Narendra Kumar Samadhiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh
2026-02-23
ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
body2026
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The instant Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed seeking following reliefs:- (i) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this Writ Petition; (ii) That, by issuance of the writ order or direction the orders Annexure P/1 dated 15.7.2011 passed by the respondent no.4 may kindly be directed to be quashed and the order passed by the appellate authority vide order Annexure P/2 as well as the order Annexure P/3 dated 4.3.2013, may kindly be directed to be quashed and further the respondents may kindly be directed to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Section Commander from the date when his juniors/batch mates have been promoted with all consequential benefits along with arrears of salary along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. (iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner. Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable on 08/01/1995. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Head Constable on 15/03/1993. In the year 2003-2004, a committee was constituted to look after the construction work of Petrol Pump of Battalion wherein the platform and the showroom were to be constructed and the committee was constituted to look after the construction work in which Shri Parminder Singh Saini, Asstt. Commandant, 17th Battalion Bhind was made as the President and Shri Phool Singh Tomar, Company Commander, Shri Dhanpat Dohare, Platoon Commander, Shri Vakeel Singh, Section Commander and the petitioner were made as members of said committee. The construction work was carried out in the year 2003- 04 in which the cost incurred was Rs.4,20,050/- and the payment was made by the then Commandant. 3. Subsequently, in the year 2007, the then Commandant wrote a letter to the Public Works Department to conduct physical possession for valuation of the cost of petrol pump building and the report was submitted by order dated 21/09/2007 by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department in which the valuation was quoted to be Rs.2,71,000/- and on the basis of which the preliminary enquiry was conducted by the department and thereafter, the charge-sheet dated 27/11/2009 has been issued. Thereafter, enquiry officer and the presenting officer were appointed.
Thereafter, enquiry officer and the presenting officer were appointed. The enquiry report was submitted by enquiry officer in which both the charges against the petitioner were not found to be proved. Thereafter, respondent No.4 disagreeing with the findings of enquiry officer sent the matter again for re/fresh enquiry by appointing Shri P.L. Luhariya, Assistant Commandant, 17th Battalion, Bhind as an enquiry officer. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that again the enquiry has been completed by enquiry officer and both the charges were found to be partially proved by the enquiry officer. Thereafter, the enquiry report was supplied to petitioner and respondents asked the reply upon the enquiry report and thereafter, petitioner submitted the reply dated 15/07/2011. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that without considering the detailed reply submitted by the petitioner, by non-speaking and unreasoned order, punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect has been imposed by order dated 15/07/2011. Thereafter, petitioner has preferred the detailed appeal. But the appellate authority has also rejected the appeal by non-speaking and unreasoned order. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that by order dated 09/05/2011 (Annexure P/6), the disciplinary authority has directed de novo enquiry by appointing enquiry officer and presenting officer. It is further submitted that there is no such direction that further enquiry be taken up as per Rule 15 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for brevity, the Rules, 1966') wherein only the further enquiry may be permitted and no fresh or de novo enquiry can be ordered. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that as per Rule 15(1) of the Rules, 1966, the disciplinary authority if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further enquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further enquiry according to provisions of Rule 14 as far as may be but in the present case, the disciplinary authority had not remitted the matter for further enquiry and remitted the matter for fresh enquiry and appointed one another person as enquiry officer. It is contrary to Rule 15(1) of the Rules, 1966. 6.
