JUDGMENT : P.V. BALAKRISHNAN, J. 1. This intra-court appeal is filed by respondents 1,2 and 5 in W.P. (C) No.31152/2022, challenging the judgment dated 11.11.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein. 2. The first respondent herein/writ petitioner claims to be the former Secretary of the 3 rd respondent Society. He was appointed as Salesman on 05.02.1990 and was promoted as Junior Clerk, Senior Clerk, Accountant and as Secretary with effect from 01.11.2017. Initially, consequent to the arising of a vacancy in the post of Secretary on 01.08.2014, the first respondent was appointed as Secretary-in-charge. Thereafter, the 2 nd respondent as per Resolution No.999 dated 06.02.2018 promoted the first respondent as Secretary with effect from 01.11.2017. Consequently, the managing committee also took a decision to create a supernumerary post of Internal Auditor by resolution No. 1000, dated 06.02.2018. The first respondent had acquired the necessary qualification as per Rule 186 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' for short) for promotion to the post of Secretary. Thereafter, the resolutions were forwarded by the Society to the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, as per Ext.P2. The Managing Committee also as per Ext.P3 resolution No.1085 dated 03.03.2018 decided to request the Joint Registrar to approve the creation of a supernumerary post of Internal Auditor and obtain approval for the promotion to the post of Secretary with effect from 01.11.2017. But the Joint Secretary issued Ext.P10 proceedings dated 30.08.2019 stating that the resolution of the Society, promoting the first respondent to the post of Secretary cannot be approved. The same was challenged by the first respondent before the 3 rd appellant, by filing Ext.P11 appeal dated 23.3.2022. But the 3 rd appellant rejected the appeal upholding Ext.P10, as per Ext.P12 order. It is hence, challenging Exts.P10 and P12, the first respondent filed the afore writ petition. 3. The learned Single Judge by judgment 11.11.2022, after hearing both sides and considering the materials on record, allowed the writ petition and set aside Exts.P10 and P12. 4. Heard Adv.Sunil Kumar Kuriakose, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and Adv.Harisankar N Unni, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 5. 3. The learned Single Judge by judgment 11.11.2022, after hearing both sides and considering the materials on record, allowed the writ petition and set aside Exts.P10 and P12. 4. Heard Adv.Sunil Kumar Kuriakose, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and Adv.Harisankar N Unni, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned Single judge has allowed the writ petition without considering Rule 185 of the Rules in a correct perspective. Relying on the decision in Padmaja K. v. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies (General) and Others, 2008 KHC 6878 , he submitted that the benefit of the 2 nd proviso to Rule 185 (1) works only in the zone of feeder category and its immediate lower category and it does not admit any elasticity, so as to stretch it to categories which are further down in the Feeder Category Rules. He argued that by applying the afore proviso, the first respondent, who was working as an Accountant at the relevant time, can only be promoted as an Assistant Secretary, by creating a supernumerary post of Internal Auditor or Branch Manager and that too, if he has the requisite qualifications. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has wrongly interpreted the second proviso to Rule 185 (5) of the Rules in favour of the 1 st respondent, since the same is applicable only in cases where appointment is made to 10% of the vacancies in the post, and since there is only one post of Secretary/Assistant Secretary, where the afore reservation cannot be made applicable. He also argued that the first respondent has passed the qualifying examination prescribed in Rule 185 (5) of the Rules, only in March 2019 and therefore, as on the date of his promotion in 1.11.2017, he is not qualified even to be promoted as Assistant Secretary. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent supported the impugned judgment and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with it. He submitted that admittedly the post of Secretary/Assistant Secretary were remaining vacant and the person occupying the post of Internal Auditor was not having qualification for getting promoted. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent supported the impugned judgment and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with it. He submitted that admittedly the post of Secretary/Assistant Secretary were remaining vacant and the person occupying the post of Internal Auditor was not having qualification for getting promoted. He contended that it in such circumstances, considering the necessity of the bank for filing up the post of Secretary, the first respondent was promoted as Assistant Secretary and then as Secretary, by creating a supernumerary post of Internal Auditor. He also submitted that the promotions, being an incidence of service, the employer has every right to promote a suitable person according to the requirements and since, the post of Assistant Secretary was lying vacant, the first respondent was promoted directly as Secretary. He further contended that since, the first respondent crossed the age of 52, he is not required to attend the qualifying examination as per the second proviso to Rule 185 (5) and hence, there is no illegality in granting promotion to him. He also submitted that the first respondent has retired from service on 31.05.2022 after rendering service as Secretary and the only relief now sought is the retirement benefits due to him. Hence, he prayed that this writ appeal may be dismissed. 7. The first and foremost question that arises for consideration in this writ appeal is whether the promotion granted to the first respondent as Secretary while he was working as an Accountant, by invoking second proviso of Rule 185 (1) is correct or not. Rule 185 (1) and the first two provisos to it which are applicable in the instant case reads as follows: “ 185.Promotion - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rules (2), (3) and (4), appointments to the categories of posts in a society, other than those mentioned in sub-rules(2),(3) and (4), shall be made by promotion, on the basis of seniority in the feeder category. The feeder categories for this purpose shall be specified by the society by framing suitable regulations, with the approval of the Registrar. Provided that if the senior employee/employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion, the immediate junior to the employee/employees in the feeder category shall be promoted. The feeder categories for this purpose shall be specified by the society by framing suitable regulations, with the approval of the Registrar. Provided that if the senior employee/employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion, the immediate junior to the employee/employees in the feeder category shall be promoted. Provided further that if all the employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion an employee on the immediate lower category shall be promoted to the post after promoting him to the feeder category post by creating a supernumerary post. The supernumerary post so created shall be abolished on promotion of the said employee to the higher posts. 