ORDER : D.N. RAY, J. 1. Heard Mr. Amrish K. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner. 2. The short question involved in the present Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is whether this Court, in exercise of its powers of supervision over the District Courts, would interdict with the judgment of the learned Commercial Court by which the application for condonation of delay of 3 months and 21 days, occurred in filing the restoration application in Commercial Civil Suit No. 890 of 2021, which was dismissed for default by the order dated 19.10.2023, came to be dismissed. 3. A short sketch of relevant facts necessary for determination of the aforesaid question is as follows:- 3.1 The petitioner is the original plaintiff, and the respondents are the original defendants in Commercial Civil Suit No. 890 of 2021, which was instituted before the learned Commercial Court, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad. The said suit was filed for recovery of an amount of Rs.1,40,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty Lakhs only), along with interest and ancillary reliefs. 3.2 The petitioner is stated to be engaged in the business of running shops and hotels. It is the case of the petitioner that in or around June 2013, respondent No.1 expressed his intention to purchase a hotel known as “Karnavati Hotel” situated at the third floor, Block-B, Signature Galaxy Complex, Sola, Ahmedabad. Owing to an alleged shortage of funds, respondent No.1 is stated to have borrowed money from the petitioner through a common acquaintance, namely one Bhavarsinh Gopalsinh. According to the petitioner, an amount of Rs.41,00,000/- was paid to respondent No.1 by way of cheque and cash during the period between June 2014 and November 2014. It is further asserted that, apart from the amounts advanced for the said hotel transaction, the respondents borrowed additional sums from the petitioner during the period between 2014 and 2017, and that the total amount allegedly advanced by the petitioner to the respondents aggregated to Rs.1,40,00,000/-. 3.3 As per the petitioner, since the respondents were unable to repay the outstanding dues, with their knowledge and consent, a registered sale deed in respect of Karnavati Hotel was executed in favour of the petitioner on 01.01.2016. Consequent thereto, the petitioner claims to have become the owner and occupier of the said hotel premises. 3.4 Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties. Consequent thereto, the petitioner claims to have become the owner and occupier of the said hotel premises. 3.4 Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties. The respondents lodged complaints against the petitioner at Sola Police Station. While earlier complaints were stated to have been disposed of, an FIR being I.C.R. No. 56 of 2017 came to be registered on 21.02.2017 for offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under the provisions of the Gujarat Money Lenders Act, 2011. The petitioner was thereafter released on bail by the competent court. 3.5 On 28.02.2017, meetings were allegedly held between the parties with a view to resolve the disputes. It is stated that the respondents agreed to pay Rs.1,40,00,000/- to the petitioner and issued a cheque for Rs.60,00,000/-, with an assurance that the cheque would be presented upon intimation and that the balance amount of Rs.80,00,000/- would be paid thereafter. However, according to the petitioner, no satisfactory response was given regarding encashment of the cheque, and instead, the respondents instituted Special Civil Suit No. 343 of 2018 seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 01.01.2016, which is stated to be pending. 3.6 In these circumstances, the petitioner filed Special Civil Suit No. 159 of 2019 seeking recovery of Rs.1.40 crore, later transferred to the Commercial Court and renumbered as Commercial Civil Suit No. 890 of 2021. The respondents appeared and filed a written statement. During pendency, petitioner’s advocate retired. Due to COVID-related disruptions, the petitioner faced coordination difficulties. On notice, the petitioner appeared on 26.04.2023, sought time to appoint new counsel, which was granted, and the matter was adjourned to 28.06.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner remained absent on 28.06.2023 and on subsequent dates. In the absence of representation and prosecution, the Commercial Court dismissed the suit for default on 19.10.2023. 3.7 Upon learning of the dismissal, the petitioner filed an application for restoration under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As the said application was filed with a delay of 111 days, a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was preferred, registered as Commercial Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 37 of 2024. The respondents opposed the said application. By order dated 19.05.2025, the learned Commercial Court dismissed the delay condonation application. 4. As the said application was filed with a delay of 111 days, a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was preferred, registered as Commercial Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 37 of 2024. The respondents opposed the said application. By order dated 19.05.2025, the learned Commercial Court dismissed the delay condonation application. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Mr. Amrish K. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner laboured to persuade us with the sufficiency of the grounds by which the delay would be explained satisfactorily. The main thrust of Mr. Pandya was that the petitioner is an aged person a foreigner to this state, originally hailing from Rajasthan with a tenuous bond with his son who resides at Ahmedabad, due to which his visits to Ahmedabad were, at best, occasional. It was due to the negligence of the petitioner’s son that proper engagement of advocate had not been done which ultimately resulted in dismissal of the suit for non prosecution. Upon coming to know of the same, the petitioner engaged a different advocate who filed the restoration application upon which, the impugned judgment has come to be passed. The breakup of the delay of 111 days was sought to be explained in the following manner as can be found in ground (d) of the SCA memo as under:- “(d) That the Ld. Appellate court has failed to consider that as an when the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of the said suit, the Petitioner immediately engaged the advocate and applied for certified copies on 24/01/2024 and the same was prepared on 30/01/2024 and the received by the petitioner's advocate on 09/02/2024 and filed the restoration application on 19/02/2024, but the delay of 111 days occurred in filing the same, which was not deliberate and purely un-intentional. Thus the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside in the interest of justice.” 6. Having perused the record and noting the submissions of Mr. Pandya, we are unable to persuade ourselves that the present case is one of those rare cases where this Court must exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Thus the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside in the interest of justice.” 6. Having perused the record and noting the submissions of Mr. Pandya, we are unable to persuade ourselves that the present case is one of those rare cases where this Court must exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. From the perusal of the Rojkam of the learned Commercial Court, it will be seen that till 16.02.2023, the advocate for the plaintiff was present and on the said date, the advocate for the plaintiff filed retirement pursis. Thereafter, several dates later, the suit was dismissed for non prosecution on 19.10.2023. The details of the same can be found at pages 45 to 49 of the paper-book. Noting all of these facts, the learned Commercial Court in its impugned judgment has recorded as under:- “7. So, after considering the facts of the case and documents produced in the matter, this Court is of the view that the applicant failed to show the justifiable reasons which enable this Court to grant the present application. Hence, in absence of any justifiable reasons and in absence of any overwhelming circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the present application deserves to be rejected. 