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2026 DIGILAW 39 (TS)

D. Shivakumar v. S. Shyamsunder

2026-01-07

NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

body2026
JUDGMENT : NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J. 1. This Appeal is preferred by the Appellant/plaintiff under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Court, 1908, being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree, dated 19.07.2004 passed in O.S.No.329 of 1996 by the Additional Judge, City Small Causes Court-cum-VI Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and set aside the suit with costs. 2. Heard Mrs. Manjari S. Ganu , learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N.V. Anantha Krishna, learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the entire material on record. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant entered into an agreement of sale with the defendant under Ex.A4, which was duly attested by DW-2. It is contended that there was a clear agreement between the parties whereby the defendant agreed to sell the subject flat for a total sale consideration of Rs. 5,00,000/-. It is further contended that on 11.01.1995, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash to the defendant towards part payment of the sale consideration, for which the defendant executed a receipt marked as Ex.A1. Subsequently, the plaintiff paid Rs. 75,000/- in cash on 31.01.1995 as evidence under Ex.A2 and a further sum of Rs. 75,000/- on 22.03.1995, as evidence under Ex.A3. On the same day, the defendant executed the agreement of sale dated 22.03.1995, marked as Ex.A4, wherein the defendant has admittedly received a total sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- towards the sale consideration and it was agreed that the balance of sale consideration of Rs.1,25,000/- shall be paid on execution of sale deed. When the plaintiff approached the defendant with the balance sale consideration, the defendant postponed the issue on one or other pretext. The plaintiff came to know that the defendant was trying to sell away the property to third parties and got issued legal notice to the defendant calling upon him to register the suit property, but the defendant failed to do the same. Hence, the suit is filed. 4. Basing on the said pleadings the learned Trial Judge has framed the following issues for Trial: Issues: i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of specific performance as prayed for? ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for alternative relief for recovery of Rs.3,75,000/- as prayed for? iii. To what relief? 5. Hence, the suit is filed. 4. Basing on the said pleadings the learned Trial Judge has framed the following issues for Trial: Issues: i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of specific performance as prayed for? ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for alternative relief for recovery of Rs.3,75,000/- as prayed for? iii. To what relief? 5. In support of the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself examined as PW1 and one K.R. Dayashanker was examined as PW2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A6. On behalf of the defendants, the defendant himself examined as DW1 and no documents were marked. The handwriting expert was examined as CW1 and Ex.C1 was marked. 6. The learned Trial Judge after going into entire record and on considering the oral and documentary evidence, has dismissed the Judgment and Decree vide O.S.No.329 of 1996 dated 19.07.2004. 7. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed on the following grounds: “The Court below failed to properly appreciate the handwriting expert’s report (Ex.C1), which categorically confirms that the defendant has signed each page of Ex.A4, including all corrections and the questioned signatures marked as Q4 to Q7 tally with the admitted signatures of the defendant. Despite this clear expert opinion, the Court below wrongly doubted the genuineness of Ex.A4. The finding that Ex.A4 is materially altered is legally unsustainable, as all corrections in Ex.A4 were duly signed by the defendant himself. There is no allegation or evidence of alterations made subsequent to execution. The corrections do not affect the validity or enforceability of the agreement. The Court below completely misdirected itself by treating signed corrections as material alterations. The Court below misunderstood and misapplied the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment reported in (2002) 6 SCC 375 , which clearly holds that every alteration is not a material alteration and even post- execution alterations do not invalidate an agreement unless they affect its enforceability. In the present case the correction relating to sale of 1/6 th undivided share on page 2 is duly signed. The correction in the schedule mentioning 1250 Sq. feet is not even disputed by the defendant. Hence, the reliance placed by the Court below on the said judgment is wholly misplaced. In the present case the correction relating to sale of 1/6 th undivided share on page 2 is duly signed. The correction in the schedule mentioning 1250 Sq. feet is not even disputed by the defendant. Hence, the reliance placed by the Court below on the said judgment is wholly misplaced. The Court below committed a grave error in rejecting the evidence of P.W.2, the sole attesting witness, whose testimony remained unshaken in cross-examination