8. As per Ext.P8 Feeder Category Sub Rules for Promotion, the post of Head Clerk/Accountant is a feeder category for promotion to the post of Internal Auditor/Branch Manager. Internal Auditor/ Branch Manager in turn is the feeder category to the post of Assistant Secretary/Manager/Chief Accountant/Chief Cashier and these posts, in turn, are feeder category to the post of Secretary. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the first respondent who was working as an Accountant, has been directly promoted as Secretary by invoking the 2 nd proviso to Rule 185 (1) of the Rules. A reading of the second proviso quoted afore, would go to show that if at all the employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion, an employee on the immediate lower category can be promoted to the post after promoting him to the feeder category post by creating a supernumerary post and the said supernumerary post has to be abolished on promotion of the said employee to the higher posts. If so, in case of a promotion being made to the post of Secretary, the employees in the feeder category i.e., Assistant Secretary/Manager/Chief Accountant/Chief Cashier, must have relinquished their promotion, enabling an employee in the immediate lower category i.e., Internal Auditor/Branch Manager to be promoted as Secretary by creating a supernumerary post of Assistant Secretary/Manager/Chief Accountant/Chief Cashier. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the first respondent herein at the time of promotion was working as an Accountant, which is a feeder category to the post of Internal Auditor/Branch Manager. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the first respondent herein at the time of promotion was working as an Accountant, which is a feeder category to the post of Internal Auditor/Branch Manager. If so, the benefit of second proviso to Rule 185 (1) will not enure to the first respondent, who was working as an Accountant for being promoted to the post of Secretary directly. At this juncture, we will also take note of the fact that a learned single judge in Padmaja's case (cited supra) has also considered the very same question and has rightly held that the second proviso to Rule 185 (1) works in the zone of the feeder category and its immediate lower category and it does not admit any elasticity to stretch it to categories which are further down in the Feeder Category Rules. The decision in Jose Varghese v. The Kottiyoor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others, 2012 SCC OnLine Ker 25752 , relied on by the learned single judge is not applicable to the facts of this case, since in that decision what was considered was only a promotion to a category above the next immediate post and the question whether permission of Joint Registrar is required for the same. If so, we find that the promotion granted to the 1 st respondent as Secretary directly from the post of Accountant, by invoking the 2 nd proviso to Rule 185 (1) of the Rules cannot be sustained. 9. The next question to be considered in this writ appeal is whether the promotion granted to the first respondent is in accordance with Rule 185 (5) of the Rules. 9. The next question to be considered in this writ appeal is whether the promotion granted to the first respondent is in accordance with Rule 185 (5) of the Rules. Rule 185 (5) reads as follows: “Selection of candidates to the posts to be filled up by promotion under sub-rule (2) shall be made from the feeder category in accordance with merit and ability to be assessed through a qualifying examination: Provided that all candidates, irrespective of the fact whether their probation has been declared or not, [in all posts of and above Junior Clerk/Cashier], shall be eligible to appear for the qualifying examination, even if they do not possess the prescribed minimum educational qualifications for the promotion post: [xxx] Provided also that appointment to 10% vacancies to be filled up by promotion under sub-rule (2), shall be made, in accordance with seniority in the feeder category, from among those who have attained the age of 52 years, without insisting on merit and ability, to be assessed through qualifying examination.” 10. It is the case of the first respondent that since he has crossed the age of 52, there is no requirement for him to pass the qualifying examination and hence, is entitled to be promoted as Assistant Secretary and thereafter, as Secretary. But, a perusal of the 2 nd proviso to Rule 185 (5) would go to show that the same is applicable for appointment to 10% of the vacancies to be filled up by promotion. The said proviso clearly says that for the said 10% vacancies, persons who have crossed age of 52 can be considered for promotion, without insisting for passing the qualifying examination. It is true that the first respondent had crossed the age of 52 at the time of issuing the promotion order. But, it is to be seen that admittedly there is only one post of Assistant Secretary/Secretary in the Bank. Since there is only one post of Assistant Secretary, there is no question of the afore reservation being made applicable to the post, enabling the first respondent to claim the benefit of the said proviso for promotion, even as Assistant Secretary. It is a settled law as held by the Apex court in State of Karnataka and others v. K. Govindappa and another, 2009 KHC 4031 that reservation cannot be applied to a single isolated post as it would amount to 100% reservation. It is a settled law as held by the Apex court in State of Karnataka and others v. K. Govindappa and another, 2009 KHC 4031 that reservation cannot be applied to a single isolated post as it would amount to 100% reservation. That apart, it is to be seen that it is an admitted fact that the 1 st respondent has passed the qualifying examination as specified in Rule 185 (5) only in March 2019, thereby disentitling him for promotion even to the post of Assistant Secretary on 1.11.2017, under normal rule. At this juncture, it would also be very relevant to take note that there is no order promoting the 1 st respondent to the post of Assistant Secretary. 11. The upshot of the afore discussions is that the learned single judge has failed to consider Rule 185 of the Rules in a proper perspective and has, by giving a wrong interpretation to it, arrived at a wrong conclusion. This, in turn, means that the impugned judgment passed by the learned single judge cannot be sustained and the same has to be set aside, by upholding Exts.P10 and P12 orders. But considering the fact that the first respondent has already retired, we are of the view that, he can be protected from any recovery steps being taken by the appellants to recover the benefits already paid to him. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed in part as follows: i) The impugned judgment dated 11.11.2022 in W.P. (C)No.31152/2022 is set aside, by upholding Exts.P10 and P12. ii) It is made clear that the appellants will not be entitled to recover the service benefits already paid to the first respondent.