ORDER : NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J. 1. The case of the petitioner-Adani Gangavaram Port Limited (AGPL), insofar as relevant for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition, is that it is a port operator engaged in maritime logistics and cargo handling services and was granted Service Exports from India Scheme (SEIS)scrip benefit under the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2015–2020. In the ordinary course of its business, the petitioner entered into cargo handling service agreements with its customers, under which it coordinated berthing, handled customs documentation including filing of bills of entry, discharged cargo from vessels, transported cargo to stackyards, stored it, and loaded it for evacuation by road or rail, in addition to providing berthing, de-berthing, pilotage, and anchorage services. For certain partial marine operations, it entered into separate marine operation service agreements with KEI-RSOS Maritime Limited on 21.10.2008 and with Great Offshore Limited on 05.05.2015 for the provision of tugboats, marine craft, and personnel. According to the petitioner, these third-party arrangements did not alter the fact that the core port and cargo-handling services were rendered by the petitioner itself. 1.1 On the basis of its foreign exchange earnings from notified maritime services, the petitioner applied for SEIS benefits for the financial years 2015–16 and 2016–17. The application for FY 2015–16 was submitted on 23.03.2017, and after verification, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade granted SEIS scrips/benefits on 30.03.2017. Similarly, the application for FY 2016–17 was submitted on 04.11.2017, and SEIS benefits were granted on 16.11.2017. The petitioner emphasizes that these scrips were issued strictly in accordance with the FTP 2015–2020 and were also utilized or transferred well before any controversy arose, and in any event prior to 22.05.2018. 1.2 The dispute arose only after Respondent No. 2 issued a Policy Circular No.06/2018 dated 22.05.2018, which purported to retrospectively restrict SEIS eligibility to “actual service providers” such as tug operators and ship brokers, thereby excluding port operators and infrastructure providers. The petitioner alleges that this Circular sought to amend the FTP through an executive clarification rather than a Notification under Section 5 of the FTDR Act, and thus illegally redefined eligibility criteria that were never part of the FTP 2015–2020. The petitioner alleges that this Circular sought to amend the FTP through an executive clarification rather than a Notification under Section 5 of the FTDR Act, and thus illegally redefined eligibility criteria that were never part of the FTP 2015–2020. Relying on this circular, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Hyderabad Zonal Unit, issued a letter dated 29.10.2019 under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, addressed to the petitioner, seeking detailed information about all SEIS and SFIS scrips availed from 2014–15 onwards, including license numbers, issue dates, total amounts, and utilization status. The petitioner responded by letter dated 06.11.2019, enclosing comprehensive details and asserting that the scrips were lawfully granted and utilized, while also informing the DRI that a parallel inquiry was being conducted by the Kolkata Zonal Unit. 1.3 The petitioner further states that despite the Bombay High Court, in Atlantic Shipping Private Limited v. Union of India , 1W.P.No.1827 of 2019, dated 09.03.2021 (Bombay High Court) , quashing Policy Circular No. 06/2018 by judgment dated 09.03.2021 as ultra vires the FTDR Act, the DRI continued its inquiry. By letter dated 25.11.2020, the DRI sought clarifications regarding payments made to tug operators and questioned whether such payments should have been excluded while computing SEIS benefits. In response, the petitioner sent a detailed reply dated 31.03.2021 explaining that it was not an aggregator of third-party services and that SEIS benefits were claimed only on services rendered by the petitioner. However, the petitioner states that, despite the Bombay High Court judgment, the DRI insisted on surrender of benefits, and under protest and without admitting liability, the petitioner remitted Rs. 2,95,66,263/- on 30.03.2021, representing SEIS benefits attributable to payments made to tug operators, together with interest at 18%, solely to avoid coercive action and ensure business continuity. 1.4 While an SLP was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the Bombay High Court judgment, in SLP (C) No. 20307/2022, no stay was granted. Subsequently, the Karnataka High Court, by judgment dated 25.04.2024 in ECL Puyvast (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India , W.P.No.12068 of 2021, dated 25.04.2024 (Karnataka High Court) also quashed the same Policy Circular No. 06/2018, holding that export incentives could not be retrospectively withdrawn by executive action and reaffirming principles of legitimate expectation and statutory discipline. Subsequently, the Karnataka High Court, by judgment dated 25.04.2024 in ECL Puyvast (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India , W.P.No.12068 of 2021, dated 25.04.2024 (Karnataka High Court) also quashed the same Policy Circular No. 06/2018, holding that export incentives could not be retrospectively withdrawn by executive action and reaffirming principles of legitimate expectation and statutory discipline. 