JUDGMENT : G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J. Since the issues involved in these appeals are one and the same, both the appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The present dispute arises out of a tragic motor accident that occurred on 26/27.10.2023, resulting in death of two brothers, namely, Madaboina Gangaraju, (deceased No.1) and Madaboina Sai Prasad (deceased No.2). 3. M.A.C.M.A.Nos.127 and 128 of 2020 have been filed by the National Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the insurer’), assailing the awards dated 11.09.2018 passed in O.P.Nos.586 and 587 of 2014 by the learned Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-VIII Additional District Judge, Nizamabad (for short, ‘Tribunal’). 4. M.A.C.M.A. No.385 of 2020 has been preferred by the mother and wife of deceased No.1 (hereinafter referred to as “the claimants”), seeking enhancement of compensation awarded in O.P.No.586 of 2014. 5. Heard Sri N.S.Bhaskar Rao, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant in MACMA No.127 and 128 of 2020 and respondent in MACMA No.385 of 2020 and Sri Ambedkar Sridhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Surya Balu Mahendra, learned counsel for respondents/claimants in MACMA Nos.127 and 128 of 2020 and appellants in MACMA No.385 of 2020. Factual matrix (in brief) 6. On the intervening night of 26/27.10.2013, deceased No.1 aged about 29 years, and deceased No.2 aged about 20 years, were travelling on a motorcycle bearing Registration No. AP 25 AN 1810, owned by Panchal Prakash i.e., respondent No.3 in MACMA Nos.127 and 128, proceeding from their native Village Birkur towards Nizamabad. At about 1:15 AM, when the motorcycle reached near Laxmi Medical “X” Road, Pedda Bazar, Nizamabad, an unknown vehicle, driven at high speed in a rash and negligent manner, came from the opposite direction and violently dashed against the motorcycle. The offending vehicle fled the scene immediately after the accident. 7. The impact of the collision was severe, wherein deceased No.2 sustained fatal injuries and died on the spot. Deceased No.1 suffered grievous injuries, including serious head and leg injuries, and was immediately shifted to the Government Hospital, Nizamabad, where he underwent treatment. Despite prolonged medical care, deceased No.1 succumbed to the injuries on 27.03.2014. 8. In respect of the said accident, the Police, Nizamabad, registered Crime No.108 of 2013 under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the driver of the unknown offending vehicle. 9. Despite prolonged medical care, deceased No.1 succumbed to the injuries on 27.03.2014. 8. In respect of the said accident, the Police, Nizamabad, registered Crime No.108 of 2013 under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the driver of the unknown offending vehicle. 9. The motorcycle bearing No. AP 25 AN 1810 was admittedly insured with the Insurer Company under a comprehensive insurance policy bearing No.35100731126203575040, valid for the period from 30.03.2013 to 29.03.2014, covering the date of the accident. 10. Consequent upon the deaths arising out of the said accident, the legal representatives of the deceased instituted claim petitions. O.P.No.586 of 2014 was filed by the mother and wife of deceased No.1, claiming compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- on account of his death, whereas O.P.No.587 of 2014 was filed by the mother of deceased No.2 alone, claiming compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- for his death. 11. Both claim petitions were tried jointly. The Tribunal by a common judgment dated 11.09.2018 has awarded compensation as under: i. In O.P.No.586 of 2014, a sum of Rs.5,23,333/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization; ii. In O.P.No.587 of 2014, a sum of Rs.5,36,667/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization. 12. The Tribunal held that the owner of the motorcycle and the insurer were jointly and severally liable to satisfy the awards in both claim petitions. Contentions on behalf of the Appellant–Insurer in M.A.C.M.A. Nos.127 and 128 of 2020 13. Learned counsel for the appellant–Insurance Company contended as follows: i. That the impugned awards are unsustainable in law and on facts, as the claim petitions under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V.Act’) are not maintainable. The said provision, according to the insurer, applies only to third parties and not to riders or pillion riders of the insured vehicle. Since both the deceased were occupants of the motorcycle, the claimants ought to have invoked Section 166 of the M.V.Act, and as the offending vehicle was admittedly unknown, fastening liability on the insurer of the motorcycle was impermissible. ii. That the deceased No.1, who was riding the motorcycle, did not possess a valid driving licence, constituting a fundamental breach of policy conditions and entitling the insurer to avoid liability under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. ii. That the deceased No.1, who was riding the motorcycle, did not possess a valid driving licence, constituting a fundamental