ORDER (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman) Heard Mr. R. Anurag, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioners - Corporation and Mr. Arpith, learned counsel representing Mr. Vivek Jain, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. 2. The present Civil Revision Petition is filed against the order dated 05.12.2011 in I.A. No. 338 of 2011 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989 [hereinafter “impugned order”] passed by the learned V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad [hereinafter “the Reference Court”]. 3. This is an unfortunate case where the Respondent had invoked arbitration proceedings in 1989. However, due to the present proceedings and such other previous proceedings initiated by the Corporation, the arbitration proceedings remained pending. 4. The Petitioners are the Andhra Pradesh (now Telangana) State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘corporation’). The Respondent is a private contractor. The facts in brief are that, pursuant to a tender floated by the Corporation, the Respondent was selected as a contractor to construct the “Acute Medicare and Trauma Complex” at Gandhi Hospital, Hyderabad. Accordingly, a Work Order dated 04.04.1987 was issued to the Respondent to begin the construction works. Pursuant to such Work Order, the Respondent claims to have paid the EMD and to have invested huge sums of money. However, the Respondent alleges that the corporation had not handed over the site. As there was a delay in handing over the site, the Respondent claims to have addressed letters to the corporation. In reply to which, he was informed that the site was shifted from Gandhi Hospital to Musheerabad Jail. This was followed by other letters dated 16.06.1988 and 22.06.1988 whereby the corporation informed the Respondent that the site for construction of “Acute Medicare and Trauma Complex” was not finalized and that the Work Order dated 04.04.1987 was cancelled. 5. Contending that the unilateral termination / cancellation of the Work Order dated 04.04.1987 was illegal as huge investments were already made, the Respondent addressed a letter dated 13.07.1988 seeking the disputes to be referred to an arbitrator. As the Corporation did not agree for the reference, the Respondent had filed O.S. No. 545 of 1989 under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 [hereinafter “the Act of 1940”]. 6. Initially, O.S. No. 545 of 1989 filed for appointment of Arbitrator was dismissed by the Reference Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.10.1993. As the Corporation did not agree for the reference, the Respondent had filed O.S. No. 545 of 1989 under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 [hereinafter “the Act of 1940”]. 6. Initially, O.S. No. 545 of 1989 filed for appointment of Arbitrator was dismissed by the Reference Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.10.1993. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent herein preferred an appeal vide AAO No.621 of 1994. Vide judgment dated 10.03.2000, learned Single Judge, allowed the said appeal setting aside the judgment and decree dated 14.10.1993 and remanded the matter for fresh disposal to appoint an Arbitrator holding that there was concluded contract existed between the parties. Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 10.03.2000 of learned Single Judge, the Corporation preferred LPA No. 168 of 2000 before the Division Bench. Vide judgment dated 13.03.2003, a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Thus, the order of the learned Single Judge attained finality. Pursuant to the judgment of learned Single Judge, the Reference Court appointed Sri Justice Ranga Rao, Former Judge of High Court as an Arbitrator. The Corporation instead of obeying the orders of the learned Single Judge, filed a Revision vide CRP No.2552 of 2005 challenging the appointment of the said Arbitrator. However, this Court, after hearing both sides, dismissed the said CRP on 05.012.2007. 7. We stress here that the arbitrator was appointed after more than 15 years since the filing of O.S. No. 545 of 1989. Instead of participating in the proceedings, the Corporation again challenged the reference order dated 08.11.2004 in C.R.P. No. 2552 of 2005. This Court vide order dated 05.12.2007 dismissed the said CRP confirming the reference to arbitration and the appointment of the arbitrator. 8. The arbitral proceedings commenced. During its pendency, the Respondent filed an application seeking to include additional claims to be adjudicated by the arbitrator. These claims pertained to the alleged business loss due to the illegal termination of the contract and the delay caused by the Corporation in appointment of the arbitrator. Further, compensation was also sought towards legal expenses. Towards loss of business, a total of Rs. 2,20,00,000/- (two crores and twenty lakhs only) was claimed. 9. These claims pertained to the alleged business loss due to the illegal termination of the contract and the delay caused by the Corporation in appointment of the arbitrator. Further, compensation was also sought towards legal expenses. Towards loss of business, a total of Rs. 2,20,00,000/- (two crores and twenty lakhs only) was claimed. 9. The arbitrator refused to entertain these additional / subsequent claims on the ground that such claims were not referred for adjudication by the Reference Court in O.S. No. 545 of 1989. The Reference Court relied on Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Prannath Vishwanath Rawley , AIR 1977 SC 2014 and directed the Respondent to obtain further orders from the Reference Court in relation to the additional claims. 