ORDER : JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J. This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused No.1 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.1567 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate at Medchal, Cyberabad, (for short ‘the learned trial Court’) registered for the offences under Sections 342, 323, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). 02. Heard Sri A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Pulimamdmi Shashidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State- respondent No.1 as well as Sri P. Pandu Ranga Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. Even after service of notice, none appeared on behalf of the respondent No.3. Perused the record. 03. The brief facts of the case are that on 19.01.2023, the respondent No.2-complainant noticed the circulation of a video on social and electronic media relating to an incident that allegedly occurred in the hostel of Mahindra University, depicting the involvement of certain students of the said University. Subsequently, the respondent No.2 came to know that the respondent No.3-victim is a B.Tech first-year student of Mahindra University and is residing in the University campus hostel. It is further alleged that, in the month of November, the petitioner-accused No.1 made a phone call to the respondent No.3 and threatened him on the allegation that the respondent No.3 had scolded a friend of the petitioner-accused No.1 by name Nanda. On the same day, after completion of dinner, while the respondent No.3 was alone in his Room No.9-12A, at about 22:00 hours, the petitioner-accused No.1, along with the accused No.2 and other associates, allegedly went to the said room. It is alleged that the petitioner-accused No.1 and the accused No.2 assaulted the respondent No.3 without any valid reason, while the other accused persons were roaming in the room. 04(a). Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner-accused No.1 has no connection whatsoever with the alleged offences. It is contended that the alleged incident is stated to have occurred in November, 2022, whereas the complaint came to be lodged by the University only on 19.01.2023, after an unexplained delay of nearly two months. It is further submitted that the present complaint was not initiated by the respondent No.3, who is projected as the victim. It is contended that the alleged incident is stated to have occurred in November, 2022, whereas the complaint came to be lodged by the University only on 19.01.2023, after an unexplained delay of nearly two months. It is further submitted that the present complaint was not initiated by the respondent No.3, who is projected as the victim. The petitioner-accused No.1 and the respondent No.3 are students of the same University, and the charge sheet does not disclose the exact date or time of the alleged video clip. It is also submitted that there is no medical or other corroborative evidence on record to substantiate the allegations levelled against the accused persons. Even if the allegations contained in the charge sheet are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not constitute any offence. The contents of the charge sheet, read as a whole, do not disclose the essential ingredients necessary to attract the alleged offences. 04(b). With the above submissions, while praying to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner- accused No.1, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana and another , 2025 INSC 19 4 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.21 and 22 that: “21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein, an abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: “28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.” 04(c). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , 2025 INSC 19 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.13 to 13.3 that: “13. Let us now examine the next charge for which the appellant stands accused. For an offence u/s 503 to be established, it must be shown that:- (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two years or with a fine or both, as applicable to this case. 13.1 Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka13 as affirmed by a bench of three judges in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab14, records the principle of application of Section 506, IPC in the following terms:- “11.…A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 13. …It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. 13. …It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant….” 13.2 A recent judgment of this court, Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P held as under:- “38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record. The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid or fearful, especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word ‘threat’ refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.” This judgment also, with reference to Manik Taneja (supra), underscored the importance of material and evidence being placed on record to demonstrate intention. A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence.” 05. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent No.1 as well as the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting full-fledged trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition. 06. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is relevant to refer Sections 342, 323, 504, 506 of the IPC, which reads as under: “ 342 . 06. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is relevant to refer Sections 342, 323, 504, 506 of the IPC, which reads as under: “ 342 . Punishment for wrongful confinement: Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 323 . Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 504 . Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace. Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 506 . Punishment for criminal intimidation: Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 07. A plain reading of the aforesaid penal provisions makes it manifest that, in order to attract their application, there must be specific and direct allegations attributable to the petitioner-accused No.1 with regard to wrongful confinement, voluntarily causing hurt, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace, and criminal intimidation. 08. A plain reading of the aforesaid penal provisions makes it manifest that, in order to attract their application, there must be specific and direct allegations attributable to the petitioner-accused No.1 with regard to wrongful confinement, voluntarily causing hurt, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace, and criminal intimidation. 08. A careful perusal of the record discloses that the petitioner-accused No.1 and the respondent No.3 are students of the same University, and that the respondent No.2, who is the Chief Coordinator (Student Affairs) of Mahindra University, lodged the present complaint on behalf of the University. It is evident from the material on record that the alleged incident is stated to have occurred in the month of November, 2022, whereas the complaint came to be lodged only on 19.01.2023. Significantly, the present complaint was not initiated by the respondent No.3, who is projected as the victim. There is a delay of more than one month in lodging the complaint, and no plausible explanation whatsoever is forthcoming for such delay. 09. A perusal of the contents of the charge sheet reveals an allegation that the petitioner-accused No.1, along with the accused No.2 and others, allegedly went to the room of the respondent No.3 and assaulted him without any valid reason. In order to substantiate the said allegations, the Police examined a total of eight witnesses, namely, the complainant-respondent No.2, three police officials, two panch witnesses, one circumstantial witness who is the roommate of the respondent No.3, and the respondent No.3 himself. It is pertinent to note here that, as per the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of the only circumstantial witness, he categorically stated that he was not present at the scene of offence at the relevant time, as he had gone to play badminton, and that upon his return, the respondent No.3 narrated the incident to him. If that be so, it remains unexplained as to what prevented the respondent No.3 from lodging a complaint either with the University authorities or with the concerned Police at the earliest point of time. 10. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the alleged acts were triggered by the respondent No.3 having scolded a friend of the petitioner-accused No.1 by name Nanda. 10. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the alleged acts were triggered by the respondent No.3 having scolded a friend of the petitioner-accused No.1 by name Nanda. However, the said person, whose role is projected as the genesis of the alleged incident, was neither cited nor examined as a witness by the investigating agency. The non- examination of such a crucial witness, without any explanation, strikes at the very root of the prosecution case and renders the version put forth highly doubtful. 11. Furthermore, the alleged incidents pertain to the month of November, 2022, whereas the complaint came to be lodged only in January, 2023, without any explanation whatsoever for such inordinate delay. It is also significant to note that there is no medical evidence on record to substantiate the allegations levelled in the charge sheet. There is no mention of the nature or extent of the injuries, if any, sustained by the respondent No.3, who is projected as the victim. More importantly, there are no specific allegations or averments in the charge sheet to demonstrate that the petitioner-accused No.1 wrongfully confined the respondent No.3, voluntarily caused hurt, intentionally insulted him with intent to provoke breach of the peace, or threatened him with intent to cause alarm. The charge sheet does not disclose any material to indicate that the respondent No.3 was subjected to criminal intimidation so as to suffer any real or reasonable apprehension of injury to his life, limb, or property. In the absence of specific allegations satisfying the essential ingredients of the alleged offences, the continuation of criminal proceedings cannot be sustained. Even if the allegations contained in the charge sheet are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the alleged offences against the petitioner- accused No.1. The material collected during the course of investigation, as reflected in the charge sheet, fails to disclose the commission of any offence so as to make out a case against him. Consequently, the continuation of criminal proceedings against petitioner-accused No.1 would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law and is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.1 in C.C.No.1567 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate at Medchal, Cyberabad, are hereby quashed. 12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.1 in C.C.No.1567 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate at Medchal, Cyberabad, are hereby quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.