1.5 Notwithstanding these judgments, Respondent No. 3 issued a Show Cause notice dated 20.10.2023 under Section 14 of the FTDR Act, proposing to cancel the SEIS scrips for FY 2015–16 and 2016–17, and also proposing to impose penalty, and also to suspend or cancel the petitioner’s IEC. The Show Cause notice alleged that the petitioner had wrongfully claimed SEIS benefits for services rendered by third-party marine operators and was not an “actual service provider.” The petitioner responded by a detailed letter dated 26.12.2023, reiterating that it had claimed benefits only for services rendered by itself, referring to its earlier reply dated 31.03.2021, and highlighting that it had already surrendered Rs. 2,95,66,263/- along with interest on 30.03.2021. The petitioner asserted that there was no justification to continue proceedings. 1.6 According to the petitioner, despite this reply and in complete disregard of binding High Court judgments, Respondent No. 3 passed an Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 cancelling the SEIS scrips for both financial years, imposing a penalty of Rs. 50,00,000/-, and directing recovery of an alleged wrongly availed amount of Rs. 1,81,24,518/-, with threats of enforcement under Section 11(5) of the FTDR Act. The petitioner states that the respondent alleged that only actual service providers such as KEI-RSOS Maritime Limited, Great Offshore Limited, and Ocean Sparkle Limited were eligible, and that port operators like the petitioner could not claim SEIS benefits. The petitioner contends that this order was never served or communicated to the petitioner and was discovered only much later through customs proceedings. 1.7 Relying on the unserved DGFT order, the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, issued a Show Cause notice dated 21.06.2024 under Section 28AAA of the Customs Act, 1962, demanding recovery of customs duty amounting to Rs. 2,09,67,102/- along with interest and penalty under Section 114AB, and even proposing confiscation of goods imported using the SEIS scrips. 1.7 Relying on the unserved DGFT order, the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, issued a Show Cause notice dated 21.06.2024 under Section 28AAA of the Customs Act, 1962, demanding recovery of customs duty amounting to Rs. 2,09,67,102/- along with interest and penalty under Section 114AB, and even proposing confiscation of goods imported using the SEIS scrips. The petitioner asserts that it was not served with this notice also, and that the petitioner became aware of the notice only upon receiving a personal hearing notice dated 03.01.2025, which directed it to appear on 22.01.2025 at 12:30 PM before the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, warning of ex parte adjudication in case of non-appearance. The petitioner emphasizes that this was the first intimation of the customs proceedings. 1.8 After learning that an Order-in-Original had already been passed by DGFT, the petitioner addressed a letter dated 21.01.2025 to Respondent No. 3 requesting a certified copy of the order, pointing out that it had never been served the order despite its reply dated 26.12.2023. When no response was received, the petitioner wrote again on 20.02.2025 to the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, requesting a copy of the order referred to in paragraph 17 of the customs Show Cause notice. Ultimately, by email dated 21.02.2025, the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, supplied a copy of the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024. The petitioner alleges that the belated service of the Order caused severe prejudice by depriving the petitioner of a timely statutory remedy. 1.9 In sum, the petitioner’s case is that the entire chain of actions— cancellation of SEIS benefits, imposition of a Rs. 50,00,000/- penalty, demand for Rs.1,81,24,518/- and Rs. 2,09,67,102/-, and initiation of customs recovery proceedings—rests solely on Policy Circular No. 06/2018, which has been conclusively quashed by the Bombay High Court on 09.03.2021 and the Karnataka High Court on 25.04.2024. The petitioner contends that the respondents have countered the petitioner’s claims by alleging that the petitioner had wrongfully availed a third-party service provision. The petitioner contends that the allegations made by the respondents ignore the FTP 2015–2020, the petitioner’s actual role as a service provider, the prior surrender of Rs. 2.95 crores with 18% interest on 30.03.2021, and the binding nature of judicial precedents. On this basis, the petitioner asserts that the impugned orders are void ab initio, violative of natural justice due to non-service, and liable to be set aside. 