10. Accordingly, the Respondent had approached the Reference Court vide I.A. No. 328 of 2011 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989 seeking reference of the additional / subsequent claims to arbitration. The Reference Court vide the impugned order dated 05.12.2011 allowed the Respondent’s application and referred the additional claims to the arbitrator. 11, The findings of the Reference Court in the impugned order are extracted below: “25. In the instant case as seen from averments in the counter it is clear that still the matter is before the Arbitrator and the stage of the proceedings before the Arbitrator is coming up for arguments. At that juncture the corporation came up with the present petition to include the additional claims for decision before the arbitrator. According to Section 20 of the Arbitration Act all the disputes that arose between the parties in pursuance of the agreement shall be decided by the arbitrator. In the instant case as the matter is still pending before the arbitrator, The additional claims referred by the corporation prima facie needs to be consider and examined by the arbitrator including with regard to maintainability of additional claims. The additional claims are in continuation of disputes between the parties. This court feels by referring the matter to the Arbitrary to decide the additional claims also is just and proper thereby the arbitrator will examine and decide the additional claims of the corporation in accordance with law. 25. The additional claims are in continuation of disputes between the parties. This court feels by referring the matter to the Arbitrary to decide the additional claims also is just and proper thereby the arbitrator will examine and decide the additional claims of the corporation in accordance with law. 25. As per the order's in IA 545/1989 this court appointed the Hon'ble Justice Sri T.Ranga Rao retired Judge of Hon'ble High Coun of A.P as arbitrator and the matter is still pending not at all disposed of coming up for arguments. In view of pendency of the matter, this court feels the additional claims are continuation of the matter referred to the arbitrator. In view of above the above discussion there is prima facie needs to be considered and examined regarding the additional Issues because the agreement i is between the parties and the additional claims are also continuation of dispute in between the parties pending before the Hon'ble arbitrator prima facie needs to be considered and examined by the party including regarding maintainability of said additional claims in accordance with law. Hence the point is answered accordingly.” 12. Therefore, considering that the arbitration proceedings were already pending and the fact that all the disputes are to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, the additional claims were referred to the arbitrator. The Reference Court also considered that the additional claims raised by the Respondent are in relation to the continuing disputes between the parties. Likewise, the maintainability and entitlement of the additional claims was left for the arbitrator to decide. 13. Against the reference of additional claims to the arbitrator, the Corporation has filed the present Civil Revision Petition. The Contentions of the Corporation are as follows: i. O.S. No. 545 of 1989 was decreed by appointing an arbitrator. The same attained finality. The Reference Court after the appointment of the arbitrator becomes functus officio. Therefore, additional claims, after a lapse of 07 years, could not have been referred to arbitration by the Reference Court. ii. Once the main case is disposed of, no party can reopen the proceedings by filing miscellaneous applications. Reliance was placed on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3677 . iii. The additional claims sought to be adjudicated by the arbitrator are very remote and are barred by limitation. Reliance was placed on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3677 . iii. The additional claims sought to be adjudicated by the arbitrator are very remote and are barred by limitation. The said claims do not relate to the arbitration agreement and are non-arbitrable. Reliance was placed on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Raunaq International Ltd. , (2009) 17 SCC 323 . iv. The proceedings before the arbitrator were at the stage of arguments. At such a belated stage, additional claims could not have been referred to the arbitrator. v. The additional claims are fresh claims. Therefore, fresh proceedings have to be initiated by issuing a notice. The arbitrator cannot adjudicate additional claims in pending proceedings. 14. In his reply, the Respondent supported the findings rendered in the impugned order and contended as follows: i. The additional claims relate to the loss of business on account of delay attributable to the Corporation. The said claims are related to the main claims which were already referred to arbitration. Therefore, such claims could have been referred to arbitration. Reliance was placed on H.L. Batra and Co. v. State of Haryana , (1999) 9 SCC 188 . ii. Relying on State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises , (2012) 12 SCC 581 , it was contended that unless the arbitration clause refers to specific disputes, the parties are entitled to raise all the disputes relation to the agreement. Further, such claims / counter claims can be amended. 