ORDER : 1. The case of the petitioner, as per the writ affidavit, is that he was appointed as a Junior Stenographer in the respondent corporation on 18.07.1981 and joined duty on 20.07.1981, holding qualifications of Bachelor of Commerce and a Diploma in Commercial Practice, and later completing his Degree in Law during 1984-85. He was promoted as Senior Stenographer on 13.08.1985 with effect from 12.08.1985. By proceedings dated 15.04.1988, the post of Senior Stenographer was converted into Junior Assistant, and he was accordingly placed in that cadre from that date. He was then promoted as Senior Assistant by proceedings dated 25.02.1992 with effect from 31.01.1990, and his probation in that post was declared satisfactorily completed on 24.02.1993. A Common Inter-Se Seniority List dated 31.03.1995 placed him at Serial No. 19 in the cadre of Senior Assistants/Accountants, showing his date of joining that cadre as 31.01.1990. In 1997, the cadre of Senior Assistants/Accountants was re-designated as Assistant Manager with effect from 07.11.1997, while the existing Assistant Manager post became Deputy Manager and Deputy Manager became Manager. Promotions from Assistant Manager to Deputy Manager, and from Deputy Manager to Manager, were non-selection posts to be filled strictly on the basis of seniority. 1.1 It is stated that promotions to the post of Deputy Manager were effected in the year 1999, but despite his seniority, the petitioner was overlooked. By proceedings dated 23.04.1999, the respondent corporation promoted his juniors Tulsidas, J. Venkata Rao, and V. Satyanarayana, who were placed at Serial Nos. 21, 30, and 33 respectively in the seniority list dated 31.03.1995, while the petitioner stood at Serial No. 19. He submitted representations to the respondent corporation requesting protection of his seniority and promotion on par with his juniors, but while those representations were pending, several other juniors—K. Vikram Reddy (Serial No. 22), M. Swaraj Kumar (Serial No. 20), K. Sumathi Devi (Serial No. 23), R. Jayaram (Serial No. 27), M. Katyayini (Serial No. 29), and S.V.G.K. Murthy (Serial No. 31)— approached the High Court by filing W.P. No. 17945 of 1999 challenging the same promotion process. By order dated 29.12.2008, the High Court allowed that writ petition, declared the writ petitioners therein to be seniors to the promotees, and directed the respondent corporation to promote them to the post of Deputy Manager with effect from the dates on which their juniors were promoted, with all consequential benefits. By order dated 29.12.2008, the High Court allowed that writ petition, declared the writ petitioners therein to be seniors to the promotees, and directed the respondent corporation to promote them to the post of Deputy Manager with effect from the dates on which their juniors were promoted, with all consequential benefits. The Court held that promotions should be effected on the basis of seniority- cum-merit and found the corporation’s procedure to be contrary to law, relying on W.A. No. 1431 of 1987 dated 27.12.1994 and the Supreme Court judgment reported in B.V. Sivaiah vs. K. Addanki Babu , (1998) 6 SCC 720 . Following that judgment, the respondent corporation promoted K. Vikram Reddy, K. Sumathi Devi, R. Jayaram, and M. Katyayini—who are arrayed as Respondent Nos. 2 to 5—to the post of Deputy Manager, but, according to the petitioner, the Corporation continued to deny him similar treatment. Respondent Nos. 2, 3, and 4 were promoted with effect from 23.04.1999, Respondent No. 5 with effect from 03.09.2007, and even another junior, N. Rama Reddy, placed at Serial No. 34, was promoted as Deputy Manager on 22.09.2007. Further, Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted as Managers on 13.10.2009. The petitioner emphasizes that in the lower feeder post as well, he was senior: he joined as Junior Stenographer on 20.07.1981, whereas K. Vikram Reddy joined on 25.07.1981, K. Sumathi Devi on 05.08.1981, R. Jayaram on 02.10.1982, and M. Katyayini on 25.12.1981, despite some of them having the same appointment date of 18.07.1981. On these facts, the petitioner asserts that his juniors were consistently promoted over him without any justification. 