and clearly proved the execution of Ex.A4. The rejection of his evidence merely because he could not recollect trivial details like the defendant’s height or number of pages after seven years is perverse and contrary to settled principles of evidence. The rejection of Ex.A1 to Ex.A3 is erroneous because the payments covered under these receipts are acknowledged in Ex.A4 itself and the signatures on the receipts and Ex.A4 are similar. Merely because, the handwriting expert did not confirm the receipts, the Court below ought not to have ignored the admitted acknowledgment in Ex.A4. This finding should have weighed in favour of the plaintiff. The Court below wrongly discredited the plaintiff based on a minor discrepancy where P.W.1 stated in cross-examination that notice was sent by RPAD, whereas in chief-examination, it was clearly stated that the notice was sent under certificate of posting and that accidental slip does not affect the validity of notice, especially when the address is undisputed and the defendant did not reply to the notice. The defendant’s conduct ought to have been considered while exercising discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court below failed to consider that against a sale consideration of Rs. 5,00,000/-, the plaintiff had already paid Rs. 3,75,000/- and the plaintiff sufficiently explained his financial capacity by borrowing from friends and using family savings and also no separate issue was framed on readiness and willingness, yet an adverse finding was recorded. There was no valid legal ground to deny the relief of specific performance. These errors amount to serious errors of law and fact, leading to an unjust denial of specific performance.” 8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that no specific time was prescribed for performance in the agreement of sale. It is further contended that the agreement stipulates that, in the event of failure to execute the regular sale deed, the defendant shall refund the amount of Rs. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that no specific time was prescribed for performance in the agreement of sale. It is further contended that the agreement stipulates that, in the event of failure to execute the regular sale deed, the defendant shall refund the amount of Rs. 3,75,000/- received, along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. 9. It is further argued that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was ready to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,25,000/-, but the defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff issued a legal notice under Ex.A5 against the defendant, which was sent under certificate of posting. 10. It is also further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff got issued certificate of posting under Ex.A6 to the house No.1-9-285/1, the address which is shown in the evidence is one and the same and further argued that the defendant, by filing the written statement, has denied the alleged transactions, though he has admitted that the plaintiff is known to him and pointed out that the defendant has categorically denied the execution of the agreement of sale as well as the receipts alleged to have been issued by him in favour of the plaintiff and also further brought to the notice of this Court that the report submitted by the Joint Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, relied upon Ex.X1 and Ex.C1, which is the said report marked through CW1 (the Joint Director). 11. On a perusal of the said report, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the standard signatures marked as S1 to S8 and the questioned signatures marked as Q1 to Q3, which are found on the receipts (Ex.A1 to A3), and Q4 to Q7, which are found on the agreement of sale, were examined by the expert. According to the opinion of CW1, the Joint Director of the Forensic Science Department, the person who wrote the red-enclosed standard signatures marked as S1 to S8 also wrote the red-enclosed signatures marked as Q4 to Q7, but did not write the red-enclosed signatures marked as Q1 to Q3. 12. According to the opinion of CW1, the Joint Director of the Forensic Science Department, the person who wrote the red-enclosed standard signatures marked as S1 to S8 also wrote the red-enclosed signatures marked as Q4 to Q7, but did not write the red-enclosed signatures marked as Q1 to Q3. 12. In other words, the signatures marked as Q4 to Q7 were opined to have been executed by the same person who signed S1 to S8, namely, the defendant, whereas the signatures marked as Q1 to Q3 were not written by the defendant. 13. Further, with regard to the original writings deciphered in the red-enclosed portions marked as Q8 to Q11, CW1 opined that the alterations found therein pertain to Q8, wherein the document originally reflected a mortgage transaction. 14. The learned counsel for the defendant contended that the agreement in question is a forged document and in view of the material alterations found therein, the same cannot be relied upon or considered by this Court. It was further contended that the receipts marked as Ex.A1 to A3 have not been duly proved in accordance with law and that a mere reference to the alleged payments under Ex.A1 to A3 in Ex.A4, the agreement of sale does not validate such payments. He further pointed out that PW2, during his examination, specifically stated that he does not know one Shyam Sundar. He also drew the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of the witnesses, wherein the material alterations in the document were not denied. It was also argued that there is a substantial difference between a mortgage deed and an agreement of sale, and that the alteration of the nature of the transaction from mortgage to sale constitutes a material alteration affecting the validity of the document. 