JUDGMENT : G. K.ILANTHIRAIYAN, J. This appeal has been preferred as against the Judgment passed in S.C.No.75 of 2019 dated 20.04.2022 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kaur. 2.The case of the prosecution is that A.1 and his brother are running a bakery business and own bakeries at Ayyarmalai, Irumbuthipatti and Kosur. A.2 is the cousin brother of A.1 and A.3 is the uncle of A.1. A4 and A5 are known associates of A.1. While being so, the deceased had requested A.1 to give him a two wheeler, which was refused by A.1. Consequently, a quarrel arose between A.1 and the deceased. About one month after the said incident, the deceased went to the shop of A.1, poured petrol in front of the shop, and set fire, threatening A.1 with dire consequences. He further threatened that he would pour petrol on the shop and set fire to close down the entire business. The deceased was already involved in theft and robbery cases and was a habitual offender. He frequently went to prison. Therefore, A.1 was afraid of the deceased and informed A.2 to A.5 about the threats made by him. Subsequently, a panchayat was convened, during which the deceased assaulted A.1 and A.1 was forced to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- to the deceased. 3.Therefore, A.1 along with other accused persons, intended to do away with the life of the deceased. All the accused conspired together on 06.01.2019 and went to the house of the deceased and informed him that the issue would be settled through negotiation, and invited him to come to the rice godown near Ayyarmalai. Thereafter, A.1, A.4 and A.5 went there to the said place with weapons in a two wheeler owned by A.4. A.3 along with A.2 went to the place of occurrence in another two wheeler. During the negotiation, the deceased demanded money from the accused, which led to a quarrel. Thereupon, A.2 caught hold of the deceased and A.1 attacked him with an aruval on his head. 4.At that juncture, the wife, sister and brother-in-law of the deceased came to the scene of occurrence and raised an alarm. Immediately, A.2 released his hold and took a stone and hit the deceased on the head. When the deceased attempted to escape, A.3 to A.5 surrounded him and prevented him from moving away. 4.At that juncture, the wife, sister and brother-in-law of the deceased came to the scene of occurrence and raised an alarm. Immediately, A.2 released his hold and took a stone and hit the deceased on the head. When the deceased attempted to escape, A.3 to A.5 surrounded him and prevented him from moving away. Once again, A.2 attacked the deceased with an aruval on his head and hands. In the said incident, A.2 also sustained injury. Thereafter, the deceased was taken to the hospital, where he was declared as brought dead. On the complaint, the respondent registered an F.I.R in Crime No.12 of 2019 for the offences punishable under Sections 120(b), 147, 148, 364, 341, 302 and 506(ii) of I.P.C r/w Section 34 of I.P.C. After completion of the investigation, a final report was filed and the same has been taken cognizance by the Trial Court. 5.In order to bring the charges to home, the prosecution had examined P.W.1 to P.W.21 and marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.21. The prosecution produced Material Objects M.O.1 to M.O.16. The Court had marked witness document as Ex.C.1. On the side of the accused, they had examined D.W.1 and no documents were marked. 6.On perusal of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court acquitted A.3 to A.5 from all the charges and found A.1 and A.2 guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C and sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to P.W.1 and her son as compensation. Aggrieved by the same, A.1 & A.2 as appellants have preferred the present appeal. 7.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that except P.W.1, all other eye witnesses turned hostile, though they are blood relatives of the deceased. Further, P.W.1 herself is totally unreliable, as she was not at all present at the place of occurrence. Therefore, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges as against the appellants. While the Trial Court acquitted A.3 to A.5 of all charges, the Trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellants also, as they stand on the same footing. 8.After the alleged occurrence, P.W.1 lodged a complaint, which was marked as Ex.P.1, on 07.01.2019 at about 01.00 hours. While the Trial Court acquitted A.3 to A.5 of all charges, the Trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellants also, as they stand on the same footing. 8.After the alleged occurrence, P.W.1 lodged a complaint, which was marked as Ex.P.1, on 07.01.2019 at about 01.00 hours. However, in her deposition, she stated that she lodged the complaint at about 02.00 p.m. Further, the F.I.R reached the Court only on 07.01.2019 at 03.20 p.m. In fact, P.W.5 deposed that he had informed about the occurrence as early as on 06.01.2019 at about 08.30 p.m. This fact is also evident from the deposition of P.W.20. P.W.5 further deposed that on 06.01.2019, between 09.30 p.m., and 09.45 p.m., he had seen police personnel near the scene of occurrence. Therefore, the very registration of F.I.R is doubtful and the Trial Court ought not to have convicted the appellants. 9.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants further submitted that P.W.1 had separated from the deceased as early as the year 2017 and had also filed a petition for divorce against him. In the divorce petition, she averred that the deceased had indulged in robbery and dacoity and that he had not lived with P.W.1 for the past eight years. That apart, it was stated that he had extra-marital affairs with several women and had subjected P.W.1 to cruelty. Therefore, P.W.1 was not present at the place of occurrence and her evidence is not trustworthy. Hence, the order of conviction cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 10.Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent submitted that the prosecution had clearly proved the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C. Though P.W.2 to P.W.5 turned hostile, one of the eyewitnesses, namely P.W.1, fully supported the case of the prosecution. Admittedly, the deceased had poured petrol and set fire in front of the bakery owned by A.1. Though the deceased was a habitual offender and was demanding mamool from the shop owners, during the course of the negotiation, the accused murdered the deceased. There was no delay either in registration of the F.I.R or in forwarding the F.I.R to the Court. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the appellants and the same does not warrant any interference by this Court. 11.Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record. There was no delay either in registration of the F.I.R or in forwarding the F.I.R to the Court. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the appellants and the same does not warrant any interference by this Court. 11.Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record. 12.The wife of the deceased was examined as P.W.1. She lodged a complaint, which was marked as Ex.P.1. The sister of the deceased was examined as P.W.2. The husband of P.W.2 was examined as P.W.3. The brother-in-law of the deceased was examined as P.W.4. The reporter, who was also an eyewitness to the occurrence, was examined as P.W.5. Except P.W.1, P.W.2 to P.W.5 turned hostile. 13.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently contended that P.W.1 did not accompany the deceased on the date of occurrence. The complaint was not prepared by P.W.1. It was dictated by the police and her signature was obtained from P.W.1 on the next day, ie., on 07.01.2019 at about 02.00 p.m. Therefore, the presence of P.W.1 itself is questionable. In fact, P.W.1 had not been living with the deceased for the past seven years prior to the alleged occurrence. She had filed a divorce petition in the year 2017 as against the deceased for divorce. She also lodged a complaint as against him for the torture she allegedly suffered. The relevant portion of her deposition is as follows: 14.Further, even according to the case of the prosecution, the complaint was signed by P.W.1 and lodged before the respondent. Therefore, it cannot be a first information. Further, there is no evidence of a conspiracy between the accused. Though P.W.5 turned hostile, he deposed that he had seen police personnel as early as on 06.01.2019, ie., on the date of occurrence, between 09.30 p.m., and 09.45 p.m. Therefore, the respondent had knowledge of the occurrence even on 06.01.2019. Despite this, the respondent did not register any F.I.R. Only after receiving the complaint from P.W.1 the next day, F.I.R was registered in Crime No.12 of 2019. This raises serious doubts about the registration of the F.I.R itself, whether it was based on the information provided by P.W.1 or from another source. The relevant portions of the deposition of P.W.5 are as follows: 15.P.W.1 deposed that P.W.2 and P.W.3 were also present with her at the time of the alleged occurrence. This raises serious doubts about the registration of the F.I.R itself, whether it was based on the information provided by P.W.1 or from another source. The relevant portions of the deposition of P.W.5 are as follows: 15.P.W.1 deposed that P.W.2 and P.W.3 were also present with her at the time of the alleged occurrence. However, P.W.2 deposed that the deceased was her own brother and that she did not know the accused. She was not present at the place of occurrence and had only heard about it through a phone call. The husband of P.W.2 also deposed that he did not know about the accused and was not present with P.W.1. The reporter, who was examined as P.W.5, also turned hostile and deposed that he did not know P.W.1 to P.W.3. The other witnesses viz., P.W.6 to P.W.8 also turned hostile and failed to support the case of the prosecution. 16.Now, the Trial Court had convicted the appellants solely based on the evidence of P.W.1. While disbelieving the evidence of P.W.1 regarding the overt act as against A.3 to A.5, the Trial Court should have applied the same reasoning to the appellants. Only due to enmity between the first accused and deceased, the Trial Court believed the evidence of P.W.1 insofar as the appellants are concerned and convicted them. Asfar as wrongful restraint is concerned, P.W.1 testified that the deceased had escaped from the hands of the accused and ran away towards the eastern side. However, there is no specific evidence to show that the appellants inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased. Though there were two reports from P.W.5 and Kulithalai Government Hospital, the respondent did not register an F.I.R., which casts suspicion on the death of the deceased. Only on receipt of the complaint from P.W.1, the respondent registered the F.I.R. Admittedly, P.W.1 never lived with the deceased, and while the divorce petition and another complaint were pending before the police station, P.W.1 went to the place of occurrence along with the deceased. This is unbelievable one and as such, the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be looked into for any purpose. There are also contradictions between the statement of P.W.1 under Section 161 of Cr.P.C and her deposition before the Court regarding the time of the incident and the events surrounding the occurrence. This is unbelievable one and as such, the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be looked into for any purpose. There are also contradictions between the statement of P.W.1 under Section 161 of Cr.P.C and her deposition before the Court regarding the time of the incident and the events surrounding the occurrence. These time discrepancies were not reflected in the statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C or the complaint. Later on P.W.1 had improved her version and deposed before the Trial Court. Further, the appellants produced D.W.1 to show that A.2 had sustained an injury while cutting cake in a bakery shop, not during the occurrence. 17.In order to prove the conspiracy between the accused, the prosecution examined two witnesses, but both turned hostile and failed to support the case of the prosecution. P.W.13 and P.W.14 were cited by the prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy. According to the prosecution, on 06.01.2019 at about 04.00 p.m., all the accused had conspired together and planned to do away with the life of the deceased by taking him to the rice godown under the pretext of negotiating to settle issues between them. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 120(b) of I.P.C. Further, the specific case of the prosecution was that the second appellant/A.2 had dropped a stone on the deceased, but there was no recovery of the stone. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C as against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the benefit of doubt goes in favour of the appellants and they are entitled to acquittal for the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C. 18.In view of the above, the convictions and sentences imposed on the appellants in S.C.No.75 of 2019 dated 20.04.2022 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kaur, cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. 19.In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the Judgment, dated 20.04.2022 made in S.C.No.75 of 2019 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kaur, is hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges. The bail bond, if any, executed by the appellants shall stand cancelled. The fine amount, if any paid, shall be refunded to the appellants. The appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith, if they are no longer required in connection with any other case.