07.2015 (Annex.13), the respondent informed that higher authorities had ordered a re-departmental enquiry and no information was supplied. The petitioner submitted representation dated 28.07.2015 (Annex.12) for redressal of his grievance. In the meantime, the petitioner filed an appeal under the Right to Information Act, which was allowed by order dated 04.08.2015 (Annex.14), yet the requisite documents were still not supplied, demonstrating arbitrary conduct on part of the respondents. 2.4. The petitioner submitted representation dated 28.07.2015 (Annex.12) for redressal of his grievance. In the meantime, the petitioner filed an appeal under the Right to Information Act, which was allowed by order dated 04.08.2015 (Annex.14), yet the requisite documents were still not supplied, demonstrating arbitrary conduct on part of the respondents. 2.4. Pursuant to order dated 12.02.2015, a re-departmental enquiry was conducted and the newly appointed Enquiry Officer, after fresh consideration, submitted his report dated 07.09.2015 (Annex.15), again holding that the charges against the petitioner were not proved. That despite two enquiry reports exonerating the petitioner, the respondent-Chief Depot Manager, Phalodi, without any justification or valid reason, disagreed with the enquiry reports and vide order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16), received by the petitioner on 27.01.2016, imposed the punishment of censure and further ordered forfeiture of wages for the period of suspension. Hence, the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is vitiated by a fundamental procedural infirmity, insofar as the Disciplinary Authority failed to issue a mandatory notice of disagreement despite departing from the exonerating findings recorded by two Enquiry Officers. The petitioner submits that whenever the Disciplinary Authority chooses to differ from the findings of an inquiry report, it is legally obligated to record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and provide the delinquent employee with an opportunity to represent against the same. In the present case, by failing to communicate proper and cogent reasons for disregarding the Inquiry Officers' conclusions prior to passing the final punishment order, the Disciplinary Authority has acted in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice and the settled law that a "second opportunity" is indispensable when the authority reverses a finding of 'not guilty,' thereby rendering the entire disciplinary proceeding and the resultant punishment order null and void. 3.1. He submits that the respondent Disciplinary Authority has committed a grave illegality in passing the impugned order of punishment (Annexure-16) dated 22.01.2016, as the authority completely ignored and failed to consider the findings of two separate inquiry reports submitted by different Enquiry Officers who unequivocally found that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved. 3.2. 3.1. He submits that the respondent Disciplinary Authority has committed a grave illegality in passing the impugned order of punishment (Annexure-16) dated 22.01.2016, as the authority completely ignored and failed to consider the findings of two separate inquiry reports submitted by different Enquiry Officers who unequivocally found that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved. 3.2. He further submits that in the absolute absence of any incriminating material or evidence surfacing from the proceedings of the two inquiries, there was no occasion or legal justification for the Disciplinary Authority to deviate from those findings or to take a contrary view for the purpose of imposing a penalty. 3.3. He also submits that the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annexure-16) ex facie reveals non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority, inasmuch as upon receipt of the second Inquiry Officer's report—which, like the first, exonerated the petitioner—the authority sought and obtained directions from the Secretary (Inquiry/Appeal), Headquarters, Jaipur, to "pass order on merits," and mechanically proceeded thereafter. 4. On the contrary, Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the averment made by the petitioner regarding having served the respondent-department with sincerity, zeal, and dedication is wholly incorrect and misleading, on the contrary, the service record of the petitioner reflects repeated acts of misconduct, as many as, twenty-four disciplinary enquiries have been initiated against the petitioner during the course of his service and in all such enquiries, the petitioner was found guilty and appropriate penalties were imposed. The petitioner, therefore, does not deserve any indulgence or equitable relief from this Court. 4.1. He further submits that the contention of the petitioner that the charges levelled against him were false or actuated by malafides is absolutely baseless. He also submits that the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet for serious misconduct committed while discharging his official duties and during inspection, it was found that twenty-seven passengers were travelling without tickets, despite the fact that the petitioner had collected fare from them and the petitioner deliberately failed to issue tickets and thereby indulged in corrupt practices causing financial loss to the respondent-Corporation, therefore, in view of such grave misconduct, initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was fully justified and in accordance with law. 4.2. 4.2. He further submits that although a re-enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer, vide enquiry report dated 07.09.2016, did not hold the charges proved, the disciplinary authority, after due consideration of the entire material available on record, including the statements of witnesses as well as the past conduct of the petitioner, has rightly imposed the penalty vide order dated 22.01.2016. He submits that it is a settled proposition of law that the disciplinary authority is not bound by the findings of the Enquiry Officer and is competent to differ from the same, provided reasons are recorded and in the present case, the disciplinary authority has exercised its discretion judiciously and after due application of mind. 4.3. Learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position to refute that the disciplinary authority did not issue the petitioner a reasoned notice of dissent with the two enquiry reports. 4.4. He further submits that even if a procedural lapse is found regarding the non-issuance of a notice of disagreement, such an omission constitutes a curable irregularity rather than a terminal illegality that necessitates the total quashing of proceedings. The counsel contends that the settled legal position dictates that when a disciplinary action is challenged on the grounds of a procedural "lacuna"—specifically the failure to communicate the points of dissent from the Inquiry Officer’s findings—the proper judicial course is not to exonerate the delinquent employee, but to remit the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority. It is further submitted that in the interest of justice and administrative accountability, the Respondent should be permitted to cure this defect by issuing a fresh notice of disagreement, assigning proper and cogent reasons for the difference in opinion, and allowing the petitioner to submit a representation as this approach ensures that the merits of the misconduct are not ignored due to a technical error, thereby balancing the rights of the employee with the Authority’s power to maintain departmental discipline. 