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2026 DIGILAW 167 (GUJ)

Aziz Musabhai Bandi v. State Of Gujarat

2026-03-10

NIRZAR S.DESAI

body2026
JUDGMENT : NIRZAR S. DESAI, J. 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 31.12.2025 passed by the State Project Engineer, Gujarat Council of School Education, Vidhya Samiksha Kendra, Gandhinagar whereby upon completion of petitioner’s old contract, the petitioner was offered a new contract as TRP, Padra, Dist. Vadodara instead of petitioner’s earlier place of working as per old contract which had already lived its life as TRP, Mahemdabad. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 21.1.2026 whereby the petitioner was relieved from Mahemdabad, Kheda zone by respondent No.3. 2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. Ashutosh Dave appearing for the petitioner submitted that though it is a well settled law that transfer is an incident of service, looking to the peculiar facts of the case, the present petition is required to be entertained. According to Mr. Dave, the petitioner was appointed as Civil Engineer on contractual basis under Sarva Sikshan Abhiyan on 4.2.2010 and he was posted at various places. Every time, upon completion of petitioner’s contract, new contract used to be offered to the petitioner in a different District and the petitioner had already served in various districts. But this fact must end at some day and, therefore, when the petitioner was offered new contract at Padra, Dist. Vadodara vide order dated 3.1.12.2025, the petitioner has challenged the same by way of this petition. Mr. Dave further submitted that the petitioner has already been relieved from his duty as TRP, Mahemdabad vide order dated 21.1.2026 and, therefore, that order is also required to be quashed and the petitioner is required to be offered a new contract as TRP, Mahemdabad. 3. Mr. Dave also relied upon terms of the contract which was first time offered to the petitioner in the year 2010 and pointed out that terms do not state anything about the fact that the nature of the job of the petitioner would be a transferable job and, therefore, the petitioner’s transfer cannot be said to have been made legally or for any justifiable reason in absence of there being any specific clause about the fact that the nature of the petitioner’s job is transferable job. 4. In support of his submissions, Mr. 4. In support of his submissions, Mr. Dave relied upon the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Vegada Varsha Revashankar (Supra) v. State of Gujarat and others, delivered on 5.8.2015 in Special Civil Application No.12419 of 2015 wherein while allowing the petition and quashing and setting aside the impugned order of transfer, the coordinate Bench directed the State to re-transfer the petitioner to the place where she was earlier appointed after being selected to the post of Deputy Mamlatdar. Mr. Dave also relied upon paragraph 3 of the said decision which is based on a decision dated 11.6.2015 passed in Special Civil Application No.9191 of 2015 wherein in paragraph 15, the coordinate Bench observed that as the petitioner while having been offered a contractual job had no option but agree to the appointment on contractual basis on fixed pay. The petitioners, therefore, were left with no choice but to compromise and work on a fixed pay basis for a pittance, without any other benefits associated with the Government services. Mr. Dave further submitted that in that case also, as the transfer was not done as per the ratio of 3 : 1 between the promotees and direct recruits, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the coordinate Bench of this Court had quashed the order of transfer and ordered to re-transfer the said petitioner. Except the above submission and decision, no other submission/decision was made/cited by learned advocate Mr. Dave. 5. Ms. Kinjal Vyas, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner though is terming the action under challenge as transfer, as such, it is not a transfer and the petitioner, upon completion of old contract which had lived its life, was offered job by way of new contract at a different place. She further submitted that it was an admitted position which was even admitted by Mr. Dave also that in the past also, the petitioner was transferred to various Districts as he was offered contract in various Districts and the petitioner had accepted the same and there is nothing exceptional which the petitioner could point out in the present contract dated 31.12.2025. Dave also that in the past also, the petitioner was transferred to various Districts as he was offered contract in various Districts and the petitioner had accepted the same and there is nothing exceptional which the petitioner could point out in the present contract dated 31.12.2025. She further submitted that the petitioner has already been relieved on 21.1.2026 and, therefore, the relieving order has also been issued and once the petitioner is already relieved, the petitioner ought not to have prayed for quashing of the said order. 