ORDER : T. MADHAVI DEVI, J. This Civil Revision Petition (CRP) is filed against the order of the I Additional District Judge at Suryapet dt.03.09.2025 in I.A.No.169 of 2025 in O.S.No.49 of 2019. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract. Defendant No.1 filed I.A.No.169 of 2025 under Order 13 Rule 3 of CPC to reject and de-exhibit Ex.A.1 agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017. It is stated that the agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017 was marked during the chief examination, but at the time of marking the said document, neither defendant No.1 nor its counsel was present and that in Ex.A.1 original agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017, there is a recital that possession of the suit schedule was delivered to the party and in the plaint pleadings, it was also mentioned that possession was delivered and if possession was delivered, the said document is to be treated as sale deed and it requires stamp duty and penalty, but the plaintiff did not pay the required stamp duty and penalty and therefore, the said document cannot be marked. Therefore, it was prayed to reject and de- exhibit Ex.A.1 agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017. The same was opposed by the plaintiff by filing a counter submitting that the said petition is not maintainable and particularly since defendant No.1 denied delivery of possession in his written statement in the main suit. It is also stated that it is not correct to say that defendant No.1 or its counsel was not present in Court on 30.06.2025 at the time of marking of Ex.A.1and that the cross-examination of P.W.1 was deferred at the request of the learned counsel for defendant No.1 and that there was no objection at the time of marking of Ex.A.1. It is further stated that Ex.A.1 has since been marked and has been admitted into evidence, such admission cannot be called in question in view of the bar contained in Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Javer Chand and others Vs. Pukhraj Surana , AIR 1961 SC 1655 , wherein it was held that once a document has been admitted in evidence, it is not open either to the trial Court itself or to a court of appeal or revision to go behind that order. Pukhraj Surana , AIR 1961 SC 1655 , wherein it was held that once a document has been admitted in evidence, it is not open either to the trial Court itself or to a court of appeal or revision to go behind that order. It is stated that the petitioner/defendant No.1 is taking contrary stands, one in the written statement that possession is not delivered and the second in I.A. No.169 of 2025 that possession is delivered and therefore, such a stand cannot be accepted and the plaintiff cannot be called to pay the stamp duty since the point for consideration by the Court will depend on a finding whether possession has at all been delivered in terms of the agreement of sale or not. It is further stated that if the Court gives a finding on the possession, the plaintiff undertakes to pay the stamp duty upon the document being sent for determination of the actual stamp duty leviable on the instrument Ex.A.1 after reference to the Collector under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. It was therefore prayed for dismissal of I.A.No.169 of 2025. 3. The trial Court, however, allowed I.A.No.169 of 2025 and held that Ex.A.1 is demarked and liberty is given to respondent No.1/plaintiff to take necessary steps to seek impounding of the document and to make a request to mark the document again as exhibit in evidence. The trial Court observed that since there is a recital of handing over of possession in the agreement of sale, it amounts to conveyance deed and requires stamp duty under Schedule-1-A of Article 47A, Explanation I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and as per Section 35 of the said Act, instruments not duly stamped are inadmissible in evidence and therefore, the agreement of sale is inadmissible in evidence for want of stamp duty. It was further observed that while marking the document, no exercise was taken up to examine whether it requires stamp duty as there was no such endorsement of the office of the Court on the document when it was filed along with the plaint though there was relief prayed for recovery of past and future rents. It was further observed that while marking the document, no exercise was taken up to examine whether it requires stamp duty as there was no such endorsement of the office of the Court on the document when it was filed along with the plaint though there was relief prayed for recovery of past and future rents. It was observed that before proceeding with cross-examination of P.W.1 through whom the said document was marked, defendant No.1 raised objection about marking of Ex.A.1 and hence, the document was not put to scrutiny in the cross- examination nor was it used by parties. Thus observing, I.A.No.169 of 2025 was allowed. The said order dt.03.09.2025 is challenged in this CRP. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/plaintiff also pointed out from the written statement that defendants admitted that the suit schedule property was let out to tenants and they are collecting rents and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be said to be in possession of the property and therefore, he cannot be called upon to pay stamp duty and the point for consideration of the Court will depend on the finding as to whether possession at all has been delivered in terms of the agreement of sale or not. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein, while relying upon the averments made in the counter to I.A.No.169 of 2025 and also in the written statement filed by the defendants, has drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another , (2003) 8 SCC 752 , wherein it was observed that objections to admissibility of secondary evidence can be classified as (i) objection that the document sought to be proved is itself inadmissible, and (ii) objection directed not against the admissibility of the document but against the mode of proof thereof on the ground of irregularity or insufficiency and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the objection under category (i) can be raised even after the document has been marked as “as exhibit” and even in appeal or revision, but the objection under category (ii) can be raised when the evidence is tendered but not after the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein submitted that in this case, the objection is relating to category (i) that it itself is not admissible and as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can be raised even subsequently after it is marked. He also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Javer Chand and others Vs. Pukhraj Surana (1 supra), wherein a question raised was as to the admissibility of a document on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped. It was held that the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court and once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act comes into operation and it is not open either to the trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or Revision to go behind that order. He further placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.E.A. Annamalai Chettiar and another Vs. S.V.V.S. Veerappa Chettir and others , AIR 1956 SC 12 , wherein it was held that the document having been admitted in evidence, such admission could not be called in question at any stage of the proceedings on the ground that it had not been duly stamped and the provisions of Section 36 of the Stamp Act preclude the appellants from raising any objection against the admission of the document at this stage and that the appellants are not entitled now to urge this objection before the Supreme Court. 5. Learned counsel for respondent/defendant No.1, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and submitted that under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, instruments which are not duly stamped are inadmissible in evidence and Article 6 of Schedule-1-A refers to agreement or memorandum of an agreement not otherwise provided for and therefore, the subject agreement of sale falls within this category. He also submitted that the subject agreement of sale was cancelled by mutual consent vide memorandum of mutual understanding dt.16.06.2019 between the petitioner herein and respondents 1 and 2 and a third party one Mr. Shaik Saidulu. He also submitted that the subject agreement of sale was cancelled by mutual consent vide memorandum of mutual understanding dt.16.06.2019 between the petitioner herein and respondents 1 and 2 and a third party one Mr. Shaik Saidulu. It is submitted that subsequent to the agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017 and a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- was paid as an advance, the share of the purchaser under Ex.A.1 was handed over to the purchaser out of the total property and both the parties agreed to make construction on their share of property in fourth floor with their own expenses and also in stilt floor and both parties have agreed to permit the purchaser to demolish the old stair case for second, third and fourth floors and as per the MoU dt.16.06.2019, the respondents accepted to return the amount of Rs.25,00,000/- paid by the petitioner towards advance of sale consideration and also the amount of Rs.15,00,000/- spent by the petitioner for the construction of the unfinished building covered by the sale agreement and accordingly, respondent No.1 repaid the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- through online transaction on 15.06.2019 and agreed to pay Rs.55,00,000/- to the mediator, i.e., Shaik Saidulu and his son Shaik Madar and therefore, according to the learned counsel for defendant No.1, the suit on the basis of the agreement of sale itself is void ab initio and it is submitted that the petitioner and the father of the petitioner have conspired with malafide intention to cause great loss and irreparable damage to the reputation of respondent No.1 society and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief and further that, the agreement of sale filed by the petitioner could not have been admitted as evidence without payment of stamp duty. He also relied upon the judgments which have been referred to by the trial Court in allowing I.A.No.169 of 2025 and de-admitting of the document. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a reply affidavit along with the documents such as lease agreements and copies of cheques, FIRs, copy of plaint in O.S.No.236 of 2021 to demonstrate that the possession of the subject property was with the defendants only and not with the plaintiff and therefore, the document which has been marked as Ex.A.1 did not require impounding. He submitted that Section 47 of the Indian Stamp Act deals with a situation where instruments of conveyance etc., are undervalued and provides for a procedure to deal with the same. 7. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record, this Court finds that the plaintiff is seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale while the defendants are denying the same and in the written statement, it is claimed that possession is with the defendant society itself. The document was marked as Ex.A.1 during the chief- examination of P.W.1 and immediately thereafter, an objection has been raised by the defendants that the document was marked without their presence and further that it was not a document where stamp duty is paid. The trial Court has accepted the contentions of the defendants and de-admitted the document. Therefore, the questions to be decided in this CRP are (1) whether the agreement of sale sought to be introduced as evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is admissible without payment of stamp duty, and (2) whether the document which has been marked can be de-admitted subsequently. As far as the 1 st question is concerned, this Court finds that Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act prescribes that no document which is not sufficiently stamped can be admitted in evidence and for the purpose of determining whether the subject document is sufficiently stamped or not, it is only the recitals in the documents which have to be considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Omprakash Vs. Laxminarayan & Ors., Civil Appeal No.9032 of 2013 @ SLP (C) No.20721 of 2028 dt.07.10.2013 has affirmed the decision of the Division of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in W.P.No.6464 of 2008 ( Man Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Smt. Sumranbai & Ors. Vs. Rameshwar) and agreed with the conclusions of the Division Bench as under: “ 8. A document would be admissible on basis of the recitals made in the document and not on basis of the pleadings raised by the parties. Vs. Rameshwar) and agreed with the conclusions of the Division Bench as under: “ 8. A document would be admissible on basis of the recitals made in the document and not on basis of the pleadings raised by the parties. In the matter of Laxminarayan (supra) , the learned Single Judge with due respect to his authority we don’t think that he did look into the legal position but it appears that he was simply swayed away by the argument that as the defendant was denying the delivery of possession, the endorsement/recital in the document lost all its effect and efficacy. 9. It would be trite to say that if in a document certain recitals are made then the Court would decide the admissibility of the document on the strength of such recitals and not otherwise. In a given case, if there is an absolute unregistered sale deed and the parties say that the same is not required to be registered then we don’t think that the Court would be entitled to admit the document because simply the parties say so. The jurisdiction of the Court flows from Sections 33, 35 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and the Court has to decide the question of admissibility. With all humility at our command we over-rule the judgment in the matter of Laxminarayan (Supra). Therefore, it is clear that no document which is insufficiently stamped can be admitted in evidence. The second question is to be now considered. This Court finds that the A.P. High Court (it then was) in the cases of Chebrolu Srinivasa Rao and others Vs. Ravi Venkata Ratna Vara Prasad and others , 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 491 : (2018) 6ALT 606 : (2019) 1ALD 90 and Syed Yousuf Ali Vs. Mohd. Yousuf and others, 2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 37 : (2016) 3 ALD 235 : (2016) 2 ALT 557 has held that a document once admitted under Section 36 of the Registration Act cannot be objected to subsequently. For the sake of clarity, the relevant observations in the case of Syed Yousuf Ali Vs. Mohd. Yousuf and others (6 supra) are reproduced hereunder: “24. According to Order 13 Rule 3 CPC the Court may at any stage of the suit, reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds for such rejection. For the sake of clarity, the relevant observations in the case of Syed Yousuf Ali Vs. Mohd. Yousuf and others (6 supra) are reproduced hereunder: “24. According to Order 13 Rule 3 CPC the Court may at any stage of the suit, reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds for such rejection. Order 13 Rule 4 CPC prescribes the endorsement to be made on the document when a document is admitted in evidence. According to it, there shall be an endorsement on every document which has been admitted in evidence containing number and title of the suit, the name of the person producing the document, the date on which it was produced and a statement of its having been so admitted and the endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge. 26. In the present case, the trial Court did not record any statement as to the admissibility as required under Order 13 Rule 4(1)(d) and there was absolutely no judicial determination about the admissibility of possessory contract of sale, in evidence. In such a case, when an objection was raised, the Court is under obligation to record reasons in admitting the document in evidence or reject the same even if it is marked for numerical purpose or for convenience of reference, by following the procedure under Order 13 Rule 3 CPC. The trial Court in the present case, only on the ground that once the document is marked as exhibit, the same cannot be challenged in view of interdict contained under Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act. The trial Court did not draw distinction between marking of document for convenience of reference and judicial determination of admissibility of the document, as no objection was raised as to the admissibility of the document at the time, it was marked, committed an error in considering the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. 