COMMON ORDER: J. SREENIVAS RAO, J. These Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) by the petitioners/accused Nos.3 and 4 seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.Nos.1607, 1476 & 1617 of 2016 and 185 of 2017 respectively, on the files of the XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the NI Act’). 1.1. Since the parties and the issues involved in all four criminal petitions are similar, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 1.2. The parties hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed in the complaints. 2. Brief facts of the case: Respondent No.2-complainant filed private complaints stating that IFCI Limited is a Government of India company and a financial institution within the meaning of Companies Act, 2013, and is engaged in the business of providing short and long term financial assistance. Accused No.1 is a company registered under the Companies Act, having its registered office at Hyderabad and is engaged in infrastructure development projects/services. Accused Nos.2 and 3 are the promoters and directors, and accused No.4 is the nominee director (Sycamore) of accused No.1 company. At the request of accused, the complainant sanctioned a corporate loan of Rs.90 crores vide letter of intent dated 08.09.2014 and further sanctioned another corporate loan of Rs.100 crores vide letter of intent dated 06.04.2015. The said loans were duly availed by accused No.1 company and were repayable as per the repayment schedule annexed to the loan agreements dated 15.09.2014 and 05.05.2015 respectively. Accused No.1, through accused No.3, issued cheques dated 15.07.2016, 15.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 15.08.2016 in favour of the complainant for Rs.4,50,00,000/-, Rs.1,01,19,452/- & Rs.1,22,87,671/- (C.C.No.1607 of 2016); Rs.1,22,87,671/- & Rs.1,01,19,452/- (C.C.No.1476 of 2016); Rs.1,26,97,260/- & Rs.1,04,56,767/- (C.C.No.1617 of 2016); and Rs.98,75,836/- & Rs.4,16,66,700/- (C.C.No.185 of 2017) respectively, towards part discharge of accused’s liability. The said cheques were presented for encashment by the complainant on 18.07.2016, 16.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 16.08.2016 respectively through its banker, i.e., HDFC Bank, Begumpet Branch, Hyderabad, to the accused’s banker i.e., State Bank of Hyderabad. However, the cheques were returned unpaid on 19.07.2016, 17.05.2016, 16.06.2016 and 17.08.2016 respectively by accused banker with the endorsement ‘Insufficient Funds’. The bank return memos along with the unpaid cheques were received by the complainant on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016 respectively. However, the cheques were returned unpaid on 19.07.2016, 17.05.2016, 16.06.2016 and 17.08.2016 respectively by accused banker with the endorsement ‘Insufficient Funds’. The bank return memos along with the unpaid cheques were received by the complainant on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016 respectively. Thereafter, the complainant issued legal notices dated 19.08.2016, 20.06.2016, 20.07.2016 and 22.08.2016, calling upon the accused to make payment of Rs.6,74,07,123/-, Rs.2,24,07,123/-, Rs.2,31,54,027/- and 5,15,42,536/- respectively, within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notices. All the accused received the notices on 22.08.2016, however, they neither complied with the demand made in legal notices nor issued any reply. Thereby, the accused have committed the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and are liable for punishment and sought imposition of a fine of double the cheque amounts by way of compensation to the complainant under Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. 3. Heard Mr. Sharad Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4 and Mr. M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 State. 4. Submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners: 4.1. Learned counsel submitted that the complaints were lodged by one Humaira, who does not have any authority to file complaints on behalf of the complainant, and she is only an Assistant Manager (Law) of the IFCI Limited. Even according to the allegations made in the complaints, the alleged cheques were presented by the complainant to its bank on 18.07.2016, 16.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 16.08.2016 and the same were returned on 19.07.2016, 17.05.2016, 16.05.2016 and 17.08.2016 respectively and the complainant ought to have issued the statutory notice within a period of 30 days from the date of return of the said cheques. However, the notices were issued after expiry of 30 days only on the ground that the bank return memos were received by the complainant on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016. To support the said version, the complainant has not filed any document along with the complaints. 4.2. He further submitted that the complainant has failed to issue the statutory legal notice as required under Section 138(b) of the NI Act within the stipulated period of 30 days and has issued the legal notices after expiry of 30 days from the date of return of the alleged cheques. 