1.2 The petitioner further states that he made a series of written representations to the respondent corporation on 15.06.2009, 07.08.2010, 10.12.2010, 10.01.2011, 27.01.2011, and 28.01.2011, requesting promotion to the posts of Deputy Manager and Manager on par with juniors, proper pay fixation, and payment of consequential monetary benefits. He states that none of these representations were acted upon. After his retirement on 31.01.2011, he again approached the respondent corporation regarding anomalies in pay fixation, denial of promotions, and non-payment of earned leave encashment. He states that none of these representations were acted upon. After his retirement on 31.01.2011, he again approached the respondent corporation regarding anomalies in pay fixation, denial of promotions, and non-payment of earned leave encashment. On 24.05.2011, he submitted an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to the Public Information Officer of the respondent corporation seeking details of the action taken on his representations, reasons for denial of promotions to Deputy Manager and Manager, comparison of his pay fixation with that of juniors who were promoted, and particulars of the earned leave accrued to his credit. Although certain documents were furnished, the petitioner states that the respondent did not disclose the reasons for denying him promotion and did not provide calculations of the monetary benefits or earned leave encashment due to him. 1.3 The petitioner’s claim rests on undisputed seniority, binding judicial pronouncements, and parity with juniors who were granted relief by this Court in W.P. No. 17945 of 1999. He states that the respondent did not rebut his contentions by any reasoned order, and remained silent, failing to consider his representations, and proceeding to promote juniors while ignoring him. According to the petitioner, the respondent has not alleged any lack of merit, misconduct, or ineligibility on his part, nor was there any lawful basis for excluding him from promotion. The petitioner therefore contends that the action of respondents in denying him promotion on par with his juniors and not providing revised pay fixation, earned leave encashment and consequential benefits constitutes a continuing cause of action. 2. A counter affidavit is filed by the respondent corporation contending that the petitioner was never denied promotion arbitrarily or in violation of seniority rules, but was in fact duly considered on two separate occasions by properly constituted Departmental Promotion Committees (DPCs) in the years 1999 and 2007, and was found unfit on both occasions for failing to secure the prescribed benchmark marks under the governing principle of seniority-cum-merit. The respondent further contends that the petition suffers from gross delay and laches, having been filed after nearly 12 years from the first alleged cause of action and only after the petitioner’s retirement, and that granting relief at this belated stage would unsettle long-settled service positions of other employees. The respondent further contends that the petition suffers from gross delay and laches, having been filed after nearly 12 years from the first alleged cause of action and only after the petitioner’s retirement, and that granting relief at this belated stage would unsettle long-settled service positions of other employees. 2.1 The respondent further contends that promotions to the posts of Deputy Manager and Manager in the corporation are not governed by seniority alone, as claimed by the petitioner, but by seniority-cum-merit (fitness), assessed through a structured evaluation process conducted by DPCs. In the promotion exercise held in 1999, the DPC met on 21.04.1999 and considered all eligible Assistant Managers, including the petitioner, strictly in order of seniority. The assessment was based on a total of 100 marks, comprising 20 marks for minimum qualifications, 10 marks for additional qualifications, up to 25 marks for length of service (one mark per completed year of service in the corporation and half a mark for service outside, subject to a maximum), 20 marks for Confidential Reports graded as Outstanding (20), Very Good (15), or Adequate (5), and 25 marks for interview performance. A benchmark of 70 marks was fixed, considering that candidates were being promoted from staff positions to officer cadre posts. Out of 31 candidates considered, only 16 secured 70 marks or above, and since only 14 vacancies were available, the senior-most 14 among those found fit were promoted. The petitioner, along with some candidates senior to him, failed to secure the benchmark and was therefore not promoted. 2.2 The respondent states that a similar exercise was conducted again in September 2007, when promotions to the post of Deputy Manager were taken up for six sanctioned vacancies. The DPC met on 21.09.2007 and adopted revised criteria totaling 100 marks: up to 30 marks for qualifications (20 for minimum qualification, 5 for post- graduation, 3 for PG Diploma/LLM, and 2 for Diploma), 25 marks for service, 20 marks for Confidential Reports (Outstanding 20, Very Good 15, Good 10, Adequate 5), and 25 marks for interview. As number of candidates were more than the available posts, the benchmark was raised to 75 marks. After reserving one post to be carried forward under the roster, a panel of nine candidates was prepared for six vacancies, with a panel validity of one year. As number of candidates were more than the available posts, the benchmark was raised to 75 marks. After reserving one post to be carried forward under the roster, a panel of nine candidates was prepared for six vacancies, with a panel validity of one year. The petitioner again appeared before the DPC but secured only 68.25 marks, broken down as 25 marks for qualifications, 25 for service, 6.25 for Confidential Reports, and 12 for interview, falling short of the benchmark. Consequently, he was not promoted in 2007 either. The respondent emphasizes that on both occasions—1999 and 2007—the petitioner was fairly considered in accordance with seniority, but failed on merit. 