2. 2.95 crores with 18% interest on 30.03.2021, and the binding nature of judicial precedents. On this basis, the petitioner asserts that the impugned orders are void ab initio, violative of natural justice due to non-service, and liable to be set aside. 2. A counter affidavit, and also an additional counter affidavit, has been filed by the respondents. The essence of the counter affidavits is that the writ petition is not maintainable and deserves outright dismissal with costs, both on the threshold ground of availability of efficacious statutory alternative remedies and on merits, since the impugned actions are lawful, jurisdictionally sound, procedurally valid, with a correct interpretation of the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2015–2020. The respondents seek dismissal of the writ petition, contending that entertaining it would undermine the statutory appellate and review framework under Sections 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, Para 2.58 of the FTP, and Para 2.95 of the Handbook of Procedures, all of which provide comprehensive remedies that the petitioner deliberately bypassed. 2.1 Respondent No. 3 contends that it is settled law, reiterated by the Supreme Court in decisions such as United Bank of India v. SatyawatiTondon , (2010) 8 SCC 110 , Authorized Officer v. Mathew K.C. , (2018) 3 SCC 85 , Arc Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir , 5 (2022) 5 SCC 345 , Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu , (2023) 2 SCC 168 , that High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot entertain writ petitions where effective alternative remedies exist. According to the respondents, the petitioner had a statutory right to file an appeal within forty-five days under Section 15 of the FTDR Act, with a further condonable period of thirty days, and thereafter to seek review under Section 16, as well as to approach the Policy Interpretation Committee under Para 2.95 of the HBP read with Para 2.58 of the FTP, yet the petitioner chose to avoid all these remedies and directly invoked writ jurisdiction. 2.2 It is further contended that Policy Circular No. 06/2018 dated 22.05.2018 was issued by the DGFT strictly within the powers conferred under Para 2.58 of the FTP 2015–2020, after inter-ministerial consultations and upon obtaining a considered legal opinion from the Ministry of Law and Justice. 2.2 It is further contended that Policy Circular No. 06/2018 dated 22.05.2018 was issued by the DGFT strictly within the powers conferred under Para 2.58 of the FTP 2015–2020, after inter-ministerial consultations and upon obtaining a considered legal opinion from the Ministry of Law and Justice. The circular did not amend, alter, or retrospectively change the FTP but merely clarified an existing requirement flowing from Para 3.08(a) read with Para 9.51(i) and 9.51(ii) of the FTP, namely that SEIS benefits are available only to “actual service providers” of notified services and not to aggregators or intermediaries. The respondents emphasize that the very first paragraph of the circular records that it was issued in response to references and queries raised by exporters themselves regarding entitlement under SEIS, and Paragraph 2 of the circular expressly notes that the issue was examined in light of applicable FTP provisions. Paragraph 5 of the circularmakes it clear that the clarification was necessary to prevent misinterpretation, misuse, and double claims. 2.3 Further, the respondents deny the petitioner’s claim that the circular is ultra vires the FTP or the FTDR Act. They contend that the DGFT is expressly empowered to interpret policy provisions, and that a clarificatory circular, unlike a substantive amendment, merely explains what was always intended by the policy. In the additional counter affidavit, the respondents reiterate that the clarification that only genuine foreign exchange earners providing services themselves are eligible under SFIS/SEIS, and the clarification flows directly from the plain language and object of the policy. According to the respondents, rewarding aggregators such as port authorities for services actually rendered by third-party tug operators would defeat the scheme’s objective and enable double benefits. 2.4 Further, the respondents state that the Directorate General of Foreign Trade received an investigation report from the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), which indicated that the petitioner, referred to as GPL, had claimed SEIS benefits even for portions of services that were not rendered by it. The DRI investigation revealed that several marine services, particularly tug services, were performed by third-party entities such as M/s KEI RSOS Maritime Limited (KRML) and M/s Great Offshore Limited (GOL), using their own tugboats and marine crafts. These entities rendered services either directly or at the direction of the petitioner, and were paid lump-sum consideration by the petitioner for performing those services. These entities rendered services either directly or at the direction of the petitioner, and were paid lump-sum consideration by the petitioner for performing those services. On this factual basis, the respondents assert that KRML and GOL were the actual service providers for those services, while the petitioner merely acted as a contractor or aggregator. The respondents specifically reject the petitioner’s portrayal of itself as the sole service provider and state that the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 was issued only after examining the DRI report, the documents on record, and the petitioner’s own submissions. 