15. At this stage, we would like to highlight that when the present Civil Revision Petition came for admission, the predecessor bench which heard the matter had stayed the arbitration proceedings vide order dated 22.12.2011. The said stay operates till date. Further, vide order dated 11.04.2017, the interim order dated 22.12.2011 was made absolute and the following observations were made: “In our, prima facie, opinion with the disposal of the suit, the Court below has become functus officio and therefore, it could not have referred additional claims for arbitration. Moreover, the interim order was granted as far back as 22.12.2011. Hence, at this length of time, it is not desirable to vacate the said interim order as doing so would render the revision petition itself infructuous. Moreover, the interim order was granted as far back as 22.12.2011. Hence, at this length of time, it is not desirable to vacate the said interim order as doing so would render the revision petition itself infructuous. For the aforementioned reasons, C.R.P.M.P. No.8048 of 2016 is dismissed. Interim order, dated 22.12.2011, in C.R.P.M.P.No.7972 of 2011 is made absolute. C.R.P.M.P.No. 7972 of 2011, accordingly, stands disposed of.” 16. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties at length. The question before us is whether the Reference Court becomes functus officio under the Act, 1940 after the appointment of an arbitrator and whether such Reference Court could have referred the additional claims to arbitration after an arbitrator was already appointed. 17. To answer the above question, it is relevant to note the distinction between the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 [hereinafter “1996 Act”]. The latter incorporates the features of minimum judicial intervention in the conduct of arbitral proceedings, whereas the former contemplates conduct of arbitral proceedings under the control and supervision of the Court. 18. Under the Act of 1940, Section 2(c) defines “Court” as a civil court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference as if the same were the subject matter of a suit. In other words, for the purposes of the Act of 1940, “Court” means the court which would have jurisdiction if a suit had been filed under the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. The Court, as defined under Section 2 (c) of the 1940 Act, has been conferred with various powers including the power to refer disputes an arbitrator, appoint an arbitrator, remove the arbitrator, etc. Under Section 20 of the 1940 Act, power has been conferred on the Court to refer the disputes to arbitration and to appoint an arbitrator. 20. The Court, under the 1940 Act, retains higher control over the arbitral proceedings and the post-arbitral proceedings. Once an award is passed by an arbitrator appointed under the 1940 Act, the same has to be signed and filed before the Court under Section 14. After filing of the award, the Court shall issue notices to the parties and hear objections on the award. Under Sections 15 & 16, the Court, after hearing the parties, can confirm the award, modify or correct the award, remit the award, or set aside the award. After filing of the award, the Court shall issue notices to the parties and hear objections on the award. Under Sections 15 & 16, the Court, after hearing the parties, can confirm the award, modify or correct the award, remit the award, or set aside the award. If the award is confirmed, the Court shall pronounce a judgment in terms of the award. This judgement will be followed by a decree. This is envisaged under Section 17 of the 1940 Act. 21. It is pertinent to note here that the term “Court” used in multiple provisions like Section 14, 15, 16, 17, and 20 is defined under Section 2 (c) of the Act, 1940. Meaning thereby that, once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 20 by the Court, an award has to be filed by the arbitrator before the same Court and the judgment shall be pronounced by the same Court. This indicates that the Reference Court, i.e., the Court acting under Section 20 of the 1940 Act retains control over the arbitral proceedings till the judgement and decree are passed in terms of Section 17. This means that the Reference Court, after appointing an arbitrator, does not become functus officio. 22. Now coming to the facts of the case, it was fervently argued on behalf of the Corporation that once Sri Justice T. Ranga Rao was appointed as an arbitrator vide order dated 08.11.2004 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989 and the same was confirmed by this Court vide order dated 05.12.2007 in C.R.P. No. 2552 of 2005, the proceedings attained finality. The Corporation’s argument is that the Reference Court becomes functus officio and could not have entertained I.A. No. 338 of 2011 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989. 23. We disagree with the argument advanced on behalf of the Corporation. As discussed supra, the Reference Court does not become functus officio after appointment of the arbitrator. The said Court still retains control to entertain any “subsequent applications arising out of that reference”. In this regard, Section 31 of the 1940 Act may be referred to. Section 31 (4) expressly states that the Reference Court has jurisdiction to entertain subsequent applications arising out of the reference. For the sake of convenience, Section 31 is extracted below: “31. The said Court still retains control to entertain any “subsequent applications arising out of that reference”. In this regard, Section 31 of the 1940 Act may be referred to. Section 31 (4) expressly states that the Reference Court has jurisdiction to entertain subsequent applications arising out of the reference. For the sake of convenience, Section 31 is extracted below: “31. Jurisdiction:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the awarded under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that Court and in no other Court.” 