JUDGMENT : Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy, J. These three intra court appeals arise out of a common order dated 29.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 19512 and 21914 of 2008 and 15224 of 2011. Since the issues involved in all these appeals are substantially common, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The appellants (State) assail the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the impugned proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“the Act”) were set aside on the ground that mandatory statutory notices, particularly under Sections 8(3) and 10(5) of the Act, were not served on the declarant or the person in possession. I. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3. The material facts, shorn of unnecessary detail, are that the lands in dispute are situated in Survey Nos. 157 and 158 of Narsingi Village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short “the Subject Lands”). The subject lands are recorded as agricultural lands, a fact which is not seriously disputed. The respondents / writ petitioners claim ownership and possession on the strength of a registered Sale Deed and an Agreement of Sale dated 24.03.1983, supported by continuous revenue entries (Pahanies) evidencing their possession. 4. The particulars of the writ petitions instituted by the respondents and the corresponding writ appeals preferred by the State are as follows: S.No. W.P.No. W.A.No. 1 19512/2008 1741/2018 2 21914/2008 1723/2018 3 15224/2011 10/2019 5. The case of the appellants is that the subject lands constitute “vacant land” within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the Act, that they were held in excess of the ceiling limit, and that upon completion of proceedings under the Act against the original declarants, the lands stood vested in the Government by operation of Section 10(3). 6. Before the learned Single Judge, the controversy crystallized around the following questions: (i) Whether actual possession of the subject land was taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act? (ii) Whether the mandatory requirement of Section 8 of the Act was complied with and (iii) Whether the petitioners were in possession of the land as on the relevant cut-off date. 7. (ii) Whether the mandatory requirement of Section 8 of the Act was complied with and (iii) Whether the petitioners were in possession of the land as on the relevant cut-off date. 7. The learned Single Judge, upon an exhaustive examination of the statutory framework and binding judicial precedents, held that the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act were vitiated due to non- service of the mandatory notice under Section 8(3). In the absence of such service, the consequential order under Section 8(4) was declared illegal. 8. It was further held that there was a clear failure of application of mind on the part of the competent authority in declaring the land as surplus, inasmuch as no consideration was given to the crucial issue whether the land fell within the definition of “urban land” or “vacant land” under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. The report of the Enquiry Officer dated 31.07.1979, which categorically recorded that the land was agricultural in nature and reflected as such in the revenue records, was ignored without assigning reasons, contrary to Section 2(o)(B) of the Act. 9. The learned Single Judge further found that the State failed to establish lawful and actual physical possession of the land under Section 10 of the Act. There was no proof of service of notices under Sections 10(5) or 10(6). The alleged taking over of possession on 28.08.1995 was found to be merely symbolic. The panchanama dated 25.08.1995 did not disclose the precise extent or identifiable boundaries of the land allegedly taken over. On the other hand, the revenue records consistently reflected the writ petitioner i.e., Smt. Sujatha Reddy, as pattadar and person in possession from 1983-84 to 2001-2002. 10. In the absence of valid notice and proof of actual physical possession, the learned Single Judge concluded that the alleged taking over of possession was invalid in the eye of law, and accordingly allowed the writ petitions. 11. Aggrieved by the said order, the State has preferred the present writ appeals, contending that the learned Single Judge erred in law and on facts in interfering with proceedings which, according to the appellants, had attained finality. 12. We have heard the learned Government Pleader for Assignment appearing for the appellants–State, Mr. V. Ramesh, the learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. D.S.V.G. Nagaraju, appearing for the respondents / writ petitioners, and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for Tourism. 12. We have heard the learned Government Pleader for Assignment appearing for the appellants–State, Mr. V. Ramesh, the learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. D.S.V.G. Nagaraju, appearing for the respondents / writ petitioners, and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for Tourism. We have also carefully perused the pleadings, the material placed on record, and the reasoning and conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellants (State) 13. Learned Government Pleader for Assignment, appearing for the appellants–State, contended that the respondents / writ petitioners lack locus standi to maintain the writ petitions, as they are neither absolute owners nor persons entitled in law to question proceedings initiated under the Act. It was urged that once the lands stood vested in the Government pursuant to proceedings under Section 10(3) of the Act, no right, title or interest survived in favour of the respondents. 14. It was further contended that possession of the subject lands was taken over by the authorities on 28.08.1995, and therefore, the respondents were never in possession so as to claim any benefit under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999(for short “Repeal Act”). According to the appellants, the alleged possession of the respondents is neither lawful nor supported by any enforceable right. 15. Learned Government Pleader submitted that the respondents’ claim to title and possession had already been adjudicated and had attained finality in earlier proceedings, particularly in W.P. Nos. 24398 and 25156 of 1995, and in the absence of any challenge to the said judgments before the Honourable Supreme Court, the findings therein operate as res judicata, precluding re-agitation of the issue of possession or entitlement to regularization under any Government Orders. 