JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No.08 of 2025, which came to be disposed of by the impugned order dated 01.10.2025 below Exh.21 and 22, the applications filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11(a) and Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “CPC” for short). 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff had filed a suit essentially for cancellation of a sale deed dated 12.02.2025 which had root in probate proceedings arising out of Misc. Civil Application No.182 of 2025 (sic.). The suit also prayed for a declaration to declare the appellant as heir to the properties described in para-9 of the plaint originally belonging to the Maharana Natvarsinji. The claim of the plaintiff in the property is through one Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji Shivsinhji, who is the biological son of Shivsinhji Jethva and in that capacity real uncle of the plaintiff. Balsinhji in the year 1941 was given in adoption to the family of Maharana Natvarsinji and as adopted son, he was the legal heir of Maharana Natvarsinji. The plaintiff claims through Balsinhji in his capacity as a first nephew (father’s brother falling in Class II to the schedule of Hindu Succession Act). The defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 being the legal heirs of Maharana Natvarsinji are also the beneficiaries of Will executed, whereas defendant No.2 is the purchaser under the sale deed which is questioned. 2.1 The defendants filed two applications Exh.21 and 22 respectively under Order VII Rule 11(a) and Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, which came to be allowed, thereby non-suiting the appellant. Order VII Rule 11 applications were therefore accepted on the ground of limitation and there being no cause of action. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Pratik Jasani, for learned advocate Mr. Dhairya D. Mamtora for the appellant initially sought time for placing on record the accurate information regarding descendants of two families namely Shivsinji Jethva and Maharana Natvarsinji. Therefore, the matter was adjourned to today. Learned advocate has placed on record the paper book which, according to learned advocate is complete in all respect. Learned advocate Mr. Maulik R. Shah and learned advocates Mr. Jay Kansara and Mr. Umang Dave have appeared on caveat led by learned senior advocate Mr. Mihir Joshi and learned senior advocate Mr. Therefore, the matter was adjourned to today. Learned advocate has placed on record the paper book which, according to learned advocate is complete in all respect. Learned advocate Mr. Maulik R. Shah and learned advocates Mr. Jay Kansara and Mr. Umang Dave have appeared on caveat led by learned senior advocate Mr. Mihir Joshi and learned senior advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta, for respondent Nos.2 and 1 respectively. Both the sides have agreed that the paper book supplied is complete in all respect and therefore, the matter may be taken up for the final disposal today. 4. Learned advocate for the appellant has argued that fundamental error is committed by the Court in treating the suit to be without cause of action. He has argued that applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC were decided in hot haste and the Court had not even taken into consideration the hearing of Exh.5 application and he drew attention of this Court to the chronology of events. 4.1 The suit came to be filed on 11.03.2025 alongwith Exh.5 application and on 16.06.2025, even before Exh.5 application could be heard and decided, applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC came to be filed and the trial Court proceeded immediately to hear and decide those applications by the impugned order. 4.2 Learned advocate submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court travels far beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The jurisdiction under this provision is narrow and circumscribed and does not extend to an adjudication on the merits of the controversy. Therefore, the Trial Court has erroneously ventured into disputed questions of fact and law, such as the validity of the adoption, the effect of the probate proceedings, and the issue of limitation. It is submitted that the Court below has misapplied the provision by equating alleged "lack of clarity" in pleadings with absence of cause of action, which is impermissible under the settled principles of civil procedure. 4.3 It is submitted that the plaint specifically seeks (1) a declaration that the probate issued in the year 1985 is illegal, (ii) cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 12.02.2025, and (iii) declaration of the plaintiff's status as a Class II heir. Each of these substantive prayers independently discloses a cause of action in law. 4.3 It is submitted that the plaint specifically seeks (1) a declaration that the probate issued in the year 1985 is illegal, (ii) cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 12.02.2025, and (iii) declaration of the plaintiff's status as a Class II heir. Each of these substantive prayers independently discloses a cause of action in law. The existence of multiple prayers, some of which may be stronger than others, does not render the plaint devoid of cause of action. Even if certain factual averments appear weak, incomplete, or require further clarification, such deficiencies are curable by way of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, and cannot justify outright rejection of the plaint. 