JUDGMENT : GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J. 1. Heard Sri Aditya Vemparla, learned counsel representing Sri G.Pavan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.Vasanta Rayudu, learned counsel representing Sri K.P.Saradhi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/IDBI Bank Limited. 2. The present Writ Petition is filed assailing the order dated 26.11.2025 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad (DRT) in I.A.No.3255 of 2025 in S.A.No.485 of 2025 dismissing the SA along with the IA, as illegal and arbitrary. 3. The petitioner filed the SA before the learned DRT challenging the action of the 1 st respondent bank in issuing the possession notice dated 29.08.2025 in respective paper publications along with symbolic possession notice dated 28.10.2025 under Rule 8(1) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘the SARFAESI Act’). 4. The petitioner also filed IA.No.3255 of 2025 seeking condonation of the delay of 22 days in filing SA.No.485 of 2025 under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, on the ground that despite payments after publication of possession notice dated 29.08.2025 and assurance dated 20.09.2025, without initiating any action, the 1 st respondent bank is taking further measures. 5. The 1st respondent bank filed counter resisting the petition that both the SA and IA are filed through Special General Power of Attorney (SGPA) executed by Amudala Radha Krishnamurthy in his personal capacity, whereas the petitioner is a company and hence, the SGPA itself is invalid in the eye of law and accordingly, SA and IA are not maintainable. Further, no assurance was given by the 1strespondent bank with regard to further proceedings. 6. The learned DRT after considering the submissions made on behalf of both the parties, held that the SGPA dated 09.09.2025 stated to be executed in USA by Amudala Radha Krishna Murthy in favour of Dinesh Babu Kannan in his personal capacity. Admittedly, the petitioner is a private limited company represented by its Director. It is also observed that when the petitioner is a private limited company and having a separate legal entity, the power of attorney should have emanated from the resolution passed by the Board of the Directors of the company and not in the individual capacity of the Director. Admittedly, the petitioner is a private limited company represented by its Director. It is also observed that when the petitioner is a private limited company and having a separate legal entity, the power of attorney should have emanated from the resolution passed by the Board of the Directors of the company and not in the individual capacity of the Director. Hence, the SGPA is an invalid document for the purpose of filing SA under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and accordingly, concluded that the suitor of the SA is not an authorized person of the applicant company and hence, SA along with the subject IA are dismissed as not maintainable. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Mr.Amudala Radha Krishna Murthy and his wife Mrs.Amudala Rajni are the only two Directors of the petitioner company – M/s. Devesh Motors Private Limited and the subject loan was availed by them by mortgaging their personal immovable properties standing in their individual names in favour of the 1 st respondent bank. It is also stated that the immovable properties referred to in the demand notice and possession notice stand exclusively in the names of Mr.Amudala Radha Krishna Murthy and Mrs.Amudala Rajni and therefore, they are the aggrieved persons being entitled in law to approach the DRT seeking protection against the coercive measures under the SARFAESI Act. 8. On the other hand, Sri G.Vasantha Rayudu, learned counsel appearing for the 1 st respondent bank submits that the learned DRT rightly dismissed the application as not maintainable, since the petitioner is a private limited company having separate entity and accordingly, prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 9. We have given our earnest consideration to the submissions made on either side and perused the record. 10. Before adverting to the various contentions raised, we deem it appropriate to examine the maintainability of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the availability of an efficacious and statutory alternative remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Section 18 of the SARFESI ACT states that: “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal1 under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Section 18 of the SARFESI ACT states that: “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal1 under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” Section 18 of Act specifically states that any person aggrieved by any order made by the DRT under Section 17 thereof, may prefer an appeal along with such fee as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order of the DRT. 11. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and others , (2001) 6 SCC 569 , while dealing with the issue of maintainability of writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India vis-a-vis the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, has held that the Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and financial institutions, with hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act viz. filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. When there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provision. 12. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon , (2010) 8 SCC 110 on a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act and availability of the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, it was observed that a Writ Petition ought not to be entertained, in view of the availability of an alternative statutory remedy. 13. In the case of ICICI Bank Limited vs. Umakanta Mohapatra , Civil Appeal Nos. 10243-10250 of 2018 dated 05.10.2018 the Hon’ble Apex Court reaffirmed the legal position that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, where a statutory remedy is available by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 14. The issue of availing alternative remedy is amply cleared by series of decisions rendered by the Apex Court as well as this Court. In recent past, this Court has also examined similar issues in which after analyzing other decisions of the Apex Court, a consistent view is taken that when the statutory forum is created for redressal of grievances, the same ought to be adopted. The High Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot usurp the jurisdiction of an authority constituted under a special statute. 15. The SARFAESI Act is enacted empowering the banks and financial institutions to recover their dues expeditiously by enforcing security interests in respect of secured assets, without the intervention of the civil Courts or Tribunals, except to the limited extent provided under the statute. The Act seeks to ensure speedy recovery of non- performing assets (NPAs), strengthen the financial health of banks and financial institutions, and enhance the overall efficiency of the banking system, while simultaneously providing adequate safeguards to the borrowers through statutory remedies under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. 16. The Act seeks to ensure speedy recovery of non- performing assets (NPAs), strengthen the financial health of banks and financial institutions, and enhance the overall efficiency of the banking system, while simultaneously providing adequate safeguards to the borrowers through statutory remedies under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. 16. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner being well aware of the efficacious remedy of statutory appeal provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of considered view that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of the availability of an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Accordingly, without entering into or expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we do not wish to entertain the Writ Petition, leaving it open to the petitioner to avail and exhaust the alternative remedy of appeal as provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. 18. W.P.No.38843 of 2025, along with all connected applications, is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.