2.5 Adverting to the petitioner’s reliance on surrender of amounts “under protest,” the respondents contend that the petitioner had paid the surrendered amount under protest, and therefore the adjudicating authority was duty-bound to pass a formal Order-in-Original on 16.04.2024 to determine liability and eligibility; and the respondents contend that their action does not amount to retrospective application of the policy circular. They contend that order was issued strictly in alignment with Para 3.08(a) of the FTP and not based on any new or ex post facto condition. 2.6 Further, the respondents rebut the petitioner’s allegation of non-service of the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024. The respondents contendthat the order was dispatched on 16.04.2024 itself by registered speed post to the petitioner’s address as reflected in the last modified Importer Exporter Code (IEC) details, which had been updated by the petitioner itself. They assert that the envelope was returned undelivered with the postal remark “Left without instructions”. According to the respondents, this circumstance demonstrates that the petitioner intentionally avoided service to evade adverse consequences. Invoking Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the respondents contend that once a document is properly addressed, prepaid, and sent by registered post, service is deemed to have been effected in the ordinary course of post unless the contrary is proved. They rely on the judgment of Madras High Court in M/s Jayalakshmi Textiles v. S.K. Kolandasamy , 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14166 to contend that even remarks such as “refused,” “unclaimed,” or similar endorsements do not negate valid service, and that the burden squarely lies on the addressee to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the respondents contend that the petitioner’s claim that it was unaware of the Order-in-Original and also the plea of non- service is a fabricated ground built to overcome limitation and procedural default. Consequently, the respondents contend that the petitioner’s claim that it was unaware of the Order-in-Original and also the plea of non- service is a fabricated ground built to overcome limitation and procedural default. 2.7 The respondents also rebut the petitioner’s reliance on judgments of the Bombay High Court dated 09.03.2021 and the Karnataka High Court dated 25.04.2024. They contend that an SLP arising from the Bombay High Court judgment has been filed by the DGFT as SLP (C) No. 20307/2022, which is pending before the Supreme Court of India. According to them, the circular has been quashed only within the respective jurisdictions of those High Courts and does not lose its force throughout India. Until the Supreme Court finally adjudicates the issue, the respondents contend that the circular continues to be valid and binding on all Regional Authorities and exporters in jurisdictions where it has not been struck down. They therefore submit that reliance on those judgments is premature and that the present proceedings cannot be invalidated merely because the circular has been questioned elsewhere. 2.8 Adverting to the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, the respondents assert that adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner prior to cancellation of SEIS scrips and issuance of the Order-in- Original. They contend that the dispute is purely statutory, falling squarely within the competence of the appellate and reviewing authorities under the FTDR Act. They further contend that none of the exceptions carved out in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 —namely violation of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, or lack of jurisdiction—are attracted in the present case. 2.9 The respondents further contend that the petitioner has approached the Court with unclean hands by suppressing material facts. It is contended that the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 is a detailed, reasoned order that specifically records factual findings, figures, and conclusions drawn from the DRI investigation, clearly establishing that the petitioner acted as an aggregator rather than an actual service provider. On this basis, the respondents maintain that the cancellation of SEIS scrips and the consequential proceedings are lawful, justified, and in consonance with the FTP and the FTDR Act. On this basis, the respondents maintain that the cancellation of SEIS scrips and the consequential proceedings are lawful, justified, and in consonance with the FTP and the FTDR Act. The respondents therefore submit that the writ petition be dismissed, or in the alternative, be kept pending until the Supreme Court decides the pending SLP, as entertaining the writ petition it at this stage would cause serious prejudice to the government exchequer and undermine the statutory framework. 