8. Further, it is also pertinent to note that the Court cannot permit the litigant to take shelter of substantial justice to hide his own inaction. Hence, in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, when there is no ground whatsoever in the present application for condonation of delay, the same is require to be rejected.” 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani & Ors. , reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 143 , reiterated the nature and limits of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under:- “5. Article 227 of the Constitution invests the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Sub- Article(1) thereof provides that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. As per sub-Article(2), without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in sub-Article (1), the High Court may (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts and (c) prescribe forms in which the books and accounts etc. As per sub-Article(2), without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in sub-Article (1), the High Court may (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts and (c) prescribe forms in which the books and accounts etc. to be kept by the officers of courts. As per sub-Article (3), the High Court may also settle tables of fees. Sub- Article (4) provides that nothing in the Article shall deem to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 5.1 The scope, ambit, amplitude and nature of the powers of a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are discussed and delineated by this Court in catena of decisions. Article 227 is perceived to be a custodian of justice, which is in the nature of extraordinary supervisory powers, discretionary in nature. In Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, this Court cautioned that an improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and would divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. It was observed that this discretionary power has to be exercised very sparingly. 5.1.1 The reserve of exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for granting of relief in individual cases but should be directed for the promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice. It is emphasized that though the power under Article 227 may be unfettered, its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The Court observed in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), ‘The power of interference under Article 1 (2010) 8 SCC 329 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to halt and the foundation of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.’ 5.2 Similarly, in State vs. Navjot Sandhu , the powers of the High Court under Article 227 came to be explained by this Court observing that the powers available to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are not meant for and not to be exercised just for the purpose of correcting errors. It was held:‘ It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.’ (Para 28) 5.3 In A. Venkateshubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan , this Court held that ‘though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well-recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies before he resorts to a constitutional remedy.’ 5.4 In Rajendra Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and Anr ., this Court reiterated that the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution available to the High Court is not for a routine exercise, it is meant to keep the courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction or where grave miscarriage of justice has occurred or there is a flagrant violation of law. What was stated was that the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised ‘in the cloak of an appeal in disguise’, it cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum. (2000) 7 SCC 695 2019 (20) SCC 143 5.5 In K.Valarmathi and Ors. vs. Kumaresan , this Court reiterated the same principles for exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution by the High Courts as under, ‘Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.’ (Para 9) 5.5.1 It was further observed, which observation may also be pertinently reproduced, ‘Civil Procedure Code is a self-contained Code and Order VII Rule 11 therein enumerates the circumstances in which the trial court may reject a plaint. Such rejection amounts to a deemed decree which is appealable before the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. Such rejection amounts to a deemed decree which is appealable before the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. This statutory scheme cannot be upended by invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 to entertain a prayer for rejection of plaint.’ (Para 10) 5.6 In Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai and Others vs. Tuticorin Educational Society and Others , the appellants therein had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. In the said suit proceedings, the trial court 2025 SCC OnLine SC 985 6 (2019) 9 SCC 538 passed order granting an injunction. Respondent No. 5 in the suit called in question the order of granting injunction by filing a regular appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. But the Defendant Nos. 1 and 6 challenged the said order of injunction not by filing regular appeal but by invoking the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court allowed the said civil revision petition and set aside the order of injunction granted by the trial court. 5.6.1 The exercise of supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution by the High Court to challenge the injunction order was strongly disapproved by this court, observing that the High Court ought to have seen that when remedy of appeal under Section 104 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r), CPC, was directly available, Defendant Nos.1 and 6-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before this Court ought to have taken recourse to the same. 5.6.2 In Virudhunagar (supra), by categorizing the cases where the remedy is available under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the cases where such remedial provisions exist under special statutes, this Court emphasised that in cases falling under the first category, where there is availability of remedy in terms of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the existence of such remedy has to be treated as almost a complete bar against applying powers under Article 227 of the Constitution in that regard. 5.6.3 The Court observed thus, ‘…courts should always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such alternative remedy is available before civil courts in terms of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, and (ii) cases where such alternative remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which Respondents 1 and 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court.’ (Para 12) 5.7 The statement of law observed by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath while overruling (2015) 5 SCC 423 , the earlier decision in Surya Dev Ray vs. Ram Chander Rai , was recollected, that ‘orders of civil courts stand on a different footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than judicial/ Civil Court’, stating further as under, ‘Therefore wherever the proceedings are under the Civil Procedure Code and the forum is the civil court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self- imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Civil Procedure Code itself.’ (Para 13) 8. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court , we are unable to place the present case as a fit case where our supervisory powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India deserve to be exercised. In fact, it is the other way around. We are of the opinion that any interference with the impugned judgment and order would be a travesty of justice and against public policy. Therefore, the present petition is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.