4.4 It is further submitted that the Trial Court has gravely erred in rejecting the plaint and allowing applications Exh.21 and 22 on the reasoning that the probate order was not produced along with the plaint. Such a finding is wholly unsustainable in law. The non-production of a document at the threshold stage is a matter pertaining to evidence, not to the maintainability of the Suit. The Code of Civil Procedure does not mandate that every document relied upon must be annexed at the time of institution of the Suit. Learned advocate submitted that the Trial Court has erred in law and on facts in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation, holding that the Suit is barred as it has been filed after a lapse of 40 years. Such a finding is wholly unsustainable in view of the settled legal position that the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The plaintiff is entitled to plead and establish the date of knowledge of the probate proceedings, and such factual aspects can only be adjudicated upon evidence at trial. Even if the plaint does not clearly set out the date of knowledge, the proper course for the Court would have been to permit amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The plaintiff is entitled to plead and establish the date of knowledge of the probate proceedings, and such factual aspects can only be adjudicated upon evidence at trial. Even if the plaint does not clearly set out the date of knowledge, the proper course for the Court would have been to permit amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. 4.5 Learned advocate has thereafter, in support of his submission relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of C.M.Meenakshi v/s. Archbishop of Banglore, reported in, 2025 (O) AIJEL-SC 76186 to submit that where the plaint did not disclose cause of action or was barred by the limitation or was hit by res- judicata due to previous suits filed, the High Court had correctly set aside the trial Court’s order rejecting the plaint as the issues are required to be proceeded by full-fledged trial. 4.6 Another judgment of this Court relied upon by learned advocate in case of Patel Chandrikaben D/o Haribhai Makabhai Patel and W/o Gadhvi Amirdan Nathubuai v/s. Patel Manguben Wd/o Haribhai Makabhai, reported in, 2025 (O) AIJEL-HC-252089 that the issue of succession to the property has to be decided on merits. 5. As against this, learned senior advocate Mr. Mihir Joshi with learned advocate Mr. Jay Kansara and learned advocate Mr. Umang Dave for respondent No.2 and learned senior advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta with learned advocate Mr. Maulish Shah appearing for respondent No.1, at the outset, have submitted that the requirement of existing cause of action has to be legal cause of action and in the facts of the present case, there is no legal right in favour of the appellant to agitate in the suit. Learned advocates have drawn our attention to the provisions of the Hindu Law referring to the adoption and the effect of such adoption which severs the tie of the adopted person with family, who has given the child for adoption and reestablished a new tie with the adoptee family. Attention is drawn to Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short) particularly Section 12 which provides for the effect of adoption. Attention is drawn to Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short) particularly Section 12 which provides for the effect of adoption. 5.1 It is submitted that the effect of adoption is not disputed and as a result of which such adoption, ties of Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji Shivsinhji, biological child of family of Shivsinji and adopted son of family of Maharana Natvarsinji was severed with the family of Shivsinhji Jethva upon adoption and therefore, the plaintiff Rajendrasinh, who is the nephew of the said Balsinhji, ties between them were also severed and therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim right in the property of Maharana Natvarsinji through the uncle of the plaintiff, who has already severed ties with the family of Shivsinhji Jethva. 5.2 Learned advocates have referred to the proceedings on the basis of the Will which had concluded long back and these proceedings were for drawing of probate on the basis of Will and issuance of letter of administration. There is no participation by the appellant for such proceedings which are the proceedings in rem and after approximately 40 years, now the prayer is made for cancelling the probate issued. 