JUDGMENT : PRANAV TRIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Ms. Palak Devpura, learned advocate for the petitioner and Ms. Tanushree Shrimal, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents. 2. Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. Tanushree Shrimal, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondents. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. 3. By way of present petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the show-cause notice for cancellation of registration dated 02.02.2022, Order for Cancellation of Registration dated 21.02.2023 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the order-in-Appeal dated 04.12.2025 passed by the respondent No.3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned orders’ for short) under the provisions of Section 107 of the Central Goods and Service Tax(CGST)/ Gujarat Goods and Service Tax Act (GGST), 2017 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) 4. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of manufacturing cake boxes and wooden cake bases made from plywood. For the said purpose, the petitioner got itself registered under the Act with registration no. 24LSOPS2490B1ZD with effect from 30.07.2021. 4.1. The petitioner had engaged a tax consultant to handle Goods and Service Tax compliance and was under a bona fide impression that returns were being filed in time. However, due to professional negligence and failure of the previous consultant, multiple returns remained unfiled, leading to issuance of the impugned show-cause notice by respondent No. 2 calling upon to reply as to why the registration should not be cancelled for the reasons of non-filing of GST returns for a continuous period, in terms of Rule 21A(2A) of the Central Goods and Service Tax (CGST) Rules, 2017 (for short “the rules”). The petitioner was directed to respond to the impugned show-cause notice within thirty days. 4.2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner being unaware of the issuance of the impugned show-cause notice online, failed to submit its reply and on 21.02.2023, respondent No. 2 passed the impugned Order online for cancellation of registration retrospectively with effect from 31.07.2022 in FORM GST REG-19. The impugned Order does not record any reasons whatsoever for the cancellation of registration of the petitioner. The impugned Order does not record any reasons whatsoever for the cancellation of registration of the petitioner. 4.3 It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner preferred an appeal on 13.08.2025 against the impugned Order under Section 107(1) of the Act before Respondent No. 3 by submitting Form GST APL 01, indicating the fact of delay in filing of appeal beyond the limitation period provided u/s 107(4) of the Act and for which an acknowledgment in Form GST APL-02 was issued. Respondent No. 3 issued the notice for the personal hearing dated 20.11.2025, instructing the petitioner to be present on 27.11.2025. 4.4 Pursuant to the submissions made by the petitioner during the personal hearing dated 27.11.2025, respondent No. 3, vide the impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 04.12.2025, rejected the appeal of the petitioner on the ground that the appeal of the petitioner is not filed within the time limit prescribed under Section 107 of the Act. It is submitted that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 failed to take into consideration the judgment of this Court in the case of Aggarwal Dyeing & Printing Works v/s State of Gujarat (SCA No. 18860 of 2021 and other allied matters decided on 24.02.2022). Therefore, the petitioner is constrained to approach this Hon'ble Court by way of the present Petition. 5. Ms. Palak Devpura, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the impugned show-cause notice dated 02.02.2022 and the consequent Order for Cancellation of registration dated 21.02.2023 passed by respondent No. 2 are wholly illegal, void ab initio and non est in law, having been issued and passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. Although the impugned show-cause notice makes a bald and mechanical reference to the possibility of a personal hearing, it conspicuously fails to specify any date, time or place for such hearing. In the absence of a clearly notified and effective opportunity of personal hearing, the Respondent No. 2 proceeded to pass the impugned order ex parte, resulting in serious civil consequences to the petitioner, including retrospective cancellation of GST registration. The denial of a meaningful opportunity of hearing constitutes a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and vitiates the entire adjudicatory process at its very inception. The denial of a meaningful opportunity of hearing constitutes a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and vitiates the entire adjudicatory process at its very inception. Once the foundational order is rendered void for violation of natural justice, all proceedings emanating therefrom, including the impugned Order in Appeal dated 04.12.2025 passed by Respondent No. 3, are equally without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law. The impugned orders, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. 5.1 It was further submitted that the impugned Order for cancellation of registration dated 21.02.2023, passed by respondent No. 2 is a cryptic and non-speaking order and therefore the same is also required to be quashed and set aside. 5.2 It was further submitted that the respondent No. 2 and 3 failed to take into consideration the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Aggarwal Dyeing & Printing Works (supra). The impugned show-cause notice dated 02.02.2022 issued by respondent No. 2 is unreasoned and vague. The impugned show-cause notice also states that if the Petitioner fails to appear for a personal hearing on the appointed date and time, the case will be decided ex parte on the basis of available records and on the merits. However, no date, time or place of personal hearing has been stated in the impugned show-cause notice. 5.3 It was further submitted that the petitioner is ready and willing to file all its due and pending Goods and Service Tax returns and pay the due taxes, along with interest and applicable late fees, once the registration is restored. Therefore, on this ground also, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside, and the registration of the Petitioner deserves to be restored. The continued cancellation of registration of the petitioner infringes the essential rights of the Petitioner under Article 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. 6. Per contra, Ms. Tanushree Shrimal, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that in view of settled legal precedent, this Court may not set aside the appellate order, more particularly, when the petitioner has not remained present before the appellate authority. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has filed an appeal challenging the Order-in-Original dated 21.02.2023 belatedly over and above the period of limitation of 120 days. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has filed an appeal challenging the Order-in-Original dated 21.02.2023 belatedly over and above the period of limitation of 120 days. The Registration of the petitioner has been cancelled for non-filing of returns, for which the petitioner has blamed his Accountant. The petitioner had filed its appeal on 13.08.2024, after a delay of almost one and half year under the provision of Section 107 of the GST Act. Further, the impugned order dated 04.12.2025 has categorically observed that even during the course of hearing of the appellate proceedings, the petitioner did not remain present for hearing on 27.11.2025. Opportunity to be heard was extended to the appellant in the appeal proceedings, however, the petitioner did not remain present for asserting its case before the appellate authority. Therefore, there is no justification for belatedly filing the appeal after almost a period of 1½ years. The provisions of Section 107 under Chapter 18 of the GST Act stipulates filing of an appeal,which is as under :- “ Section 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. (2) xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx (4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.” 