16. It was also urged that the subject lands were allotted to the Tourism Department for the purpose of establishment of an Artists’ Village, and that the respondents’ claim runs contrary to larger public interest. Mere entries in the revenue records, it was contended, do not confer title or lawful possession, nor can they defeat concluded proceedings under the Act. 17. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that reliance placed by the respondents on an Agreement of Sale does not confer any enforceable right, title or interest in immovable property unless such right is declared or recognized by a competent civil court. 17. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that reliance placed by the respondents on an Agreement of Sale does not confer any enforceable right, title or interest in immovable property unless such right is declared or recognized by a competent civil court. In the absence of such adjudication, the writ petitions were asserted to be not maintainable and motivated by an attempt to usurp valuable Government land. 18. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Mahalakshmi Motors Limitedd. v. MRO & others, 2007 (11) SCC 714 to contend that individual claims cannot override public interest and those persons without a subsisting legal right cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to defeat statutory acquisitions. b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Writ Petitioners 19. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners submitted that the initiation of proceedings under the Act itself was without jurisdiction, as the subject lands are agricultural in nature, continuously used as such, and therefore expressly excluded from the purview of the Act by virtue of Sections 2(o) and 2(q). 20. It was contended that the subject lands were never included in any notified Master Plan, lie outside the municipal limits, and fall only within the peripheral limits of the urban agglomeration. In the absence of statutory inclusion in a Master Plan, the lands could not have been treated as urban or vacant lands, rendering the proceedings void ab initio. 21. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents, having entered into possession under an Agreement of Sale, being reflected as possessors in the revenue records, and having been in actual, continuous possession and enjoyment of the lands, squarely fall within the expression “persons concerned” under Section 8(3) of the Act and were therefore entitled to mandatory notice and an opportunity of hearing. 22. It was emphatically urged that non-service of notices under Sections 8(3) and 10(5) strikes at the root of the proceedings. Issuance and service of such notices is mandatory and constitutes an integral facet of the principles of natural justice. Proceedings undertaken in violation thereof are void and unenforceable. 23. Lastly, it was contended that, in any event, by operation of the Repeal Act, all proceedings stood abated, inasmuch as no lawful or actual physical possession of the subject land was taken by the competent authority prior to the repeal. Proceedings undertaken in violation thereof are void and unenforceable. 23. Lastly, it was contended that, in any event, by operation of the Repeal Act, all proceedings stood abated, inasmuch as no lawful or actual physical possession of the subject land was taken by the competent authority prior to the repeal. It was submitted that the requirement of taking possession in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act is mandatory, and that mere notional or paper vesting under Section 10(3) does not divest the landholder or the person in possession of actual possession. In the absence of compliance with the statutory procedure, the proceedings initiated under the principal Act cannot survive after repeal and stand extinguished by operation of law. Reliance was placed on a consistent line of following decisions to submit that unless actual, physical possession is taken strictly in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) prior to repeal, the proceedings cannot survive: 1. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram , (2013) 4 SCC 280 2. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Collector and Competent Authority , (2012) 4 SCC 718 3. The Commissioner of Land Reforms & another V. Libra Electrical Meters (P) Limited , 1997 SCC OnLine Mad 1594 4. G. Krishnamoorthy and others v. Government of Tamilnadu , Madras High Court: W.P. No. 3749 of 2001 decided on 07.08.2009 5. The State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs S.L. Chitale & others , 2002 (1) CTC 18 6. T.V. Antony v. State of Tamil Nadu & others. , 2019 SCC Online SC 1486 7. Benjamin Mohanty v. State of Orissa and another , AIR 1982 ORISSA 236 8. Pratima Paul & others v. The Competent Authority and others , AIR 1990 CALCUTTA 185 9. G.V. Mohan & others v. State of Andhra Pradesh , APHC: W.P. No.9198 of 2007 decided on 08.10.2010 10. Mangalsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh , 2012 (3) SCALE 514 11. Government of Tamil Nadu v. Mecca Prime Tannery , 2012 (4) SCC 718 12. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector , 2014 (12) SCC 523 13. Competent authority v. Barangore Jute Factory & others , 2005 (13) SCC 477 14. Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana , (2012) 1 SCC 792 15. Union of India v. Ibrahi, Uddin and another , (2012) 8 SCC 148 16. Commissioner of Land Reforms v. M. Venkataraman , 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 4505 17. Competent authority v. Barangore Jute Factory & others , 2005 (13) SCC 477 14. Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana , (2012) 1 SCC 792 15. Union of India v. Ibrahi, Uddin and another , (2012) 8 SCC 148 16. Commissioner of Land Reforms v. M. Venkataraman , 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 4505 17. The Government of Tamil Nadu v. I. Richardson , 2014 (3) LW 328 18. Union of India and Others V. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others , (2014) 2 SCC 269 III. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION: 24. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the rival submissions, and the material placed on record, the following issues arise for determination: (i) Whether the respondents/writ petitioners have locus standi to assail the proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976? (ii) Whether the subject lands constitute “vacant land” within the meaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act? (iii) Whether non-service of notice under Section 8(3) of the Act vitiates the proceedings? (iv) Whether possession of the subject lands was lawfully taken in compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act? (v) Whether the proceedings stood abated by operation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999? (vi) Whether the order of the learned Single Judge warrants interference in appellate jurisdiction? IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: Issue (i): Locus Standi of the Respondents / Writ Petitioners 25. The first contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that the respondents/writ petitioners lack locus standi to question the proceedings initiated under the Act, as they are not absolute owners of the subject lands. According to the appellants, once the lands were declared surplus and vested in the Government, no right, title or interest survived in favour of the respondents so as to enable them to invoke writ jurisdiction. 26. Per contra, it is the case of the respondents that they are in lawful and settled possession of the subject lands, either under registered sale deeds or under an agreement of sale coupled with long- standing possession reflected in the revenue records. It is submitted that they are persons directly affected by the impugned proceedings and face imminent threat of dispossession, thereby entitling them to maintain the writ petitions. 27. The issue of locus standi in proceedings under the Act cannot be examined in a narrow or pedantic manner. It is submitted that they are persons directly affected by the impugned proceedings and face imminent threat of dispossession, thereby entitling them to maintain the writ petitions. 27. The issue of locus standi in proceedings under the Act cannot be examined in a narrow or pedantic manner. The scheme of the Act, particularly Section 8(3) read with Rule 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, makes it clear that notice is required not only to be served on the declarant but also on all persons who have, or are likely to have, any claim to, or interest in, the ownership or possession of the land. The statutory recognition of such persons itself indicates that the right to question proceedings is not confined only to absolute title holders. 28. It is well settled that a person in lawful, recognized or settled possession, whose rights are likely to be adversely affected by statutory proceedings, has sufficient standing to seek judicial review. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is available to any person who demonstrates a real and substantial grievance arising from an action which is alleged to be illegal, arbitrary or without jurisdiction. 29. The contention of the appellants that vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act automatically extinguishes all rights of the landholder or person in possession cannot be accepted. The law is now settled that vesting under Section 10(3) is only a de jure vesting of title and does not, by itself, amount to de facto possession. Actual physical possession can be taken only in the manner prescribed under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. In the absence of lawful taking of possession, the landholder or the person in possession cannot be divested of their right to question the proceedings. 30. In the present case, the respondents assert continuous possession of the subject lands for several decades, supported by revenue records. They further allege that the authorities sought to deal with the lands by treating them as surplus and proposing allotment to another Department, thereby posing a direct and immediate threat to their possession. Such persons cannot be characterized as strangers or third parties to the proceedings. 31. The objection based on res judicata is equally misconceived. The question of locus standi must be examined with reference to the legality of the impugned proceedings and the nature of the right asserted. Such persons cannot be characterized as strangers or third parties to the proceedings. 31. The objection based on res judicata is equally misconceived. The question of locus standi must be examined with reference to the legality of the impugned proceedings and the nature of the right asserted. Where proceedings are alleged to be vitiated by non- compliance with mandatory statutory requirements and violation of principles of natural justice, the plea of finality cannot be invoked to shut out judicial scrutiny. 32. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that the respondents / writ petitioners, being persons in possession and directly affected by the impugned proceedings, possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the writ petitions and to challenge the validity of the proceedings initiated under the Act. Issue (ii): Whether the subject lands constitute “vacant land” within the meaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act 33. Issue (ii) strikes at the very jurisdiction of the competent authority to initiate proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The applicability of the Act itself depends upon whether the subject lands fall within the statutory definitions of “urban land” and consequently “vacant land” under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. 34. At this stage, it is apposite to extract the relevant statutory provisions. Section 2(o) of the Act defines “urban land” as follows: Section: 2(o) "urban land" means, (i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or (ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small-town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture… 35. Section 2(q) defines “vacant land” thus: “2(q) ‘vacant land’ means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration….” A conjoint reading of the above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that land mainly used for agricultural purposes is expressly excluded from the definitions of both “urban land” and “vacant land”. 36. Section 2(q) defines “vacant land” thus: “2(q) ‘vacant land’ means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration….” A conjoint reading of the above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that land mainly used for agricultural purposes is expressly excluded from the definitions of both “urban land” and “vacant land”. 36. The consistent case of the respondents is that the subject lands situated in Survey Nos. 157 and 158 of Narsingi Village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, are agricultural lands, continuously used for agricultural purposes and recorded as such in the revenue records. This assertion stands corroborated by the Enquiry Officer’s report dated 31.07.1979, which categorically recorded the lands as agricultural, and by the certificate dated 13.03.1983 issued by the office of the Special Officer certifying that the lands were situated outside the municipal limits, within the peripheral limits of the urban agglomeration, and were not urban lands so long as they continued to be used for agriculture. 