breach of policy conditions and entitling the insurer to avoid liability under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. It was also urged that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the unknown vehicle, with no contributory negligence on the part of the insured motorcycle. iii. That in O.P.No.586 of 2014, the father of the deceased, who lodged the FIR, was not impleaded, rendering the claim petition defective. iv. That the Tribunal mechanically applied the Second Schedule without proof of income. In respect of deceased No.2, a bachelor aged 20 years, deduction towards personal expenses ought to have been 50% and not one- third. The awards were therefore excessive and contrary to law. Contentions on behalf of the claimants in M.A.C.M.A. Nos.127 and 128 of 2020 14. The learned counsel for the claimants supported the findings of the Tribunal and has contended as follows: i. That Section 163-A of the M.V. Act is a beneficial and social welfare provision founded on the principle of no- fault liability, where proof of negligence is wholly irrelevant. ii. That the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” is of wide amplitude and squarely covers drivers, riders, and pillion riders, thereby rendering the claim petitions fully maintainable. iii. That in claims under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, the defences available under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, including absence of a driving licence, are not open to the insurer, the liability being strict and statutory. Reliance was placed on the police records and the evidence of the insurer’s witness to establish the involvement of the insured motorcycle, and it was argued that where multiple vehicles are involved, the claimants are legally entitled to proceed against any one of them. iv. In regard to non-joinder, it was submitted that the father of deceased No.1 had predeceased the filing of the claim petition, and therefore, non-impleadment was not fatal. v. That the Tribunal correctly applied the structured formula under the Second Schedule, including the notional income, multiplier, and deductions. It was asserted that the Schedule does not mandate a 50% deduction for bachelors and that the awards were just and in accordance with the statute. v. That the Tribunal correctly applied the structured formula under the Second Schedule, including the notional income, multiplier, and deductions. It was asserted that the Schedule does not mandate a 50% deduction for bachelors and that the awards were just and in accordance with the statute. Contentions of the appellants-claimants in M.A.C.M.A. No.385 of 2020 i. That deceased No.1 was an electrician earning Rs.9,000/- per month, which ought to have been accepted instead of adopting the notional income. ii. That compensation awarded under conventional heads was inadequate, future prospects were not added, and the rate of interest ought to have been enhanced from 7.5% to 9% per annum. 15. I have taken note of the respective contentions urged. Issues for Determination 16. In the light of the rival submissions, the following issues arise for consideration in these appeals: I. Whether a claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is maintainable in respect of the death of a person who was riding or occupying the insured vehicle? II. Whether, in a claim under Section 163-A of the M.V.Act, the insurer can avoid liability on the grounds of i. absence of a valid driving licence, or ii. the accident having been caused solely by an unknown vehicle? III. Whether the claim petition is vitiated on account of non-joinder of the father of the deceased? IV. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in O.P. Nos.586 and 587 of 2014 is in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Act and whether interference is warranted? Analysis and Findings A. Maintainability of Claim under Section 163-A of M.V.Act 17. It is pertinent to note that Section 163-A of M.V.Act opens with a non obstante clause and provides for payment of compensation on a structured formula basis as specified in the Second Schedule, dispensing with the requirement of pleading or proving any wrongful act, neglect or default. The statutory trigger is the occurrence of “death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle”. The said provision is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. The statutory trigger is the occurrence of “death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle”. The said provision is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle of the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 18. The expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” in Section 163-A of the M.V. Act has received an expansive interpretation so as to advance the beneficent object of the provision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the phrase takes within its sweep all accidents in which the motor vehicle is involved, irrespective of whether the victim was a third party, driver, rider or pillion rider. 