4 th defendant before the trial Court. 32. A co-joint reading of Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act and Order XII Rule 3 of CPC, there is little conflict as to rejection of any document which is already marked on the ground that the document is irrelevant or inadmissible in evidence after recording reasons. 32. A co-joint reading of Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act and Order XII Rule 3 of CPC, there is little conflict as to rejection of any document which is already marked on the ground that the document is irrelevant or inadmissible in evidence after recording reasons. If really the bar contained in Section 36 is absolute which preclude the Court to entertain any objection as to admissibility at any subsequent stage, after the document is marked in evidence, Order XIII Rule 3 become redundant. When Court did not determine judicially as to admissibility of possessory contract of sale and marked the same as Exhibit, without applying its mind, the admissibility of document can be decided judicially and reject if the Court find that the document is inadmissible in evidence or reject the document at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, the trial Court did not exercise its jurisdiction under Order XIII Rule 3 of CPC, consequently liable to be set aside.” 8. In the case of Sure Ranga Murali Krishna Reddy Vs. Sure Yerri Vara Prasada Reddy and others , 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 209 : (2018) 4 ALT 616 : (2018) 5 ALD 396 also, this Court has observed thus: “27. In the case on hand, the objection is not only with regard to the mere sufficiency or otherwise of the stamp duty payable on the original partition deed but, also with regard to non-registration of the original partition deed. The law is well settled that there is no bar under law to consider at any stage of the matter, an objection which is raised with regard to the admissibility of an unregistered document, which is compulsorily registerable, even though such document is marked as an exhibit, more particularly, when such marking is given inadvertently and without application of mind. Indeed, in a recent decision in Uma Pandey v. Munna Pandey [ (2018) 5 SCC 376 ] the Supreme Court held that question relating to admissibility of an unregistered partition deed relied upon by the defendants is a substantial question of law and can be permitted to be raised even in a second appeal. Further, as already noted the law is well settled that Section 35 only deals with original instruments and not copies and that Section 36 cannot be so interpreted as to allow secondary evidence of an instrument to have its benefit. Further, as already noted the law is well settled that Section 35 only deals with original instruments and not copies and that Section 36 cannot be so interpreted as to allow secondary evidence of an instrument to have its benefit. The words ‘an instrument’ in Section 36 must have the same meaning as that in Section 35. The Legislature only relented from the strict provisions of Section 35 in cases where the original instrument was admitted in evidence without objection at the initial stage of a suit or proceeding. Therefore, the document in question now being a certified copy and not an original the benefit cannot be extended to it in any view of the matter. 28. In the facts & circumstances and in view of the precedential guidance, this Court is of the well considered view that the Court below was in error in marking the document, viz., CC of unregistered partition deed as exhibit B1 without application of mind and without first deciding the objection raised as ordained in the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal's case (supra) and in further refusing to accede to the request of the plaintiff to de-exhibit the document or exclude/eschew it from evidence for deciding its admissibility or otherwise after adverting to the aspects viz., whether it's original was duly stamped/charged with duty and whether it can be admitted in evidence for collateral purpose in the light of the ratios in the precedents adverted to supra. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the order is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.” 9. All these decisions have been relied upon by the trial Court for de-admitting the document. After considering the above judgments relied upon by both the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No.1 and the trial Court, this Court observes that in the present case, the document was marked as Ex.A.1 only for numerical purpose during the evidence of P.W.1, but immediately thereafter, before the cross-examination was undertaken, the defendants have taken an objection about its admissibility and as held in the above cases, when there is no judicious application of mind by the learned Judge about the admissibility of the document at the time of marking of the document, it cannot be said that the petition under Order 13 Rule 3 of CPC cannot be entertained. The contention of the petitioner is that sufficiency or otherwise of the stamp duty is to be decided after the trial Court decides the question of possession. The issue of requirement to pay stamp duty would depend on the recitals in the document and the issue of possession or otherwise will have to be decided only after the document has been admitted by the Court and the admission will not be subject to payment of the stamp duty. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss if he were required to pay stamp duty first and if later it was decided that he did not have possession, since the defendants in their written statement, have claimed the possession to be with them. This contention is to be considered since there is no provision under the Stamp Act to refund the stamp duty already paid if the document is held to be not valid by the Court. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its recent decision in the case of Vayyaeti Srinivasarao Vs. Gaineedi Jagajyothi , 2026 INSC 59 : Civil Appeal Nos. of 2026 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.21976-21977 of 2023 dt.15.01.2026 has held as under. “11.2 The facts of the case in Gafoor can be compared to the present case, as it was rightly overruled by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ratnamala , as the findings in the said case were incorrect wherein, it had been expressly mentioned in the agreement to sell that the possession of the schedule property was with the appellant therein as a tenant. Therefore, the appellant therein also did not come into possession of the property in relation to the agreement to sell but was already in possession of the property as a tenant. But, there was surrender within the meaning of Section 111 of the Act so as to determine the lease or tenancy. On the other hand, pursuant to the agreement to sell in the present case, there was no change in the status of the appellant herein inasmuch as he continued to be a tenant and did not acquire possession under the agreement to sell. The appellant herein also suffered an eviction order as a tenant of the schedule property. On the other hand, pursuant to the agreement to sell in the present case, there was no change in the status of the appellant herein inasmuch as he continued to be a tenant and did not acquire possession under the agreement to sell. The appellant herein also suffered an eviction order as a tenant of the schedule property. Therefore, the appellant did not acquire possession of the property prior to the agreement to sell dated 14.10.2009 in relation thereto or at the time of its execution or subsequent thereto. In other words, the possession of the schedule property by the appellant herein was not following the agreement to sell nor was delivery of possession pursuant to the execution of agreement to sell as stipulated under the A.P. Stamp Act. It is only when the possession is acquired in relation to the execution of the agreement to sell, that it would be a deemed conveyance and stamp duty has to be levied as conveyance. 12. However, in the instant case, the agreement to sell dated 14.10.2009 expressly states that the appellant was in possession of the schedule property as a tenant for fifty years and in fact an order of eviction was also passed against the appellant. Therefore, the appellant did not come into possession of the schedule property in relation to the execution of the agreement to sell dated 14.10.2009 but almost fifty years prior thereto as a tenant and not as a vendee. In fact, the existing tenant sought to purchase the schedule property but there was no express or implied surrender of tenancy so as to bring about determination of the tenancy or lease by the appellant herein. Hence, the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Mishrimal is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 12.1 The Trial Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter and simply directed the appellant herein to pay the stamp duty as if it were a conveyance or sale and there was a transfer of title from the respondent to the appellant herein. The High Court in fact misdirected itself in assuming that there was in fact a deemed conveyance between the respondent and the appellant herein. The High Court in fact misdirected itself in assuming that there was in fact a deemed conveyance between the respondent and the appellant herein. The appellant herein is not liable to pay any additional duty and penalty on the said instrument and neither is the said instrument liable to be impounded for the purpose of payment of duty and penalty. Hence, we find that the High Court was not right in sustaining the order of the Trial Court. Consequently, both the impugned orders of the High Court as well as the order of the Trial Court are set aside. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. 12.2 The Trial Court shall mark the agreement to sell dated 14.10.2009 as an Exhibit and proceed to dispose the suit as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of the next hearing before the Trial Court. No costs.” Therefore, the payment of stamp duty can be subject to the finding about the possession by the trial Court. 10. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. 11. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Civil Revision Petition shall stand closed.