ORDER : 1. The petitioners in both these petitions are before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in crime No.176/2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 504 read with Section 149 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). Both these petitions are filed challenging the same crime but are filed by different accused. Therefore, both the petitions are taken together and considered by this common order. 2. Heard Sri. Rohith B.J., learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri. Nageshwarappa, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1. 3. Respondent No.2 though served 3 years ago has remained unrepresented. The State has preferred an application seeking vacation of the interim order. Therefore, the matter is taken up for its final disposal. 4. The petitioners and the respondent No.2/complainant have a dispute with regard to certain lands. The dispute leads to an altercation between the two on a particular date i.e., on 01.05.2023. It is the allegation in the complaint that on 01.05.2023, the petitioners enter the land of the complainant and assault the complainant and hurl abuses taking the name of the caste. The complaint results in two crimes being registered; one by the petitioners against the complainant and the other by the complainant against the petitioners. The registration of the crime against the petitioners by the complainant, falls within the subject matter of both these petitions. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows: The complaint narrates several instances of assault and other issues. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would now restrict his submission in the case at hand to the ones that are concerning the Act. He contends that there is an interim order granted by this Court only insofar as the offences under the Act are concerned. 6. The learned High Court Government Pleader submits that charge sheet is now filed after investigation against these petitioners for all other offences except the ones under the Act, as the offences under the Act have been stayed at the hands of this Court. 7. 6. The learned High Court Government Pleader submits that charge sheet is now filed after investigation against these petitioners for all other offences except the ones under the Act, as the offences under the Act have been stayed at the hands of this Court. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the available material on record. 8. The consideration in the case at hand, therefore, is limited only to the offences under the Act. The complaint is quoted herein above. In the complaint, the offences under the Act are found in the last three lines. The last three lines would indicate that the petitioners have hurled abuses against the complainant by taking the caste of the complainant and therefore, it has become an offence under the Act. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act. Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act reads as follows: " 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities : (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe— ……… ……… ……… (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.” (Emphasis supplied) Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act mandate that the abuses should be hurled taking the name of the caste of the complainant with an intention to insult. There is no averment in the complaint that it happened in a public place or place of public view nor that the said abuses were intentionally hurled. 9. In that light, permitting the continuation of further proceedings against these petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act, would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand , (2020) 10 SCC 710 , wherein it has been held as follows: “ 10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26-1-2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3. (1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.” 12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view.” 13 . The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh (2008) 8 SCC 435 , at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in Para 15, below: “Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view”]. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 443-444, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 443-444, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (Emphasis in original) 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that the abuses must be hurled with an intention to insult and it must be hurled in a place of public view or in a public place. None of these averments are found in the complaint. The fact that a civil suit in O.S.No.52/2023 is pending between the parties is also a matter that is to be noted. In the light of the aforesaid circumstance, the offences under the Act are clearly not made out in the case at hand even on the perusal of the complaint. 10. In that light, permitting the continuation of further proceedings, qua the offences under the Act, would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court as quoted herein above in the case of HITESH VERMA (supra) and would become an abuse of process of the law. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed in part by obliteration of the offences under the Act. 11. Liberty is reserved to the petitioners to challenge the charge sheet, if any, so filed, on all other offences. 12. All contentions qua the other offences shall remain open. 13. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed in part by obliteration of the offences under the Act. 11. Liberty is reserved to the petitioners to challenge the charge sheet, if any, so filed, on all other offences. 12. All contentions qua the other offences shall remain open. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Both the petitions are allowed in part. (ii) Registration of the crime in Crime No.176/2023 insofar as the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 stand quashed. (iii) Registration of the crime in Crime No.176/2023 insofar as the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 504 read with Section 149 of the IPC stand sustained. (iv) It is made clear that this Court has not pronounced upon its finding on any other offence alleged against the petitioners and the crime or the filing of the charge sheet in the case at hand.