It is contrary to Rule 15(1) of the Rules, 1966. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate submitted that disciplinary authority has rightly appointed enquiry officer and presenting officer and directed to complete the departmental enquiry as per procedure since there were vital defects in the previous enquiry conducted by earlier enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority has rightly directed for completion of departmental enquiry in a month. It is further submitted that de novo enquiry is permissible when eepartmental enquiry finds lacuna in following incorrect inquiry procedure and in taking evidence of witnesses. Thus, the entire contention of petitioner is baseless and misconceived. 7. Heard the counsel for parties and perused the record appended thereto. 8. From the material available on record, it is apparent that in 2003-04 a committee was constituted to supervise the construction of the Battalion’s petrol pump, including the platform and showroom, with Shri Parminder Singh Saini, Assistant Commandant, 17th Battalion, Bhind, as President and Shri Phool Singh Tomar, Shri Dhanpat Dohare, Shri Vakeel Singh, and the petitioner as members. The construction was carried out during 2003-04 at a reported cost of Rs. 4,20,050/-, and payment was made by the then Commandant. In 2007, the then Commandant sought valuation from the Public Works Department, and the Executive Engineer, by report dated 21/09/2007, assessed the construction cost at Rs. 2,71,000/-, leading to a preliminary enquiry and issuance of a charge-sheet dated 27/11/2009 against the petitioner. An enquiry officer initially held the charges not proved; however, respondent No. 4 disagreed and ordered a fresh/de novo enquiry by appointing Shri P.L. Luhariya as the new enquiry officer, who in the subsequent enquiry found the charges partially proved. After furnishing the enquiry report to the petitioner and without considering his detailed reply dated 15/07/2011, the disciplinary authority, by non-speaking and unreasoned order dated 15/07/2011, imposed the penalty of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect, and the petitioner’s appeal was subsequently dismissed by the appellate authority. 9. By order dated 09/05/2011, the disciplinary authority has directed de novo/fresh enquiry in following manner:- 10.
9. By order dated 09/05/2011, the disciplinary authority has directed de novo/fresh enquiry in following manner:- 10. Even in the reply, the respondents have submitted that the disciplinary authority has right to direct fresh enquiry and the respondents have admitted that enquiry officer has directed for de novo/fresh enquiry and not for further enquiry and it is settled position that as per Rule 15 (1) of the Rules, 1966, the disciplinary authority may remit the case to the enquiry authority for further enquiry only and not remitted the case for fresh/de novo enquiry. Rule 15 (1) of the Rules, 1966 provides as under :- 15. Action on the inquiry report. "(1) The disciplinary authority if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14 as far as may be" 11. Considering the fact that disciplinary authority had directed the enquiry officer to proceed de novo from the stage of prosecution witnesses and there is no such direction that any further enquiry be taken up as per Rule 15 (1) of the Rules, 1966. As per Rule 15(1) of the Rules, 1966, for further enquiry, the matter may be remitted and not for the fresh/de novo enquiry. Even otherwise, the reply submitted by petitioner has not been considered by disciplinary authority at the time of issuing of the punishment order and by non-speaking or unreasoned order, the punishment by which one increment with cumulative effect (major punishment) has been imposed upon the petitioner and subsequent de novo enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer at the instance of disciplinary authority runs contrary to Rule 15 (1) of the Rules, 1966 which only prescribes further enquiry. 12. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an authority to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised with due diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision. It has been held that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even by an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties must speak. The affected party must know how his case or defence was considered before passing the prejudicial order. 13. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Bandip Singh and others, (2016) 1 SCC 724 is relevant to quote. In the said decision it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion. 14. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons: Paragraph 7 of the said decision is quoted as under:- “7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382. However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons. This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M&N Publications Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 445 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617 , B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517 .” 15. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point.
Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the Honb'le Supreme Court summarized its discussion. The relevant sub-paragraphs of the said summary are quoted as under:- “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Stasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. 16. Considering the aforesaid, the present petition is allowed and impugned order dated 15/07/2011 (Annexure P/1) passed by disciplinary authority and appeal rejection order dated 27/02/2012 (Annexure P/2) are hereby quashed. Respondents are directed to give all consequential benefits to petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 17.
16. Considering the aforesaid, the present petition is allowed and impugned order dated 15/07/2011 (Annexure P/1) passed by disciplinary authority and appeal rejection order dated 27/02/2012 (Annexure P/2) are hereby quashed. Respondents are directed to give all consequential benefits to petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 17. As the petitioner was already 48 years old at the time of filing of present petition i.e. 24/06/2013 and at present, he is near about to attain the age of superannuation, hence, no liberty is granted to respondents to take action in accordance with law. 18. With the aforesaid, the instant petition stands disposed of.