JUDGMENT : VINIT KUMAR MATHUR, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by appellant- State under Section 378 (i) & (iii) of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against accused-respondent Nanu S/o Shri Hari Shankar, challenging the judgment dated 16.02.1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Banswara, in Sessions Case No. 110/1996 arising out of FIR No.65/96, lodged at police station Lohariya, Banswara whereby the accused-respondent has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302 & 450 of the IPC. 2. As per the prosecution case on 06.03.1996, one Shri Hatu (PW-02) submitted a verbal report (Ex.P-2) at Police Station Lohariya stating that on the previous evening, at about 4:00 PM, his wife, Smt. Dev Kanwar, was preparing tea at their home, while he was sitting at the Padsal. The Adivashi villagers were playing Holi-Ger at Holi Chowk in the village. At that time, Nanu, S/o Shanker, came there with an unsheathed sword in his hand, started abusing, and said ^^jkaM] vkt rq>s tku ls [kRe djrk gw¡] rw lHkh dks Mjkrh gSA** Thereafter, he entered in the house and inflicted a sword blow on the abdomen of Dev Kanwar with the intention to kill her. On withdrawing the sword, her intestines protruded. Upon hearing her cries, Ramu, Rameng, and other villagers reached at the spot and caught hold the accused–respondent. Dev Kanwar was taken to the hospital for treatment. During the course of treatment, Dev Kanwar succumbed to her injuries. 3. On the basis of the above verbal report, a formal FIR No. 65/96 (Exhibit P.03) was registered at Police Station, Lohariya, Banswara against the accused for the offences under Sections 307, 452, 326, and 504 IPC. During the course of investigation, Dev Kanwar succumbed to her injuries accordingly; the offence under Section 302 IPC was added. 4. After completion of investigation, police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 302, 450, and 504 IPC against the accused-respondent before the concerned court where from the case was committed to the sessions court. 5. Learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges under Sections 302 & 450 IPC to the accused-respondent, who denied the charge and sought for trial. 6. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses. In support of its case, the prosecution also produced documentary evidence, Exhibits P-01 to P-16. 7. 5. Learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges under Sections 302 & 450 IPC to the accused-respondent, who denied the charge and sought for trial. 6. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses. In support of its case, the prosecution also produced documentary evidence, Exhibits P-01 to P-16. 7. The statement of the accused-respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He denied all incriminating circumstances put to him, stating that the prosecution witnesses had deposed falsely, that the evidence was fabricated, and that he was innocent. The accused-respondent did not lead any defence evidence, and the defence evidence was accordingly closed. 8. Learned Trial Court, after hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of both sides and upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, acquitted the accused-respondent as aforesaid vide judgment dated 16.02.1999. 9. Being aggrieved against the order of acquittal dated 16.02.1999, the State – appellant preferred the present appeal. 10. Learned Public Prosecution appearing for the appellant-State submitted that the learned trial court has committed grave illegality and perversity in acquitting the accused–respondent of the charges levelled against him. The impugned judgment is contrary to law, unsupported by evidence, and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 11. He further submitted that the learned trial court has erred in law and on facts in disbelieving the prosecution story without properly appreciating the evidence brought on record. The judgment thus, suffers from lack of cogent reasoning and reflects non-application of judicial mind, rendering the acquittal unsustainable. 12. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the statement of PW-2 Hatu, the husband of the deceased and an eye-witness, has been unjustifiably discarded. PW-2 has categorically stated that the accused – respondent entered the house and inflicted a sword blow on the abdomen of his wife. His testimony is duly corroborated by PW-7 Dr. Lal Chand and PW-9 Dr. Devpriya. However, the learned trial court failed to appreciate these vital and consistent testimonies and recorded acquittal in a manner perverse to the material available on record. 13. He further submitted that the deceased, Smt. Dev Kanwar, succumbed during treatment due to infection, which developed as a direct consequence of the sword injury inflicted by the accused– respondent. The medical evidence clearly establishes that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 13. He further submitted that the deceased, Smt. Dev Kanwar, succumbed during treatment due to infection, which developed as a direct consequence of the sword injury inflicted by the accused– respondent. The medical evidence clearly establishes that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Despite this, the learned trial court erroneously discarded the medical evidence, which is wholly unjustified. 14. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the impugned judgment is neither speaking nor reasoned one. The learned trial court has failed to properly analyse and discuss the prosecution evidence and has passed the judgment in a casual and superficial manner in a case involving heinous offence of murder. The prosecution had succeeded in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt, yet the learned trial court has taken an unjust and contrary view. 15. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned trial court has wrongly concluded that Dev Kanwar died after getting cured from her injuries due to infection, ignoring the crucial fact that the infection itself arose due to the grievous sword injury caused by the accused-respondent. This vital aspect has been overlooked, and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has been brushed aside without lawful justification. 