4.2. He further submitted that the complainant has failed to issue the statutory legal notice as required under Section 138(b) of the NI Act within the stipulated period of 30 days and has issued the legal notices after expiry of 30 days from the date of return of the alleged cheques. Hence, the complaints filed by the complainant for the offence under Section 138 of NI Act are not maintainable under law. 4.3. He also submitted that accused No.1 company has gone into liquidation and in the said proceedings, the complainant has received the entire amount. Hence, the continuation of the proceedings in C.C.Nos.1607, 1476 & 1617 of 2016 and 185 of 2017 against the petitioners is a clear abuse of the process of law and the criminal petitions are liable to be quashed. 4.4. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments: 1. Sivakumar v. Natarajan , (2009) 13 SCC 623 2. Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi v. State of Gujarath and another , (2014) 11 SCC 759 3. A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra and another , (2014) 11 SCC 790 ; and 4. Meters and Instruments Private Limited and another v. Kanchan Mehta , (2018) 1 SCC 560 5. Submissions of learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant : 5.1. Per contra, learned counsel submitted that accused No.3, representing himself as the Managing Director of accused No.1 company, issued cheques of accused No.1 company, dated 15.07.2016, 15.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 15.08.2016 in favour of the complainant for the following amounts respectively: Rs.4,50,00,000/-, Rs.1,01,19,452/- & Rs.1,22,87,671/-; Rs.1,22,87,671/- & Rs.1,01,19,452/-; Rs.1,26,97,260/- & Rs.1,04,56,767/-; and Rs.98,75,836/- & Rs.4,16,66,700/- towards part discharge of accused’s liability. The said cheques were presented by the complainant for encashment on 18.07.2016, 16.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 16.08.2016, respectively, through HDFC Bank Limited, Begumpet Branch, and the said cheques were returned unpaid on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’ and bank return memos along with the unpaid cheques were received by the complainant on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016 respectively. Thereafter, on 19.08.2016, 20.06.2016, 20.07.2016 and 22.08.2016, the complainant got issued legal notices to the petitioners and other accused calling upon them to make payment of the cheque amounts within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notices. Thereafter, on 19.08.2016, 20.06.2016, 20.07.2016 and 22.08.2016, the complainant got issued legal notices to the petitioners and other accused calling upon them to make payment of the cheque amounts within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notices. In spite of receiving the said notices, neither the petitioners or other accused issued any reply nor paid the cheque amounts and the statutory notices issued by the complainant are within time. 5.2. He further submitted that the complainant, after complying with all the statutory requirements, filed the complaints through Assistant Manager (Law) before the jurisdictional Magistrate and the said person is well acquainted with day-to-day affairs of the complainant. The learned Magistrate, after recording the sworn statement of the Assistant Manager (Law), took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused. 5.3. The grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant failed to issue the legal notices within the stipulated period as required under Section 138(b) of the NI Act and that the complaints were filed through an Assistant Manager (Law), who is neither competent nor authorized, are incorrect and untenable. Whether the statutory notices issued by the complainant are within stipulated time and whether Assistant Manager (Law) is competent to file the complaints on behalf of the complainant are triable issues, which has to be adjudicated by the trial Court. 5.4. He further submitted that in the liquidation process, the complainant submitted their claims to the tune of Rs.299.88 crores, however, no amount has been received in the said process. The complainant recovered only an amount of Rs.27,74,10,349/- from 10.02.2017 i.e., the date of initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against accused No.1 company, namely M/s.VNR Infrastructures Limited, by NCLT, till 28.10.2025. The above said amount was recovered from the sale of third-party securities held by the complainant and the complainant did not recover any amounts from the liquidation process of accused No.1-M/s.VNR Infrastructures Limited. 5.5. He also submitted that an amount of Rs.12,91,31,32,990.99 remains due as on 31.10.2025 and is payable by the accused to the complainant. Hence, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant has received the entire amount from the liquidation process of accused No.1 company is not true and correct. 5.5. He also submitted that an amount of Rs.12,91,31,32,990.99 remains due as on 31.10.2025 and is payable by the accused to the complainant. Hence, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant has received the entire amount from the liquidation process of accused No.1 company is not true and correct. The grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are disputed questions of facts, which can only be decided by the trial Court after a full-fledged trial. Basing on the said grounds, the petitioners are not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings. 5.6. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd , (2023) 10 SCC 545 . Analysis: 6. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that the complainant filed private complaints invoking the provisions of Section 190(1) read with 200 of Cr.P.C. against the petitioners and two others for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. In the said complaints, the complainant specifically averred that it is a registered Banking company incorporated under Companies Act, 1956, a Government of India Company and a financial institution within the meaning of the Companies Act, 2013, engaged in the business of providing short and long term financial assistance for infrastructure development projects/services. The petitioner No.1/accused No.3 is the Promoter and Director and petitioner No.2/accused No.4 is the Nominee director (Sycamore) of accused No.1 company, namely M/s.VNR Infrastructures Limited. Basing on the request of petitioners and other accused, the complainant sanctioned a corporate loan of Rs.90 Crores, vide letter of intent dated 08.09.2014 and another corporate loan of Rs.100 Crores, vide letter of intent dated 06.04.2015. The said loans were availed by accused No.1 company. Accordingly, accused No.1 and the complainant entered loan agreements dated 15.09.2014 for Rs.90 Crores and 05.05.2015 for Rs.100 Crores. The said loans were availed by accused No.1 company. Accordingly, accused No.1 and the complainant entered loan agreements dated 15.09.2014 for Rs.90 Crores and 05.05.2015 for Rs.100 Crores. The complainant in his legal notices issued under Section 138 of the NI Act specifically mentioned that addressee No.1/ M/s.VNR Infrastructures Limited, through addressee No.2 i.e., petitioner No.1/accused No.3, issued the following cheques towards part discharge of the liability of the petitioners and other accused: The afore said cheques were presented by the complainant for encashment through its banker, namely HDFC Bank, Begumpet Branch, Hyderabad, on various dates. The said cheques were returned unpaid by the petitioners’ banker with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. Thereafter, the complainant issued legal notices, calling upon them to pay the cheque amounts within 15 days from the date of receipt of said notices. The relevant particulars are mentioned in detail, as under: The petitioners have not given any reply to the legal notices issued by the complainant, even after receipt of the above said legal notices. Thereafter, the complainant has filed private complaints before the Court below. 7. The record further reveals that the complainant filed the private complaints through the Assistant Manager (Law). Along with the complaints, the Assistant Manager (Law) filed her sworn statements. Even according to the parties, it is not in dispute that the learned Magistrate, after recording the sworn statements of Humaira, Assistant Manager (Law), took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the petitioners and other accused. 8. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the complainant that the Assistant Manager (Law) is well-versed with the day-to-day affairs of the complainant/IFCI Limited and she is having knowledge of the affairs of the complainant and she is competent to file the complaints on behalf of the complainant and is duly authorized to file the complaints on its behalf. 9. 9. Insofar as the other contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant failed to issue the statutory notice within a period of 30 days from the date of return of the subject cheques and that the complaints are therefore not maintainable under law is concerned, the specific averments made in the complaints that the subject cheques dated 15.07.2016, 15.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 15.08.2016 were presented for encashment in the bank of the complainant on 18.07.2016, 16.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 16.08.2016 respectively, and the same were returned unpaid on 19.07.2016, 17.05.2016, 16.06.2016 and 17.08.2016 with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and the bank return memos along with the unpaid cheques were received by the complainant on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016. 10. Whether the complainant received the return cheque memos from the concerned bank on 19.07.2016 or 22.07.2015, 17.05.2016 or 20.05.2016, 16.06.2016 or 20.06.2016 and 17.08.2016 or 22.08.2016 is a disputed question of fact, especially the complainant has specifically averred in paragraph No.10 of the complaints that the cause of action arose on 15.07.2016, 15.05.2016, 15.06.2016 and 15.08.2016, when the cheques were issued by the accused towards discharge of legally enforceable debt and the cheques were returned on 22.07.2016, 20.05.2016, 20.06.2016 and 22.08.2016 and the complainant issued statutory notices on 19.08.2016, 20.06.2016, 20.07.2016 and 20.09.2016 and the same were received by the accused on 22.08.2016, 22.06.2016, 22.07.2016 and 23.09.2016 respectively, and after expiry of 15 days time only filed the complaints. It