JUDGMENT : Heard learned Senior counsel Mr. Sanjay Singh assisted by Mr. Bibhuti Narayan, Advocate for the petitioner and learned counsel Mr. Ayush Kumar assisted by Mr. Kanishka Shankar, Advocate for the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (in short ‘BIADA’). Re:- I.A. No. 1 of 2025, I.A. No. 2 of 2025 & I.A. No. 3 of 2025 Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that there are three interlocutory applications mentioned above. Senior counsel submits that he is not pressing any of the said I.A. 2. As such, I.A. No. 1 of 2025, I.A. No. 2 of 2025 & I.A. No. 3 of 2025, all are hereby dismissed as not pressed. Re:- C.W.J.C. No. 11079 of 2024 The present writ petition has been filed for the following relief/s:- “I. For quashing the order dated 29.05.2024 passed in Appeal Case No. 03/2023, by the Respondent No. 2, whereby and where under the Appeal filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed in a mechanical, arbitrary, whimsical, pick and choose manner, whereas the similarly situated coterminous contractual employees has been reinstated considering the fact that the termination of the Petitioner is 'termination stigmatic’ and without compliance of the principles of natural justice, service jurisprudence and in teeth of the service procedure laid down by the decision of the Cabinet contained in Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 (High Level Committee), illegal, arbitrary, malicious decision has been taken, which has no legs to stand in the eyes of law. II. For quashing the Order/Memo No. 5794/I/737Estt/BIADA/2023 dated 09.09.2023 issued by Executive Director (Operations), BIADA, Patna whereby the contractual service of the Petitioner has abruptly been brought to an end by the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (herein after referred to as BIADA) on 09.09.2023 in most arbitrary, whimsical manner without compliance of the principles of natural justice and in complete violation of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, equity and against all the canons of justice. III. For the issuance of the direction in the nature of mandamus allowing Restituo in integrum to her post with all consequential benefits. IV. For any other relief or reliefs for which the petitioner be found entitled in the eye of law.” 2. III. For the issuance of the direction in the nature of mandamus allowing Restituo in integrum to her post with all consequential benefits. IV. For any other relief or reliefs for which the petitioner be found entitled in the eye of law.” 2. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated 29.05.2024 in Service Appeal No. 03 of 2023 passed by the Respondent no.2 dismissing the petitioner has been made in a mechanical, arbitrary, whimsical, pick and choose manner and it is basically a ‘termination stigmatic’ without following the service jurisprudence and in gross violation of principles of natural justice. Senior counsel submits that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Area Manager vide letter dated 27.01.2023 in the cluster office Hajipur on probation. Senior counsel submits that during the service, a termination notice was served to the petitioner dated 09.09.2023 in which allegation of misconduct, incompetency and indiscipline have been alleged in the light of Clause 2.7(i) and (iii) of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (Financial, Service and Technical) Regulations, 2007. Senior counsel submits that it is an admitted position that the petitioner is the contractual employee, but the High Level Committee of the Government of Bihar vide Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 has protected the services of contractual employees. In this regard, the said circular/resolution has been annexed in the writ petition. Senior counsel further submits that the terms of agreement has been annexed by way of 2 nd supplementary affidavit in which it has been stated that appointment of the petitioner has taken place on contractual basis and according to Clause 6, right has been given to the second party of the contract that the second party may also terminate the contract of the first party by giving two months notice or two months remuneration in lieu thereof. Senior counsel submits that it is true that the petitioner is a contractual employee but, after the issuance of the said circular for protection of the contractual employee issued by the General Administrative Department, Government of Bihar, it is applicable to the contractual employees of the industry department also including BIADA. The said circular is part of the contract. 3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that this Hon’ble Court has pleased to decide the case based on the similarly situated persons as like that of petitioner. The said circular is part of the contract. 3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that this Hon’ble Court has pleased to decide the case based on the similarly situated persons as like that of petitioner. Firstly, vide order dated 10.02.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 18494 of 2024 (Anuj Shuckla Vs. The BIADA & Ors.) , wherein the petitioner who was appointed on contractual basis and removed on the ground of misconduct, has been protected by this Hon’ble Court. And the respondents were directed to reinstate the services of the petitioner forthwith and the petitioner was entitled for all applicable consequential benefits. Secondly, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied on another judgment dated 30.06.