JUDGMENT : K. Lakshman, J. 1. Heard Sri M. Laxman Rao, learned counsel for the Appellants and Sri P. Amarender Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal is filed challenging order dated 11.09.2025 passed in I.A.No.527 of 2025 in O.S.No.258 of 2025 by the learned III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at LB Nagar. 3. The appellants herein filed a suit vide O.S.No.258 of 2025 against respondents to declare the action of the respondents –defendants in cancelling the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018 executed by Late Mekala Subhashini in favour of Mahammed Abdul Azeem in respect of the suit schedule property by issuing legal notice, dated 30.07.2024, as illegal and consequently, to direct the respondents to execute and register sale deed in their favour in respect of the suit schedule property by receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs only). In the event of respondents - defendants fails to execute and register the sale deed, the Court to execute and register the sale deed on behalf of the respondents – defendants. 4. In the plaint, the plaintiffs contended:- i. Plaintiff No.1 is the wife of late Mohammed Abdul Azeem s/o M.A.Sattar and Plaintiff Nos.2 to 7 are their sons and daughters. The said late Mohammed Abdul Azeem was tenant of H.No.7-34, Shop No.3 (Mulgi), G+1 Floor in H.No.7-34, admeasuring 640 square feet situated at MRR Complex, Madhurapuri Colony, Dilshuknagar, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short, ‘subject property’). Late Smt. Subhashani was the original owner of the suit schedule property. Defendant No.1 is the husband of said late Smt. Subhashani and Defendants No.2 and 3 are their daughters. ii. During life time, late Mohamed Abdul Azeem, purchased the suit schedule property from Late Smt. Subhashini. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore only). Having received an amount of Rs.50,00,000/-(Rupees Fifty Lakhs), late Smt. Subhashini had executed an agreement of sale on 08.10.2018 in which it is agreed to pay balance amount within 3 (three) months for execution of registered sale deed. iii. Despite several requests made by said late Mohamed Abdul Azeem, for execution of registered sale deed, Smt. Mekala Subhashani postponed the same on one reason or the other. Meanwhile she died on 29.10.2019 leaving behind the defendants herein as her legal heirs. The said Mohamed Abdul Azeem, also died on 25.05.2020 leaving behind him the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. Despite several requests made by said late Mohamed Abdul Azeem, for execution of registered sale deed, Smt. Mekala Subhashani postponed the same on one reason or the other. Meanwhile she died on 29.10.2019 leaving behind the defendants herein as her legal heirs. The said Mohamed Abdul Azeem, also died on 25.05.2020 leaving behind him the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. Even after his death, in August/September 2021, the plaintiffs along with their uncle requested Defendant No. 1 to execute registered sale deed for which he refused and stated that there is mortgage over the schedule property and he would execute registered sale deed after releasing the mortgage. iv. Instead of executing registered sale deed, the Defendant No.1 got issued legal notice dated 30.7.2024 cancelling the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018 forfeiting amounts paid and also demanded to vacate the premises and pay damages. The Plaintiffs sent reply – cum – demand notice dated 14.08.2024 to the said notice, denying the allegations made by the defendants and called upon them to execute the sale deed in their favour by receiving the balance sale consideration. The defendants had issued a rejoinder notice dated 09.09.2024 with false allegations and also expressing to enter into agreement of sale and sale deed with third parties. v. Even after notices and reply notices, on 05.05.2025, plaintiff No.2 along with his maternal uncle, requested Defendant No.1 to execute sale deed by receiving the balance sale consideration. The Defendant No.1 demanded an additional amount of Rs.30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs Only) for execution of registered sale deed. When the plaintiffs expressed their inability, the defendants have issued another legal notice dated 24-01-2025 under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, with all false allegations stating that their tenancy is terminated and to vacate the shop in 15 days and pay rental dues Rs.15,86,182/-. The Plaintiffs, issued reply dated 10-02-2025 denying the same. vi. The defendants are bound to execute registered sale deed by receiving balance sale consideration. The defendants created mortgage over the suit schedule property to Deccan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd., and did not keep their promise. Plaintiffs obtained encumbrance certificate dated 06-08-2024 and came to know that the defendants cleared the mortgage only on 21.06.2024 and got issued the aforesaid notice dated 30.7.2024 with false allegations to make illegal gains. The defendants created mortgage over the suit schedule property to Deccan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd., and did not keep their promise. Plaintiffs obtained encumbrance certificate dated 06-08-2024 and came to know that the defendants cleared the mortgage only on 21.06.2024 and got issued the aforesaid notice dated 30.7.2024 with false allegations to make illegal gains. Plaintiffs have got issued reply on 14.08.2024 requesting to execute registered sale deed by receiving balance sale consideration. Therefore, the suit. 5. The defendants filed