2.3 In response to the petitioner’s reliance on W.P. No. 17945 of 1999, the respondent contends that the said litigation arose from challenges by some unsuccessful candidates of the 1999 DPC. By judgment dated 29.12.2008, this Court allowed that writ petition, noting that the counter filed by the corporation at that time was silent on the allocation of marks for service, Confidential Reports, and performance appraisal. It is stated that although the principles of seniority-cum-merit had in fact been followed, these details were not properly placed before the Court, compounded by the absence of counsel for the corporation during the hearing. By the time the judgment was delivered, some of the writ petitioners, namely K. Vikram Reddy, K. Sumathi Devi, and R. Jayaram, had already qualified afresh through the 2007 DPC and were working as Deputy Managers. 2.4 The respondent detailed out how the Orders in W.P. No. 17945 of 1999 were implemented after the judgment. One of the petitioners, Sri S.V.G.K. Murthy, had already taken voluntary retirement on 31.01.2003. The other four petitioners—Sri K. Vikram Reddy, Smt. K. Sumathi Devi, Sri R. Jayaram, and Kum. M. Katyayini—gave written statements on 28.04.2009 saying they would not claim any back pay and only asked for notional promotions. The notional promotion date was fixed as 23.04.1999 for all of them except Kum. M. Katyayini, whose promotion date was fixed as 03.09.2007. They were paid salary and benefits only from the dates they actually worked in the promoted posts. Because of this situation, the corporation decided not to challenge the judgment dated 29.12.2008 and followed it by granting notional promotions without paying any past monetary benefits. M. Katyayini, whose promotion date was fixed as 03.09.2007. They were paid salary and benefits only from the dates they actually worked in the promoted posts. Because of this situation, the corporation decided not to challenge the judgment dated 29.12.2008 and followed it by granting notional promotions without paying any past monetary benefits. 2.5 It is contended that the petitioner’s emphasis on dates of appointment and inter-se seniority is misplaced, because seniority becomes relevant only after an employee secures the minimum qualifying benchmark in the DPC. The respondent asserts that the petitioner is attempting to overreach the spirit of the judgment in W.P.No. 17945 of 1999 by selectively relying on it while ignoring the Court’s observations about deficiencies in the earlier counter. The respondent alleges that the petitioner had a history of absenteeism and negligence in discharge of duties, and that he was frequently issued memos for non-availability at his seat during office hours, which adversely affected his Confidential Reports and overall assessment. 2.6 With respect to the allegation of monetary loss and non-payment of leave encashment, the respondent categorically denies the claim and places specific financial details on record. It states that the petitioner was paid Rs. 5,83,229/- towards encashment of Earned Leave and Sick Leave through cheque dated 31.01.2011 drawn on Syndicate Bank, Basheerbagh Branch, Hyderabad, under proper acknowledgment. On the petitioner’s request under the Right to Information Act, the corporation furnished details of earned leave calculation by letter dated 27.06.2011. 2.7 The respondent also highlights that the petitioner was not financially stagnated, as claimed, because the corporation implemented a five-year stagnation incentive increment scheme. Under this scheme, the petitioner was granted three stagnation increments during the years 1995, 2000, and 2005, and, as a special case considering his impending retirement on 31.01.2011, was also granted one additional advance increment on 31.12.2010. Upon retirement, after deduction of TDS, the petitioner received gratuity of Rs. 8,75,184/-. Family Benefit Fund of Rs. 19,360/-, Provident Fund amount of Rs. 19,09,458/-, and leave encashment of Rs. 5,83,229/- for 223 days of Earned Leave and 240 days of Sick Leave, totaling Rs. 33,87,231/-. According to the respondent, these figures conclusively show that the petitioner suffered no monetary loss whatsoever. 8,75,184/-. Family Benefit Fund of Rs. 19,360/-, Provident Fund amount of Rs. 19,09,458/-, and leave encashment of Rs. 5,83,229/- for 223 days of Earned Leave and 240 days of Sick Leave, totaling Rs. 33,87,231/-. According to the respondent, these figures conclusively show that the petitioner suffered no monetary loss whatsoever. 