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 10101 of 2024 (Alok Kumar Gupta Vs. The BIADA & Ors.) , in which the petitioner was appointed on the post of Executive on contractual basis in the year 2007 and subsequently, by making allegation, he was removed from the service. But, in that case also, the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of that order. Senior counsel further submits that after issuance of the said notice i.e. termination notice, the petitioner has preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the said termination notice on which the Appellate Authority has passed final order on 29.05.2024 in Service Appeal No. 03 of 2023. Thereafter, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the said termination notice as well as the appellate order. Senior counsel further submits that his case is squarely covered by the ratio laid down in the above mentioned two cases i.e. Anuj Shuckla (supra) and Alok Kumar Gupta (supra) and hence, the present petitioner is also entitled for the same relief as the termination notice and the appellate order, both are stigmatic in nature. Therefore, the petitioner need the said protection that being a contractual employee, the said stigma may not continue and the petitioner may be in a position to save her career in future. 4. Learned counsel appearing for BIADA on the other hand submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable, due to the reason that the termination order has not been challenged, as the termination order has been passed on 09.10.2023. 4. Learned counsel appearing for BIADA on the other hand submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable, due to the reason that the termination order has not been challenged, as the termination order has been passed on 09.10.2023. He further submits that since, termination order has not been challenged before this Court, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable itself. He submits that the appointment of the petitioner is based on contractual basis and according to the terms of agreement/contract in Clause 6, 7, 8 & 9, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. He further submits that this termination is not stigmatic, rather, it is ‘termination simpliciter’ and such type of termination notice or termination shall not affect the petitioner in future in any manner. Counsel relied on a judgment passed by this Court in case of Sanjeev Ranjan Vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Ors. reported in 2024 (4) PLJR 279 and submits that the services of the petitioner may be terminated for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification and those may be the motive or inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of the employment or service rule, if the right exists under the contract or the rule to terminate the services, the motive operating on the mind of employer is irrelevant and the termination is not a punishment. Counsel further relied on a judgment of Appar Apar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (1970) 3 SCC 338 and Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 , which are part and parcel of the reported judgment of Sanjeev Ranjan (supra) mentioned in para 29 & 30. 5. Learned counsel for BIADA, upon making submissions on the above points, submits that in the background of his submissions, the present writ petition is not maintainable at all. He further submits that in light of the judgments cited by him, and even on merits, the petitioner’s case is fit to be dismissed, as the said termination is a “termination simpliciter” and, in accordance with the terms of the contract, the petitioner has been removed. 6. After hearing the parties, there are certain relevant facts which are necessary to be discussed here. 6. After hearing the parties, there are certain relevant facts which are necessary to be discussed here. It is an admitted position that the termination notice and the appellate order have been challenged. The termination notice is of dated 09.09.2023 and the appellate order has been passed on 29.05.2024. 7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner categorically mentioned that no termination letter has been served which has been alleged by learned counsel for the BIADA. The said termination letter has not been attached by the BIADA in the counter affidavit nor any factual matrix has come in the order of appeal that separate termination letter has been issued. 8. It is a most surprising fact for this Court that the BIADA has neither placed the said termination letter before the Appellate Court nor placed before this Court and only at the time of final argument, it is being submitted that there is a termination order. What shall be the effect of that letter, shall be discussed later on. 9. This Court after going through the contractual terms and conditions agrees that the contractual employees have a limited right, but it is also true that the said circular contained in Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 has been issued by the State of Bihar itself and is applicable for the employees of BIADA including the petitioner. Therefore, in-spite of the fact that the petitioner is a contractual employee according to the said circular, there is a protection in favour of the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner is a contractual employee and having no right of regularization, but the termination letter indicates that the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of misconduct, incompetency and indiscipline and that in the opinion of the Court is a stigma by which the petitioner shall be affected throughout her career, if not protected by the same. 10. It transpires to this Court that, for arriving at a finding of proved misconduct, incompetence, and indiscipline, no procedure was