37. It is not the case of the appellants that the subject lands were ever converted for non-agricultural use or that they ceased to be agricultural prior to initiation of proceedings under the Act. No material whatsoever has been placed on record to establish that the lands were put to any use other than agriculture so as to attract the statutory definition of “vacant land”. 38. The legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. The Honourable Supreme Court, while interpreting Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, has consistently held that agricultural land stands excluded from the purview of the Act, and that the character and use of the land are determinative. In State of Gujarat v. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja , 2013 (2) SCC 300 , the Honourable Supreme Court observed that land mainly used for agriculture, even if situated within an urban agglomeration, does not fall within the definition of vacant land under the Act. The Apex Court held thus: “44. Under the Act, 1976 while defining ‘vacant land’, the said definition specifically excludes a ‘land’ used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’. The definition of ‘Urban Land’ again makes the position clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’.” 39. The definition of ‘Urban Land’ again makes the position clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’.” 39. The principle that the actual and dominant use of the land is decisive for determining its character under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act has evolved consistently through judicial pronouncements. In Libra Electrical Meters (P) Limited’s case (supra), the Madras High Court held that land can be treated as “vacant land” only when it is established that it is mainly used for a purpose other than agriculture and that mere location within an urban agglomeration or potential for urban use does not alter its statutory character. This position was reiterated in S.L. Chitale’s case (supra), wherein it was emphasized that land recorded and used as agricultural cannot be brought within the sweep of the Act merely because it lies within urban or peripheral limits, unless there is clear evidence of conversion to non-agricultural use. The Honourable Supreme Court, in T.V. Antony’s case (supra), subsequently affirmed and authoritatively crystallized this principle by holding that, so long as land continues to be mainly used for agricultural purposes and is not diverted to a non- agricultural use, it stands excluded from the definition of “urban land” under Section 2(o) and cannot be treated as “vacant land” under the Act. 40. An additional and equally determinative jurisdictional requirement under the Act is the inclusion of the land in a notified or statutory Master Plan. The definition of “urban land” under Section 2(o) predicates either an express reference to such land in a Master Plan or, in the absence thereof, its location within municipal limits. In the absence of either condition, the competent authority lacks jurisdiction to proceed under the Act. 41. This position has been consistently recognized in Pratima Paul and Others (supra), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that agricultural lands which are recorded as such in the revenue records and are in fact used for agricultural purposes do not lose their statutory character merely because of their location, unless they are shown to be included in a notified Master Plan. The Court emphasized that Master Plan inclusion is not a procedural formality but a foundational jurisdictional fact. 42. The Court emphasized that Master Plan inclusion is not a procedural formality but a foundational jurisdictional fact. 42. In the present case, the material on record unequivocally establishes that the subject lands were not covered by any notified or statutory Master Plan. In the absence of such statutory inclusion, the very assumption of jurisdiction by the competent authority stands vitiated. When read in conjunction with the established agricultural use of the land, the initiation of proceedings under the Act is rendered wholly unsustainable in law. 43. In the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court concurs with the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the competent authority proceeded on an erroneous premise and failed to advert to the statutory exclusions and jurisdictional requirements embodied in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. Such failure to consider foundational jurisdictional facts amounts to non-application of mind and vitiates the proceedings at their inception. 44. This Court accordingly holds that the subject lands, being agricultural lands, not shown to be included in any notified Master Plan, do not constitute “urban land” or “vacant land” within the meaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. Consequently, the initiation and continuation of proceedings under the Act in respect of the subject lands are without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law. Issue (iii): Whether non-service of notice under Section 8(3) vitiates the proceedings 45. Issue (iii) concerns compliance with the mandatory procedural safeguards prescribed under the Act prior to determination of surplus land. Section 8(3) of the Act obligates the competent authority to serve the draft statement on the declarant and afford an opportunity to file objections before passing final orders under Section 8(4). This statutory requirement is amplified and operationalised by Rule 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976. 46. At this juncture, it is necessary to extract Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, which read as follows: “Rule 5 – Particulars to be contained in draft statement as regards vacant lands and manner of service of the same: (1) Every draft statement prepared under sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall contain the particulars specified in Form III. At this juncture, it is necessary to extract Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, which read as follows: “Rule 5 – Particulars to be contained in draft statement as regards vacant lands and manner of service of the same: (1) Every draft statement prepared under sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall contain the particulars specified in Form III. (2)(a) The draft statement shall be served, together with the notice referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 8, on— (i) the holder of the vacant land; and (ii) all other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or are likely to have, any claim to, or interest in, the ownership or possession or both, of the vacant land, by sending the same by registered post addressed to the person concerned— (i) in the case of the holder of the vacant land, to his address as given in the statement filed under Section 6; and (ii) in the case of other persons, to their last known addresses.” 