15. With regard to the forensic report, he submitted that the questioned signatures marked as Q1 to Q3 are not in a continuous or natural flow and appear to be blocked signatures, thereby it was a serious doubt on their genuineness. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant argued that in any event, there was no proper service of notice was issued on the defendant. He pointed out that the Under Certificate of Posting (UCP) relied upon by the handwriting of the plaintiff, and the date on which it was allegedly written has not been established. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant argued that in any event, there was no proper service of notice was issued on the defendant. He pointed out that the Under Certificate of Posting (UCP) relied upon by the handwriting of the plaintiff, and the date on which it was allegedly written has not been established. He further submitted that the UCP appears to have been obtained at a later point of time, namely on 21st March, as per the endorsement of the postal authorities. He further contended that the questions as to whether the notice sent was posted by registered post, and whether a UCP can be treated as constituting deemed service which require strict scrutiny. According to him, a UCP, by itself, does not raise a presumption of service. 17. He contended that as per Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, particularly Illustration (f), extracted below: “that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases” He submitted that it is not a deemed service, and that there is no proof of service of notice filed in respect of service of notice. 18. He further argued that the material alterations found in the document indicate that the transaction was originally intended to be a mortgage. He submitted that though the agreement recites that the vendor offered to sell the property, but in law, it is the vendee who offers to purchase, and such a recital itself reflects inconsistency in the document. He further drew attention to the questioned portion marked as Q10 by the forensic expert (CW1), which mentions an amount of Rs.5,00,000/-, and contended that the said amount is consistent with a mortgage transaction rather than an agreement of sale and that the testimony of PW2 has no evidentiary value, whereas the expert evidence remains uncontroverted. Relying upon the forensic report and the exhibits on record, he submitted that Ex.A4 clearly demonstrates that the document is materially altered and cannot be relied upon. He further argued that, till date, no amount has been deposited by the plaintiff, nor the plaintiff pleaded or proved readiness and willingness as required under law. 19. It was further contended that the Under Certificate of Posting (UCP) produced before the Court is wholly unbelievable. He further argued that, till date, no amount has been deposited by the plaintiff, nor the plaintiff pleaded or proved readiness and willingness as required under law. 19. It was further contended that the Under Certificate of Posting (UCP) produced before the Court is wholly unbelievable. Though the date mentioned thereon is 18.03.1996, it cannot be presumed that the notice was posted on that date, much less that it was served on 25.03.1996. He pointed out that no opportunity was given to the defendant to respond to the alleged notice, as the suit itself was filed immediately on 25.03.1996. According to him, it demonstrates that the plaintiff did not issue a genuine legal notice and failed to wait for a reasonable period to ascertain whether the defendant had accepted or rejected the demand. Consequently, he submitted that no cause of action had arisen for the plaintiff to institute the suit. 20. He lastly submitted that when the written statement denies the claim in toto, it amounts to a denial of all material averments, and the defendant is not required to deny each and every element separately. 21. He further argued that PW2 was a planted witness, brought in solely for the purpose of supporting the plaintiff’s case. Drawing the attention of this Court to the evidence of PW2, particularly paragraph No.2 of his deposition, he submitted that, PW2 stated that the plaintiff paid a cash amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the defendant and that an agreement of sale was executed between them in his presence, on which he also signed as a witness. He further stated that a receipt was issued by the defendant acknowledging the receipt of Rs.2,00,000/-. It was further contended that the testimony of PW2 cannot be believed, as he was a planted witness introduced only to prove the alleged transaction. According to him, nothing substantial evidence can be pulled out from the evidence of PW2 to establish the execution or genuineness of the agreement of sale, and therefore, his evidence does not help the case of the plaintiff. 22. He further argued that the decision cited by the plaintiff, reported in Krovidi Kameswaramma And Others V/s Kudapa Balamayya And Another , 1998(5)ALD68 , dated 14.07.1998, held that: “Any plaintiff must come to the Court with clean hands, more so in the case of a plaintiff who seeks an equitable relief of specific performance. 