I.A.No.527 of 2025 in the present suit under Order VII Rule 11(2) read with 151 of CPC, to reject the plaint in the aforesaid suit contending: i. The suit is not maintainable, the relief claimed is bad in law and barred by limitation. ii. There is no cause of action for plaintiff to sue for declaration and specific performance of agreement of sale. iii. There was stipulation for a period three months only from the date of agreement of sale to execute registered sale deed. iv. Plaintiffs did not file the suit within three years from the date of execution of agreement of sale dated 06.10.2018. v. The plaintiff without issuing notice, filed the present suit. 6. Opposing the said petition, the plaintiffs filed counter contending:- i. Defendant No.1 expressed that they would execute sale deed but from to time he postponed the same. ii. Since their father died on 25.05.2020, Defendant No.1 issued notice dated 30.07.2024 cancelling the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. The plaintiff issued reply and Defendant No.1 issued rejoinder. Therefore, the cause of action is continuing and not barred by limitation. iii. Despite requests made by the father of the plaintiffs, Defendant No.1 postponed the same from time to time under one pretext or the other. 7. Vide impugned order, learned trial Court allowed the said petition rejecting the plaint in O.S.No.258 of 2025 holding that the suit is barred by limitation. 8. Challenging the said order, dated 11.09.2025 passed in I.A.No.527 of 2025 in O.S.No.258 of 2025 by the learned trial Court, the plaintiffs filed the present appeal on the following grounds:- i. Learned trial Court failed to consider that the suit for declaration to declare the termination notice dated 30.07.2024 must be filed within 3 years from the date of the said notice. They have filed the suit within one year as such the suit is within limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. ii. Learned trial Court failed to consider the efforts made by father of the plaintiffs during his lifetime demanding for execution of registered sale deed within 3 months in terms of agreement of sale and also failed to see that it is only the defendants who postponed the execution intentionally. iii. As per Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC, the averments in the plaint and the documents filed along with the plaint are only to be considered. But the learned trial Court did not refer the plaint pleadings, but only relied upon the averments in the petition filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC. iv. Learned trial Court erred in holding that the plaintiffs, legal heirs of Mr. Abdul Azeem, remained silent till the defendants issued legal notice dated 30.07.2024 to vacate and for payment of arrears of rent by terminating the agreement of sale. v. Learned trial Court failed to consider the settled precedents of Apex court and other High Courts relied upon by the Plaintiffs and erroneously rejected the plaint. vi. The cause of action filing the suit for declaration and specific performance arose from the date of legal notice dated 30.07.2024 and the suit filed on 19.06.2025 is well within the period of limitation. vii. The Limitation is mixed question of facts and law. In the present case, it is the matter of fact which will be established in due course of trial and it is not a question of law to decide the limitation on the cause of action. viii. Learned Trial Court failed to consider that defendants had cleared mortgage on the suit property only on 21.06.2024, till which date, defendants obligation to discharge the encumbrance before sale under Section 55 (1) (a) of Transfer of Property Act was incomplete which clearly shows that the defendants themselves were not ready and delayed execution of registered sale deed. After clearance of mortgage only, the Vendor issued legal notice on 30.07.2024 cancelling the agreement of sale which gave rise to filing of the suit on 19.06.2025 which is within limitation. 9. With the aforesaid submissions, the appellants sought to set aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2025. 10. After clearance of mortgage only, the Vendor issued legal notice on 30.07.2024 cancelling the agreement of sale which gave rise to filing of the suit on 19.06.2025 which is within limitation. 9. With the aforesaid submissions, the appellants sought to set aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2025. 10. In support of their case, the appellants – Plaintiffs placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in P.Kumarakurubaran vs. P.Narayan , 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509 , Saleem D.Agboatwala vs. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar Order dated 17.09.2021 in Civil Appeal No.5641 of 2021 , Sri Boyenepally vs. Sri Jayavardhan vs. V.Nirupama Reddy , Order dated 29.07.2025 in Civil Appeal No.