6. Ms. Vyas further submitted that new contract was offered vide order dated 31.12.2025 and it is for the petitioner to decide whether to accept the aforesaid offer or not. The contract would complete only upon petitioner’s acceptance of the contract and no one can force the petitioner to accept the aforesaid contract if the petitioner does not want to serve at a place for which the contract is offered and it is a matter of petitioner’s own choice, but the petitioner cannot insist that he may be offered a contract at a place where he was serving earlier. She further submitted that as the petitioner has not accepted the contract till date, there is no accrued or vested right in favour of the petitioner to prefer a petition and seek a relief that the petitioner should be offered contract to serve at a particular place of his own choice. 7. Ms. Vyas further submitted that even if the order of offering new contract may be termed as transfer by the petitioner, in that case also, the distance between Mahemdabad and Padra would be around maximum 80 Kms. which cannot be said to be a transfer at a very distance place which may cause great hardship to the petitioner. Ms. Vyas further submitted that in the past also, the petitioner had served to various Districts and, therefore, unless some exceptional circumstances are pointed out, it cannot be said that the order offering new contract to the petitioner as TRP, Padra is unreasonable or illegal. 8. Ms. Vyas thereafter drew attention of this Court to the decision relied upon by Mr. Dave and pointed out that the coordinate Bench of this Court quashed the order of transfer on account of the fact that the ratio between the promotees and direct recruits in that transfer was violated. Ms. 8. Ms. Vyas thereafter drew attention of this Court to the decision relied upon by Mr. Dave and pointed out that the coordinate Bench of this Court quashed the order of transfer on account of the fact that the ratio between the promotees and direct recruits in that transfer was violated. Ms. Vyas further submitted that the posts on which the petitioner is serving and the post on which the case of Vegada Varsha Revashankar (Supra) was considered are different and both the posts are governed by different service conditions and considering the fact that every contract has its own terms, when the petitioner is offered new contract and when he is not transferred in the midst of the contract, the petitioner cannot raise a grievance that he has been transferred and he should have been offered a new contract at his earlier place of work only. She, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 9. I have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the record. On perusal of the record, I find that the language of the order dated 31.12.2025 is absolutely clear and unambiguous. The aforesaid communication is, in fact, an offer whereby a new contract is offered to the petitioner and other persons to work as TRP Padra, Dist. Vadodara at various places. It also indicates that the petitioner’s term of earlier contracts has already been over and, therefore, it is not a case that in the midst of the contract, the petitioner has been transferred at a different place. Therefore, even if the present case is considered, from the view point of whether a person can be transferred in the midst of contractual period and if there is no condition about the transfer, whether such transfer can be said to be illegal or not. But that question also would have no significance in the facts and circumstances of the present case upon completion of earlier contract. Now, the petitioner is offered another contract at a different place and, therefore, those questions are not required to be considered by this Court. 10. Further, the facts of the decision cited in the case of Vegada Varsha Revashankar (Supra) and the reason for which the transfer was held to be bad and quashed and the petitioner was re-transferred are different, and the terms of contract are also different as well and Mr. 10. Further, the facts of the decision cited in the case of Vegada Varsha Revashankar (Supra) and the reason for which the transfer was held to be bad and quashed and the petitioner was re-transferred are different, and the terms of contract are also different as well and Mr. Dave could not point out that the terms of contract were identical in the case of Vegada Varsha Revashankar (Supra) and in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the said decision relied upon by learned advocate Mr. Dave would not help the petitioner. 11. Considering the fact that though it is termed as transfer, it is actually an offer of new contract to the petitioner. The same cannot be treated or viewed as if it is a case of transfer and it is for the petitioner if he wants to join as per the new contract at a new place as per his choice and volition and if the petitioner finds that practically, economically or socially, it is not viable for him to accept the above offer, the Court cannot force the State Government or the appropriate respondent authority to offer a new contract to the petitioner at a place of his choice. Accordingly, the petition is required to be dismissed and the same stands dismissed.