ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. The present appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 1st September, 2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, in Application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 1 [CrPC], being A482 No. 7219 of 2025, whereby the application preferred by the Appellant seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings instituted against him arising out of FIR No. 176 of 2006, registered for the offence punishable under Section 460 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, came to be dismissed. 3. The facts, insofar as they are necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal, are briefly stated hereunder: 3.1 As per the FIR, during the intervening night of 29th/30th August, 2006, several incidents of theft were committed in Village Rasoolpur Kayastha. It was alleged that unknown persons committed theft in a number of houses and assaulted some persons when they raised an alarm. Upon hearing the commotion, the villagers chased the assailants towards the forest. 3.2 During the course of the said chase, Ramesh, son of the informant, who was sleeping near a tubewell at the outskirts of the village, was found lying dead with injuries on his head. 3.3 A written complaint was lodged by the father of the deceased on 30th August, 2006, which came to be registered as FIR No. 176 of 2006. The complainant stated that there was no prior enmity with anyone, but expressed suspicion against the Appellant, along with Pyarelal and Satyendra, who were residents of the same village, allegedly on account of an existing family dispute. 3.4 Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 19th December, 2006, in which the Appellant was not named as an accused. After commencement of trial, when the complainant was examined as PW-1, he reiterated the version contained in the FIR. Thereafter, an application under Section 319 of CrPC was moved, pursuant to which summons were issued against the Appellant and two others by order dated 9th July, 2007. 3.5 The Appellant and the co-accused challenged the said order by filing an application under Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court, wherein the operation of the summoning order was stayed. Consequently, the proceedings against the Appellant were separated. 3.5 The Appellant and the co-accused challenged the said order by filing an application under Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court, wherein the operation of the summoning order was stayed. Consequently, the proceedings against the Appellant were separated. 3.6 In the main trial arising out of Sessions Trial No. 170 of 2007, six accused persons, who were named in the charge-sheet, were tried and subsequently acquitted. 3.7 After conclusion of the main trial, proceedings against the Appellant and other summoned persons were revived and summons were again issued vide order dated 31st October, 2019. The Appellant again approached the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings. The said application was not argued on merits. However, liberty was granted to the Appellant to file a discharge application before the Trial Court. 3.8 The discharge application so filed remained pending for nearly five years. Vide order dated 25th July, 2025, the Trial Court rejected the discharge application. The Trial Court placed reliance upon the statement of PW-1, who had stated on oath that he had identified the applicants in torchlight and that they had caused the death of his son by striking him on the head. 4. The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the application under Section 482 of CrPC filed by the Appellant. The High Court held that a prima facie case was made out against the Appellant on the basis of the statement of PW-1 recorded during trial and found no reason to interfere with the order of the Trial Court rejecting the discharge application. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Maurya, and learned counsel for the Respondent-State. 6. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Appellant would be wholly futile. It was contended that the Appellant was not named in the charge- sheet as the investigating agency did not find any material against him. All the accused persons named in the charge-sheet have already been acquitted after full-fledged trial. The Appellant was summoned solely on the basis of the statement of PW-1 under Section 319 of CrPC. It was further submitted that the two co-accused who were summoned along with the Appellant have since expired, and that PW-1 himself died during the pendency of the discharge application. The Appellant was summoned solely on the basis of the statement of PW-1 under Section 319 of CrPC. It was further submitted that the two co-accused who were summoned along with the Appellant have since expired, and that PW-1 himself died during the pendency of the discharge application. Consequently, the Appellant has been deprived of any opportunity to cross-examine PW-1. In such circumstances, the examination-in-chief of PW-1 cannot constitute the sole basis either for summoning the Appellant or for recording a conviction. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-State argued that a prima facie case exists against the Appellant on the basis of the statement of PW-1. It was contended that although PW-1 could not be cross-examined due to his death, his evidence remains admissible and sufficient to proceed with the trial. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the material placed on record. We find merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant. In our view, the High Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 482 of CrPC and in affirming the order of the Trial Court rejecting the discharge application. The Respondent- State has not been able to point out any legally sustainable reason for continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Appellant. 9. The legal position concerning the evidentiary value of testimony where a witness has been examined-in- chief but could not be subjected to cross- examination owing to death has engaged the attention of this Court as well as various High Courts for over a century. The jurisprudence that has evolved reflects a consistent and well-settled approach: while such testimony does not stand automatically effaced from the record, its admissibility and probative worth are conditioned by the fundamental requirement of fairness, particularly the opportunity of cross-examination. 10. Although this Court has had occasion to advert to the issue in the context of civil proceedings, the principle has not been exhaustively analyzed in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, the guiding considerations emerge with sufficient clarity from the following precedents of this Court. 