is relevant to mention that even according to the synopsis filed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in Crl.P.Nos.402 and 1044 of 2018, the complainant sent legal notices on 19.08.2016 and 20.09.2016 respectively, even before expiry of 30 days time. 11. Insofar as the other contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that accused No.1 company went into liquidation and in the said process, the complainant received the entire amount is concerned, the specific case of the complainant is that as on 31.10.2025, an amount of Rs.12,91,31,32,990.00/- remains due and payable by the petitioners and other accused and the complainant has recovered only Rs.27,74,10,349/- from 10.02.2017 i.e., the date of initiation of CIRP against accused No.1 company, till 28.10.2025 and the above said amount was also recovered from the sale of third-party securities held by the complainant and the complainant did not receive any amounts from CIRP or liquidation process of accused No.1 company. 12. 12. In Sivakumar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the limitation prescribed under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act for issuance of the statutory notice. The Court held that the expression “within thirty days of the receipt of information” regarding dishonour of the cheque is deliberate and significant. Parliament consciously did not use the expression “from the date of receipt of information”, thereby excluding the application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. Consequently, the period of thirty days must be strictly computed from the date on which the complainant receives intimation of dishonour, and issuance of notice on the 31st day would fall beyond the prescribed period, rendering the complaint not maintainable. Subsequently, in Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified the computation of limitation under clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, which governs the period for presentation of the cheque. Interpreting the use of the word “from” in the provision, the Court held that the date on which the cheque is drawn must be excluded and the last day of the six-month period included. The six months are therefore to be reckoned from the day following the date of the cheque. 13. In the case on hand, the actual date on which the complainant received the bank return memos is a disputed question of fact requiring appreciation of evidence and, therefore, cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Though reliance is placed on Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi supra, the said decision deals with computation of the six-month period for presentation of the cheque under Section 138(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, whereas no dispute arises in the present case with regard to the presentation of the cheques within their validity period. Hence, the said decision has no application to the facts of the case on hand and does not justify quashing of the proceedings. 14. In A.C. Narayanan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can validly be filed and prosecuted through a power-of-attorney holder, provided such holder has either witnessed the transaction or possesses due knowledge thereof, which must be specifically averred in the complaint, and that in view of Section 145 of the Act, the Magistrate may rely upon affidavit evidence at the stage of cognizance. In Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further clarified that an offence under Section 138 is predominantly compensatory in nature, ordinarily triable summarily, and that proceedings may be closed and the accused discharged upon satisfaction that the cheque amount with appropriate compensation has been paid, even in the absence of consent, without insisting on further preliminary evidence or mandatory imprisonment where compensation would suffice. 15. The precedents relied upon by the petitioners are not applicable to the case on hand as, in A.C. Narayanan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be filed through a power-of-attorney holder provided such person has due knowledge of the transaction and the same is specifically averred; however, in the present case, the question whether the Assistant Manager (Law) who filed the complaint had requisite knowledge and authority is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Likewise, the decision in Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. supra pertains to the compensatory nature of the offence, encouragement of compounding, and the power of the court to close proceedings upon payment of the cheque amount, whereas in the present case, there is a serious dispute regarding subsisting liability and alleged payment, which again requires evidence. Therefore, on the facts of the present case, the aforesaid decisions are not applicable for seeking quashing of the proceedings at the threshold. 