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2026 DIGILAW 44 (GUJ)

District Development Officer v. State of Gujarat

2026-01-30

BHARGAV D.KARIA, L.S.PIRZADA

body2026
ORDER : L.S. PIRZADA, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Gnanesh G. Bhatt appearing for Mr.Gaurang H. Bhatt for the appellant, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Shruti Dhruve for the respondent No.1 – State and learned advocate Mr.Himanish J. Japee for respondent Nos.2 to 6. 2. At the outset, learned advocates for the respective parties submitted that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the appellant – Panchayat against the impugned Judgment and Order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil application Nos.1489 of 2025, 1826 of 2025 and 1870 of 2025. 3. Factual matrix of the case are that the respondent Nos.2 to 6 - original petitioners had been appointed on compassionate basis as Class-III employee on fix pay of Rs.2500/- per month. Thereafter, he was appointed on regular pay-scale. It is the case of the original petitioners that they have not been given appointment on regular basis and have been wrongly appointed on fixed pay on fixed term basis. 3.1. The respondents – original petitioners have thereafter, preferred writ petitions being Special Civil application No.1489 of 2025 and allied matters and the learned Single Judge vide order dated 23.06.2025, allowed the said writ petitions by observing that the issue raised in the said petitions is covered by the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.10738 of 2020 and allied matters dated 14.03.2024 wherein, the Court relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court, had allowed the writ petitions directing the respondents to issue modified appointment orders to the petitioners, whereby the period from date of appointment of the petitioners would be treated as a regular pay-scale. The Court had further directed the respondents to pay to the petitioners all consequential benefits, including the benefits of arrears etc., which the petitioners would be entitled to upon such placement would be given to the petitioners for a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petitions. The respondents were directed to complete the exercise within a period of 4 months from the date of the order. 3.2. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal, challenging the order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil application No.1489 of 2025 and allied matters. 4. Considering the above, we also Admit this Appeal. 3.2. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal, challenging the order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil application No.1489 of 2025 and allied matters. 4. Considering the above, we also Admit this Appeal. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Shruti Dhruve and learned advocate Mr.Himanish J. Japee waive service of notice of admission for and on behalf of the respective respondents. 5. The Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice A.S.Supehia and Hon’ble Mrs.Justice Mauna M. Bhatt (As Her Ladyship was then) has followed the order dated 11.07.2024 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 wherein, similar issue has been dealt with. The order dated 11.07.2024 reads as under : “14. The employees before us have contended that they are entitled to arrears from their initial date of appointment and not from 01.01.2020, whereas the State has prayed for restricting it for three years. 15. In our considered opinion, the date 01.01.2020 cannot be made applicable in all the cases uniformly in wake of the fact that the date of appointment of each of the employees and date of filing of the writ petitions is also different. 16. We have heard on this issue. Before we may pass final orders, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Dass (supra). While dealing with the issue of delay and latches caused in filing the writ petitions challenging termination orders, the Apex Court has held thus: “10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.” 17. Thereafter, in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), where the issue pertains to the claim of pension, the Apex Court has held thus: “5. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.” 17. Thereafter, in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), where the issue pertains to the claim of pension, the Apex Court has held thus: “5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 18. The aforementioned both the judgments are considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, JT 2022 (5) S.C. 470. It is held thus: “12 In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. It is held thus: “12 In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. The Court restricted "the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser". Further, the grant of interest on arrears was also denied. 13. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has been followed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 and Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India., (2016) 13 SCC 797 . 14. In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that the respondent-Corporation had accepted the interpretation rendered by the High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme whereby the appellants, on financial upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade payscale of the next promotional post, which is Rs.5,000- 8,000/- in the present case. As noted above, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench accepts the said position and grants the appellants the said pay- scale but restricts the benefit from the date of the judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants, that is, with effect from 31st July 2018. The Division Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/judgment of the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view of the decision and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) which has been followed in several other decisions. That apart, the date of the decision of the Single Judge is a fortuitous circumstance. Only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and laches or limitation. The appellants would, in consonance with the case law referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three years before the date offiling of the Writ Petition.” 19. The Apex Court has held that the claim which is related to service benefits, one of the exceptions to the said rule of delay and latches relating to a continuing wrong. The appellants would, in consonance with the case law referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three years before the date offiling of the Writ Petition.” 19. The Apex Court has held that the claim which is related to service benefits, one of the exceptions to the said rule of delay and latches relating to a continuing wrong. It is held that where a service-related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is exception to the exception. Ultimately, it is held that the High Courts will restrict consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. The Supreme court in case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak (supra) has held that the High Court should not have taken the date of decision / judgement of the learned Single Judge for grant of benefits in view of the decision and ration in Tarsem Singh (supra), and further it is clarified that “only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and latches or limitation, and the arrears are to be confined for three years before the date of filing of the writ petition. 20. Hence, the date of filing of the respective writ petitions becomes very relevant while restricting the arrears for three years. In the present group of appeals, the writ petitions have been filed after considerable delay and hence, the grant of actual arrears to such writ petitioners is governed as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decisions. The arrears are required to be restricted to the period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of each of the respective petitions. The reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lekh Ram (supra) will not apply to the present facts, since the issue with regard to delay in filing the writ petitions by the employee was neither raised nor examined. 21. The reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lekh Ram (supra) will not apply to the present facts, since the issue with regard to delay in filing the writ petitions by the employee was neither raised nor examined. 21. This directions will only be confined to those employees, who have belatedly filed writ petitioners beyond three years questioning the action of the State authorities in conferring the regular pay-scale belatedly, and not from their initial date of appointment. 22. Hence, the directions issued by the learned Single Judges in the respective writ petitions is altered and all the employees shall be entitled to the actual arrears from a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the respective writ petitions. It is clarified that since we have not disturbed the decision with regard to the conferment of the regular pay-scale from the initial date of appointment, the pay fixation and other benefits to all the employees shall counted notionally for the intervening period. 23. With these observations, the present appeals are disposed of. As a sequel, the connected applications are also stand disposed of.” 6. Considering the above dictum of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the issue in the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench. As the present respondent Nos.2 to 6 – original petitioners are similarly situated to the appellants of aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 and allied matters and are also entitled to get the benefits, more particularly, the appointment date of the present respondent Nos.2 to 6 should be treated as the date on which, they entered in service on regular pay-scale and are also required to be granted all the consequential benefits, including the benefits of arrears etc. 7. In view of the above, as the learned Single Judge has also relied upon the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 on 11.07.2024, we do not find any manifest error being committed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 8. Accordingly, the present Letters Patent Appeal is disposed of in terms of the observations made by the Co- ordinate Bench in the order dated 11.07.2024 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 and allied matters, which are reproduced hereinabove. 9. 8. Accordingly, the present Letters Patent Appeal is disposed of in terms of the observations made by the Co- ordinate Bench in the order dated 11.07.2024 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 and allied matters, which are reproduced hereinabove. 9. In view of the disposal of the present Letters Patent Appeal, connected Civil Application also stands disposed of.