4.5. It is thus submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 is legal, justified, and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the present writ petition being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 5. 4.5. It is thus submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 is legal, justified, and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the present writ petition being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record. 6. The core of the controversy lies in the procedural trajectory adopted by the Disciplinary Authority after receiving two separate enquiry reports, both of which exonerated the petitioner of the charges levelled against him. It is a fundamental principle of service jurisprudence that while the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the findings of the Inquiry Officer, any departure from an exonerating report must be preceded by a mandatory procedural safeguards. The Disciplinary Authority is legally obligated to record its tentative reasons for disagreement with findings of enquiry officers and communicate them to the delinquent employee. This "Notice of Disagreement" is not a mere technical formality but a substantive requirement of the principles of natural justice, intended to provide the employee a fair opportunity to defend the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and persuade the Disciplinary Authority against a reversal of those findings. 7. The importance of such a show-cause notice cannot be overstated, as it serves as the only bridge between an investigative finding of innocence and a final administrative finding of guilt as discussed in Ram Kishan v. Union of India : 1996 AIR SC 255 by the Hon’ble Apex Court . The relevant para is hereinafter produced:- “10. The next question is whether the show-cause notice is valid in law. It is true, as rightly contended by the counsel for the appellant, that the show-cause notice does not indicate the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposed to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer for the reasons given in the inquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show- cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect. But, on the facts in this case, the only charge which was found to have been accepted is that the appellant had used abusive language on the superior authority. Since the disciplinary authority has said that it has agreed partly to that charge, the provisional conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority in that behalf even in the show- cause notice, cannot be said to be vague. Therefore, we do not find any justification to hold that the show-cause notice is vitiated by an error of law, on the facts in this case.” In light of the judgment in Ram Kishan (supra), the purpose of this notice is to enable the delinquent to demonstrate that the disciplinary authority’s proposed dissent is unwarranted. Without being informed of the specific grounds upon which the Authority intends to discard the Inquiry Officer’s conclusions, the delinquent employee is left in a state of legal vacuum, unable to offer a meaningful explanation or additional reasons to support the original findings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has explicitly clarified that unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show-cause notice, the entire exercise becomes an "empty formality," causing grave prejudice and resulting in a fundamental failure of justice. 8. In the present case, the record demonstrates a blatant disregard for this established legal position. Despite the fact that two different Inquiry Officers found the charges not proved, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to impose the punishment of "Censure" and forfeiture of wages without even serving the petitioner with a statement of its tentative reasons for dissent. 9. Furthermore, the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) reveals a significant lack of independent application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority. 9. Furthermore, the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) reveals a significant lack of independent application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority. Rather than issuing a notice of dissent, the Disciplinary Authority appears to have acted mechanically. By failing to assign any cogent or logical reasons for differing with the conclusions of the two Inquiry Officers prior to passing the final order, the Disciplinary Authority has acted arbitrarily. In light of the fact that the petitioner has been subjected to two enquiries and has been exonerated in both, the reversal of these findings without procedural transparency and without following the mandatory requirement of a reasoned show- cause notice of disagreement cannot be sustained. Consequently, this Court finds that the failure to communicate a reasoned notice of disagreement has vitiated the entire disciplinary process, rendering the final order a nullity. 10. Moreover, the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) manifests a patent lack of independent application of mind on the part of the disciplinary authority. For ready reference, the operative part of the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) is reproduced hereunder: Upon perusal of the impugned order, it is revealed that the authority has mechanically passed the said order and failed to record cogent reasons for disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at in the two inquiry reports submitted by the inquiry officers. 11. Further, learned counsel for the respondents has not refuted the contention that the petitioner was never served with a notice assigning reasons for such dissent, thus in these circumstances, there is every reason for this Court to conclude that the impugned order is arbitrary, unjust, and in violation of the principles of natural justice. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the petitioner faced two inquiries and was exonerated in both, yet the findings were reversed without affording procedural fairness or adhering to the mandatory requirement of issuing a reasoned notice of disagreement. Further, vide order dated 06.07.2016, interim protection was granted in favour of the petitioner, whereby the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 was stayed and the said interim order was confirmed vide order dated 18.09.2017. 12. Accordingly, this Court holds that the non-communication of a reasoned notice of dissent as well as non-application of mind, has rendered the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annexure- 16) a nullity. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. 12. Accordingly, this Court holds that the non-communication of a reasoned notice of dissent as well as non-application of mind, has rendered the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annexure- 16) a nullity. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of punishment dated 22.01.2016 (Annex.16) is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to disburse the consequential benefits accordingly. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.