-----of 2025 Annamalai vs. Vasanthi , 2025 Law Suit (SC) 1426 , and P.Dsouza vs. Shondrilo Naidu , 2004 Law Suit (SC) 717 11. The respondents/defendants contended that the suit is barred by limitation, the plaintiffs cleverly drafted the plaint with illusory pleadings. The plaintiffs, instead of seeking specific performance of agreement of sale, sought for declaration of notice dated 30.07.2024 issued by defendants terminating the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018 as illegal only, to get over from the limitation and also to fill up lacuna / laches. Mere possession over the suit schedule promptly will not extend limitation to the plaintiffs to file the suit. On consideration of the said aspects only, learned trial Court allowed the petition filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC seeking rejection of plaint. It is a reasoned order. There is no error in it. 12. In support of their case, the respondents – Defendants placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Nikhila Divyang Mehta V. Hitesh P. Sanghvi , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779 , Fatheji and Company V. L.M.Nagpal , 2015(8)SCC 390 , Khatri Hotles Private Limited Vs. Union , 2011 (9) SCC 126 , The Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution Vs. B. Gunashekar , 2025 SCC Online SC 739 , Dahiben vs. Aravindbhai Kalyanji Bhansusali (Gujra) , 2020(7) SCC 366 , Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association vs. Sri Bala and Company , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 48 on the judgment of this Court in P. Ramakrishna vs. Goverdhan Reddy @ Gopal Reddy , 2023 (4) ALD 550 (TS) and also on the judgment of Madras High Court in Vasumathi H Shah Vs Pushpa Raj , 2015 3 LW 875 13. We have heard learned counsel on either side and gave thoughtful consideration of the submissions made and judgments cited by them. 14. In the present case, the undisputed facts are as follows:- i. Mr. Mohd. Abdul Azeem, husband and father respectively of plaintiffs entered into an agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018 with Mrs. Mekala Subhashini, wife and mother respectively of the defendants with regard to the sale of suit schedule property. The total sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,00,00,000/-. Vendee has paid an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration i.e. Rs. 10,00,000/- vide cheque No.248777, dated 06.10.2018, Rs.10,00,000/- vide cheque No.248778, dated 25.08.2018, drawn on Axis Bank, Dilsukhnagar Branch and Rs.30,00,000/- by way of cash. Vendor has received and acknowledged the said amount. Vendee agreed to pay the balance sale consideration within three months from the date of agreement of sale or at the time of registration, whichever is earlier. The said three months period was expired on 07.01.2019. ii. Vendor died on 29.10.2019. Vendee died on 25.05.2020. Vendee, i.e., late Mohd. Abdul Azeem was the tenant of the suit schedule property. After death of the vendor, their legal heirs got issued legal notice dated 30.07.2024 to the legal heirs of the vendee terminating the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. Legal heirs of vendee got issued a reply dated 14.08.2024 to the legal heirs of the vendor. Legal heirs of vendor issued interim rejoinder dated 09.09.2024 to the reply dated 14.08.2024 issued by the legal heirs of the Vendee. On 24.01.2025, the legal heirs of the vendor issued notice of termination (quit notice) under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982, demanding the legal heirs of the vendee to vacate the subject property within one month from the date of receipt of the said notice and also to pay an amount of Rs.15,86,182/- towards arrears of rent. iii. Plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.258 of 2025 on 19.06.2025 against the defendants seeking to declare the termination notice dated 30.07.2024 issued by the defendants terminating the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018, as illegal and also for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC seeking rejection of plaint on 11.08.2025. Vide order dated 11.09.2025, the learned trial Court allowed the said application and rejected the plaint. iv. The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC seeking rejection of plaint on 11.08.2025. Vide order dated 11.09.2025, the learned trial Court allowed the said application and rejected the plaint. iv. As discussed supra, the defendants filed an application vide I.A.No.527 of 2025 under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC to reject the plaint on the aforesaid grounds, more particularly, that the suit is barred by limitation. According to them, the plaintiffs should have filed the suit on or before 08.10.2021. They have filed the suit on 19.06.2025 and therefore, the same is barred by limitation. v. Whereas, according to the plaint pleadings, the legal heirs of the vendor have issued notice dated 30.07.2024 terminating the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. Therefore, they have filed plaint on 19.06.2025 i.e. within three years from the said date. 15. In the light of the above, it is apt to note that Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC deals with ‘rejection of plaint’. The same is relevant and extracted as under: “11. Rejection of plaint. — The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b)where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d)where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 16. In Dahiben (supra), the Apex Court considered the scope and ambit of Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC and held as under: “23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 ] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12) “ 12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.” 17. In Hari Shanker Jain vs. Sonia Gandhi , 14. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.” 17. In Hari Shanker Jain vs. Sonia Gandhi , 14. (2001) 8 SCC 233 , the Apex Court held that the expression “cause of action” has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of Court. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Merely quoting the words of the section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. Failure to plead “material facts” is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition. It is the duty of the Court to examine the petition irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does not disclose a cause of action. To enable a Court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings. 18. It is apt to note that the said judgment is in respect of an election petition and it is on consideration of scope and ambit of Section - 83 (1) (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 19. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings. 18. It is apt to note that the said judgment is in respect of an election petition and it is on consideration of scope and ambit of Section - 83 (1) (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 19. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, rep.by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, rep.by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee , (2012) 8 SCC 706 , wherein the date of Agreement of Sale is not mentioned in the plaint, considering Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix ‘A’ of CPC, the Apex Court held that failure to mention the date violates the statutory requirement and if the date is one which attracts the bar of limitation, the plaint has to conform to Order - VII Rule - 6 and specifically plead the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. The Apex Court found fault with the pleadings of the plaint in the said case and held that there was shortfall in the plaint averments and statutory provisions, namely, Order - VII Rule - 11, Rule - 14 (1) and Rule - 14 (2), Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix A of the CPC which are statutory in nature. The Apex Court also held that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has correctly concluded that in the absence of any cause of action shown as against the first defendant therein, the suit cannot be proceeded either for specific performance or for the recovery of money advanced which according to the plaintiff was given to the second defendant in the suit and rightly rejected the plaint as against the first defendant. 20. In the said judgment, referring to Order - VII, Rules - 11 (a) and 11 (d), the Apex Court held that the Court has to satisfy that the plaint discloses a cause of action and does not appear to be barred by any law. The statutory forms require the date of agreement to be mentioned to reflect that it does not appear to be barred by limitation. In addition to the same, in a suit for specific performance, there should be an agreement by the defendant or by a person duly authorised by a power of attorney executed in his favour by the owner. The statutory forms require the date of agreement to be mentioned to reflect that it does not appear to be barred by limitation. In addition to the same, in a suit for specific performance, there should be an agreement by the defendant or by a person duly authorised by a power of attorney executed in his favour by the owner. It was further held that in the plaint, the plaintiff has to specifically plead the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. 21. In Kamala Kumar v. Premlata Joshi , (2019) 3 SCC 704 the Apex Court held as follows: “It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are: First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property; Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract; Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract,| Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; and Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.”’ 22. In Bhargavi Constructions vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy , (2018) 13 SCC 480 , the Apex Court held that the term ‘law’ used in Order - VII, Rule - 11 (d) of CPC includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial decisions of the Apex Court in view of Article - 141 of the Constitution of India. 23. In Bhargavi Constructions vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy , (2018) 13 SCC 480 , the Apex Court held that the term ‘law’ used in Order - VII, Rule - 11 (d) of CPC includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial decisions of the Apex Court in view of Article - 141 of the Constitution of India. 23. There is no dispute that the law laid down by the Apex Court is binding on all the Courts including trial Court and this Court in terms of Article - 141 of the Constitution of India. 24. In Mohinder Kaur vs. Sant Paul Singh , (2019) 9 SCC 358 , the Apex Court held that where the agreement of sale has been cancelled by Vendor, the party has to seek relief of declaration of such cancellation, in addition to seek relief of specific performance of such agreement of sale. The said principle was also reiterated by the Apex Court in R. Kandasamy (since dead) v. T.R.K. Saraswathy , (2025) 3 SCC 513 . 25. Considering the pleadings, in Manickam v. Vasantha , (2022) SCC OnLine SC 2096 , wherein suit was filed for specific performance of agreement of sale, the Apex Court held that relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief, and pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and the same are mandatory. 26. Referring to the principle laid down in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal , . (1977) 4 SCC 467 and other judgments in Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 48 , the Apex Court held that the Court while dealing with an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC, has to consider the whole plaint and whole plaint has to consider the has to be read, not any particular plea. The averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause - (d) of Rule - 11, Order - VII of CPC is applicable. The averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause - (d) of Rule - 11, Order - VII of CPC is applicable. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint which are germane. The pleas taken by the defendant either in the affidavit filed in support of an application filed under Order - VII, Rule -11 of CPC or in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Under Order - VII, Rule -11 of CPC, the Court has to take a decision looking at the pleadings of the plaintiff only and not on the rebuttal made by the defendant or any other material produced by the defendant. i) Referring to the Limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court further held that Limitation Act does not confer any substantive right, nor defines any right or cause of action. The Law of Limitation is based on delay and laches. Unless there is a complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot be a complete cause of action unless there is a person who can sue and a person who can be sued. ii) In Annamalai (supra), the Apex Court referring to the principle laid down by it in earlier judgments in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed , (2017) 4 SCC 654 , I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani , (2013) 15 SCC 27 and R. Kandasamy (Supra) , considered as to when a declaratory relief is essential. Paragraph Nos.25 to 32 are relevant and the same are extracted as under: “When a declaratory relief is essential25. When a declaratory relief is essential 25. A declaratory relief seeks to clear what is doubtful, and which is necessary to make it clear. If there is a doubt on the right of a plaintiff, and without the doubt being cleared no further relief can be granted, a declaratory relief becomes essential because without such a declaration the consequential relief may not be available to the plaintiff [See: Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.R.s and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 . For example, a doubt as to plaintiff’s title to a property may arise because of existence of an instrument relating to that property. For example, a doubt as to plaintiff’s title to a property may arise because of existence of an instrument relating to that property. If plaintiff is privy to that instrument, Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables him to institute a suit for cancellation of the instrument which may be void or voidable qua him. If plaintiff is not privy to the instrument, he may seek a declaration that the same is void or does not affect his rights. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same is not necessary as the same is non est in the eye of law, being a nullity. Therefore, in such a case, if plaintiff is in possession of the property which is subject matter of such a void instrument, he may seek a declaration that the instrument is not binding on him. However, if he is not in possession, he may sue for possession and the limitation period applicable would be that as applicable under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on a suit for possession9. Rationale of the aforesaid principle is that a void instrument /transaction can be ignored by a court while granting the main relief based on a subsisting right. But, where the plaintiff’s right falls under a cloud, then a declaration affirming the right of the plaintiff may be necessary for grant of a consequential relief. However, whether such a declaration is required for the consequential relief sought is to be assessed on a case-to-case basis, dependent on its facts. 26. A breach of a contract may be by nonperformance or by repudiation, or by both. In Anson’s Law of Contract (29th Oxford Edn.), under the heading “Forms of Breach Which Justify Discharge”, it is stated thus: “The right of a party to be treated as discharged from further performance may arise in any one of three ways: the other party to the contract (a) may renounce its liabilities under it; (b) may by its own conduct make it impossible to fulfill them, (c) may fail to perform what it has promised. Of these forms of breach, the first two may take place not only in the course of performance but also while the contract is still wholly executory i.e., before either party is entitled to demand a performance by the other party of the other’s promise. Of these forms of breach, the first two may take place not only in the course of performance but also while the contract is still wholly executory i.e., before either party is entitled to demand a performance by the other party of the other’s promise. In such a case the breach is usually termed an anticipatory breach. The last can only take place at or during the time for performance of the contract.” 27. Ordinarily, for a breach of contract, a party aggrieved by the breach i.e., failure on the part of the other party to perform its part under the contract can claim compensation or damages by accepting the breach as a termination of the contract, or/ and, in certain cases, obtain specific performance by not recognizing the breach as termination of the contract. (See: OPG Power Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. and another, (2025) 2 SCC 417 , paragraph 106.]. In a case where the contract between the parties confers a right on a party to the contract to unilaterally terminate the contract in certain circumstances, and the contract is terminated exercising that right, a mere suit for specific performance without seeking a declaration that such termination is invalid may not be maintainable. This is so, because a doubt /cloud on subsistence of the contract is created which needs to be cleared before grant of a decree enforcing contractual obligations of the parties to the contract. 