2.8 On the issue of delay, the respondent stresses that although the promotions in question occurred in 1999, the petitioner made his first representation only on 15.06.2009, nearly ten years later and more than six months after the judgment dated 29.12.2008 in W.P. No. 17945 of 1999. The respondent contends that such unexplained delay disentitles the petitioner to any discretionary relief under Article 226, particularly after his retirement. 3. The petitioner filed a reply affidavit in response to the counter affidavit of the respondent. It is contended that under the Corporation’s Promotion Policy for Officers, 1985, all posts up to the level of Senior Deputy Manager are non-selection posts, including the post of Deputy Manager. For such non-selection posts, promotion is based essentially on seniority, subject only to fulfillment of prescribed qualifications and minimum length of service. He emphasizes that once an Assistant Manager completes five years of service and a vacancy arises, promotion to Deputy Manager follows as a matter of course. He further clarifies that even under the revised Promotion Policy framed in 2003, after re- designation of posts, promotions up to the level of Manager or Assistant General Manager continue to be non-selection posts, where seniority predominates and comparative merit has no role. According to him, the fixation of cut-off marks and the adoption of a selection-style evaluation is impermissible for non-selection posts. 3.1 Replying specifically to the respondent’s reliance on the DPC proceedings dated 21.04.1999 and 21.09.2007, the petitioner contends that several juniors, including Respondent Nos. 2 to 5, were promoted despite securing marks below the alleged cut-off in 1999, while he, being the senior-most, was denied promotion. He further points out that in the 2007 DPC, the 5th respondent secured fewer marks than him, yet was promoted as Deputy Manager. He strongly disputes the respondent’s assertion that the post of Deputy Manager is a selection post, reiterating that both the rules and promotion policies clearly classify it as a non-selection post. He further points out that in the 2007 DPC, the 5th respondent secured fewer marks than him, yet was promoted as Deputy Manager. He strongly disputes the respondent’s assertion that the post of Deputy Manager is a selection post, reiterating that both the rules and promotion policies clearly classify it as a non-selection post. 3.2 The petitioner alleges that the respondent adopted a “pick and choose” method, selectively promoting juniors under a new theory of benchmarks to justify denial of rightful promotion to the petitioner. It is stated that in promotions based on seniority-cum-merit for non-selection posts, the only permissible inquiry is whether the senior-most eligible officer is unsuitable due to adverse remarks or pending disciplinary proceedings. Since no adverse entries or disciplinary proceedings ever existed against the petitioner, denying the promotion on alleged lack of merit is illegal. 3.3 The petitioner relies on binding judicial precedents involving the very same corporation, citing the Division Bench judgment in W.A. No. 1431 of 1987 dated 27.12.1994, which held that a senior-most employee cannot be denied promotion in favor of juniors, and that this principle was implemented by the corporation itself following W.P. No. 7537 of 1994 decided on 23.09.1995. He further points out that W.P. No. 17945 of 1999, filed by Respondent Nos. 2 to 5, was allowed by this Court by applying the same principle and by following the Supreme Court judgment reported in B.V. Sivaiah (supra), granting them promotions with effect from 23.04.1999. The petitioner asserts that he stands on an equal, if not stronger, footing than those juniors and is therefore entitled to identical relief. 3.4 In response to the respondent’s justification regarding retirement benefits and leave encashment, the petitioner contends that while some amounts were paid, his earned leave was wrongly calculated and that payment for 77 days of earned leave is still due. He further states that his requests under the Right to Information Act seeking reasons for denial of promotion and proper calculation of earned leave were not satisfactorily answered, which, according to him, casts serious doubt on the fairness of the respondent’s actions. 4. Heard Mr.A.S. Bhavani Shanker, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr.M. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No.1-APIDC. Perused the record. 5. 4. Heard Mr.A.S. Bhavani Shanker, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr.M. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No.1-APIDC. Perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner, being the undisputed senior-most eligible officer in the feeder cadre, was illegally denied promotion to the post of Deputy Manager and consequential higher benefits, despite juniors being promoted ahead of him. It is contended that under the Corporation’s Promotion Policy of 1985 and the revised policy of 2003, the post of Deputy Manager (later re- designated as Manager) is a non-selection post, where promotion is governed essentially by seniority, subject to possession of the prescribed qualification and minimum length of service, and not by comparative merit or cut-off marks. The fixation of benchmark marks and treatment of the post as a selection post by constituting a Selection Committee is wholly unauthorized, arbitrary, and contrary to the governing rules. The counsel further submits that even on the respondent’s own records, juniors—including Respondent Nos. 2 to 5—were promoted in 1999 and 2007 despite securing marks equal to or lower than the petitioner, clearly demonstrating a pick-and-choose method and discriminatory application of criteria. It is emphasized that there were no adverse remarks or disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and therefore he could not have been declared unsuitable. Reliance is placed on binding judgments of this Court in W.A. No. 1431 of 1987 and W.P. No. 17945 of 1999, following the Supreme Court decision reported in B.V. Sivaiah (supra), to contend that a senior cannot be denied promotion in favour of juniors in non-selection posts and that comparative assessment of merit is impermissible. Learned counsel also disputes the respondent’s claim regarding full settlement of benefits, asserting that earned leave was wrongly calculated and that relevant information sought under the Right to Information Act was not properly furnished, and therefore the impugned actions of respondent authorities are arbitrary and illegal. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed, as the petitioner was never denied promotion arbitrarily but was duly considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Manager by properly constituted Departmental Promotion Committees in the years 1999 and 2007. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed, as the petitioner was never denied promotion arbitrarily but was duly considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Manager by properly constituted Departmental Promotion Committees in the years 1999 and 2007. It is submitted that promotions to the said post are governed by the principle of seniority-cum-merit and not by seniority alone, and that securing the prescribed benchmark marks is a mandatory condition for promotion. The petitioner, though senior, failed to achieve the minimum qualifying marks fixed by the DPCs on both occasions and was therefore rightly found unfit, along with some other seniors, while only those who satisfied the benchmark were promoted in accordance with their seniority. The counsel further contends that the petitioner’s reliance on judgments in W.A. No. 1431 of 1987 and W.P. No. 17945 of 1999 is misplaced, as those decisions turned on deficiencies in the earlier counter and cannot override the requirement of minimum merit. It is also contended that the writ petition suffers from gross delay and laches, since the petitioner questioned promotions made in 1999 only after nearly ten years and after his retirement, and that granting relief at this stage would unsettle settled service positions. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has not suffered any monetary loss, as he was granted stagnation increments and paid all terminal benefits, including earned leave encashment, in accordance with rules, and therefore no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted. 7. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it may be noted that the controversy in the writ petition is about the legality of the respondent–corporation’s denial of promotion to the petitioner with the consequential benefits, notwithstanding his undisputed seniority in the feeder cadre,and despite promotions having been extended to several of his juniors. 7.1 An examination of the pleadings disclose that the petitioner has consistently asserted, with reference to service records and the inter se seniority list dated 31.03.1995, that he stood senior to Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and other promotees, and that he satisfied the prescribed qualifications and length of service for promotion as early as 1999. 