3. A reply and an additional reply have been filed by the petitioner, in response to the counter affidavit and additional counter affidavit of the respondent.The essence of the reply and additional reply is that the entire chain of action by the respondents isunconstitutional, and without jurisdiction because it relies solely on Policy Circular No. 06/2018, which has been judicially quashed. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court quashed the circular on 09.03.2021 in Atlantic Shipping Pvt. Ltd (supra), a position later reinforced by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court on 25.04.2024 in ECL Puyvast (India) Pvt. Ltd (supra). Both courts held that the circular introduced substantive and retrospective policy changes, exceeding the DGFT’s authority under Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, and was not merely “clarificatory.” Since no interim stay was granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the Bombay High Court judgment, the circular ceased to have legal effect, binding all authorities across India. 3.1 The petitioner contends that it was duly granted SEIS benefits for the relevant years under FTP 2015–2020, based on proper scrutiny and verification, creating vested rights and legitimate expectation. The DGFT’s subsequent actions, including issuing SCNs and passing the Order-in- Original, sought to retrospectively withdraw these benefits solely on the basis of the quashed circular, rendering the actions ultra vires, arbitrary, and in violation of natural justice. The petitioner emphasizes that it structured its business and finances relying on the settled legal position, and that subcontracting certain services to third-party entities like M/s Great Offshore Limited and M/s KEI RSOS Maritime Limited was a routine industry practice that does not divest the petitioner of its status as the principal service provider under Para 3.08 of the FTP. 3.2 The petitioner also challenges the validity of service of the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024, which was dispatched by registered post but returned with the remark “Left without instructions”. 3.2 The petitioner also challenges the validity of service of the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024, which was dispatched by registered post but returned with the remark “Left without instructions”. The petitioner asserts that mere dispatch does not constitute valid service, and it first became aware of the order only when customs proceedings were initiated, following which the petitioner requested for a certified copy. The petitioner’s subsequent writ petition before the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court (Special Civil Application No. 3555/2025) challenging the customs proceedings was dismissed on 04.04.2025 as premature, since the DGFT proceedings were already under challenge before this Court. 3.3 Further, the petitioner rebuts the respondents’ allegation that it was merely an “aggregator” or “intermediary”, emphasizing that the petitioner, at all times, invoiced and received foreign exchange as the principal service provider. The petitioner further challenges the respondents’ reliance on a Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) report and provisions of FTP 2023, arguing that the rights accrued under FTP 2015– 2020 cannot be retrospectively altered by reference to later policy circulars. 3.4 The petitioner also rebuts the respondents’contention on alternative statutory remedies under Sections 15 and 16 of the FTDR Act, and asserts that these remedies are illusory and ineffective, as the DGFT itself issued the impugned circular and thus the appellate authority is institutionally biased. The petitioner maintains that writ jurisdiction is expressly maintainable where actions are ultra vires, patently illegal, or violate natural justice, as established in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India , (2004) 6 SCC 254 4. Heard Ms.Rubaina S. Khatoon, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. V. T. Kalyan, learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 5. Heard Ms.Rubaina S. Khatoon, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. V. T. Kalyan, learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner essentially contends that the entire action of the respondents is legally unsustainable as it is founded on Policy Circular No. 06/2018 dated 22.05.2018, which is ultra vires the Foreign Trade Policy 2015–2020 and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, since only the