28. Now we shall consider few decisions of this Court where the question of grant of relief of specific performance of a contract in teeth of termination of the contract without seeking a declaration qua subsistence of the contract was considered. In I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani [ (2013) 15 SCC 27 ] , the agreement for sale stipulated sale within a stipulated time frame; on failure of the plaintiff to respond to the notice seeking execution of sale, the agreement was terminated. In that context, this Court held: “36. Since the plaintiff did not perform his part of contract within the extended period in the legal notice referred to supra, the agreement of sale was terminated as per notice dated 28-3- 1985 and thus, there is termination of the agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendants 1-4 w.e.f. 10-4-1985 37. In that context, this Court held: “36. Since the plaintiff did not perform his part of contract within the extended period in the legal notice referred to supra, the agreement of sale was terminated as per notice dated 28-3- 1985 and thus, there is termination of the agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendants 1-4 w.e.f. 10-4-1985 37. As could be seen from the prayers sought for in the original suit, the plaintiff has not sought for declaratory relief to declare the termination of agreement of sale as bad in law. In the absence of such prayer by the plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of the suit scheduled property on the basis of agreement of sale and consequential relief of decree for permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. 38. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief sought for by the plaintiff for the grant of decree for specific performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit scheduled property in his favor on the basis of non-existing agreement of sale is wholly unsustainable in law.” 29. In A. Kanthamani (supra), the decision in I.S. Sikandar (supra) was considered, and it was held: “30.3. Third, it is a well settled principle of law that the plea regarding the maintainability of suit is required to be raised in the first instance in the pleading (written statement) then only such plea can be adjudicated by the trial court on its merits as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. Once the finding is rendered on the plea, the same can be examined by the first or/ and second appellate court. It is only in appropriate cases, where the court prima facie finds by mere perusal of plaint allegations that the suit is barred by any express provision of law or is not legally maintainable due to any legal provision; a judicial notice can be taken to avoid abuse of judicial process in prosecuting such suit. Such is, however, not the case here. 30.4. Fourth, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in I.S. Sikandar turns on the facts involved therein and is thus distinguishable.” 30. Such is, however, not the case here. 30.4. Fourth, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in I.S. Sikandar turns on the facts involved therein and is thus distinguishable.” 30. In R. Kandasamy (since dead) and others v. T.R.K. Sarawathy and another [ (2025) 3 SCC 513 ] , this Court considered both I.S. Sikandar (supra) and A. Kanthamani (supra), and clarified the law by observing as under: “47. However, we clarify that any failure or omission on the part of the trial court to frame an issue on maintainability of a suit touching jurisdictional fact by itself cannot trim the powers of the higher court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed, provided no new facts were required to be pleaded and no new evidence led.” 31. From the aforesaid decisions what is clear is that though a plea regarding maintainability of the suit, even if not raised in written statement, may be raised in appeal, particularly when no new facts or evidence is required to address the same, the issue whether a declaratory relief is essential or not would have to be addressed on the facts of each case. 32. In our view, a declaratory relief would be required where a doubt or a cloud is there on the right of the plaintiff and grant of relief to the plaintiff is dependent on removal of that doubt or cloud. However, whether there is a doubt or cloud on the right of the plaintiff to seek consequential relief, the same is to be determined on the facts of each case. For example, a contract may give right to the parties, or any one of the parties, to terminate the contract on existence of certain conditions. In terms thereof, the contract is terminated, a doubt over subsistence of the contract is created and, therefore, without seeking a declaration that termination is bad in law, a decree for specific performance may not be available. However, where there is no such right conferred on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conferred is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such termination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggrieved may, by treating the contract as subsisting, sue for specific performance without seeking a declaratory relief qua validity of such termination.” 