adopted and no opportunity was granted to the petitioner and the BIADA reached on the said conclusion. And only due to this reason, this Court, in the case of Alok Kumar Gupta ( supra ), finds that it’s para 7 to 12 are very much relevant, which are quoted herein below:- “7. And only due to this reason, this Court, in the case of Alok Kumar Gupta ( supra ), finds that it’s para 7 to 12 are very much relevant, which are quoted herein below:- “7. Undisputedly, the petitioner herein was appointed on contractual basis in the year, 2007 and was getting continuous extension of his services. Show cause notice (Annexure P/1) issued to the petitioner shows that six allegations regarding irregularities have been levelled against him including disobedience of senior officers. Thus, it is quite clear that allegation of misconduct was made against the petitioner and on the ground of misconduct only, he has been terminated. The order of termination clearly shows that it has been passed making stigma against the petitioner regarding his misconduct. 8. The Supreme Court, in the case of Dr Vijaykumaran CPV ( supra observed and held in paragraphs 8, 10, 11 and 13 as under: “8. It is well-established position that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer, but might be contained in “any document referred to in the termination order”. Such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as ex facie stigmatic order of termination. … … … 10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, the Court observed thus: (SCC p 528, para 21) “21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld.” 11. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a result of which it must follow that the stated order is ex facie stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. … … … 13. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a result of which it must follow that the stated order is ex facie stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. … … … 13. …, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30.11.2017 is illegal being ex facie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as pe the service rules. … … …” 9. In the light of above observation made by the Supreme Court and on examination of the facts of this case that a stigmatic order against the petitioner has been passed, therefore, a full fledged departmental enquiry was required. Thus, this Court finds that the order impugned passed by the authorities are liable to be set aside. 10. Therefore, both the orders impugned dated 30.09.2023 and 29.05.2024 are hereby quashed. 11. The petition is allowed. 12. Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 11. And further in case of Anuj Shuckla (supra) para 7 to 15 are very much relevant which are quoted herein below:- “7. Undisputedly, the petitioner herein was appointed on contractual basis in the year, 2009 and was getting extension of his services till 2022. From bare perusal of the impugned order of termination (Annexure 13), it transpires that the Authority arrived on the conclusion that all the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved and it was found that the petitioner committed misconduct, as contained in Clauses 2.7 (i) (iii) (xii) of the 2007 Regulations and invoking Clause 1.5 (b) (iv) of the 2007 Regulations, services of the petitioner have been terminated. Show cause notice (Annexure P/5) issued to the petitioner further shows that there were eight allegations levelled against him regarding irregularities committed by him including disobedience of the superior officers. Thus, it is quite clear that an allegation of misconduct was made against the petitioner and on the ground of misconduct, as contained in Clause 2.7 (i) (iii) (xii) of the 2007 Regulations, petitioner has been terminated mentioning the fact that misconduct has been proved against him. Thus, it is quite clear that an allegation of misconduct was made against the petitioner and on the ground of misconduct, as contained in Clause 2.7 (i) (iii) (xii) of the 2007 Regulations, petitioner has been terminated mentioning the fact that misconduct has been proved against him. Thus, the order of termination clearly shows that it has been passed making certain stigma against the petitioner regarding his misconduct. 8. Dealing with the issue, the Supreme Court, in the case of Dr Vijaykumaran CPV ( supra ) observed and held in paragraphs 8, 10, 11 and 13 as under: “8. It is well-established position that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer, but might be contained in “any document referred to in the termination order”. Such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as ex facie stigmatic order of termination. … … … 10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, the Court observed thus: (SCC p 528, para 21) “21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld.” 11. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a result of which it must follow that the stated order is ex facie stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. … … … 13. …, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30.11.2017 is illegal being ex facie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as pe the service rules. … … …” 9. … … … 13. …, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30.11.2017 is illegal being ex facie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as pe the service rules. … … …” 9. In the light of above observation made by the Supreme Court, on examination of the facts of this case in hand, it is clear that a stigmatic order of termination has been passed against the petitioner and, therefore, a full fledged departmental enquiry was required. 