8. Thus, the maximum period of presenting the appeal against the Order-in-Original was 3 months and thereafter, if the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause of presenting the appeal and the same can be allowed to be presented within further period of one month. Thus, the maximum period would be 120 days i.e. one month is only allowed if the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was presented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within a period of three months. Thus, the maximum period would be 120 days i.e. one month is only allowed if the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was presented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within a period of three months. Thus, at the first instant, the petitioner was required to file an appeal within a period of three months, and only if the Appellate Authority gets satisfied that the cause shown by the petitioner for non-filing of the appeal within a period of three months; the Appellate Authority has the power to give one month more to present the same. 8.1. In the present case, the petitioner has filed appeal after a period of one and half year, which is over and above the aforesaid period. Thus, even if the Appellate Authority in its discretion had accepted the cause shown by the petitioner for belatedly filing the appeal, the Appellate Authority had the power to condone the delay for a period of one month and allow such appeal to be filed within period of limitation of one month only. Thus, the Appellate Authority has precisely held that it does not have the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation of 120 days. 9. However, the issue which calls for deliberation as to whether this Court can set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and further direct the Appellate Authority to accept the appeal beyond the condonation period or not? 9.1 This issue has now been categorically decided by this Court in SCA No. 386 of 2026. 10. At this stage, we may refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Ors. v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 S.C.C 681 . The Apex Court while examining the issue analogs to the issue of Sales Tax and VAT, Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and provisions of Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides power of Appellate Authority to condone the delay and power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has held that the Appellate Authority has no power to condone the delay, if an appeal is preferred after the aggregate period. However, it is held that though the powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. It is held as under :- “16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors., the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors., Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited vs. Electricity Department represented by its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.” 11. and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited vs. Electricity Department represented by its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.” 11. Thus, the Apex Court in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) has cautioned that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court (High Court) for maintaining an appeal beyond the maximum period provided in Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2023, it has held as under :- “15.….. In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court went to observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however added a word of caution and expounded that the Constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pas orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.” 12. The Apex Court has also referred to the array of decisions dealing with provision of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in case of Special Legislation. One of such which has been rendered in the said decision is in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others, (2017) 5 S.C.C. 42 , wherein it is held thus :- “15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 ] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 ] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996 . case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 ] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996 . Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 ]. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23 , lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.” 13. The Apex Court has further held in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) as under :- “19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (AppealI), Bangalore 20. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) 33 on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also nonsuit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act,the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. xxx xxx xxx 22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such.” 14. Thus, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition is filed after the expiry of maximum prescribed period of limitation, though alternative efficacious remedy is available, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course and doing so would be in teeth of principle of dictum underlying the dictum of three Judge’s Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited (supra). The Apex Court has further held that, albeit, the High Court has wide powers, but the same does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and if the same is done, it would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. Thus, on the same principles as enunciated by the Apex Court, we are not inclined to set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority and more particularly in wake of the general explanation given by the petitioner for condoning the delay. The petitioner was aware of the service of show-cause notice dated 02.02.2022, however, he did not care to verify the proceedings. No one remained present in appeal proceedings despite affording opportunity of hearing. 15. We may also refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case M/s. Singh Enterprise vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors., rendered in Appeal (Civil) No.5949 of 2007 decided on 14.12.2007 wherein the Apex Court has refused to accept the reason of belatedly filing of the appeal on the pretext of lack of experience and closure of business. 16. 16. Section 107(4) of the Act grants discretion to the Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case he/she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from presenting the appeal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression “sufficient cause” can be raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with “Savings”, which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the “sufficient cause”. The reasons assigned by the appellant are also not palatable, since they are general in nature. We clarify, that even if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days. The tax payers are supposed to remain vigilant of all the proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal. The taxing statutes operate in very strict time frame, and any relaxation or easing of limitation period will have cascading effect on the functioning of the revenue. 17. So far as the challenge to show-cause notice and order dated 21.02.2023 is concerned, having availed the alternative efficacious remedy of filing the appeal, this Court cannot fall back and examine the validity of such show-cause notice or order, more particularly, when the petitioner chose not to remain present before the appellate authority. 17. So far as the challenge to show-cause notice and order dated 21.02.2023 is concerned, having availed the alternative efficacious remedy of filing the appeal, this Court cannot fall back and examine the validity of such show-cause notice or order, more particularly, when the petitioner chose not to remain present before the appellate authority. Having availed the remedy of filing an appeal as the petitioner was aware that none of the issues either with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice or the lack of jurisdiction was involved and the issue was only confined with the facts and the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal as provided under the statute, this Court cannot examine the validity or legality of the impugned Order dated 21.02.2023. 18. In view of the settled legal precedents, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India condoning the delay. Thus, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed .Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.