27. The sum and substance of the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that when the agreement of sale is cancelled by the vendor, the vendee has to seek declaration and also specific performance of agreement of sale, but not only specific performance of agreement of sale. 28. A declaratory relief would be required where a doubt or a cloud is there on the right of the plaintiff and grant of relief to the plaintiff is dependent on removal of that doubt or cloud. Where there is a doubt or cloud on the right of the plaintiff to seek consequential relief, the same is to be determined on the facts of each case. i) Where there is no such right conferred on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conferred is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such termination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggrieved may, by treating the contract as subsisting, sue for specific performance without seeking a declaratory relief qua validity of such termination. 29. While considering the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the CPC to reject the plaint, the trial Court has to consider pleadings of the plaint and documents filed along with the plaint nothing more. The trial Court cannot consider pleadings in the affidavit filed in support of a petition filed under Order VII Rule 11 (c) of CPC and pleadings in written statement and documents filed by the defendants. 30. In the light of the aforesaid principle, coming to the facts of the present case, the vendor i.e. Smt. Mekala Subhashini, wife and mother respectively of the defendants entered into an agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018 with Mohd. Abdul Azeem, husband and father respectively of the plaintiffs on the specific terms and conditions mentioned therein. The total sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,00,00,000/- and he has paid an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration. He agreed to pay the balance amount within three months from the date of agreement of sale. The said three months period was expired on 07.01.2019. 31. In the present case, the important aspect is that Smt. Mekala Subhashani mortgaged the suit schedule property with Deccan Housing Finance Corporation Limited Ameerpet branch by way of execution of a registered mortgage deed bearing document No.3165 of 2017, dated 05.07.2017. The said three months period was expired on 07.01.2019. 31. In the present case, the important aspect is that Smt. Mekala Subhashani mortgaged the suit schedule property with Deccan Housing Finance Corporation Limited Ameerpet branch by way of execution of a registered mortgage deed bearing document No.3165 of 2017, dated 05.07.2017. The said fact was not mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. On the other hand, in clause No.5 of the agreement of sale, she has declared and indemnified the vendee that suit schedule property is free from all encumbrances such as sales, gifts, mortgages, liens and court attachments etc., which is factually incorrect. Prior to the said agreement of sale itself, the vendor has mortgaged the subject property with Deccan Housing Finance Corporation Limited, Ameerpet branch. Thus, there is suppression of the said fact by the vendor in the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. 32. It is also not in dispute that vendor died on 29.10.2019. Thereafter, legal heirs of the vendor i.e. the defendants herein cleared the said loan, released the said mortgage by way of execution of a release deed, released mortgage rights or re-conveyance deed bearing document No.3202 of 2024 dated 21.06.2024. Thereafter, they have issued legal notice dated 30.06.2025. It is the specific contention of the plaintiffs herein that the vendee during his lifetime approached the vendor with a request to receive the balance sale considerate and execute registered sale deed in his favour. He has also expressed his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration and obtain registered sale deed. It is the vendor who postponed the same on one pretext or the other. 33. It is also the specific contention of the plaintiffs that after the death of the vendee, the plaintiff No.1 approached the defendant No.1 along with the brother of the plaintiff No.1 Mr.Mohammad Mohiuddin Abkhan requested the defendant No.1 for execution of registered sale deed and defendant No.1 informed that there was mortgage over the schedule property and he will execute after release of the mortgage. There were specific assertions in paragraph Nos.2 to 6 of the plaint. 34. There were specific assertions in paragraph Nos.2 to 6 of the plaint. 34. In paragraph No.8 of the plaint, there is specific mention that the defendants created mortgage over the suit schedule property to M/s DHFCL, and they promised to release the mortgage and execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and recently after receiving legal notice, plaintiffs obtained encumbrance certificate dated 06.08.2024 and came to know that the defendants cleared the mortgage on 21.06.2024 and got issued termination notice dated 30.07.2024. Thereafter, there was exchange of notices and reply notices between them. Thus, they have filed the said suit on 19.06.2025 seeking declaration and also specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 08.10.2018 well within limitation i.e. three years from the date of issuance of termination notice dated 30.07.2024. 35. As discussed supra, it is not in dispute that legal heirs of vendor cleared the mortgage on 21.06.2024. Thereafter, instead of requesting the plaintiffs, to pay the balance sale consideration and obtain registered sale deed, they have issued legal notice dated 30.07.2024 terminating the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. There is no explanation from the defendants with regard to suppression of registered mortgage deed bearing document No.3165 of 2017 dated 05.07.2017 executed by the vendor, in favour of M/s DHFCL, for obtaining loan for M/s MRR Bar and Restaurant represented by Mr. Mekala Ram Reddy, defendant No.1, husband of the vendor. 