24. While the Corporation is correct in contending that the arbitrator is bound by the reference made by the Reference Court under Section 20 and the scope of the reference cannot be enlarged, the 1940 Act does not proscribe amendment of claims or seeking adjudication of subsequent claims. When the arbitral proceedings are pending and if the party feels that ancillary claims arise out of the main claim, such party may seek amendment of their claim petition to include such a claim. Needless to say, that the principles of Order VI Rule 17 would apply to such cases. 25. While an amendment petition can be entertained by the arbitrator himself, it does not prohibit the party from approaching the Reference Court seeking reference of additional / subsequent claims to the arbitrator. Needless to say, that the principles of Order VI Rule 17 would apply to such cases. 25. While an amendment petition can be entertained by the arbitrator himself, it does not prohibit the party from approaching the Reference Court seeking reference of additional / subsequent claims to the arbitrator. In this regard, it is apt to note that in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. (Supra) , it was held: "11. Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940, provides that where a difference has arisen and where any persons have entered into an arbitration agreement they may apply to the court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates, that the agreement be filed in court. Sub-section (4) to S. 20 provides that the court shall order the agreement to be filed, and shall make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties. When an agreement is filed in court and order of reference is made then the claim as a result of the order of reference is limited to a particular relief and the arbitrator cannot enlarge the scope of the reference and entertain fresh claims without a further order of reference from the court . On a construction of S. 20 of the Arbitration Act the plea on behalf of the appellant will have to be accepted." 26. As is evident from the above paragraph, fresh claims can be entertained with a further order of reference. This, in our view, establishes that a party can apply to the Reference Court for a further order to include additional and subsequent claims. The validity and entitlement of such claims is for the arbitrator to decide. 27. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the impugned order is correct. The unfortunate delay in this case is regrettable. We direct all the claims to be adjudicated by the learned arbitrator. We hope that the parties cooperate and assist the arbitrator in concluding the arbitral proceedings at the earliest. 28. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. All the interim orders stand vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this revision shall stand closed. 29. We hope that the parties cooperate and assist the arbitrator in concluding the arbitral proceedings at the earliest. 28. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. All the interim orders stand vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this revision shall stand closed. 29. When the present judgment was pronounced in open court, it was brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that, due to old age, Justice T. Ranga Rao (Retd.) is unable to conduct the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the Respondent requested this Court to appoint a substitute arbitrator replacing Justice T. Ranga Rao (Retd.). However, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners opposed the same and stated that in a petition filed by them a substitute arbitrator cannot be appointed. 30. As stated above, the suit for referring the disputes to arbitration was filed in 1989. Till date the arbitral proceedings have been pending due to no fault of the Respondent. Likewise, by virtue of the order dated 22.12.2011 passed by this Court, the arbitral proceedings were stayed. The stay order operates till date. It is trite law that an act of the court shall prejudice no one. This is embodied in the Latin maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’. Therefore, remanding the Respondent back to the Civil Court to seek appointment of a substitute arbitrator will cause severe prejudice and will further delay the arbitral proceedings. 31. Under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, this Court is a “court of record”. A nine –Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra , (1966) 3 SCR 744 . , has held that a “court of record” is a superior court and is not bounds by the limits of jurisdiction. In appropriate cases, where it is expedient and to do complete justice, this Court can exercise its plenary powers. 32. In light of the facts and circumstances narrated above, we deem it appropriate to appoint Sri Justice P.Naveen Rao, Former Judge, High Court of Telangana , as the arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes referred to arbitration vide order dated 08.11.2004 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989 and order dated 05.12.2011 in I.A. No. 338 of 2011 in O.S. No. 545 of 1989 passed by the learned Vth Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.