5.3 It is also argued that in the prayer clause, a prayer is made for cancellation of the probate of Will in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 2 in Civil Suit No.182 of 1985 which are not the proceedings at all connecting with the cause in the present case. Attention is drawn to the document, cancellation of which is sought wherein reference is made to the probate proceedings arising out Misc. Application No.115 of 1980, but there is no reference to the number mentioned in the prayer clause. It is therefore, contended that there is no cause of action as the probate proceedings Civil Misc. Application No.182 of 1985 are not the proceedings on the basis of which the plaintiff is claiming the cause of action. The plaintiff claimed cause of action on the basis of the sale deed of 2025, which does not refer to the probate proceedings as mentioned in the prayer clause. 6. The Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The plaintiff claimed cause of action on the basis of the sale deed of 2025, which does not refer to the probate proceedings as mentioned in the prayer clause. 6. The Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. In the plaint, it is the case of the appellant that respondent No. 1 in this case is the Angaliyat son (son from a previous marriage) who came with Anantkunwarba, the wife of Maharaja Natwarsinhji of Porbandar; whereas respondent No. 2 is the company which executed current deed.Furthermore, respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are the heirs of the deceased Shivsinhji. Whereas, respondent No. 6 is the office responsible for maintaining records of changes in ownership rights for properties located at Porbandar. Maharaja Shri Natwarsinhji of Porbandar had no biological children, and as his wife had passed away, the uncle of the appellant Balsinhji alias Udaybhansinhji, was adopted by him. Formal permission for the said adoption was obtained from the Secretary to the Honorable Resident for the States of Western India. This adoption permission was granted vide No. F.N.O. C/Camp/41. This was based on a private letter written by Maharaja Natwarsinhji dated 29.12.1940, and the necessary documents regarding this have been attached to the plaint. 6.1 Upon the Raj Tilak (coronation) of the uncle of the appellant-Shri Balsinh (Udaybhansinh) being performed as the Yuvraj of Maharaja Natwarsinhji, he had formally become the heir and successor of the Maharana Natwarsinh, and in that capacity, he was established as the Yuvraj. Subsequently, appellant’s uncle Balsinhji passed away and at the time of the demise of appellant’s uncle-Balsinhji, who had obtained formal permission as the heir/son of Maharaja Natwarsinhji and as he died, Maharaja Natwarsinhji remarried the mother of respondent No. 1, who was serving as a nurse by profession. At the time, Maharani Anantkunwarba, with whom Maharaja Natwarsinhji had done remarriage, had a previous marriage to a Sri Lankan individual named De’Silva, and the child born from that marriage is the present respondent No. 1, whom she brought along as an Angaliyat (stepson). Thereafter, Maharaja Natwarsinhji passed away in the year 1979, and Maharani Anantkunwarba passed away on 15.12.1989. Thereafter, the aforementioned properties remained as they were. During this period, the respondents were managing and administering the said properties in accordance with the Will of Maharaja Natwarsinhji. Thereafter, Maharaja Natwarsinhji passed away in the year 1979, and Maharani Anantkunwarba passed away on 15.12.1989. Thereafter, the aforementioned properties remained as they were. During this period, the respondents were managing and administering the said properties in accordance with the Will of Maharaja Natwarsinhji. And that, due to fraudulent intentions, the respondent No. 1 has sold the property known as "Rajmahal" located at Porbandar, which includes land under City Survey No. 3478/41 measuring 64,166.5 sq. mtrs. and 34,747 sq. mtrs., as well as City Survey No. 3478 measuring 509 sq. mtrs. and 10,433.9733 sq. mtrs., totaling 35,256 sq. mtrs which is known as Rajmahal at Porbandar of Porbandar Taluka, having Old City Survey Ward No. 3. This site is known as "Huzoor Palace" and includes a construction of 7,725 sq. mtrs of Huzoor Palace. Although respondent No. 1 had no rights, titles, or authority to sell, the property was sold between 14.02.2000 and 11.02.2025. Looking to the same, the appellant contends that this act of selling by respondent No. 1, despite having no legal right to do so, is a completely illegal. 6.2 Further, the mother of respondent No. 1 in this matter obtained Probate for the Will of the Maharana from the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar. The file related to those Probate proceedings has been destroyed in the Court records and based on said Probate, an entry was made in the City Survey Property Card. The S.I. Case file of the same also destroyed. In this regard, the appellant applied for obtaining a copy of the S.I. Case to the City Survey Office. In response to that application, respondent No. 6 addressed a letter to the advocate of the appellant dated 24.01.2025, stating that the supporting documents and records for the S.I. Case could not be located. Under these circumstances, the appellant contends that the respondents in this