Central Government, under Section 5 of the FTDR Act, has the legislative competence to amend the FTP by notification and not the DGFT through an executive circular, a position conclusively settled by the judgments of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court dated 09.03.2021 in Atlantic Shipping Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court dated 25.04.2024 in ECL Puyvast (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which quashed the said circular as unconstitutional and without authority. It is contended that once a central policy circular is struck down by a High Court, it ceases to exist in the eyes of law across India, and in the absence of any stay by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondents are bound to follow the binding precedent as per High Court judgments and the respondents cannot selectively ignore them or selectively apply a non- existent circular on the premise that the circular was not challenged in some other jurisdiction. The retrospective cancellation of SEIS benefits granted in 2017 after due verification is asserted to be arbitrary, violative of vested rights, promissory estoppel, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, especially when there is no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or suppression of facts, and when exporters structured their business relying on the policy framework then in force. The impugned circular is further assailed as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for creating an artificial and irrational classification between port operators and so-called actual service providers like tug operators, a distinction never contemplated under the FTP, and also as violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 265 due to unlawful interference with the petitioner’s right to conduct business and recovery without authority of law. It is submitted that both the DGFT Order- in-Original dated 16.04.2024 and the show cause notices dated 20.10.2023 and 21.06.2024 are void ab initio for want of jurisdiction, as they flow entirely from the quashed circular. It is submitted that both the DGFT Order- in-Original dated 16.04.2024 and the show cause notices dated 20.10.2023 and 21.06.2024 are void ab initio for want of jurisdiction, as they flow entirely from the quashed circular. The counsel further submits that the proceedings are vitiated by gross violation of principles of natural justice, as the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 was never served on the petitioner and came to its knowledge only on 03.01.2025 through customs proceedings, thereby depriving the petitioner of the statutory right to challenge the order in time. It is also contended that DGFT abdicated its quasi-judicial duty by acting mechanically on DRI’s recommendations without conducting any independent investigation under the FTDR Act, issuing the Show Cause notice on mere assumptions and presumptions, which is impermissible in law, and further that cancellation under Section 9 of the Act cannot be invoked once the SEIS scrips had already been utilized and expired. The learned counsel emphasizes that FTP being an economic and export-promoting policy must be interpreted liberally in favour of exporters, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Inter-Continental (India) , 2008 SCC OnLine SC 22 . It is lastly urged that the issuance of repeated show cause notices despite clear and authoritative pronouncements of High Courts amounts to abuse of process, wastes public resources, and reflects bad faith, warranting immediate interference by this Court to set aside the impugned order, notices, and all consequential proceedings. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents essentially contends that the writ petition is not maintainable because there exists an alternative statutory remedy under Sections 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, as well as provisions of the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures, which allow for appellate or revisionary review of the impugned Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 and related proceedings. The respondents assert that Policy Circular No. 06/2018 dated 22.05.2018 was issued merely as a clarification to the Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020 and did not introduce any new substantive conditions or restrictions, and therefore actions taken under the circular are lawful. They further contend that the petitioner was duly served with the impugned order through registered post, and any delay or lack of awareness on the petitioner’s part does not invalidate the proceedings. They further contend that the petitioner was duly served with the impugned order through registered post, and any delay or lack of awareness on the petitioner’s part does not invalidate the proceedings. The respondents also rely on the pendency of SLP (C) No. 27605/2022 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the Bombay High Court judgment quashing Circular No. 06/2018, arguing that the writ petition ought to be deferred. Additionally, the respondents allege that the petitioner improperly claimed SEIS benefits for services allegedly not rendered by itself, and that the petitioner acted merely as an “aggregator or intermediary”, thereby challenging its entitlement under the policy framework. Overall, the respondents maintain that the actions taken are within the legal authority of the DGFT, and the petitioner’s claims of jurisdictional defect, non-service, or violation of natural justice are denied. 7. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it may be noted that the controversy stems from Policy Circular No.06/2018 dated 22.05.2018, which sought to restrict SEIS eligibility only to “actual service providers” and exclude intermediaries/aggregators. Relying on this Circular, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence initiated inquiries, culminating in a Show Cause notice dated 20.10.2023 from the DGFT proposing cancellation of the SEIS scrips. Despite detailed replies by the petitioner, including a voluntary payment of Rs.2.95 crores with interest in March 2021 (under protest), the DGFT passed the impugned Order-in- Original dated 16.04.2024. The petitioner alleges it was never served this order and the petitioner discovered it only in January 2025 through parallel customs recovery proceedings. 8. In this backdrop, the following issues arise for determination (i) Whether Policy Circular No.06/2018 dated 22.05.2018 is ultra vires the FTP 2015–2020 and the FTDR Act, 1992, and whether the judgments of the Bombay (09.03.2021) and Karnataka (25.04.2024) High Courts quashing it are binding in the present proceedings? (ii) Whether the petitioner’s claim for SEIS benefits is valid under Para 3.08 of the FTP 2015–2020, or is it merely an aggregator? (iii) Whether the impugned Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024 suffers from violation of natural justice due to non-service? (iv) Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the availability of alternative statutory remedies? 9. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Policy Circular No.06/2018 impugned herein, was the subject matter before the Bombay High Court in Atlantic Shipping Pvt. Ltd (supra). (iv) Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the availability of alternative statutory remedies? 9. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Policy Circular No.06/2018 impugned herein, was the subject matter before the Bombay High Court in Atlantic Shipping Pvt. Ltd (supra). The Bombay High Court, by Order dated 09.03.2021 held as follows: “The Circular introduces a substantive condition of ‘actual service provider’ not found in the FTP… Such an amendment can only be made by the Central Government u/s 5 of the FTDR Act… The Circular is ultra vires and quashed.” 10. Further, the Karnataka High Court in ECL Puyvast (supra), by Order dated 25.04.2024 reaffirmed the quashing of Circular No.6/2018. The respondents’ argument that the Circular survives in jurisdictions where not challenged is fallacious. A Central Government policy circular, once declared ultra vires by a constitutional Court, suffers a fatal legal defect. Though it is sought to be contended by the respondents that an SLP, i.e., SLP (C) No. 20307/2022 is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, admittedly, no interim stay has been granted in favour of the respondents and, therefore, the impugned Circular remained quashed, and the judgment rendered by the High Courts holds the field in the absence of either an interim order, or final order in favour of the Circular No.6 of 2018. 10.1 It is to be further noted that the retrospective withdrawal of SEIS benefits to the petitioner herein, has been done after the quashing of impugned Circular by the two High Courts, and in the absence of stay order or any interim order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the pending SLPs. Under such circumstances, admittedly when the impugned Circular No.6 of 2018 has been quashed by two High Courts, and there being no stay by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the pending SLP, the best the respondent authorities could have done is to wait for the outcome of the SLP instead of executing the Circular No.6 of 2018 in other jurisdictions where it has purportedly not been challenged, merely on a fallacious ground that the Circular survives in the jurisdictions where it was not challenged. 10.2 The interpretation of law is not how the respondent authorities deem it to be, and the authorities cannot feign ignorance or pretend to be naïve about the operation of legal proceedings. 