16. In Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, whether resulting in approval of a resolution plan or liquidation, do not ipso facto extinguish criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court rejected the contention that closure of proceedings against the company or recovery of part of the debt under the IBC would absolve the signatory, promoter, or managing director of criminal liability arising from dishonour of cheques. It was further held that offences under Section 138 are not merely compensatory in nature, as the punitive element is integral to maintaining the sanctity of negotiable instruments and commercial transactions. Consequently, criminal proceedings under Section 138 can continue independently of the outcome of IBC proceedings. 17. It was further held that offences under Section 138 are not merely compensatory in nature, as the punitive element is integral to maintaining the sanctity of negotiable instruments and commercial transactions. Consequently, criminal proceedings under Section 138 can continue independently of the outcome of IBC proceedings. 17. In the case on hand, the petitioners, being signatories to the cheques and promoters/directors/nominee director of the accused No.1 company, cannot seek quashing of the proceedings on the ground of initiation or outcome of proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. As held in Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka supra, insolvency or recovery proceedings do not ipso facto extinguish criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the criminal proceedings can validly continue independent of such processes. 18. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp1 SCC 335 The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence. In cases arising under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, where the complaint prima facie discloses issuance of cheques towards a legally enforceable debt, their presentation, dishonour for insufficiency of funds, issuance of statutory notice, and failure to make payment, the proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold. Any defence sought to be raised by the accused, including disputes relating to liability or compliance with statutory requirements, involves questions of fact which must necessarily be adjudicated at trial and do not fall within the exceptional categories warranting interference as delineated in Bhajan Lal supra. 19. Any defence sought to be raised by the accused, including disputes relating to liability or compliance with statutory requirements, involves questions of fact which must necessarily be adjudicated at trial and do not fall within the exceptional categories warranting interference as delineated in Bhajan Lal supra. 19. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court supra, this Court is of the view that whether the Assistant Manager (Law) has knowledge of the day-to-day affairs of the complainant; whether she is a competent person to file the complaints on behalf of the complainant; whether the statutory notices under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act were issued within the prescribed period of limitation are all matters of evidence, especially the initial burden lies upon the complainant to prove these aspects and thereafter the burden shifts to the accused, which can be decided only by the trial Court after a full- fledged trial and cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Similarly, whether the complainant had received the entire amount in the CIRP proceedings, as alleged by the petitioners, or whether any amount remains due and payable by the petitioners and other accused; and whether any recoveries were made either through the CIRP proceedings or from the sale of third-party securities held by the complainant, are also disputed questions of fact and the same have to be adjudicated and decided by the trial Court after a full-fledged trial and the same cannot be decided in a quash petition while exercising the powers conferred under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 20. For the foregoing reasons, this Court do not find any ground to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C.Nos.1607, 1476, 1617 of 2016 and 185 of 2017 on the file of the XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 21. Accordingly, all the criminal petitions are dismissed. 22. After pronouncing the order, Ms. C.P.Suchitra, learned counsel representing Sri Sharad Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioners, requested this Court to dispense with the presence of the petitioners/accused Nos. 3 and 4 before the trial Court. 23. Accordingly, all the criminal petitions are dismissed. 22. After pronouncing the order, Ms. C.P.Suchitra, learned counsel representing Sri Sharad Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioners, requested this Court to dispense with the presence of the petitioners/accused Nos. 3 and 4 before the trial Court. 23. Taking into consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the presence of the petitioners/accused Nos.3 to 4 before the trial Court, is dispensed with, subject to the condition that they shall be represented through their counsel on each and every date of hearing. If the presence of the petitioners is required, they shall appear before the trial Court. In case of their non- appearance on the specific date fixed by the trial Court for their appearance, the trial Court is entitled to proceed with the matter, in accordance with law. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.