10. Although this Court has had occasion to advert to the issue in the context of civil proceedings, the principle has not been exhaustively analyzed in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, the guiding considerations emerge with sufficient clarity from the following precedents of this Court. 10.1 In Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, (1989) 3 SCC 56 , while dealing with an eviction dispute, this Court underscored the inherent infirmity in placing reliance upon testimony that has not been tested by cross-examination, observing: “It would not be safe to rely on the examination- in-chief recorded which was not subjected to cross-examination… If that is so, it will appear that there is no evidence of the plaintiff in respect of allegations in the plaint.” 10.2 Interpreting the proviso to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, this Court in V. M. Mathew v. V. S. Sharma & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 122 , dealt with it in the following terms: “In other words, the proviso [to Section 33] lays down the acid test that statement of a particular witness should have been tested by both parties by examination and cross-examination in order to make it admissible in the later proceeding. Thereby it seeks to protect the rights against whom the previous proceeding might have gone ex-parte who had no right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” 11. We may now advert to the decisions of the High Courts which have engaged with the issue in greater depth. As early as in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. S. Sundaram Ayyar & Ors., 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 603, the Madras High Court articulated the foundational principle governing such evidence in the following terms: “I think the correct rule is that the evidence is admissible but that the weight to be attached to such evidence should depend upon the circumstances of each case and that, though in some cases the Court may act upon it, if there is other evidence on record, its probative value may be very small and may, even be disregarded. I am not disposed to attach any weight to the evidence of this witness.” The said principle was followed by the Lahore High Court in Mangal Sen v. Emperor, 1929 SCC OnLine Lah 270. 12. In Mt. Horil Kuer v. Rajab Ali, 1935 SCC OnLine Pat 208, the Patna High Court further refined the approach and observed: “5. I am not disposed to attach any weight to the evidence of this witness.” The said principle was followed by the Lahore High Court in Mangal Sen v. Emperor, 1929 SCC OnLine Lah 270. 12. In Mt. Horil Kuer v. Rajab Ali, 1935 SCC OnLine Pat 208, the Patna High Court further refined the approach and observed: “5. The weight to be attached to the evidence depends on the circumstances and the Court should look at the evidence carefully to see whether there are indications that by a completed cross examination the testimony of the witness was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith to be successfully impeached.” 13. The Delhi High Court, in Krishan Dayal v. Chandu Ram, 1969 SCC OnLine Del 134, provided a comprehensive set of guiding factors, observing: “So far as the question is concerned as to what weight should be attached to such statement made in examination-in-chief the Court has to keep in view the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Some of the factors which may be borne in mind are the nature of the testimony, its probative value, the status of the witness, his relationship or connection with the parties to the case, a likely animus which may colour his statement and any other factor touching the credibility of the witness which may emerge on the record. Regard must also be had to the fact that the witness has not been subjected to cross-examination. The Court should see whether there are indications on the record that as a result of cross-examination his testimony was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith or credit to be successfully impeached. The Court may also adopt a rule not to act upon such testimony unless it is materially corroborated or is supported by the surrounding circumstances. If after applying that rule of caution, the Court decides to rely upon the statement of a witness who was examined in chief, but who died before cross- examination, the decision of the Court in this respect would not suffer from any infirmity.” 14. The Kerala High Court, in Food Inspector v. James, 1997 SCC OnLine Ker 255, clarified the admissibility position with precision: “The general proposition that the evidence of a witness who is not subjected to cross- examination cannot be looked into, cannot be disputed. The Kerala High Court, in Food Inspector v. James, 1997 SCC OnLine Ker 255, clarified the admissibility position with precision: “The general proposition that the evidence of a witness who is not subjected to cross- examination cannot be looked into, cannot be disputed. But the question to be considered in this case is whether the evidence of PW 1 who was examined in chief and was not available for cross-examination due to his death in the meanwhile, is admissible in evidence or not. The principles laid down in the decisions relied upon by the counsel for the appellant referred to above clearly establish that the evidence of a witness who could not be subjected to cross- examination due to his death before he could be cross-examined, is admissible in evidence, though the evidentiary value will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.” 15. The statutory backdrop to this jurisprudence is provided by Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: “33. Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth of facts therein stated. Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable: Provided - that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine; that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. Explanation - A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section.” 16. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Somagutta Erapa Reddy v. Palapandla Chinna Gangappa, 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1322, authoritatively summarized the position as follows: “7. Explanation - A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section.” 16. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Somagutta Erapa Reddy v. Palapandla Chinna Gangappa, 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1322, authoritatively summarized the position as follows: “7. Thus, the evidence given by a witness, although he had not been cross-examined may be admissible in evidence. However, weight or probative value attached to such evidence would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. Whether such evidence should be taken or not would depend upon the fact as to how far and to what extent the deposition has been made; whether the witness has spoken about the relevant facts and the stage of examination in chief is also relevant.” “17. Section 33 of the Evidence Act, in our opinion, is clear and unambiguous. If a witness is not deliberately produced and/or if the conditions precedent for admissibility of the evidence of a witness as specified in Section 33 are not fulfilled, such evidence, evidently, would not be admissible in evidence.” “18. … although his evidence is admissible in evidence, the weight or probative value thereto would vary from case to case and in a given case may also be disregarded.” 17. The Calcutta High Court in Srikumar Mukherjee v. Avijit Mukherjee & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 6445, held: “It is, therefore, settled law that the evidence of a witness, who could not be cross-examined, cannot be expunged, but the Court shall consider its evidentiary or probative value along with other evidence.” 18. In view of the consistent judicial opinion reflected in the decisions of this Court and of various High Courts, the following principles clearly emerge and are hereby restated for clarity: 18.1 Evidence of a witness who has been examined-in- chief but dies before being subjected to cross- examination cannot, merely for that reason, be mechanically expunged from the record. Such testimony is not rendered inadmissible per se and may, in appropriate cases, be taken into consideration. 18.2 At the same time, the right of cross-examination constitutes an integral and indispensable component of a fair trial and is deeply embedded in the principles of natural justice. Cross-examination is the primary means by which the credibility, veracity, and reliability of a witness are tested. 18.2 At the same time, the right of cross-examination constitutes an integral and indispensable component of a fair trial and is deeply embedded in the principles of natural justice. Cross-examination is the primary means by which the credibility, veracity, and reliability of a witness are tested. Consequently, testimony which has not undergone such scrutiny must necessarily be approached with caution. 18.3 The probative value of testimony that remains untested by cross-examination is, by its very nature, substantially weakened. A court may place reliance upon such evidence only where it finds that the testimony is materially corroborated by independent evidence on record or is strongly supported by unimpeachable surrounding circumstances which lend assurance to its truthfulness. 18.4 Whether, and to what extent, such evidence may be relied upon is ultimately a matter of careful judicial assessment. No inflexible or universal rule of exclusion can be laid down in this regard. However, a heightened rule of caution must govern the judicial approach, particularly where such testimony forms the sole or primary basis of the prosecution or claim. 18.5 These principles are intended to strike a careful balance between preventing miscarriage of justice on account of procedural contingencies, on the one hand, and safeguarding the fairness and integrity of the adjudicatory process, on the other. 19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the prosecution against the Appellant rests on an exceedingly fragile foundation. The Appellant was not named in the charge-sheet. The First Information Report itself discloses no more than a vague suspicion against the Appellant arising out of an alleged family dispute, without attribution of any specific role, overt act, or direct involvement. The investigating agency, upon completion of investigation, did not find material sufficient to send the Appellant for trial. All the accused who were charge-sheeted have since been acquitted after a full-fledged trial on merits. The two other persons who were summoned along with the Appellant under Section 319 of CrPC have also passed away. 20. In these circumstances, although the statement of PW-1 cannot be excluded from consideration as a matter of law, its probative value is extremely limited. The summoning of the Appellant under Section 319 of CrPC rests solely on an examination-in-chief which remained wholly untested by cross-examination and finds no corroboration from independent evidence or surrounding circumstances. 20. In these circumstances, although the statement of PW-1 cannot be excluded from consideration as a matter of law, its probative value is extremely limited. The summoning of the Appellant under Section 319 of CrPC rests solely on an examination-in-chief which remained wholly untested by cross-examination and finds no corroboration from independent evidence or surrounding circumstances. The exercise of power under Section 319 of CrPC, which is extraordinary in nature and intended to be invoked sparingly, cannot be sustained on so slender and precarious a basis. To permit the prosecution to proceed in such circumstances would subject the Appellant to needless and avoidable harassment, without any realistic or reasonable prospect of conviction. 21. It is trite that in criminal jurisprudence the burden lies squarely upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, however grave or compelling it may appear, can never take the place of legal proof. Where the prosecution seeks to proceed solely on the basis of an untested examination-in-chief, unsupported by any independent, corroborative, or circumstantial material, the threshold required to justify the continuation of a criminal trial is clearly not met. 22. We are, therefore, satisfied that the continuation of criminal proceedings against the Appellant would amount to an abuse of the process of law. While it is equally well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC are to be exercised with great circumspection and in rare cases, the present matter squarely falls within that exceptional category where interference is necessary to prevent injustice and to secure the ends of justice. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 1st September, 2025 passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. All criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 176 of 2006, registered at Police Station Gudamba, District Lucknow, and all proceedings consequent thereto, insofar as they relate to the Appellant, are hereby quashed. 24. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.