10. Perusal of the order further shows that reply of show cause submitted by the petitioner has not been considered by the Authority at all. In his reply to the show cause, the petitioner replied each and every allegations levelled against him but the Authority did not bother to mention any of the grounds taken by him in his reply. It would be appropriate to reproduce the concluding part of the impugned order here which reads thus: “ mi;qZDRk xfBr vkjksikas ij i=kad 5991 fnukad 16-09- 23 }kjk Jh 'kqDyk ls Li"Vhdj.k dh ekax djrs gq, viuk i{k j[kus dk volj iznku fd;k x;kA Jh 'kqDyk }kjk Li"Vhdj.k fnukad 22-09- 23 izLrqr fd;k x;k ijarq Jh 'kqDyk }kjk lefiZr Li"Vhdj.k izkf/kdkj }kjk vlarks"ktud ik;k x;kA Jh 'kqDyk vius fo:) xfBr vkjksikas dks [kf.Mr djus esa foQYk gq, gSaA vr% vfHkysf[k; lk{;ksa ds vk/kkj ij Jh 'kqDyk ds fo:) xfBr vkjksi lgh fl) gksrs gSaA ” 11. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the material available on record, as discussed above, I find that as the impugned order has been passed by the Authority is a stigmatic order, therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr Vijaykumaran CPV ( supra ), a full fledged departmental enquiry was required but in this case, it was not done. Further, the petitioner has not been provided any proper opportunity of hearing in this case. The Authority, without recording statement of any witness and without considering the reply of show cause submitted by the petitioner, arrived on the conclusion that the charges levelled against him are proved. The Appellate Authority also did not consider this aspect. Further, the petitioner has not been provided any proper opportunity of hearing in this case. The Authority, without recording statement of any witness and without considering the reply of show cause submitted by the petitioner, arrived on the conclusion that the charges levelled against him are proved. The Appellate Authority also did not consider this aspect. Hence, both the orders dated 20.10.2023 passed by the Executive Director (Annexure P/13) and the order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the Chairman which has been communicated to the petitioner vide Annexure P/16 are liable to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 13. The impugned orders dated 20.10.2023 and 04.09.2024 are quashed. 14. Respondents are directed to reinstate the services of the petitioner forthwith. 15. The petitioner is entitled to get all applicable consequential benefits”. 12. Similarly, in case of Sanjeev Ranjan (supra) it has been rightly said that the service of employees may be terminated for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification. But in the said judgment, the said circular issued by the government of Bihar contained in Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 by which protection has been granted by the State Government to the contractual employees including the BIADA, has not been discussed at all. Therefore, this Court is differing from the decision of Sanjeev Ranjan (supra) placed by the BIADA. It has been intimated to this Court by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the term of contract of the petitioner is going to be ended on 27.01.2026. 13. This Court also deems it appropriate to quote the said circular issued by the General Administrative Department, Government of Bihar, as contained in Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018, and the extract of the same is as under:- 14. According to the said circular which is annexed in the writ petition, recommendation has been accepted by the State Government. Clause 7 of the said circular talks about the provision of appeal with regard to the contractual employees. And Clause-19 states that on BIADA, it is applicable. The extract of Clause 7 and 19 are as follows:- 15. After implementation of the said Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 and as per the terms of agreement/contract in Clause 6, 7 & 8, the same has become diluted and the services of the petitioner required protection. And Clause-19 states that on BIADA, it is applicable. The extract of Clause 7 and 19 are as follows:- 15. After implementation of the said Memo No. 12534 dated 17.09.2018 and as per the terms of agreement/contract in Clause 6, 7 & 8, the same has become diluted and the services of the petitioner required protection. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that in the light of the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench as well as the resolution dated 17.09.2018 quoted above, the removal only based on the terms of contract is not permissible. Admittedly, the said removal is stigmatic and no proper opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case has been provided. 16. As such, this Court hereby grants protection to the petitioner by way of setting aside both the orders challenged i.e. the termination notice and the appellate order on the point that the termination order has been passed if any, as pleaded by the counsel for the BIADA dated 09.10.2023, has no relevancy when the termination notice itself becomes set aside. Hence, the termination notice as contained in Letter No. 5794/I/737Estt/BIADA/2023 dated 09.09.2023 and the appellate order dated 29.05.2024 in Service Appeal No. 03 of 2023 (annexed as Annexure- P/1 series) are hereby set aside. 17. Accordingly, with the aforesaid observation and direction as well as the reasons mentioned above, the present writ petition is hereby allowed. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within three months from the date of production of a copy of this order. Arrears, if any, is directed to be paid to the petitioner within the said period.