matter, acting in collusion, have not provided information with the objective of ensuring that the true facts do not come on record. Hence, there is a strong possibility that the said Probate only granted powers of administration, management, and arrangement and it clearly appears that the same has been misused. In view of the above, the aforementioned sale transaction is illegal, unconstitutional, and liable to be declared void ab initio. Hence, there is a strong possibility that the said Probate only granted powers of administration, management, and arrangement and it clearly appears that the same has been misused. In view of the above, the aforementioned sale transaction is illegal, unconstitutional, and liable to be declared void ab initio. Under these circumstances, a situation has been created whereby the hereditary rights of the appellant may be extinguished, and even the last signs of the royalty will be used for business purposes. 6.3 Under the circumstances mentioned above, it is contended that it has become necessary to revoke the Probate of the aforementioned Will. Further, the deed executed by respondent No. 1 in favor of respondent No. 2 is also liable to be cancelled, and under these circumstances, the appellant has filed the suit. 6.4 In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant approached the Court through the suit seeking relief to the effect that, (1) The order passed in C.M.A.No. 182/85 issuing Probate of the Will in favor of respondent No. 1 and 2 be set aside; (2) Further, it is prayed to pass a decree to cancel the sale deed executed by respondent No. 1 in favor of respondent No. 2, registered vide Serial No. 1026 dated 12.02.2025. (3) To pass a decree declaring that the respondents of this matter have no right or authority to sell the aforementioned property, without making its administration and management. (4) And also, to pass an order declaring that the appellant-plaintiff is the legal collateral heir of all the aforementioned properties. (5) Further, to pass an order directing respondent Nos. 1 and 2 of this matter to handover the possession of the aforementioned property to the appellant-plaintiff, and further directing respondent No. 1 to submit all accounts of the management and administration carried out to date. (6) Further, to grant a permanent injunction restraining the respondents of this matter, either by themselves or through their persons, power of attorney holders, or agents, from enjoying, possessing, or using the aforementioned property in any manner whatsoever; and further, to grant a permanent injunction restraining respondent No. 2 from applying to the office of respondent No. 6 to mutate the property in their name, and restraining respondent No. 6 from carrying out any such proceedings. (7) And to grant any other reliefs that the appellant- plaintiff may be entitled to under the law and the facts of the case. (8) And to pass an order directing that the entire cost of this suit be recovered from the respondents. 6.5 According to the pleadings of the plaint the cause of action for this suit arose on 11.02.2025, when respondent No. 1 executed the sale of the suit property in favor of respondent No. 2, and abide by the period of limitation and the Court has full power and jurisdiction to hear and decide the same. 6.6 For the better understanding, the pedigree which is not disputed is as under:- 7. Section 12 of the Act provides for the effect of adoption and it provides that adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of the adoptive parents for all purpose from the date of adoption and from such date onwards, the relation of the child in which his birth has taken place will be severed and will be replaced by the relations created with the adoptive family. 7.1 In the present case also, facts would suggest that on 12.06.1941, when Balsinhji Udaybhansinhji, biological son of Shivsinhji Jethva was given in adoption to the family of Maharana Natvarsinhji, ties with the family of Shivsinhji Jethva and family members would stand severed. Therefore, as a consequence, the tie of Rajendrasinh Indrasinh, the plaintiff who is the son of Indrasinhji Shivsinhji and nephew of Balsinhji Udaybhansinhji would also be severed. 8. From the facts, which have emerged, the chronology as appears from the record and relevant for the purpose of the present appeal is that, Maharana Natwarsinhji was born on 30th June 1901 and was installed on the Gadi on 11th December 1908. Upon attaining majority on 26th January 1920, he became the ruler of the erstwhile Porbandar State and married Maharani Rupaliba on 5th February 1920. During the period between 1923 and 1930, Maharana Natwarsinhji constructed the Huzur Palace at Porbandar. It is not in dispute that no child was born from the wedlock between Maharana Natwarsinhji and Maharani Rupaliba. 8.1 On 29th December 1940, Maharana Natwarsinhji expressed his desire to adopt Kumar Shri Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji, and sought the requisite permission from the competent authority, which was duly granted. It is not in dispute that no child was born from the wedlock between Maharana Natwarsinhji and Maharani Rupaliba. 