47. A plain reading of Rule 5 makes it abundantly clear that the obligation to serve the draft statement and notice under Section 8(3) is not confined to the declarant alone, but expressly extends to all persons who have, or are likely to have, any claim to or interest in the ownership or possession of the land. The rule thus embodies the principle of audi alteram partem and statutorily recognises the rights of persons in possession or having an interest in the land to participate in the adjudicatory process. 48. Compliance with Rule 5 is, therefore, not a mere procedural formality, but a mandatory safeguard designed to ensure that no person is divested of rights or possession without notice and an opportunity of being heard. Any determination of surplus land made in violation of this requirement stands vitiated in law. 49. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has recorded a clear finding that no material was produced by the authorities to establish service of notice under Section 8(3) either on the declarant or on the respondents, who were admittedly in possession and whose names stood reflected in the revenue records. The alleged reliance on an untraceable written statement dated. 28.07.1983, said to have been filed by the declarant was rightly rejected in the absence of any contemporaneous record. 50. The alleged reliance on an untraceable written statement dated. 28.07.1983, said to have been filed by the declarant was rightly rejected in the absence of any contemporaneous record. 50. The legal position is well settled that failure to serve notice under Section 8(3) of the Act, read with Rule 5 of the Rules, vitiates the entire proceedings. Where the statute mandates service of notice on persons concerned, compliance is not a matter of discretion but a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction. Non-service of such notice strikes at the very root of the proceedings. In G. Krishnamoorthy’s case (supra), it has been categorically held by the Madras High Court that determination of surplus land without issuing notice to persons in possession is impermissible in law and renders the proceedings void. The Court emphasized that persons whose possession or interest is likely to be affected cannot be excluded from the statutory process, and any adjudication undertaken behind their back is a nullity. 51. The Honourable Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised that statutory prescriptions governing notice and hearing cannot be diluted on considerations of expediency. Where the statute itself incorporates the principles of natural justice, compliance therewith is mandatory, and any action taken in violation thereof is rendered non est. 52. In view of the express language of Rule 5(2)(a), the respondents, being persons in possession and having a demonstrable interest in the land, were entitled to service of notice and an opportunity of filing objections. The failure of the competent authority to do so renders the proceedings under Section 8(4) illegal and unsustainable. 53. This Court, therefore, holds that non-service of notice under Section 8(3) of the Act, read with Rule 5(1) and 5(2)(a) of the Rules, vitiates the entire proceedings, and the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside the same on this ground. Issue (iv): Whether possession of the subject lands was lawfully taken in compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act 54. Issue (iv) concerns the State’s assertion that possession of the subject lands was taken prior to the coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. The legality of such assertion must be tested strictly on the anvil of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which exclusively govern the manner in which physical possession may be assumed by the State. 55. The legality of such assertion must be tested strictly on the anvil of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which exclusively govern the manner in which physical possession may be assumed by the State. 55. Section 10(5) mandates that where vacant land is vested in the State under Section 10(3), the competent authority shall, by notice in writing, require the person in possession to surrender or deliver possession within the stipulated period. Section 10(6) permits forcible dispossession only upon failure to comply with such notice. 56. The statutory scheme thus makes a clear and conscious distinction between vesting of land under Section 10(3) and taking of actual physical possession. Vesting under Section 10(3) is not self- executory so far as possession is concerned and does not, by itself, divest the landholder or the person in possession of physical control over the land. 57. The law on the manner in which possession may be taken under the Act, stands authoritatively settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra), wherein it was held that vesting under Section 10(3) results only in de jure vesting, and that de facto possession can be taken only by strict compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6). The issuance and service of notice under Section 10(5) was held to be mandatory. 58. The Honourable Supreme Court further explained that Section 10(5) contemplates peaceful dispossession pursuant to notice, whereas Section 10(6) contemplates forcible dispossession, which can be resorted to only upon failure to comply with the notice issued under Section 10(5). Any deviation from this statutory sequence renders the act of dispossession legally impermissible. The Honourable Court held as under: “30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such a hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155 , while interpreting Section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows: “We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To vest, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 32. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act. 33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub- section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of “possession” which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub- section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub- section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub- section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub- section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10. 37. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non- issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 59. Effect of non- issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 59. This principle has been consistently reiterated and reinforced in subsequent decisions including M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra) and Mangalsen’s case (supra), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court held that possession claimed by the State without issuance and service of notice under Section 10(5) cannot be recognised as lawful possession. The Court deprecated reliance on internal records, possession memos or panchanamas prepared without statutory compliance, characterising such possession as illusory or paper possession. 60. The Honourable Supreme Court in M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra) further held that the procedure under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) is not an empty formality but a substantive safeguard, and unless dispossession is effected strictly in the manner known to law, the State cannot claim the benefit of vesting so as to defeat the operation of the Repeal Act. The Honourable Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations: “21 . Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 respectively which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present Appeals read as under: “10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit— (5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of notice. (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary”. 22 . 22 . On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder or any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person to surrender or deliver possession of such land. It is only when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) within a period of thirty days of the service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use force, if necessary. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 within the prescribed period. 23 . In State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 , this Court in the context of the Act, 1976 held that the said Act being an expropriatory legislation should be construed strictly. 24 . This Court in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 , in the context of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 held thus: — “The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The state and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof”. (Emphasis supplied) 25 . Thus, applying the principle of strict construction as explained in the aforesaid two decisions, the authorities are required to act strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. Thus, when sub-section (5) of Section 10 mandates giving notice of an order under the said sub-section to the person in possession, the same is required to be complied with in its true letter and spirit. Considering the nature of rights involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof, cannot be said to be due compliance with the provisions of the statute. Considering the nature of rights involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof, cannot be said to be due compliance with the provisions of the statute. Besides, the provisions of subsection (6) of Section 10 can be resorted to only if the person fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) thereof, within a period of thirty days of service of notice. Hence, possession cannot be taken over under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 unless a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice has elapsed. In absence of service of notice under sub-section (5) of Section 10, there will be no starting point for calculating the period of thirty days. In other words, time will not start running, hence the question of taking over possession under sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 will not arise at all. In this view of the matter, in the case on hand, it was not open to the respondent authorities to resort to the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 without first strictly complying with the provisions of sub-section (5) thereof. Hence, such action being in contravention of the statutory provisions cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down. Validity of Transactions – Relevance to Possession Proceedings 61. It is in the above statutory and jurisprudential backdrop that the contention of the appellants regarding the alleged invalidity of the sale deeds and agreements of sale relied upon by the respondents / writ petitioners is required to be examined. Proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 are not proceedings for adjudication of title, and the competent authority is not vested with jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of private conveyances. 62. For the purposes of compliance with Sections 8(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, the determinative consideration is not the ultimate validity of the transaction, but whether the person concerned is in possession or has a claim or interest in the land. Even where the State disputes the validity of a private transaction, such dispute cannot justify denial of statutory notice nor legitimise dispossession otherwise than in accordance with law. Questions relating to title can be adjudicated only by a competent civil court and cannot be collaterally presumed against the respondents in proceedings under the Act. 63. Even where the State disputes the validity of a private transaction, such dispute cannot justify denial of statutory notice nor legitimise dispossession otherwise than in accordance with law. Questions relating to title can be adjudicated only by a competent civil court and cannot be collaterally presumed against the respondents in proceedings under the Act. 63. It is a settled principle that even a person in settled possession without perfected title cannot be dispossessed except by authority of law. Where the statute itself mandates notice and prescribes a specific procedure for taking possession, the State cannot circumvent such safeguards by questioning the validity of underlying transactions. Any such attempt would amount to deprivation of possession without due process. 