16. In view of the above submissions, it is prayed that the present appeal may be allowed and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court be set aside and the accused-respondent be convicted for the offences proved against him. 17. Learned counsel for the accused–respondent has opposed the submissions made by the learned Public Prosecutor and has supported the judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge, Banswara, and he submitted that there is no infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused–respondent from the offences under Sections 302 & 450 IPC vide judgment dated 16.02.1999. 18. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent submitted that it is the cardinal principle of law that even if two views are possible and the learned trial court found the other view to be more probable, an interference would not have been warranted by the appellate court, unless the view taken by the learned trial court was a perverse or impossible view. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent submitted that it is the cardinal principle of law that even if two views are possible and the learned trial court found the other view to be more probable, an interference would not have been warranted by the appellate court, unless the view taken by the learned trial court was a perverse or impossible view. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent submitted that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned trial court has not committed any perversity and the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court does not call for any interference. 19. We have considered the submissions made before this Court and have carefully examined the relevant record of the case, including the impugned judgment dated 16.02.1999. 20. A close scrutiny of the record reveals that PW-2 Hatu, the husband of the deceased, stated that several persons were present at the place of occurrence. The deceased, in her police statement, also mentioned the presence of PW-1 Ramu, PW-4 Nana, PW-6 Vela, and PW-3 Rameng at the place of occurrence, however, a perusal of the statements of above four witnesses, it is revealed that none of above four eyewitnesses have stated that the accused-respondent inflicted the sword injury upon the deceased, Smt. Dev Kanwar. Their testimonies do not corroborate the version put-forth by PW-2 Hatu, thereby creating doubt regarding the prosecution story. 21. PW-9 Dr. Dev Priya Ashok Panda stated that the deceased remained hospitalized for nearly one month due to the injuries sustained and ultimately died due to an internal abdominal infection. According to him, the external injuries had healed by the time of her death. 22. PW-8 Nathu Singh- the Investigating Officer in his statement stated that on the basis of the information furnished by the accused-respondent, a blood-stained sword was recovered vide Fard Bardamagi (Ex.P-9) from the house of accused-respondent in the presence of PW-5 Bhopal Singh and one Hiralal. However, PW-5 Bhopal Singh has not supported the prosecution version, and Hiralal, the other attesting witness, was not produced before the Court. Therefore, the alleged recovery of the sword cannot be held to be duly proved merely on the basis of the statement of the Investigating Officer-PW-8 Nathu Singh. Further, as per the serologist’s report (Ex.P-15), the blood group on the seized articles, including the clothes, kurta, and sword, could not be determined. Therefore, the alleged recovery of the sword cannot be held to be duly proved merely on the basis of the statement of the Investigating Officer-PW-8 Nathu Singh. Further, as per the serologist’s report (Ex.P-15), the blood group on the seized articles, including the clothes, kurta, and sword, could not be determined. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish that the sword recovered was the weapon used for commission of crime. 23. From the testimony of PW-2 Hatu, the husband of the deceased, it emerges that on the day of Dhulendi, at about 5:00 PM, he was sitting in the courtyard of his house while his wife, Smt. Dev Kunwar, was preparing tea. The Holi celebration was taking place in front of his house where people were playing Holi- Ger. According to him, the accused Nanu, who is his nephew, was present there with a naked sword in his hand. When his wife came out to give him tea, the accused allegedly abused her and said ^^jkaM] vkt rq>s tku ls [kRe djrk gw¡] rw lHkh dks Mjkrh gS** and then he thrusted the sword into her abdomen, causing her intestines to protrude. He further stated that many people gathered at the spot and apprehended the accused. The Dev Kanwar was taken to the hospital where she remained under treatment for nearly one month and subsequently died. The witness denied the suggestion in cross-examination that the injury was accidental or that the accused was falsely implicated due to a land dispute. 24. PW-2 Hatu, being the husband of the deceased, is an interested witness, and in the absence of corroboration from other eyewitnesses, it would not be safe to rely solely on his testimony. A perusal of the statements of the witnesses this Court found that even PW-2 neither attempted to intervene nor raised any alarm at the spot, further weakening the credibility of his version. 