JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. In both the appeals, the challenge is to the judgment passed by the learned Commercial Court-II, Jaipur Metro-II, whereby the objections raised under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’), were rejected by the learned Commercial Court on the ground that the same had been raised beyond period of limitation, as provided for filing objections in terms of Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996. 3. Brief facts which have come up before us are that the appellant had initially raised a dispute and in terms of Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘MSMED Act’) preferred an application before the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council, Jaipur (for short ‘Council’) claiming compound interest. The Council vide its order dated 10.05.2022, noticed that in terms of the contract, there was a provision of raising a dispute before the Settlement Committee of the Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited in terms of the conditions of tender. It is further observed that the claim had been directly put up before the Council. Thereafter, it proceeded to examine the claim on merits and reached to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Section 15 of the MSMED Act by the respondent-purchaser and, therefore, the claim of three times compound interest on the ground of delay of one month was not acceptable. Having reached to that conclusion, the Council closed the case unanimously. It however, further proceeded to observe that the supplier could further raise its claim relating to interest before the Settlement Committee, which would examine the case separately and pass an order taking into consideration the interest payable and lay down the same accordingly. It appears that after the dispute had been closed by the Council, the appellant approached the Settlement Committee, which passed an order on 05.08.2022 allowing simple interest at the prevailing bank rate to the appellant with direction that the same be paid within a further period beyond 45 days in all the cases referred to it. 4. After the said order has been passed by the Settlement Committee, the appellant raised objections relating to the order passed by the Council dated 10.05.2022 under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the learned Commercial Court. 4. After the said order has been passed by the Settlement Committee, the appellant raised objections relating to the order passed by the Council dated 10.05.2022 under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the learned Commercial Court. Learned Commercial Court, however, found the said claim of objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 to be beyond the period of limitation, as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 and rejected the same. Aggrieved thereto, the present appeals have been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that period during which the proceedings remained pending i.e. between 10.05.2022 and the order passed by the Council dated 05.08.2022, should be treated as dies non and should not be counted for the purpose of counting limitation, as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 and, therefore, the objections raised under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, would be treated to be within limitation and on that count, he assails the order passed by the learned Commercial Court to be unjustified and illegal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1467 and Geo Miller and Company Private Limited Vs. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited , (2020) 14 SCC 643 . 7. We have carefully considered the submissions. 8. It would be apposite to quote Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996, which reads as under: “ 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award (1) ………….. (2) ………….. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 9. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that the objection under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 can be raised within a period of three months and for any sufficient reasons, which may be put up before the Court, one month further time may be granted to condone the delay, as has now been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the High Court. The period cannot be extended beyond 120 days in no circumstances and even if sufficient cause is shown to the Court, still the Commercial Court cannot extend the period of limitation. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chintels India Limited Vs. Bhayana Builders Private Limited , (2021) 4 SCC 602 wherein it was held as under: “ 11. A reading of Section 34(1) would make it clear that an application made to set aside an award has to be in accordance with both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would mean that such application would not only have to be within the limitation period prescribed by sub-section (3), but would then have to set out grounds under sub-sections (2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such award. What follows from this is that the application itself must be within time, and if not within a period of three months, must be accompanied with an application for condonation of delay, provided it is within a further period of 30 days, this Court having made it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply and that any delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned.” 10. However, the contention of learned counsel is different. It is his submission that the period spent from 10.05.2022 to 05.08.2022, is not to be counted for the purpose of counting of three months+one month. 11. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the submission, as we find that the Council had unequivocally and with a unanimous decision, closed the cases relating to the dispute raised before it. So far as the observations regarding allowing the supplier to avail the remedy before the Settlement Committee are concerned, they are independent of the arbitration award passed by the Council. So far as the observations regarding allowing the supplier to avail the remedy before the Settlement Committee are concerned, they are independent of the arbitration award passed by the Council. The settlement proceedings flow from the conditions of contract and the Settlement Committee, which passed the order on 05.08.2022, was independent of the award passed by the Council. The Council’s award dated 10.05.2022 could have been objected to by raising objections under Section 34 within the period as prescribed, hereinabove. It was not required or bound in any manner to be also counting as to what is the decision by the Settlement Committee. 12. Learned counsel’s reliance on the two judgments, as stated hereinabove, is also misconceived. 13. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Geo Miller and Company Private Limited (supra), the Court was examining the amicable settlement, which may have arrived between the parties for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration. The reference to arbitration is independent of the objections which have been raised under Sections 34 and 34(3) of the Act of 1996 and is nowhere influenced by the period, as laid down for reference to arbitration. Thus, the said judgment would have no application and would not help the appellant. The relevant paragraph No.28 of the said judgment reads as under: “ 28. Having perused through the relevant precedents, we agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases the entire negotiation history between the parties must be specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the ‘breaking point’ at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This ‘breaking point’ would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the ‘breaking point’ at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This ‘breaking point’ would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The threshold for determining when such a point arises will be lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the party’s primary interest is in securing the payment due to them, than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claim.” 14. In M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the issue was completely different. It would be, therefore, apposite to quote paragraph No.24, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining the issue before it, which reads as under: “ 24 . In light of the above statutory provisions, we will decide the first issue of whether the Limitation Act applies to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, and even if not, whether time-barred claims can be referred to conciliation.” 15. Thus, the issue which the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining was whether claims which are time barred can be raised under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. Presently, it is not a case of raising of claims under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, which the appellant raised within time and were decided by the Council within time. The issue is with regard to raising of objections before the learned Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, which has been examined by us hereinabove and we notice and agree with the view taken by the learned Commercial Court that the objections were not raised within the limitation period and the same cannot be extended in any manner beyond the period, as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996. 16. Accordingly, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.