64. Turning to the facts of the present case, the appellants assert that possession was taken on 28.08.1995. However, the record discloses that no notice under Section 10(5) was ever served either on the declarant or on the respondents, who were admittedly in possession. There is also no material to show that proceedings under Section 10(6) were initiated or that forcible dispossession was lawfully effected. 65. The panchanama dated 25.08.1995 relied upon by the appellants neither specifies the precise extent nor identifies the boundaries of the land allegedly taken possession of, nor does it evidence actual physical dispossession. In the absence of statutory compliance, it can only be characterised as evidencing paper possession. 66. On the contrary, the revenue records consistently reflect the respondents as persons in possession even subsequent to the alleged date of taking possession. These contemporaneous public records strongly support the respondents’ case that possession was never lawfully taken by the State. 67. This Court accordingly holds that the appellants have failed to establish lawful taking of possession of the subject lands in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. The possession claimed by the State is merely symbolic and is non-est in law. Issue (v): Whether the proceedings stood abated by operation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 68. Issue (v) concerns the effect of the Repeal Act on the proceedings initiated against the subject lands. The determinative question is whether the State had taken lawful and actual physical possession of the lands prior to the commencement of the Repeal Act. 69. Issue (v) concerns the effect of the Repeal Act on the proceedings initiated against the subject lands. The determinative question is whether the State had taken lawful and actual physical possession of the lands prior to the commencement of the Repeal Act. 69. Section 3 of the Repeal Act provides that all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act shall stand abated, except in cases where possession of the surplus land has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by it. The saving clause thus makes it abundantly clear that only those cases where actual possession had been lawfully taken prior to repeal survive. 70. The legal position governing the scope and effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is now well settled. The Honourable Supreme Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra ) held that for the purpose of saving proceedings from abatement, possession contemplated under Section 3 of the Repeal Act must be actual, physical possession, taken in accordance with law, and that mere vesting under Section 10(3) or preparation of internal records does not suffice. 71. This principle has been consistently reiterated in Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar’s case (supra), Gajanan Kamlya Patil’s case (supra) and Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi v. State of Gujarat , (2016) 4 SCC 531 wherein it has been held that unless the State establishes lawful dispossession in compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act prior to repeal, the proceedings automatically abate. 72. In M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court, after examining the interplay between the principal Act and the Repeal Act, reiterated that paper possession or symbolic possession cannot be treated as possession in the eye of law for the purpose of invoking the saving clause under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The Court held at paragraph Nos.20 and 40 as under: “20 . Thus, by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999, if possession of vacant land has been taken over on behalf of the State Government before the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, the repeal of the Principal Act would not affect the vesting of such land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of Act, 1976. Hence, the issue as to whether actual possession of land declared excess under the Act has been taken over or not assumes great significance after the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999 inasmuch as if possession has not been taken over, the proceedings would abate under Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and the ownership of the land, if vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976 would be required to be restored to the original land-holder subject to repayment of any amount that has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land.” “40 . The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is further clear. If the landowner remains in physical possession, then irrespective of his land being declared surplus and/or entry being made in favour of the State in revenue records, he will not be divested of his rights. Even if compensation is received that also will not dis-entitle him to claim the benefit if compensation is refunded, provided he is in actual physical possession. Payment of compensation has no co-relation with the taking of actual physical possession as with the vesting land compensation becomes payable which can be paid without taking actual physical possession.” 73. In the present case, as already held while dealing with Issue (iv), the appellants have failed to establish that possession of the subject lands was taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. No notice under Section 10(5) was served, no lawful proceedings under Section 10(6) were undertaken, and the so-called possession claimed by the State is unsupported by any legally sustainable material. 74. In the absence of lawful and actual physical possession having been taken prior to the commencement of the Repeal Act, the inevitable consequence is that all proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated by operation of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State, therefore, cannot assert any subsisting right over the subject lands on the basis of the repealed legislation. 75. This Court accordingly holds that the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, in respect of the subject lands, stood abated on the coming into force of the Repeal Act, and no further action could have been lawfully taken thereunder. Issue (vi): Whether the order of the learned Single Judge warrants interference in appellate jurisdiction 76. 