8.1 On 29th December 1940, Maharana Natwarsinhji expressed his desire to adopt Kumar Shri Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji, and sought the requisite permission from the competent authority, which was duly granted. Pursuant thereto, on 12th June 1941, Kumar Shri Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji was adopted as the heir of Maharana Natwarsinhji. Shortly thereafter, on 3rd July 1941, Yuvraj Udaybhansinhji married Yuvrani Premkumari. No child was born from the said wedlock. Maharani Rupaliba passed away on 26th October 1943. 8.2 Subsequently, on 20th November 1954, Maharana Natwarsinhji married Maharani Anantkunverba who was already mother to Respondent No.1- Harendrakumar D. Silva, from previous marriage who thereafter became the lawful son of Maharana Natwarsinhji. Yuvraj Udaybhansinhji passed away on 20th July 1973. Thereafter, on 24th September 1973, Maharana Natwarsinhji executed his last Will, inter alia bequeathing his properties, including his private immovable properties, in favour of Maharani Anantkunverba. Maharana Natwarsinhji passed away on 5th October 1979. 8.3 After the demise of Maharana Natwarsinhji, Maharani Anantkunverba initiated proceedings by filing Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 115 of 1980 seeking Letter of Administration in respect of the Will dated 24th September 1973, which came to be issued in her favour on 23rd September 1982. During the pendency of the said proceedings, a representative suit being Special Civil Suit No. 30 of 1981 came to be filed by members of the Jethwa community claiming rights over the properties of late Maharana Natwarsinhji. The said suit was dismissed by judgment dated 21st April 1982, wherein the Court held that Maharani Anantkunverba was the sole legal heir of Maharana Natwarsinhji in respect of the properties left behind by him. Pursuant thereto, on 23rd September 1982, Letter of Administration was granted in favour of Maharani Anantkunverba. 8.4 On 2nd December 1988, Maharani Anantkunverba executed her last Will bequeathing her properties in favour of Respondent No. 1- Harendrakumar D. Silva, which Will came to be registered on 5th December 1988. Maharani Anantkunverba passed away on 5th December 1989, though the appellant has alleged a different date of demise in the plaint i.e., on 15th December 1989. After the demise of Maharana Natwarsinhji and Maharani Anantkunverba, Respondent No. 1- Harendrakumar D. Silva was using and administering the properties in accordance with the testamentary dispositions. Maharani Anantkunverba passed away on 5th December 1989, though the appellant has alleged a different date of demise in the plaint i.e., on 15th December 1989. After the demise of Maharana Natwarsinhji and Maharani Anantkunverba, Respondent No. 1- Harendrakumar D. Silva was using and administering the properties in accordance with the testamentary dispositions. On 9th September 1991, Bombay High Court granted probate of the Will of Maharani Anantkunverba. 8.5 Thereafter, in January 2025, the appellant claims to have sought copies of certain orders and testamentary documents from the City Survey Office, Porbandar, and was informed that the record was not available. On 12th February 2025, the subject property came to be sold and conveyed by Respondent No. 1- Harendrakumar D. Silva to Respondent No. 2- Damini Estate & Finance Pvt. Ltd. by a registered sale deed. 8.6 Subsequently, on 11th March 2025, the appellant instituted Special Civil Suit No. 8 of 2025 before the Civil Court at Porbandar. Written statements were filed by the defendants, followed by applications preferred by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint. The appellant filed a common reply thereto. By the impugned order dated 1st October 2025, the Trial Court allowed the said applications and rejected the plaint. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has filed the present First Appeal. 9. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act was codified in the year 1956, whereas the adoption had taken place in the year 1941 and therefore, the Hindu Law which was un-codified will have to be relied upon. The Court may quote the commentary on adoption from Mulla’s Hindu Law, 25 th Silver Jubilee Edition, Chapter XXIII (Adoption). Under the said Chapter, Note 491, falling under the head of “V. Results of Dattak Adoption” deals with the results of adoption and would read as under:- “V. RESULTS OF DATTAK ADOPTION 491. RESULTS OF ADOPTION (1) Adoption has the effect of transferring the adopted boy from his natural family into the adoptive family. It confers upon the adoptee, the same nights and privileges in the family of the adopter as the legitimate s except in a few cases. Those cases relate to marriage and adoption (s s (3) below), and to the share on a partition between an adopted and after born son. It confers upon the adoptee, the same nights and privileges in the family of the adopter as the legitimate s except in a few cases. Those cases relate to marriage and adoption (s s (3) below), and to the share on a partition between an adopted and after born son. (2) But while the adopted son acquires the rights of a son in the adoptive family, he loses all the rights of a son in his natural family, including the of claiming any share in the 'estate of his natural father' or natural relations, or any share in the coparcenary property of his natural family. This foll from a text of Manu (IX, Verse 142).” 