19. In Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Company Limited , (2004) 5 SCC 385 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 163-A of the M.V. Act constitutes a self-contained code providing for a distinct scheme of no-fault liability, intended to afford immediate and efficacious relief to victims of motor accidents. The relevant para is extracted hereunder: 42 [Para 42 corrected vide Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./64/2004 dated 12-7-2004] . The relevant para is extracted hereunder: 42 [Para 42 corrected vide Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./64/2004 dated 12-7-2004] . Section 163-A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of the people whose annual income is not more than Rs 40,000 having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto, compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in columns 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle. Therefore, the insurer’s contention that the deceased must be a third party is legally untenable and rejected and the claims filed before the Tribunal under Section 163-A of M.V. Act are maintainable. B. Defences of the Insurer in a Section 163-A Claim i. Absence of Driving Licence: Section 163-A(2) of M.V. Act specifically provides that in a claim under the said provision, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the accident occurred due to any wrongful act, neglect or default. Consequently, defences that are otherwise available to the insurer in a fault-based claim under Section 166 of M.V.Act, including breach of policy conditions relating to driving licence, are not available in proceedings under Section 163-A of M.V.Act. 20. Consequently, defences that are otherwise available to the insurer in a fault-based claim under Section 166 of M.V.Act, including breach of policy conditions relating to driving licence, are not available in proceedings under Section 163-A of M.V.Act. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Sinitha , (2012) 2 SCC 356 has held as under: 25. A perusal of Section 163-A reveals that sub-section (2) thereof is in pari materia with sub-section (3) of Section 140. In other words, just as in Section 140 of the Act, so also under Section 163-A of the Act, it is not essential for a claimant seeking compensation to “plead or establish” that the accident out of which the claim arises suffers from “wrongful act” or “neglect” or “default” of the offending vehicle. But then there is no equivalent of sub-section (4) of Section 140 in Section 163-A of the Act. Whereas under sub-section (4) of Section 140 there is a specific bar whereby the party concerned (the owner or the insurance company) is precluded from defeating a claim raised under Section 140 of the Act by “pleading and establishing” “wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default”, there is no such or similar prohibiting clause in Section 163-A of the Act. The additional negative bar, precluding the defence from defeating a claim for reasons of a “fault” (“wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default”), as has been expressly incorporated in Section 140 of the Act [through sub-section (4) thereof], having not been embodied in Section 163-A of the Act has to have a bearing on the interpretation of Section 163-A of the Act. 27. Thus, in our view, it is open to a party concerned (the owner or the insurer) to defeat a claim raised under Section 163-A of the Act by pleading and establishing any one of the three “faults”, namely, “wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default”. But for the above reason we find no plausible logic in the wisdom of the legislature for providing an additional negative bar precluding the defence from defeating a claim for compensation in Section 140 of the Act and in avoiding to include a similar negative bar in Section 163-A of the Act. The object for incorporating sub-section (2) in Section 163-A of the Act is that the burden of pleading and establishing proof of “wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default” would not rest on the shoulders of the claimant. The object for incorporating sub-section (2) in Section 163-A of the Act is that the burden of pleading and establishing proof of “wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default” would not rest on the shoulders of the claimant. The absence of a provision similar to sub-section (4) of Section 140 of the Act from Section 163-A of the Act is for shifting the onus of proof on the grounds of “wrongful act”, “neglect” or “default” on to the shoulders of the defence (the owner or the insurance company). A claim which can be defeated on the basis of any of the aforesaid considerations, regulated under the “fault” liability principle. We have no hesitation therefore to conclude that Section 163-A of the Act is founded on the “fault” liability principle. ii. Accident caused by an Unknown Vehicle: It is to be noted that Section 163-A of the M.V.Act fastens liability on the owner and insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident, without reference to fault or negligence. In the present case, the police records (Exs.A-5 and A-6) and the admission of RW-1 clearly