75. This Court accordingly holds that the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, in respect of the subject lands, stood abated on the coming into force of the Repeal Act, and no further action could have been lawfully taken thereunder. Issue (vi): Whether the order of the learned Single Judge warrants interference in appellate jurisdiction 76. Issue (vi) relates to the scope of interference by this Court in intra-court appellate jurisdiction with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is well settled that an appellate court would interfere only where the findings recorded are shown to be perverse, contrary to law, or based on mis-appreciation of material on record. 77. In the present case, the learned Single Judge undertook a detailed and meticulous examination of the statutory provisions governing the Act, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, and the binding precedents of the Honourable Supreme Court. The conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge are firmly founded on the statutory scheme and the settled legal position. 78. The learned Single Judge correctly held that the subject lands are agricultural in nature, excluded from the purview of the Act under Sections 2(o) and 2(q), and that the competent authority lacked jurisdiction to treat the same as vacant land. This finding is supported by contemporaneous revenue records, the enquiry report, and the absence of inclusion of the lands in any notified Master Plan. 79. The finding that the proceedings stood vitiated on account of non-service of mandatory notice under Section 8(3), read with Rule 5(1) and 5(2)(a) of the Rules, is fully in consonance with the statutory mandate and the principles of natural justice. No material has been produced by the appellants to dislodge this finding. 80. The learned Single Judge further recorded a correct finding that lawful and actual physical possession of the lands was never taken by the State in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. This finding is squarely supported by the consistent line of decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court, including Hari Ram’s case (supra), M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra) , and the other authorities referred to hereinbefore. 81. Once it is held that possession was not lawfully taken, the conclusion that the proceedings stood abated by operation of the Repeal Act necessarily follows. 81. Once it is held that possession was not lawfully taken, the conclusion that the proceedings stood abated by operation of the Repeal Act necessarily follows. The learned Single Judge, therefore, committed no error in law in setting aside the proceedings initiated under the principal Act. 82. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error in the reasoning or conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge. The contentions advanced in appeal merely seek a re-appreciation of facts and settled legal principles, which is impermissible in appellate jurisdiction. 83. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the order of the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. The writ appeals are devoid of merit. VI. CONCLUSIONS: 84. On a holistic consideration of the statutory framework of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Rules framed thereunder, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, and the binding precedents governing the field, this Court records the following conclusions. 85. The subject lands are agricultural in character, continuously recorded and used as such, and are not shown to have been included in any notified Master Plan. In view of the express exclusion contained in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, they do not fall within the definition of either “urban land” or “vacant land”. The initiation of proceedings under the Act in respect thereof was, therefore, without jurisdiction. 86. The respondents/writ petitioners, being persons in possession and having a demonstrable claim or interest in the subject lands, fall within the ambit of “persons concerned” under Section 8(3) read with Rule 5(1) and 5(2)(a) of the Rules. The admitted failure to serve mandatory notice upon them strikes at the root of the proceedings and renders the determination unsustainable. 87. The Vesting Contemplated under Section 10(3) of the Act is only de jure and does not by itself result in divestment of physical possession. Lawful assumption of physical possession can be effected only upon strict compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6). In the absence of service of notice under Section 10(5) and lawful dispossession in the manner known to law, the possession claimed by the State is merely symbolic or paper possession, which is non-est. 88. The challenge raised by the appellants to the validity of the sale deeds or agreements of sale relied upon by the respondents is misconceived. In the absence of service of notice under Section 10(5) and lawful dispossession in the manner known to law, the possession claimed by the State is merely symbolic or paper possession, which is non-est. 88. The challenge raised by the appellants to the validity of the sale deeds or agreements of sale relied upon by the respondents is misconceived. Proceedings under the Act are not proceedings for adjudication of title, and disputed questions relating to the validity of private transactions cannot be invoked to deny statutory notice or to bypass mandatory procedural safeguards. 89. In the absence of lawful and actual physical possession of the subject lands was taken prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act, all the proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated by operation of Section 3 thereof. No right, title or interest can thereafter be claimed by the state on the basis of such abated proceedings. 90. The learned Single Judge, upon a correct appreciation of statutory scheme and the binding precedents governing the field, rightly interfered with proceedings which were vitiated by lack of jurisdiction and non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements. This Court finds no error, jurisdictional or otherwise warranting interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction. VII. RESULT 91. In view of the conclusions recorded hereinabove, and for the reasons stated, all the Writ Appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. 92. The common order dated 29.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 19512 and 21914 of 2008 and 15224 of 2011 is hereby affirmed. 93. It is held and declared that the proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in respect of the subject lands are without jurisdiction, vitiated for non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements, and stood abated by operation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 94. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in these appeals, shall stand closed.