JUDGMENT : The present Writ Appeal is directed against the order dated 12.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3148 of 2025, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the proceedings dated 18.12.2024 issued by the Telangana State Waqf Board (for short “the Board”) appointing the appellants (respondent Nos.3 to 9 in the Writ Petition) as President and Members of the Towliath Committee of Dargah Hazrath Imam Ali Shah Quadri (R.H.), Balapur, and further directed the Board to reconstitute the said Committee considering the claim of respondent No.1 (writ petitioner) for the post of President with preferential status. 2. For the sake of clarity and brevity, the parties are hereafter referred to as they were arrayed in the Writ Petition. Factual background (succinctly stated) 3. Dargah Hazrath Imam Ali Shah Quadri, Balapur (for short ‘the Balapur Dargah’) is a notified Waqf institution bearing Serial No.2958, as published in the Gazette dated 09.02.1989. Upon the demise of the original Mutawalli, disputes arose regarding succession to the office of Mutawalli. In order to resolve the said disputes, a Family Compromise dated 25.02.1960 (for short ‘the Compromise Deed’) was recorded in Case No.13/2 of 1959. 4. The key terms of the Compromise Deed were: i. A Towliath (Management) Committee shall be constituted. ii. Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri (father of the Writ Petitioner and grandfather of respondent No.3) shall be the President. iii. In case of any eventuality concerning the President, his legal heirs or nominee would succeed him. 5. Subsequent disputes between the parties culminated in further litigation. A Division Bench of this Court, by Judgment in W.A.No.23 of 1992, directed the constitution of a fresh Towliath Committee strictly in accordance with the Compromise Deed, while continuing Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri as the Chairman thereof. In compliance with the said directions, the Waqf Board constituted a five-member Towliath Committee vide proceedings dated 03.04.1993. 6. Upon the demise of Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri, his 2 nd son, Syed Sultan Mohiuddin Quadri, who is the brother of the writ petitioner, was appointed as Mutawalli/President of the Balapur Dargah through Gazette Notifications dated 20.01.2005 and 08.02.2007. The said appointment made under Section 63 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’), was assailed before the Waqf Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’). However, the challenge was dismissed and the appointment was upheld by the order dated16.09.2006 in O.A.No.4 of 2005. The said appointment made under Section 63 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’), was assailed before the Waqf Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’). However, the challenge was dismissed and the appointment was upheld by the order dated16.09.2006 in O.A.No.4 of 2005. 7. Subsequently, the Board appointed Syed Sultan Mohiuddin Quadri as Mutawalli under Section 42 of the Act vide proceedings dated 29.06.2012. The said appointment was assailed in O.A.No.45 of 2016 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by judgment dated 01.10.2021, allowed the O.A, set aside the impugned appointment, and issued elaborate directions for reconstitution of the Towliath Committee in strict conformity with the Compromise Deed and the proceedings dated 03.04.1993. The Tribunal categorically held that the office of President shall be filled from the first branch, namely the branch of Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri, and that the remaining members of the committee shall be drawn from each of the five branches of the family. 8. The order of the Tribunal was challenged in C.R.P.No.1608 of 2021. The said C.R.P. was disposed of by this Court on 27.09.2023 with a modification, as follows: “The Waqf Board is directed to constitute a Towliath Committee from the members of all the branches and the President shall be appointed from the first branch as per the terms of compromise dated 25.02.1960 and as per the direction of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.23 of 1992 dated 03.02.1992.” The order dated 27.09.2023 passed by this Court in C.R.P.No.1608 of 2021 was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition (SLP). The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the said SLP on 16.02.2024 thereby confirming the order passed by this Court in the said C.R.P. 9. In compliance of the order in the said C.R.P.No.1608 of 2021, the Board issued the impugned proceedings dated 18.12.2024 appointing respondent No.3/appellant No.1 herein i.e., Syed Zainul Abideen Hussaini Quadri as President and respondent Nos.4 to 9/appellant Nos.2 to 7 herein as Members of the Towliath Committee. The respondent No.3 is the grandson of Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri (daughter’s son i.e., maternal grandson). 10. The respondent No.3 is the grandson of Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri (daughter’s son i.e., maternal grandson). 10. The Writ Petitioner, being the son of late Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri, challenged the proceedings dated 18.12.2024 before the learned Single Judge, contending that the appointment of a maternal grandson as President, overlooking him, violated the terms of the Compromise Deed, the directions of this Court and Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. The respondent No.3 aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge preferred the present writ appeal. The primary thrust of the appellant’s challenge is on the maintainability of the writ petition. It is vehemently contended that the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error in entertaining the writ petition when a complete, efficacious, statutory alternative remedy by way of an application under Section 83 of the Act, was available to the writ petitioner. On merits, it is argued that the term ‘legal heirs’ in the Compromise Deed and the ‘first branch’ in the Court’s order are broad enough to include a grandson and the Board had validly exercised jurisdiction under Section 63 of the Act. 12. The learned Single Judge, repelling the objection as to maintainability and by relying on the judgment in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 , held that the writ petition was maintainable. On merits, it was held that the son (writ petitioner) and the daughter's son (appellant No.1) were not equals; the son had a preferential claim. It was also held that mere pendency of complaints against the writ petitioner could not disqualify him without enquiry. Consequently, the learned Single Judge set aside the impugned proceedings and directed the Board to reconstitute the Committee, giving preference to the writ petitioner for Presidentship. 13. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt. Vedula Chitralekha, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri Ashfaq Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent No.1, Sri Ananthula Ravi, learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare appearing for respondent No.2 and Sri Farhan Azam Khan, learned Standing Counsel for Telangana State Waqf Board appearing for respondent No.3 and perused the record. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellants 14. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted: i. That the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the writ petition despite the availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy under Section 83 of the Act. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellants 14. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted: i. That the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the writ petition despite the availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy under Section 83 of the Act. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute relating to an order of the Board. Reliance was placed on M.P. Waqf Board v. Subhan Shah , (2006) 10 SCC 696 , and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi , (2012) 4 SCC 307 ii. That the exception in Whirlpool Corporation (supra)does not apply to the present case, as no violation of any fundamental right or legal right of the writ petitioner; or jurisdictional error, is made out by the writ petitioner. iii. That the learned Single Judge erred in applying Article 14 of the Constitution to the Mohammedan law, religious office context. The post of President of a Towliath Committee is not a public office amenable to strict scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Board’s discretion under Section 63 of the Act is wide and administrative. iv. That the Compromise Deed and the subsequent judicial directions use the expression “legal heirs or nominee”. Under Mohammedan law, which governs the Waqf Act, and as per Section 205-A of Mulla's Principles, a daughter’s son is a legal heir and is not excluded from consideration. The Board correctly interpreted that sons and grandsons (including through daughters) from the first branch are eligible. v. That the learned Single Judge transgressed into the realm of factual appraisal, reappreciating the suitability of candidates, which is the Board’s domain under Section63 of the Act. vi. That the Board’s impugned order was passed in meticulous compliance with the directions in C.R.P.No. 1608 of 2021, which only mandated appointment from the “first branch”, without specifying “son” to the exclusion of “grandson”. Submissions of learned counsel for the respondents 15. Learned counsel for respondent No.1/writ petitioner supported the learned Single Judge’s order and contended that the Board’s action was in blatant violation of specific judicial directions and was arbitrary, thus warranting intervention under writ jurisdiction, by making the following submissions: i. That the writ jurisdiction was rightly invoked as the Board’s order was in flagrant violation of specific directions of this Court in C.R.P.No.1608 of 2021, which constituted a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the appointment of the committee under the impugned order was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. ii. That the core direction of this Court was to appoint the President “from the first branch”. The natural, ordinary and legal meaning of succession in the context of the Compromise Deed, where the founder’s intent was family-based management, mandates that the immediate male descendant (son) succeeds, not a descendant from a daughter who moves into another family line, after her marriage. iii. That when the Board makes an appointment; its action must be non-arbitrary. Treating a son and a daughter’s son as equals for this specific religious-office succession is irrational, as their degrees of relationship and lines of descent are fundamentally different. iv. That the Compromise Deed aimed at family harmony and preventing disputes, by clarifying lineal succession from the named President. This intent is defeated by appointing a maternal grandson over a son as a President of the committee. 16. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1/writ petitioner in support of their case has placed reliance on the following decisions: i. Whirlpool Corporation (supra) ii. Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and others , (2003) 2 SCC 107 iii. Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others , (2021) 6 SCC 771 iv. M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others , MANU/SC/0086/2023 17. Learned Standing Counsel for Waqf Board (respondent No.3), adopted the arguments on maintainability and added: i. The Board, after considering all applications and the historical context, has found that representation from the first branch was satisfied by appointing a grandson as the president and a great-grandson as a member of the Committee. The Board’s decision was a bona fide exercise of power under Section 63 of the Act. ii. The alleged criminal complaints against the writ petitioner were a relevant, though not a sole factor for considering the overall suitability for managing a large Waqf property. 18. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and perused the material on record. Consideration by this Court Maintainability of the writ petition 19. ii. The alleged criminal complaints against the writ petitioner were a relevant, though not a sole factor for considering the overall suitability for managing a large Waqf property. 18. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and perused the material on record. Consideration by this Court Maintainability of the writ petition 19. The foremost challenge which eclipses all other questions and which needs to be resolved at the threshold is the very maintainability of the underlying writ petition filed under Article 226 in the face of Section 83 of the Act; and whether the learned Single Judge ought to have exercised writ jurisdiction in the face of the explicit statutory scheme delineated in the waqf Act. Section 83 of the Act, so far as material, is extracted below: 83. Constitution of Tribunals, etc - The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property, eviction of a tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee of such property, under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such Tribunals. (2)Any mutawalli person interested in a waqf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under this Act, or rules made thereunder, may make an application within the time specified in this Act or where no such time has been specified, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to the waqf. (3) xxxx (4) xxxx (5) The Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have the same powers as may be exercised by a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, or executing a decree or order. (6)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed. (7)The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding upon the parties to the application and it shall have the force of a decree made by a civil court. 20. Another provision having a bearing on this issue is Section 85 of the Act which is extracted hereunder: 85. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. (7)The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding upon the parties to the application and it shall have the force of a decree made by a civil court. 20. Another provision having a bearing on this issue is Section 85 of the Act which is extracted hereunder: 85. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any civil court, revenue court and any other authority in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal. 21. The Waqf Act, 1995 provides a complete mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating to waqfs through the Tribunal constituted under Section 83. It is a settled principle of law that where an efficacious alternative remedy is available under a statute, the High Court would ordinarily refrain from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 22. In Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari and others , (2022) 4 SCC 414 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the property is admitted to be waqf property, any dispute arising in respect thereof, including its management and administration shall be filed before the Tribunal. Further, the Apex Court in W.B. Wakf Board v. Anis Fatma Begum , (2010) 14 SCC 588 , has held that: 7. The dispute in the present case relates to a wakf. In our opinion, all matters pertaining to wakfs should be filed in the first instance before the Wakf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and should not be entertained by the civil court or by the High Court straightaway under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It may be mentioned that the Wakf Act, 1995 is a recent parliamentary statute which has constituted a Special Tribunal for deciding disputes relating to wakfs. The obvious purpose of constituting such a Tribunal was that a lot of cases relating to wakfs were being filed in the courts in India and they were occupying a lot of time of all the courts in the country which resulted in increase in pendency of cases in the courts. Hence, a Special Tribunal has been constituted for deciding such matters. (emphasis supplied) 23. Hence, a Special Tribunal has been constituted for deciding such matters. (emphasis supplied) 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Devi v. The Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board and others ,MANU/SC/0235/202 has held that: The jurisdiction of the High Court is restricted to only examine the correctness, legality or propriety of the findings recorded by the Wakf Tribunal. The High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under proviso to Sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act does not act as the appellate court. 24. The Constitution Bench in Subhan Shah ’s case (supra) and the three-Judge Bench in Kanwar Singh Saini’ s case (supra) have unequivocally held that where a statute provides a specific forum and remedy, the parties must exhaust such remedy before invoking writ jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act is exclusive and comprehensive. The exceptions carved out in Whirlpool Corporation ’s case (supra), namely violation of fundamental rights, breach of principles of natural justice, or complete lack of jurisdiction, are not attracted in the present case. The grievance raised relates to the interpretation of the expression “first branch” and the suitability of a candidate for appointment, which are matters which fall squarely within the adjudicatory competence of the Waqf Tribunal. 25. The reliance placed by respondent No.1/writ petitioner on Whirlpool Corporation ’s case (supra), Harbanslal Sahnia ’s (supra) , Radha Krishan Industries ’s case (supra) and M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Limited ’s (supra) is misconceived and does not advance his case. The said decisions only carve out limited exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, which are not attracted herein. The dispute raised pertains to matters squarely falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act, and mere allegations of arbitrariness or violation of Article 14 are insufficient to bypass the statutory remedy. 