25. The prosecution relied heavily upon the statement of deceased recorded under Section 161 CrPC (Ex.P-16), wherein she named PW-1 Ramu, PW-4 Nana, PW-6 Vela and PW-3 Ramaing as persons, who reached at the place of occurrence. However, all these witnesses, when examined before the Court, stated that they did not see the accused inflicting any sword injury on the deceased and claimed ignorance about the cause of death. These witnesses were declared hostile. However, all these witnesses, when examined before the Court, stated that they did not see the accused inflicting any sword injury on the deceased and claimed ignorance about the cause of death. These witnesses were declared hostile. They also stated in their cross-examination that their police statements, (Exhibits P-1, P-7, P-8 and P-11), did not contain any mention of the accused-respondent causing injuries to the deceased. Consequently, their testimonies do not corroborate the version of PW-2 Hatu. 26. PW-8 Nathu Singh, ASI, stated that he registered the FIR on the basis of the verbal report (Ex.P-2), inspected the site and prepared the site inspection report (Ex.P-4) and inquest report (Ex.P-6). He further deposed that the deceased’s clothes were seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P-5) and that the accused was arrested vide arrest memo (Ex.P-12). The accused allegedly gave information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (Ex.P-13), pursuant to which a sword was recovered from his house, as shown in the recovery memo (Ex.P-9). However, the witness PW-5 Bhopal Singh, an attesting witness to the recovery memo, did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. He admitted his signature on the memo, but denied witnessing the recovery. The other attesting witness, Hiralal, was not produced before the Court. Thus, the alleged recovery of the sword remains uncorroborated and cannot be relied upon solely on the unverified statement of the investigating officer. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the sword was recovered from the accused- respondent and contained bloodstains, the serologist’s report (Ex.P-15) shows that although human blood was present on the deceased’s garments and on the sword, but the blood group could not be matched. Accordingly, it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the blood found on the sword belonged to the deceased, nor is the sword conclusively connected with the crime. 27. With respect to the medical evidence, PW-7 Dr. Lalchand Maida proved the injury report (Ex.P-12). PW-9 Dr. Dev Priya Ashok Panda, who conducted the post-mortem (Ex.P-16), opined that the cause of death was perforation of intestines and gallbladder caused by a sharp weapon and that such injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, in cross-examination he admitted that the deceased remained admitted in hospital for about one month and ultimately, died during treatment due to an internal abdominal infection. However, in cross-examination he admitted that the deceased remained admitted in hospital for about one month and ultimately, died during treatment due to an internal abdominal infection. He further stated that the external wounds had healed, stitches had been removed, and that abdominal infection can arise from numerous causes, including hospital-acquired infection. He clarified that the deceased could have died from an infection unrelated to the injury. This creates a definite doubt about whether the death was the direct result of the injury allegedly inflicted by the accused-respondent or not. Thus, the medical evidence, instead of conclusively supporting the prosecution, introduces uncertainty regarding the cause of death, weakening the prosecution’s case on the essential link between the injury and the eventual demise of the deceased. 28. Additionally, the presence of close relatives at the scene of occurrence becomes doubtful if they neither intervene nor raise an alarm to save the deceased and even during trial, they have been declared hostile. In the present case, PW-2 Hatu is the sole eyewitness, closely related to the deceased. He has not stated anywhere in his testimony that he attempted to prevent the assault or raised an alarm. This conduct casts a cloud of suspicion over his presence and reliability. 29. This Court is of the firm view that looking to overall facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court has not committed any illegality while acquitting the accused-respondent from the charges levelled against him. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ballu & Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 (260) AIC 204 has held that in any case, even if two views are possible and trial Judge found the other view to be more probable, and interference would not have been warranted by High Court, unless the view taken by learned trial Judge was perverse or impossible view. 30. In the case of Ballu and Ors. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh decided on 02.04.2024 reported in 2024 (260) AIC 204, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 8. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An Accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An Accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 9. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An Accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An Accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below: 13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0236/2016MANU/SC/0236/2016 : (2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that: In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the Accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the Accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. 14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0456/2016MANU/SC/0456/2016 : (2016) 12 SCC 665 , the Supreme Court has held that: No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re- appreciating the evidence If the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record and convict the Accused. 20. The High Court could have interfered in the criminal appeal only if it came to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Judge were either perverse or impossible. As already discussed hereinbefore, no perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted by the learned Trial Judge.” 31. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the view that the learned trial court has rightly acquitted the accused- respondent from the charges levelled against him and, therefore, no interference is warranted in the present case. 32. Hence, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant-State against the judgment of acquittal dated 16.2.1999 passed by the learned trial court, fails and is therefore, dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court is upheld accordingly.