ORDER : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. The instant application for suspension of sentence has been moved on behalf of the applicant in the matter of judgment dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, NDPS Cases, District Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No.02/2021 whereby he was convicted and sentenced to suffer maximum imprisonment of 20 years of R.I. along with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- under Section 8/22 of the NDPS Act. 2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial Judge has not appreciated the correct, legal and factual aspects of the matter and thus, reached at an erroneous conclusion of guilt, therefore, the same is required to be appreciated again by this court being the first appellate Court. The appellant was on bail during trial and did not misuse the liberty so granted to him; hearing of the appeal is likely to take long time, therefore, the application for suspension of sentence may be granted. 3. Per contra, learned public prosecutor has vehemently opposed the prayer made by learned counsel for the accused-applicant for releasing the appellant on application for suspension of sentence. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. There exists a fine yet significant distinction between the grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC. While the power exercised under Section 439 CrPC is essentially discretionary in nature and operates at the pre-conviction stage, the jurisdiction under Section 389 CrPC, though also discretionary, is qualitatively different and operates post-conviction. Under Section 389 CrPC, the appellate court is vested with a distinct authority; however, the core consideration before the appellate forum must necessarily be whether the judgment of conviction and the consequent order of sentence are sustainable in the eyes of law. 6. It is trite that the presumption of innocence, which enures in favour of an accused, comes to an end upon conviction. Consequently, while considering an application under Section 389 CrPC, the appellate court is required to examine the grounds raised in the appeal, and for such purpose, the oral and documentary evidence must be looked into. 6. It is trite that the presumption of innocence, which enures in favour of an accused, comes to an end upon conviction. Consequently, while considering an application under Section 389 CrPC, the appellate court is required to examine the grounds raised in the appeal, and for such purpose, the oral and documentary evidence must be looked into. Where, upon appreciation of evidence, it appears that the conclusions drawn by the trial court may be erroneous, and where logical, legal and sustainable arguments are advanced assailing the findings, disclosing a strong and arguable case, the appellate court is duty-bound to consider such contentions. 7. Where the sustainability of the conviction itself becomes debatable, and where the grounds raised in appeal, if adjudicated in favour of the appellant, disclose a real and substantial possibility of success, and where, prima facie, it appears that the conviction may be reversed and the appellant may be acquitted, the appellate court ought to suspend the sentence pending disposal of the appeal. 8. Such discretion deserves to be exercised with greater circumspection in cases where the appellate forum has sufficient reason to believe that the appeal is not likely to be taken up for hearing in the near future. In such circumstances, the court is required to assess whether the grounds raised are not merely ornamental but possess real substance and force, for the simple reason that if the appeal ultimately succeeds, the period of incarceration already undergone cannot be undone or restituted. In such a situation, the court should incline towards suspending the sentence. 9. At the same time, it is well settled that the appellate court is not required to record any definitive or conclusive finding, as doing so would amount to forming a pre-determined opinion on the merits of the appeal at an initial stage, without affording a full hearing on the appeal itself. It is sufficient if the court merely indicates that the grounds raised are prima facie appreciable, logical and legally tenable, that they are founded upon settled principles of law, and that there appears to be improper evaluation or assessment of evidence, or non-consideration / disregard of relevant statutory provisions. 10. It is sufficient if the court merely indicates that the grounds raised are prima facie appreciable, logical and legally tenable, that they are founded upon settled principles of law, and that there appears to be improper evaluation or assessment of evidence, or non-consideration / disregard of relevant statutory provisions. 10. It is also to be borne in mind that in several cases, the conviction may ultimately be converted to a lesser offence, or the propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court, being within its discretionary domain may also require reconsideration, particularly whether an adequate and proportionate sentence was imposed after due hearing on the point of sentence. These aspects, too, are open to re- examination at the appellate stage. 11. An appeal, in its true sense, is an extension of the trial, for the reason that additional evidence may be taken, and the entire body of evidence is subject to re-appreciation on both factual and legal parameters. At this stage, the appellate court is empowered to set aside the conviction, modify it, remand the matter, or maintain the judgment, as the case may be. 12. In this High Court, thousands of criminal appeals have remained pending for the last 20–30 years, including jail appeals, where even the likelihood of early hearing does not appear forthcoming. In such matters, instead of taking an irreversible risk, the court must proceed on the safer side by placing paramount importance on human dignity and personal liberty. 