26. It is pertinent to note that Section 83 of the Act is not a mere procedural formality; it constitutes comprehensive and exclusive jurisdictional architecture for disputes pertaining to waqfs. Section 83(1) establishes the Tribunal. Section 83(2) is expansively worded, conferring upon the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine “any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal”. Section 83(1) establishes the Tribunal. Section 83(2) is expansively worded, conferring upon the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine “any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal”. The expression ‘any dispute’ leaves no room for any doubt regarding the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 27. It is to be noted that the learned Single Judge’s reliance on Whirlpool Corporation ’s case (supra) to bypass this statutory remedy was, with respect, misplaced. The mere assertion of a violation of a Court order or Article 14 does not, by itself, justify the exercise of writ jurisdiction when the Tribunal is fully empowered to examine such questions. The Tribunal, vide judgment dated 01.10.2021, has already demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the compromise and the applicable law. There was no compelling reason to by-pass this alternative remedy. The relevant portion of the decree dated 01.10.2021 is extracted hereunder for ready reference: This Original Application is coming on this day before us for final hearing in the presence of Mr.Syed Altaf Mehdi, Advocate for applicants, Mr. Asif Amjad, Standing Counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr.Khaja Moizuddin, Advocate for respondent No.2 and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Tribunal doth ordered and decreed as under:- That the Original Application of the Applicant be and the same is hereby allowed; The impugned proceedings dt.29-06-2012 is set aside, with the following directions:- 1) Respondent No.1 shall reconstitute the Towliath Committee of the subject Dargah or before 01-11-2021. 2) Respondent No.1 for reconstitution of the Towliath Committee shall take five members i.e., one member from each branch of the Towliath committee constituted vide proceedings dt.03-04-1993, viz., 1. Janab Syed Ghouse Mohiuddin Quadri. 2. Janab Faqeer Mohiuddin Quadri. 3. Janab Sultan Mohiuddin Quadri 4. Janab Khaja Mohiuddin Quadri and 5. Janab Badashah Sahib Mohiuddin Quadri. 3) The son of a member shown in direction No.2 above, or grand son or great grand-son or a nominee made from the said branch shall be member in the new Towliath Committee. 4) The President shall be appointed in the proceedings dt.3-4-93, from the first branch, if there is consensus in the members. Janab Badashah Sahib Mohiuddin Quadri. 3) The son of a member shown in direction No.2 above, or grand son or great grand-son or a nominee made from the said branch shall be member in the new Towliath Committee. 4) The President shall be appointed in the proceedings dt.3-4-93, from the first branch, if there is consensus in the members. If there is no consensus, the President shall be from second branch, or third branch or fourth branch or fifth branch by giving opportunity of consensus to every branch as shown in Section 205 A of Mulla's Mohemmedan Law, mentioned in the judgment. If still there is no consensus for the President of the Towliath Committee, respondent No.1 shall be at liberty to appoint any member from five branches stated in direction No.2 above. 5) For resolving any dispute in future the bases shall be from the following (3) sources:- 1. Compromise deed dt.25-2-1960. 2. Division Bench judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. in W.A.No.23 of 1992, dt.3-2-1992. 3. Proceedings of the Waqf Board dt.3-4-1993. Till the reconstituting of the Towliath Committee on or before 01-11- 2021, management of the subject Dargah shall be continued as existing as on today. 28. As stated hereinabove, in the present case, the grievance is fundamentally about the interpretation of a family compromise and the application of the term ‘first branch’ to a specific set of family relationship. These are essentially ‘disputes’ precisely of the kind, the waqf Tribunal is constituted to decide. The Tribunal is not just an alternative forum, it is the primary and specialized adjudicatory body endowed with the expertise in waqf law and Mohammedan law, necessary to unravel such intricate family and religious disputes. 29. Consequently, we hold that the Writ Petition itself was not maintainable, and the learned Single Judge ought to have relegated the parties to the remedy under Section 83 of the Act. The impugned order is therefore vitiated by a jurisdictional error. 30. Having held that the Writ petition itself was not maintainable for the reasons stated above, we considered it neither necessary not appropriate to adjudicate upon the substantive merits of the rival contentions, including the learned Single Judge’s observations regarding the terms of ‘legal heirs’ and ‘first branch’, or the principle of Mohammedan Law pertaining to succession. 31. 30. Having held that the Writ petition itself was not maintainable for the reasons stated above, we considered it neither necessary not appropriate to adjudicate upon the substantive merits of the rival contentions, including the learned Single Judge’s observations regarding the terms of ‘legal heirs’ and ‘first branch’, or the principle of Mohammedan Law pertaining to succession. 31. Any observations made by the learned Single Judge on the aforementioned merits of the dispute, including those relating to the eligibility of a daughter’s son for consideration as a legal heir under the Compromise Deed or Mohammedan Law, are expunged. These are complex questions intertwining the interpretation of a family settlement, personal law and the Board’s discretionary power under Section 63 of the Act, which squarely fall within the specialized jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 32. We refrain from expressing any opinion, even tentative, on these aspects, lest it should prejudice or pre-empt a fair and full adjudication of all factual and legal issues by the Tribunal. The merits of the claims of the respective parties, including the correctness of the Board’s impugned order dated 18.12.2024 are left entirely open for fresh and uninfluenced consideration, in accordance with law by competent Tribunal. Conclusion 33. For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to allow the Writ Appeal. Accordingly: i. The order dated 12.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3148 of 2025 is set aside. ii. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability, due to the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 83 of the Act. iii. This dismissal shall not preclude any aggrieved person from seeking appropriate relief in accordance with law before the competent forum i.e., Telangana State Waqf Tribunal, subject to all just exceptions including limitation. iv. It is made unequivocally clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the claim of either party concerning the constitution of the Towliath Committee or on the suitability of any individual for any post. All rights and contentions on merits are left open. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand closed. No order as to costs.