22. He further argued that the decision cited by the plaintiff, reported in Krovidi Kameswaramma And Others V/s Kudapa Balamayya And Another , 1998(5)ALD68 , dated 14.07.1998, held that: “Any plaintiff must come to the Court with clean hands, more so in the case of a plaintiff who seeks an equitable relief of specific performance. The relief by way of specific performance lies within the discretion of the Court. It is absolutely necessary that the plaintiff should come to the Court with clean hands. In other words a plaintiff who sets up a false case cannot expect a Court of equity to grant him the relief In view of the finding that the plaintiff has failed to pay the amount due by the end of January 1983 it is clear that he has come up setting out a false plea and that he has committed default of the terms of the contract. This again implies that he is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is axiomatic to infer that the plaintiff who sets up a false plea of payment and fails to substantiate that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract cannot seek the relief of specific performance. In a similar case this Court in K.Venkata Subbayya v. K. Venkateswarulu, observed as follows: "Irrespective of any other fact the averment in the plaint and the notice is sufficient to hold that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under Ex.A-1 and that apart the plaintiff who seeks equitable remedy of specific performance must come to the Court with clean hands". It is categorically observed there that the plaintiff who had set up a false plea of payment of a major portion of the purchase money was not only disentitled to the discretionary relief on the ground that The has set up a false plea but also on the ground that, that discloses that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this decision. The principle that Impart delicto potior est conditio defends is also to the effect that in case of equal guilt the defendant alone should succeed. So on application of this principle also the plaintiff must fail for setting up a false plea. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this decision. The principle that Impart delicto potior est conditio defends is also to the effect that in case of equal guilt the defendant alone should succeed. So on application of this principle also the plaintiff must fail for setting up a false plea. From all the above principles it is clear that the plaintiff who does not come to the Court with clean hands cannot succeed.” 23. He also contended that the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and was further submitted that although PW1, in his evidence, stated that the legal notice was sent by registered post with acknowledgment due, but no acknowledgment has been filed before the Court. On the contrary, the record clearly discloses that the plaintiff relied only upon an Under Certificate of Posting, marked as Ex.A6, which is wholly unreliable and cannot be believed. 24. In support of his contentions, he further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Lourdu Mari David and Ors V/s Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and Ors AIR 1996 SC 2814 , dated 09.08.1996, held that: “It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the Court with clean hands; In other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. The Division Bench has pointed out in the judgment three grounds which disentitle the plaintiff to the equitable relief as he came with a positive case of incorrect and false facts.” 25. The crux of the case is that, in fact that the plaintiff’s entire claim is founded upon Ex.A1 to A6 and Ex.A1 to A3 which are the receipts alleged to have been executed by the defendant on 11.01.1995, 23.01.1995, and 30.01.1995 respectively. The defendant has categorically denied the execution of the agreement of sale marked as Ex.A4, dated 22.03.1995, contending that the said agreement was never executed by him. He has specifically denied that he ever offered to sell the flat to the plaintiff or that he agreed to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-. The defendant has categorically denied the execution of the agreement of sale marked as Ex.A4, dated 22.03.1995, contending that the said agreement was never executed by him. He has specifically denied that he ever offered to sell the flat to the plaintiff or that he agreed to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-. The defendant has further denied the issuance of the receipts marked as Ex.A1 to A3 and the alleged payments said to have been made by the plaintiff there under. He has also specifically denied the payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- alleged to have been made by the plaintiff on 22.03.1995. 26. As already discussed by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the nature of the transaction originally being a mortgage and the material alterations found in the documents are important. The findings relating to the material alterations and the expert evidence, as extracted and analyzed earlier, are required to be read into and form part of the present discussion. 