ORDER : 1. Union of India and the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force 1 [CISF] Bhilai are aggrieved by the common judgment and order dated 14th October, 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court, whereby the writ petitions of the respondents 1, 2 and 3, presented before it, have been allowed. Such petitions had challenged orders passed by the competent authority of the CISF holding the respondents 1, 2 and 3 ineligible for service under the CISF on the ground that their exoneration from criminal charges based on acquittals recorded by the trial courts were not honourable. Upon the orders under challenge being set aside, the petitioners were ordered to appoint the respondents 1, 2 and 3 in service as well as grant other benefits as indicated. 2. We have heard Mr. S.D. Sanjay, learned Additional Solicitor General for the petitioners. 3. In all the three cases under consideration, the respective complainants had accused the respondents 1, 2 and 3 of having committed offences, inter alia, against women which, if proved, could amount to moral turpitude. No doubt, in the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondent 1, giving him the “benefit of doubt” is found to have been recorded. However, at the same time, it is noticed that the prime witnesses were not believed and the trial court specifically observed of practically no reliable evidence being available on record to substantiate the prosecution case. With respect to the respondent 2, after the matter reached the court, the complainant herself moved an application under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that she did not seek to pursue the complaint and wished to settle the matter. Such prayer was granted and an order was made under sub-section (8) of Section 320, having the effect of an acquittal. Regarding the respondent 3, the trial court recorded a categorical finding that the prosecution had “miserably failed” to establish its case, thereby entitling the accused to acquittal. There is no mention of “benefit of doubt” in this judgment. 4. For the purpose of guidance of the appointing authorities, we propose to emphasize that while dealing with cases of the present nature, the appointing authority ought not to get unduly swayed merely because of user of the expression “benefit of doubt” by the trial court in its judgment. There is no mention of “benefit of doubt” in this judgment. 4. For the purpose of guidance of the appointing authorities, we propose to emphasize that while dealing with cases of the present nature, the appointing authority ought not to get unduly swayed merely because of user of the expression “benefit of doubt” by the trial court in its judgment. An acquittal could be based on technicality or upon a full consideration of the prosecution case. The judgment of acquittal in its entirety has to be read to ascertain whether the acquittal that has been recorded is other than honourable. If witnesses do not turn up for tendering evidence or turn hostile or the investigation is found to be flawed or there be any such similar vitiating factor and if these give rise to a lingering suspicion in the mind of the trial court that the witnesses have been won over or that the evidence has deliberately been withheld but, at the same time, the evidence/materials on record are absolutely inadequate or insufficient to record a finding of guilt, the trial courts are generally prone to record acquittal of the accused by giving them the benefit of doubt. Such an acquittal being based on technical grounds or on “benefit of doubt” would obviously fall short of an honourable acquittal. But, if the trial court upon consideration of the entirety of the evidence on record finds that the charge has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, yet, acquits the accused by recording that he is given the benefit of doubt, a claim of honourable acquittal could certainly be raised notwithstanding such recording. After all, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Much would, therefore, depend on witness behaviour and how the trial court appreciates and analyses the evidence. More often than not, it is found that the trial courts after recording that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case follows it up by giving the accused the “benefit of doubt.” If such be the finding, i.e. the accused is exonerated with no suspicion left, it would be thoroughly improper, unfair and unjust to deny an appointment on the specious ground of the acquittal being based on what the trial court terms as “benefit of doubt.” 5. Doubtless, the appointing authorities are the sole judges of eligibility and suitability of any individual aspiring for an appointment in a disciplined force. It is equally true that the appointing authorities do have an onerous duty of selecting individuals who have clean antecedents. However, the power to scrutinize claims for appointments and to proceed in that direction requires exercise of due care, caution and circumspection. The power cannot be exercised arbitrarily to the detriment and prejudice of prospective appointees by rejecting their claims, despite their fulfilment of other criteria, for no better reason than that such appointee had figured as an accused in a crime. The decision not to appoint must be based on sound reasons evincing application of mind to all relevant factors or else the same would be liable to judicial interdiction. 6. Although in a slightly different context, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramashanker Raghuvanshi, (1983) 2 SCC 145 this Court posed the question: whether Government service is a heaven where only angels can seek entry? This decision was noticed in subsequent decisions too, viz. K. Vijaya Lakshmi v. State of A.P. (2013) 5 SCC 489 and Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 . We can take judicial notice that over the past several years, across the country, quite a few of the incidents giving rise to registration of crimes are either politically motivated or designed to deprive someone of his legitimate dues. Unless there are strong reasons to hold the view that a prospective appointee has indulged in serious criminal or other subversive activity thereby disentitling him to an appointment, he may not be denied such appointment on hyper-technical grounds in these challenging times of lack of adequate opportunity of public employment. 7. What has also not escaped our notice is that the respondents 1, 2 and 3 did not attempt to secure public employment by deception. They were honest and truthful in their versions, a fact admitted even by Mr. Sanjay. As such, the restrictions envisaged in the relevant circulars applicable to the CISF could not have been invoked in any of the three cases under consideration to deny the benefits of appointment to the respondents 1, 2 and 3. 8. They were honest and truthful in their versions, a fact admitted even by Mr. Sanjay. As such, the restrictions envisaged in the relevant circulars applicable to the CISF could not have been invoked in any of the three cases under consideration to deny the benefits of appointment to the respondents 1, 2 and 3. 8. Since the impugned judgment and order of the Delhi High Court is based on proper appreciation of the relevant circulars as well as on a correct and proper understanding of the reasons assigned by the respective trial courts while acquitting the respondents 1, 2 and 3, we see no reason to interfere therewith; hence, the special leave petitions are dismissed. 9. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. 10. The directions given by the Delhi High Court may be implemented in right earnest.