7.1 An examination of the pleadings disclose that the petitioner has consistently asserted, with reference to service records and the inter se seniority list dated 31.03.1995, that he stood senior to Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and other promotees, and that he satisfied the prescribed qualifications and length of service for promotion as early as 1999. Significantly, the respondent does not dispute the petitioner’s seniority position, nor does it allege the existence of any adverse entries or pending disciplinary proceedings against him at the relevant time. The respondent’s sole justification for denying promotion rests on the assertion that the petitioner failed to secure the benchmark marks fixed by the Departmental Promotion Committees held on 21.04.1999 and 21.09.2007. While the respondent corporation claims strict adherence to benchmark criteria, the respondent simultaneously admits that several juniors of the petitioner, including Respondent Nos. 2 to 5, were promoted with effect from 23.04.1999 and subsequently, and that such promotions were continued and even carried forward after the judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 17945 of 1999. The respondent’s own pleadings further disclose that in the 2007 promotion exercise, at least one junior secured fewer marks than the petitioner but was nonetheless promoted. These admissions materially corroborate the petitioner’s allegation of arbitrariness in the action of respondent corporation in the way the alleged benchmark was selectively applied. 7.2 Further, the respondent corporation has failed to rebut the specific contention of the petitioner that the post of Deputy Manager is a non-selection post, under both the Promotion Policy of 1985 and the revised policy of 2003. Beyond a bare assertion that promotions are governed by “seniority-cum-merit,” there is no material placed on record to demonstrate how the fixation of rigid cut-off marks and comparative assessment is permissible for non-selection posts. The counter-affidavit is conspicuously silent on any rule or statutory provision authorizing rejection of a senior-most eligible officer on the sole ground that a junior is found comparatively more meritorious, particularly in the absence of any finding of unsuitability. This silence assumes importance as the respondent corporation itself admits that there were no adverse remarks or pending departmental proceedings against the petitioner. This silence assumes importance as the respondent corporation itself admits that there were no adverse remarks or pending departmental proceedings against the petitioner. 7.3 At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Division Bench judgment in W.A. No. 1431 of 1987 dated 27.12.1994, rendered in the context of the very same corporation, unequivocally held that in promotions governed by seniority-cum-merit to non-selection posts, a senior employee cannot be denied promotion in favour of juniors unless he is found unsuitable. This principle was reiterated and implemented by the corporation itself in W.P. No. 7537 of 1994. Further, in W.P. No. 17945 of 1999, this Court, following the law declared by the Supreme Court in B.V. Sivaiah (supra), set aside promotions granted to juniors and directed promotion of seniors with all consequential benefits, emphasizing that comparative merit has no role once minimum suitability is satisfied. Therefore, the contention of the respondent corporation that the judgment in the earlier writ petitions was the outcome to deficiencies in the counter filed therein cannot be countenanced, as the legal principles laid down in the writ petitions and also the judgment in B.V. Sivaiah (supra) are of general application and binding in nature. 7.4 Further, it is the specific contention of the petitioner as can be seen from the writ petition that he has been making representations, beginning from 1999 and reiterated between 2009 and 2011, and the representations were not considered by passing any reasoned order, thereby denying him a fair and meaningful consideration of his claim. Further, as noted above, the respondent corporation’s action in treating the post of Deputy Manager as a selection post, introducing cut-off marks and comparative evaluation, is without any authority under the applicable promotion policies, and therefore there cannot be any alleged failure of the petitioner in securing a benchmark, so as to grant promotions to the juniors of the petitioner with equal or lesser marks than the petitioner. The selective application criteria-adopted by the respondent corporation by inventing a cut-off benchmark though the governing rules do not confer any such criteria, and denying promotion to the petitioner, when admittedly the petitioner has sufficient seniority without any adverse remarks or pending disciplinary proceedings, is an arbitrary action that offends the mandate of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Further, in view of non-consideration of the representations of the petitioner seeking rightful promotion and pay benefits, the respondent corporation cannot now allege that there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed by granting the relief as prayed for. The respondent corporation is directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.