10.2 The interpretation of law is not how the respondent authorities deem it to be, and the authorities cannot feign ignorance or pretend to be naïve about the operation of legal proceedings. When once a Central Government Order has been quashed by a High Court as illegal or arbitrary, and when a challenge is laid before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against such quashing, and in case there is no stay on quash, then the quashed order remains quashed until the final outcome of the SLP or until an order is passed in the interregnum that has a bearing on the impugned order. If the action/stance of the respondent authorities, that the Circular is operative in unchallenged jurisdictions, has to be accepted, it would virtually amount to perpetuating illegality until the time such Central Government Order is challenged and quashed by all the jurisdictional High Courts of the Country. 10.3 In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent-authorities ought not to have retrospectively withdrawn the SEIS scrip benefits granted to the petitioner on the fictional ground that the Circular is operative in the jurisdiction where it was not challenged. The respondent authorities cannot perpetuate actions based on an instrument held to be without legal authority. Therefore, the Policy Circular No.06/2018 cannot sustain the Show Cause notice dated 20.10.2023, the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024, or the Customs Notice dated 21.06.2024. 11. With regard to the petitioner’s eligibility as a Service Provider, it may be noted that the FTP 2015–2020 under Para 3.08 granted benefits to “Service Providers”. The policy did not exclude entities that subcontract ancillary services. The petitioner provided integrated port services, by engaging specialists for tug operations. The DRI’s characterization of the petitioner as a mere “aggregator” ignores the substantive role of the port as the primary service provider contracting with customers, earning foreign exchange, and bearing ultimate responsibility. The SEIS scrips were granted after due scrutiny, and there is no allegation of fraud on the petitioner. The attempt to retrospectively revise and re-interpret eligibility, through a quashed circular is arbitrary and illegal, as it violates the policy’s export- promotion objective (Hasmira Healthcare India (P) Ltd (supra)). 12. With regard to the issue of violation of natural justice, the respondents rely on the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, which is a rebuttable presumption. The attempt to retrospectively revise and re-interpret eligibility, through a quashed circular is arbitrary and illegal, as it violates the policy’s export- promotion objective (Hasmira Healthcare India (P) Ltd (supra)). 12. With regard to the issue of violation of natural justice, the respondents rely on the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, which is a rebuttable presumption. It is to be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Suri vs. Delhi Development Authority , (2022) 11 SCC 1 , referred to various precedent judgments, like Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions vs. Pindiga Sridhar , (2007) 13 SCC 352 , held that natural justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any straightjacket formula that can be applied across all cases. In the instant case, when the respondents proposed to withdraw the SEIS benefit and demanded remittance of substantial amounts availed by the petitioner under the SEIS, merely dispatching a letter and taking subsequent action, despite the letter returning with an endorsement “Left without instructions”, cannot be deemed to be service of notice to fit the definition of natural justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and therefore the petitioner has undoubtedly been deprived of the opportunity to challenge within the statutory period. Further, the petitioner participated diligently in all prior proceedings, which is evident from the petitioner’s replies dated 06.11.2019, 31.03.2021, and 26.12.2023; and the averments show that the petitioner learnt about the Order-in-Original through Customs Notice on 03.01.2025. 13. With regard to maintainability of the writ petition, it is to be noted that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar when the impugned action is based on a document (Policy Circular No.06/2018 herein) which was declared ultra vires, and the impugned action herein is a pure question of law, and therefore this Court finds that the petitioner is not misdirected in approaching this Court under Article 226. Further, the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd (supra) has upheld writ jurisdiction in such exceptional circumstances.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, quashing the Policy Circular No.06/2018 dated 22.05.2018. Further, the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd (supra) has upheld writ jurisdiction in such exceptional circumstances.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, quashing the Policy Circular No.06/2018 dated 22.05.2018. Consequently, the Show Cause notice dated 20.10.2023, and the Order-in-Original dated 16.04.2024, and the Customs Show Cause notice dated 21.06.2024 and all consequential recovery proceedings, are also set aside. The amount of Rs.2,95,66,263/- along with interest remitted by the petitioner, shall be refundedto the petitioner within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.