13. In view of the fact that the original record stands remitted back, learned counsel for the appellant has placed before this Court, for its considered perusal, the certified copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses along with the documents tendered into evidence. This Court has bestowed its anxious, careful, and minute consideration upon the same. At page No. 6 of the statement of PW-2 Shambhoo Dayal, the seizing officer, there emerges a clear and categorical admission that on the date of the alleged incident, one Vishwajeet Singh, Circle Inspector, was posted and functioning as the Station House Officer of Police Station Jawaharnagar. He has further admitted that no charge of the said police station was ever handed over to him. He has further admitted that no charge of the said police station was ever handed over to him. Conspicuously, there is not even a semblance of documentary material on record to demonstrate that PW-2 Shambhoo Dayal was either posted as the SHO or was lawfully entrusted with the charge of the police station in question. In absence of any such authorization, his claim of exercising the powers of a Station House Officer remains wholly unsubstantiated. It is trite law that, in terms of Notification No. 1/86, only those Sub-Inspectors who are duly posted as Station House Officers are vested with the competence to conduct search and seizure. Any departure from this statutory mandate strikes at the very root of the prosecution case. Thus, the search and seizure having been conducted by an incompetent person, the recovery stands irreparably vitiated in the eyes of law and cannot be pressed into service against the accused. 14. Hon’ble the Supreme Court passed a landmark judgment in the case of Roy V.D. Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 2001 SC 137 wherein, in a similar situation, it was observed as under:- 16. Now, it is plain that no officer other than an empowered officer can resort to Section 41(2) or exercise powers under Section 42(1) of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act or make a complaint under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36A of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act. If follows that any collection of material, detention or arrest of a person or search of a building or conveyance or seizure effected by an officer not being an empowered officer or an authorised officer under Section 41(2) of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, lacks sanction of law and is inherently illegal and as such the same cannot form the basis of a proceeding in respect of offences under Chapter IV of the Narcotic Drugs &Psychotropic Substances Act and use of such a material by the prosecution vitiates the trial. 18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence bases on such material butal so the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice. All the issues raised are vital in nature and carry sufficient force and substance, such that if they are adjudicated in favour of the appellant, the possibility of acquittal cannot be ruled out. The grounds raised are appreciable and necessitate definitive adjudication, which would require meticulous examination and re-appreciation of evidence, and there exists a reasonable possibility that such exercise may ultimately ensure to the benefit of the appellant. 15. Accordingly, the application for suspension of sentence filed under Section 389 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the sentence passed by learned trial court, the details of which are provided in the first para of this order, against the appellant-applicant named above shall remain suspended till final disposal of the aforesaid appeal and he shall be released on bail provided he executes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/-with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge and whenever ordered to do so till the disposal of the appeal on the conditions indicated below:- 1. That he will appear before the trial Court in the month of January of every year till the appeal is decided. 2. That if the applicant changes the place of residence, he will give in writing his changed address to the trial Court as well as to the counsel in the High Court. 3. That he will appear before the trial Court in the month of January of every year till the appeal is decided. 2. That if the applicant changes the place of residence, he will give in writing his changed address to the trial Court as well as to the counsel in the High Court. 3. Similarly, if the sureties change their address(s), they will give in writing their changed address to the trial Court. 16. The learned trial Court shall keep the record of attendance of the accused-applicant in a separate file. Such file be registered as Criminal Misc. Case related to original case in which the accused-applicant was tried and convicted. A copy of this order shall also be placed in that file for ready reference. Criminal Misc. file shall not be taken into account for statistical purpose relating to pendency and disposal of cases in the trial court. In case the said accused applicant does not appear before the trial court, the learned trial Judge shall report the matter to the High Court for cancellation of bail.