10. In the facts of this case, after severing ties with the family members of Shivsinhji Jethva, Yuvraj Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji established the ties with Maharana Natwarsinhji and therefore, the Court is of the view that there is no legal right which can be agitated by Rajendrsinh Indrasinh, who is the descendant of family of Shivsinhji Jethva in the property belonging to the family of Maharana Natwarsinhji. It is an admitted position that there is no connection between family of Shivsinhji Jethva and Maharana Natwarsinhji. 11. In furtherance, the argument of learned advocate that a triable issue has arisen and whether is claim of the appellant-plaintiff in the property of Maharana Natwarsinhji through the adopted son Yuvraj Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji is a triable issue, the Court may refer to and rely upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court Maharaj Shri Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v/s. Rajmata Vijaykunverba wd/o Late. Maharaj Mahendrasinhji, reported in, (1998) 2 GLH 823 Focusing upon the word ‘cause of action’ in para-14 has held as under:- “14. Having noticed brief summary of the plaint and prayers earlier, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC and the scope thereof. Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC provides that the plaint shall be rejected in case where it does not disclose a cause of action. Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC is mandatory and if it is found that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the Court has no option but to reject the plaint. To find out whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the Court has to look only to the averments made in the plaint. Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC is mandatory and if it is found that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the Court has no option but to reject the plaint. To find out whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the Court has to look only to the averments made in the plaint. When a plaint is based on a document filed along with the plaint, it can, however, be considered to ascertain if plaint discloses any cause of action. Cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. The words "cause of action" mean the whole bundle of material facts which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. What is to be done by the Court at the stage of deciding as to whether the plaint discloses any cause of action or not is to find out from the allegation of the plaint itself as to whether a bogus, wholly vexatious or frivolous litigation is sought to be initiated under the garb of ingenuous drafting of the plaint or not because it is the duty of the Court to guard against the mischief of a litigant misusing the process of court by entering into a false litigation merely for the purpose of harassing the other party and to nip in the bud the litigation which is sham and shabby in character. In order to find out whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the averments made in the plaint and documents annexed thereto should be scrutinised meaningfully and if on such scrutiny it is found that the plaint does not disclose cause of action, it has got to be rejected in view of the provisions of Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC. When it is said that the Court should take into consideration the averments made in the plaint for the purpose of deciding the question whether the averments made in the plaint disclose cause of action or not, it does not mean that the Court is precluded from applying the statutory provisions or case-law to the averments made in the plaint. When it is said that the Court should take into consideration the averments made in the plaint for the purpose of deciding the question whether the averments made in the plaint disclose cause of action or not, it does not mean that the Court is precluded from applying the statutory provisions or case-law to the averments made in the plaint. If an assertion made in the plaint is contrary to statutory law or case-law, it cannot be considered as disclosing cause of action. In ITC Ltd. (supra), bank had filed suit against the appellant and others and claimed relief for a sum of Rs.52,59,639-66 ps. After the suit was filed, it was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, an application was filed by the appellant under Order 7, R.11 of the CPC for rejecting the plaint, so far as appellant was concerned, on the ground that no valid cause of action had been shown against the appellant. That application was rejected by the Tribunal. Against the said order, an appeal was filed before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed in limine. Thereupon a writ petition was filed by the appellant, which was dismissed holding that the question should be decided at the trial. Against that judgment, the appellant had filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was also dismissed. The matter was thereafter carried before the Supreme Court. After taking into consideration the decided cases on the point whether there was fraudulent movement of goods under which letter of credit was obtained which in turn entitled the bank to file the suit, the Supreme Court held that that point was already decided by decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. Co- operative Federation's case and therefore the allegation of non-supply of goods by the sellers to the buyers did not by itself amount, in law, to a plea of "fraud" as understood in this branch of the law and hence by merely characterising alleged non-movement of goods as "fraud", the bank was not entitled to claim that there was a cause of action based on fraud or misrepresentation. While allowing the appeal, what is emphasised by the Supreme Court is that the question whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7, R.11 of the CPC has to be decided with reference to averments made in the plaint and clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is evident that if something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7, R.11 of the CPC by resorting to clever drafting, it cannot be said that the plaint discloses a cause of action and if a clear right to sue is not shown in the plaint, it is liable to be rejected.” 12. The Court may therefore, refer to prayer clause which is reproduced in the preceding paras. From the reading of the contents of the plaint itself, recording the status of the plaintiff vis-a-vis Balsinhji Udaybhansinhji is not established and therefore, a legal cause of action is not made out. The cause of action has to be a legal cause of action. The prayer is made for cancellation of Sale- deed of 2025. Ostensibly, the suit is filed immediately after the Sale-deed, but whether the prayer to set aside Sale-deed can be sustained without the plaintiff making out a ground or his connection with the property in question, and without challenging the authority of respondent to enter impugned Sale-deed, the answer is "No" and therefore, the appellant has first made the prayer of setting aside the probate in the suit. Therefore, the Sale-deed is only a manifestation of the probate, which unless cancelled, will not give simply cause to set aside Sale-deed any leg to stand. Therefore, the suit is rightly held to be beyond period of limitation. In the facts as aforesaid, it does not appear to the Court that the issue of limitation has to be treated as mixed question of law and facts. 13. Therefore, the suit is rightly held to be beyond period of limitation. In the facts as aforesaid, it does not appear to the Court that the issue of limitation has to be treated as mixed question of law and facts. 13. This Court is supported by the decision of the Apex Cour in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and others v/s. Shrimant Chhtrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Anr, reported in, 2024 (15) SCC 675 , where in para 18 held as under:- “18 Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally is mixed question of law and facts, when upon meaningful reading of the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. In the present case, we have already held that 02.03.2007 is a fictional date. It is not a case where a fraudulent document was created by the appellant or his predecessors. The title of the suit property as observed by us earlier was conveyed in 1938 and 1952, and what transpired later by way of compromise was only an affirmative assertion by the State. While so, the prayer (a) made in the suit relates to declaration to the effect that the Respondent No. 1 is the owner of the suit properties.” 14. Moreover, even if the claim for declaring the appellant as legal heir of Class II, then also, on the principle of severance of relation with the biological family, the appellant-plaintiff will not fall in a category of heir in Class-II of the Schedule-2, Hindu Succession Act (VII father’s brother). It is pertinent to observe that Udaybhansinji had pre-deceased Maharana Natvarsinhji. Yuvraj Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji had expired on 20.07.1973, whereas, Maharana Natvarsinhji had expired on 05.10.1979. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 01.10.2025 passed below Exh.21 and 22 in Special Civil Suit No.08 of 2025 by the Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar. Yuvraj Balsinhji @ Udaybhansinhji had expired on 20.07.1973, whereas, Maharana Natvarsinhji had expired on 05.10.1979. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 01.10.2025 passed below Exh.21 and 22 in Special Civil Suit No.08 of 2025 by the Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar. Hence, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 16. In view of the dismissal of appeal, the Civil Application does not survive and hence, disposed of accordingly.