establish the involvement of motorcycle bearing No.AP 25 AN 1810. Where more than one vehicle is involved, it is open to the claimants to proceed against any one of them. The insurer cannot evade statutory liability by attributing negligence to an unknown vehicle. Therefore, the defences sought to be raised by the insurer on the grounds of absence of a driving licence and negligence of an unknown vehicle are wholly irrelevant in a claim under Section 163-A of M.V.Act and were rightly rejected by the Tribunal. C. Non-Joinder of Father of the Deceased 21. The material on record discloses that the father of deceased No.1, who was the complainant in the FIR, had expired on 19.02.2014, prior to the institution of O.P.No.586 of 2014. Consequently, the father of the deceased was not a necessary party to the proceedings. Thus, the claimants on record, namely the mother and wife, are undisputedly the legal representatives entitled to maintain the claim. D. The quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal Section 163-A(1) of the M.V. Act mandates that compensation shall be paid strictly in accordance with the structured formula prescribed under the Second Schedule, which takes into account the age of the deceased, notional annual income, the applicable multiplier, and a uniform deduction of one-third towards personal expenses. 22. D. The quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal Section 163-A(1) of the M.V. Act mandates that compensation shall be paid strictly in accordance with the structured formula prescribed under the Second Schedule, which takes into account the age of the deceased, notional annual income, the applicable multiplier, and a uniform deduction of one-third towards personal expenses. 22. The Supreme Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni ’s case (supra 1) has authoritatively held that the Second Schedule is mandatory and binding in claims under Section 163-A of M.V. Act. 23. It is also pertinent to note that the insurer’s contention that 50% deduction ought to have been applied in the case of a bachelor runs contrary to the express prescription of the Second Schedule, while the claimants’ plea for enhancement on the basis of higher income, future prospects, increased conventional heads, or higher rate of interest is unsupported by evidence and inconsistent with the structured formula, which inherently factors such elements. 24. It is to be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Niru and others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1431 has affirmed 9% interest on compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The relevant para of the judgment is extracted hereunder for ready reference: 8. Further contention taken is the higher rate of interest of 9%, in challenge of which several precedents were placed before us. From the decisions perused what emanates is that in the 1980's, Courts were awarding 12% interest which stood reduced to 9% in the 1990's. With the advent of the 21st century and the economic recession world over, the interest rates fell considerably. But even now the rates offered by National Banks for long term deposits are 7% or more. Considering the over-all circumstances especially the long delay caused, we are of the opinion that 9% interest rate granted by the Tribunal is perfectly in order especially noticing the accident having occurred in the year 1995. 25. It is pertinent to note that MACMA No.385 of 2020 has been preferred by the mother and wife of the deceased seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, in O.P. No.586 of 2014, had awarded a total compensation of Rs.5,23,333/-. 25. It is pertinent to note that MACMA No.385 of 2020 has been preferred by the mother and wife of the deceased seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, in O.P. No.586 of 2014, had awarded a total compensation of Rs.5,23,333/-. This Court is of the considered view that in terms of the Second Schedule, the loss of income in fatal accident (death) cases is required to be computed by adopting the following formula: Annual income – 1/3 rd x multiplier = loss of income Rs.40,000/- - Rs.13,333/- x 18 = Rs.4,80,000/- In addition thereto, the claimants are entitled to Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, and Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenses. Thus, the total compensation payable to the claimants is recalculated at Rs.5,50,000/-. Thus, the compensation is enhanced to Rs.5,50,000/- instead of Rs.5,23,333/-. Conclusion 26. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals vide MACMA Nos.127, 128 of 2020 stand dismissed and MACMA No.385 of 2020 is allowed in part enhancing the compensation amount from Rs.5,23,333/- to Rs.5,50,000/- which shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realization payable by respondent Nos.1 and 2. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to deposit the compensation amount within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On such deposit, the appellants are entitled to withdraw the same without furnishing any security. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.