27. In view of the categorical denial of the entire transaction as well as the alleged payments by the defendant, the initial burden squarely lies upon the plaintiff to prove the execution of the documents and the payments alleged to have been made by him to the defendant. The plaintiff has relied upon Ex.A1 to A4, with Ex.A5 being the legal notice. Whereas Ex.A1 to A3 are the receipts alleged to have been issued by the defendant. Before going into the further discussion, it is relevant to extract Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which reveals as follows: “Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties. Alteration by indorsee. And any such alteration, if made by an indorsee, discharges his indorser from all liability to him in respect of the consideration thereof.” 28. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, at the instance of the defendant, the receipts and the agreement of sale were sent to the Forensic Science Department for expert opinion with regard to the genuineness of the signatures. 29. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, at the instance of the defendant, the receipts and the agreement of sale were sent to the Forensic Science Department for expert opinion with regard to the genuineness of the signatures. 29. The evidence of CW1 clearly shows that he examined the disputed writings and signatures marked as Q1 to Q11 and compared them with the standard signatures marked as S1 to S8. After such examination, he furnished his opinion with reasons on 25.07.2003, which is marked as Ex.C1. In his cross-examination, CW1 stated that Ex.C1 is his report, the contents made are true and correct and further admitted that there are alterations in Ex.A4. 30. With regard to the evidence of CW1, though there was no cross-examination on behalf of the plaintiff challenging the findings relating to the signatures marked as Q4 to Q7, it is relevant to note that there was also no rebuttal evidence adduced by the defendant to disprove the expert opinion that the said signatures belong to the defendant. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence, the findings of CW1 remain unchallenged. This establishes that Ex.A4 was executed by the defendant. 31. Insofar Ex.A1 to A3 are concerned, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, once Ex.A4 is proved through the evidence of CW1 and Ex.C1, and when the said agreement itself refers to the payments covered under Ex.A1 to A3, it follows that the amounts mentioned therein were paid by the plaintiff and received by the defendant. Per contra, the execution of Ex.A4 necessarily leads to acceptance of amounts mentioned in the receipts as well. 32. Though certain alterations were pointed out by the defendant with reference to the portions marked as Q4 to Q8, the same do not, in the opinion of this Court, affect the intention of the parties. The mere use of the word “mortgage” in the altered portion does not change the overall purpose and nature of the document, it clearly evidences as an agreement of sale. 33. Coming to the aspect of time, it is admitted that, in the cross-examination of PW1, the defendant elicited that Ex.A4, the agreement of sale does not stipulate any specific time for execution of the sale deed. 33. Coming to the aspect of time, it is admitted that, in the cross-examination of PW1, the defendant elicited that Ex.A4, the agreement of sale does not stipulate any specific time for execution of the sale deed. The agreement contains a clause to the effect that as and when the plaintiff is ready and pays the balance sale consideration, the defendant shall execute the sale deed either in favour of the plaintiff or any nominee. 34. In such circumstances, time cannot be construed as the essence of the contract. Therefore, the plaintiff was required to express his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract by issuing a legal notice to the defendant and thereafter seek execution of the sale deed. 35. In the present case, the principal dispute between the parties is with regard to the issuance and service of the legal notice. According to the plaintiff, the legal notice was issued under Ex.A5 on 18.03.1996. It is the plaintiff’s case that the said notice was sent under certificate of posting to the address mentioned in the agreement. Admittedly, the present suit was filed on 25.03.1996. 36. Even assuming that the notice was posted on 18.03.1996, the suit having been instituted on 25.03.1996, it is evident that the plaintiff did not even wait for a period of seven days. The defendant, therefore, was not afforded reasonable or sufficient time to respond to the alleged notice. Further, since the notice is claimed to have been sent only under certificate of posting, the same cannot be treated as proof of service on the defendant. 