36. As discussed supra, in the present case, once there is cancellation of agreement of sale, necessarily the plaintiffs have to seek only declaration and they cannot seek specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. The said principle was also laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments. Thus, the plaintiff filed the said suit seeking to declare the termination notice dated 30.07.2024 as illegal and also for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. There is no error in it. It is not an illusory pleading and the plaint is not cleverly drafted plaint as alleged by the defendants. 37. It is also not in dispute that the vendee, the husband and father of the plaintiffs, was tenant of the suit schedule property. Therefore, the defendants issued quit notice dated 24.01.2025 under Section 106 of the TP Act. It is not an illusory pleading and the plaint is not cleverly drafted plaint as alleged by the defendants. 37. It is also not in dispute that the vendee, the husband and father of the plaintiffs, was tenant of the suit schedule property. Therefore, the defendants issued quit notice dated 24.01.2025 under Section 106 of the TP Act. There is no dispute with regard to legal position that possession of the suit schedule property cannot extend limitation to file a suit for specific performance of agreement sale. But in the present case, the facts are different. Vendor, the wife and mother of the defendants suppressed about the registered mortgage deed in the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. 1 st defendant, husband of the vendor, obtained loan from M/s DHFCL, by way of execution of registered mortgage deed in respect of suit schedule property prior to the subject agreement of sale and they have cleared the said mortgage by way of executing a registered release deed only on 21.06.2024. 38. Thus, it is the specific case of the plaintiffs herein that the defendants, legal heirs of the vendors specifically stated with them that they will clear the loan, release the mortgage and then execute registered sale deed in their favour. There are specific pleadings to the said effect in the plaint right from paragraph Nos.2 to 10. Even the plaintiffs have specifically mentioned about the limitation and cause of action in the plaint. Therefore, the trial Court has to consider the contents of the plaint and documents filed along with the plaint. Trial Court cannot consider anything beyond the same while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The said principle was also laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments cited supra. Instead of considering the said aspects, vide impugned order dated 11.09.2025, learned trial Court erroneously held that the vendee, the husband and father of the plaintiffs did not approach the vendor during her lifetime or after her death, her husband and children (defendants) with a request to receive the balance sale consideration and execute registered sale deed, he did not even issued legal notice within three months demanding the specific performance or return the advance sale consideration. The trial Court also erred in giving finding with regard to possession of the subject property by the plaintiff. The trial Court also erred in giving finding with regard to possession of the subject property by the plaintiff. It is apt to note that the plaintiffs never sought extension of limitation basing on possession. 39. It is their specific case that the vendor suppressed about the registered mortgage of the subject property with M/s DHFCL. The vendee during his lifetime requested the defendants and after her death to receive the balance sale consideration and execute a registered sale deed, in his favour. Even after the death of the vendee, the plaintiffs approached 1 st defendant, husband of the vendor, with a request to receive balance sale consideration and execute registered sale deed. They have informed that there is mortgage over the suit schedule property, they will clear the same and executed register sale in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial Court missed the said aspects in the impugned order dated 11.09.2025. The trial Court also missed the fact that there is suppression of the said registered mortgage of the suit schedule property by the vendor in the agreement of sale dated 08.10.2018. 40. As discussed supra, the said aspects are triable issues. The trial Court cannot consider the said aspects while deciding a petition under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The defendants have to take the pleadings in the written statement, also during trial and it is for the trial Court to consider the said aspects. Therefore, the impugned order dated 11.09.2025 is not on consideration of the said aspects and also principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments. It is liable to be set aside. 41. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Appeal Suit is allowed. The order dated 11.09.2025 in I.A.No.527 of 2025 in O.S.No.258 of 2025 passed by the III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at L.B.Nagar, is set aside. I.A.No.527 of 2025 is dismissed. However, the trial Court shall decide O.S.No.258 of 2025 strictly in accordance with law, considering the evidence both oral and documentary without being influenced by any of the findings in the present order. Liberty is granted to both the plaintiffs and defendants to take all the contentions/grounds which they have taken in the present appeal, in the suit and it is for the trial Court to consider the same. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.