37. In the absence of reliable proof of service of notice and without granting sufficient time to the defendant after the alleged issuance of notice, it cannot be said that a valid cause of action has arisen for the plaintiff to institute the present suit. 38. Though there is legal notice was said to have been posted on 18.03.1996 issued through certificate of posting, the same can be treated as proof of service as per the Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. However, in the absence of any material indicating the actual date of service of the said notice and without any pleading or evidence to establish that there was a refusal on the part of the defendant, such service cannot be conclusively inferred. However, in the absence of any material indicating the actual date of service of the said notice and without any pleading or evidence to establish that there was a refusal on the part of the defendant, such service cannot be conclusively inferred. Admittedly, as per the Clause 5 of the agreement of sale, there is no specific time for execution of sale deed and law of limitation is applicable. It is further contended that in case vendor fails to execute the sale deed in favour of Vendee or his nominee, the Vendor shall refund the advance and earnest money of Rs.3,75,000/- received together with interest at the rate of 24% per annum from date of execution of the agreement of sale. 39. In view of the finding given by CW1 under Ex.C1, the said agreement of sale was duly executed by the defendant. Though the execution was denied, the evidence placed by the plaintiff proves the agreement of sale, thereby binding the parties to the covenants thereof. However, the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of the agreement, as no cause of action had arisen to seek the compensation. The plaintiff has not placed any evidence to show that there was a demand for execution of the sale deed or refusal on the part of the defendant. Further, it is contended that the plaintiff is ready and willing to place his part of contract in absence of such demand or refusal. Though, a notice was issued, the plaintiff did not even wait for the reply or refusal on the part of the defendant. Consequently, the cause of action for seeking specific performance cannot be said to have arisen. Admittedly, in view of Ex.C1 and the evidence of CW1, the defendant has received the total sum of Rs.3,75,000/- under Ex.A4. 40. Though it is contended that Exs.A1 to A3 were not proved, CW1 admitted that the said documents were not signed by the defendant. However, the finding given by the CW1, the signatures on Ex.A4 are that of the defendant and shows that acknowledgment of receipt of the advance of Rs.1,75,000/- on the dates mentioned therein and Rs.2,00,000/- at the time of execution of the agreement of sale. However, the finding given by the CW1, the signatures on Ex.A4 are that of the defendant and shows that acknowledgment of receipt of the advance of Rs.1,75,000/- on the dates mentioned therein and Rs.2,00,000/- at the time of execution of the agreement of sale. In view of the Clause 5 of the agreement of sale, the defendant is bound to refund the amount in case the said sale deed is not executed in favour of the plaintiff. In the present case, as this Court having held that the plaintiff is not entitled for the specific performance of the agreement and in alternate the plaintiff is not entitled for relief or refund by invoking Clause 5 of the agreement of sale. As such, the findings which are given by the learned trial Court that the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 22.03.1995. But considering the above discussions made before this Court, this Court holds that the plaintiff is entitled for the alternative relief for recovery of sum of Rs.3,75,000/-. Further, the findings given by the learned trial Court that no amounts were paid to the plaintiffs to defendants under Exs.A1 to A3 and A4 is not the agreement of sale executed by defendant and the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that Exs.A5 and A6 were not genuine documents and they have created for the purpose of the suit, hard to accept. 41. It appears that the learned trial Court ignoring the evidence of CW1 and the expert opinion Ex.C1, the alterations which are made in the agreement of sale does not amounts to material alterations. As such, the Ex.A4 holds good and the same cannot be said that it is not a genuine document and created for the purpose of suit. 42. In view of the above discussion, while holding that the agreement of sale as genuine, this Court also finds that in the absence of any demand by the plaintiff and refusal on the part of the defendant for the specific performance is not granted. 43. This Court holds that the plaintiff is not entitled for any specific performance, but the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of said amounts under the agreement of sale along with interest. Hence, for the above said reasons, these points are partly answered in favour of the appellant. 44. 43. This Court holds that the plaintiff is not entitled for any specific performance, but the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of said amounts under the agreement of sale along with interest. Hence, for the above said reasons, these points are partly answered in favour of the appellant. 44. Therefore, the findings of the trial Court deserves to be set aside. Consequently, the Judgment and Decree dated 19.07.2004 passed in O.S.No.329 of 1996 by the Additional Judge, City Small Causes Court- cum-VI Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is set aside. 45. Accordingly, this City Civil Court Appeal is partly allowed, partly decreeing the suit to the extent of granting a relief of recovery of amount of Rs.3,75,000/- paid by the plaintiff to the defendant under Ex.A4 agreement of sale, with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the agreement till the date of judgment of the trial Court and future interest at 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date of realization rejecting the claim of specific performance of the agreement of sale. Each party shall bear their own costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.