ORDER : 1. The petitioner by filing instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has made a challenge to the charge-sheet dated 11.05.2005 (Annexure-3) issued under the signatures of the Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range (I), Jaipur, the order dated 02.08.2005 (Annexure-5) issued under the signatures of the Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range-I, Jaipur, the order dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-7) issued under the signatures of the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur so also the order dated 12.02.2008 (Annexure-10) issued under the signatures of the Dy. Secretary of the Government, Government of Rajasthan, Home (Gr. 11) Department. 2. The facts emerge out from the pleadings are that when the petitioner was posted as SHO police station Pragpura, District Jaipur, he was issued a charge-sheet on 21.02.2005 (Annexure-1) under Rule 16/18 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and Amendment Rules of 1983 (for short 'the Rules of 1958, amended Rules of 1983') by the Inspector General of Police, Jaipur (I), Jaipur after conducting a preliminary enquiry with regard to the incident alleged to have taken place on 18.12.2004. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the said charges. The respondent no. 4 after considering the reply of the petitioner came on the conclusion that his action was not malicious and dropped the said charge-sheet, however, on the same day directed to issue the charge-sheet to the petitioner under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules vide order dated 11.05.2005. On 26.05.2005 the petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the charge-sheet. The respondent without applying the judicious mind on the reply so submitted by the petitioner, found the charges proved against the petitioner and imposed a penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect vide order dated 02.08.2005. Against the punishment order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur. The respondent no. 3 considering the reply of the petitioner came on the conclusion that the petitioner on receiving the information regarding the incident of 18.12.2004 immediately took necessary action despite that respondent-Authority held the petitioner guilty of supervisory negligence without assigning any plausible and cogent reasons and vide order dated 26.07.2006 reduced the penalty from stoppage of two grade increments without cumulative effect to one annual grade increment without cumulative effect. Against the punishment order dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-7), the petitioner filed a review petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan. Vide order dated 12.02.2008 (Annexure-10) issued under signatures of Dy. Secretary of the Government, Government of Rajasthan, Home (Group 11) Department, the review petition filed by the petitioner was rejected. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Mr. M.M. Mehrishi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned charge-sheet dated 11.05.2005 (Annex-3), the orders dated 02.08.2005 (Annex-5), 26.07.2006 (Annex-7), 02.02.2008 so also the order dated 12.02.2008 (Annex-9 and 10) are ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, malicious and perverse and therefore same deserve to be quashed and set aside. He further submitted that all the charges are absolutely baseless and against the material available on record and sufficient enough to prove the petitioner innocent and thus charge-sheet as well as the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondents failed to appreciate report No. 889 of daily diary dated 18.12.2004 and report No. 892 of daily diary dated 19.12.2004, which are the genuine official documents. A bare perusal of these reports clearly reveal that the petitioner on receiving the information regarding the alleged suspect Mr. Mahendra, having been caught by the local residents of Paota, immediately issued necessary instructions on the Mobile Unit on round. Mr. Phool Chand, ASI went on the site and having found that said suspect had sustained injuries on his mouth and body having been beaten by the local residents. On the instructions of petitioner they took Mr. Mahendra to BDMH Kotputali for treatment. The aforesaid facts clearly indicate that the petitioner took all the necessary steps immediately and thus the charge No. 1 to the effect that he failed to take any legal action, is clearly false and baseless. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that from the report No. 892 dated 19.12.2004 it is clear that ASI Shri Phool Chand, ASI after returning from Hospital with the said suspect, Mr. Mahendra neither produced him before the petitioner nor reported him; rather he himself made his interrogatories and set him free with necessary instructions. Thus apparently Shri Phool Chand, ASI seriously erred in discharging his duty. However, the petitioner did not get any opportunity for any investigation in the matter and therefore the charge No. 1 is clearly baseless. Mahendra neither produced him before the petitioner nor reported him; rather he himself made his interrogatories and set him free with necessary instructions. Thus apparently Shri Phool Chand, ASI seriously erred in discharging his duty. However, the petitioner did not get any opportunity for any investigation in the matter and therefore the charge No. 1 is clearly baseless. He also submitted that as per the report No. 892 dated 19.12.2004 said Mr. Mahendra was caught by the local residents of Paota on the basis of suspicion of pig stealing, however no FIR was lodged by them against him immediately and even on being asked by the Shri Phool Chand, ASI they said that they will tell later on about giving written complaint against said suspect Mr. Mahendra. The aforesaid facts clearly indicate that there was neither any complaint nor any FIR for commission of any cognizable offence against Mr. Mahendra on 18.12.2004, in absence of which there was no basis for taking any legal action against the petitioner. Thus, the charge No. 1 is absolutely baseless and vauge. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that from the bare perusal of report No. 889 dated 18.12.2004 and report No. 892 dated 19.12.2004, it is clear that alleged suspect Mr. Mahendra was never kept in Police Station and Shri Phool Chand, ASI set him free immediately after his medical examination on 18.12.2004 itself. Hence there was no question of deputing any ‘Santry’ specially for his vigligence. Therefore, the charge No. 2 is absolutely false and baseless. He further submitted that even otherwise also the respondents failed to appreciate that nowhere in the Police Rules 1948 or the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965 Santry duty and vigilance duty has been defined. From the rules these words are not distinguishable, rather from rule 202(A) of Police Rules 1948 and Rule 3.10 of Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965, it is clear that the "Santry" is responsible for looking after and taking care of the prisoners, goods lying in malkhana and other articles lying at police station. In other words the guard responsible or deputed for the above work is called "Santry". In other words the guard responsible or deputed for the above work is called "Santry". The respondents while leveling charge No. 2 clearly seems to be confused about the word "Santry" and therefore inspite of having found that a Guard was on duty for taking care and vigilance of prisoners, goods lying at malkhana and other goods at, police station on the night of 18.12.2004 and even prior and thereafter also, alleged that it was only vigilance duty and not a Santry duty whereas, from the above quoted rules it is clear that there is no difference between these two words and they are the same. Hence charge No. 2, levelled against the petitioner deserves to be quashed and set asided. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from the report No. 889 and 892 of daily diary it is crystal clear that the petitioner took all the legal actions immediately as per the requirement of situation and also issued necessary instructions to his staff. If Shri Phool Chand, ASI lacked his duty and while exceeding his jurisdiction and going beyond the instructions issued to him for reporting the petitioner after medical examination of said suspect Mr. Mahendra, himself set him free, the petitioner cannot be held responsible for it. However it is pertinent to mention here that till then there was no complaint or FIR against said Mr. Mahendra and therefore he could not be categorized to be a suspect till then. Hence, the charge No. 3 levelled against the petitioner is based on surmises and conjectures. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that charge No. 4 is based on surmises and conjectures. As clear from the record neither said Mr. Mahendra was a suspect accused, as no FIR or complaint was existing against him on 18.12.2004 nor he ran away from police station, rather as is clear from report No. 892 dt. 19.12.2004, he was set free by Shri Phool Chand, ASI. Therefore, the Charge No. 4 is also absolutely false and baseless. It is worth while to mention here that during preliminary enquiry complainant Lallu Ram stated to have reached in Police Station for lodging the FIR at 11.30 am on 19.12.2004, however he never mentioned about petitioner's refusal to register the FIR. Therefore, the Charge No. 4 is also absolutely false and baseless. It is worth while to mention here that during preliminary enquiry complainant Lallu Ram stated to have reached in Police Station for lodging the FIR at 11.30 am on 19.12.2004, however he never mentioned about petitioner's refusal to register the FIR. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per report No. 907 dated 19.12.2004 entered by Circle Officer, Kotputli at 11.30 am, he reached the police station at 11.30 am from his 20 km away residence, on the phone call of one Shri Nityanand-collegue of complainant Lallu Ram regarding non registration of their FIR against said Mr.Mahendra by the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that when complainant Lallu Ram himself stated to have reached Police Station at 11.30 am, how the petitioner could have refused to register their FIR prior to it. The aforesaid facts clearly falsify the charge No. 4 and hence same deserves to be quashed and set aside. He also submitted that the FIR No. 416/2004 which is related to the present case, there is no remark by the Circle Officer for its registration nor the Circle Officer himself registered it under the provisions of Section 36 Cr.P.C. If the petitioner would have refused to register the FIR as alleged, his superior officer i.e., Circle Officer was well competent to register it himself under the aforesaid provisions of Cr.P.C.. However, absence of invoking the aforesaid provision by the Circle Officer clearly proves that the registration of FIR was never refused by the petitioner and hence charge No. 4 is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed being absolutely false. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the verbal statements of the witnesses during preliminary enquiry are contrary to each other on the material points and therefore it was incumbent upon the authorities to rely upon the official records like daily diary of concerned Police Station. It is pertinent to mention here that the reports in daily diary are neither alleged to be manipulated nor forged rather these are genuine documents which depicts the real picture. However, the respondents clearly failed in it and passed the orders holding the petitioner guilty of charges levelled against him. Thus, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed, being totally mechanical and perverse. However, the respondents clearly failed in it and passed the orders holding the petitioner guilty of charges levelled against him. Thus, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed, being totally mechanical and perverse. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from the bare perusal of order dated 2.8.2005 passed by Disciplinary Authority it is clear that the authority has only narrated the reply of petitioner to the charges, however he neither discussed the evidences and other material available on record nor applied his judicious mind before passing the impugned order and passed it totally in a mechanical manner without assigning any cogent reason whatsoever. He also submitted that after preliminary enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority found that petitioner is not guilty of malacious and therefore dropped the charge- sheet dated 21.2.2005 issued to the petitioner under Rule 16/18 of the Rules of 1958 and Amendment Rules of 1983. However, in a most arbitrary and illegal manner issued another charge-sheet dated 11.5.2005 to the petitioner under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 without any basis. Hence the charge-sheet itself deserves to be quashed being bad in law. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner never failed in discharge of his duty or in any manner putting any stigma or spot on the police force. The whole problem arose only because Mr. Phool Chand, ASI failed to discharge his duty as per the instructions issued to him by the petitioner. In preliminary enquiry the petitioner has been found guilty also. Thus it is totally unfair, illegal, arbitrary and malicious to prosecute petitioner for fault of Mr. Phool Chand, ASI. He also submitted that from the bare perusal of appellate order dated 26.7.2006 it is crystal clear that the Appellate Authority found that the petitioner on information regarding suspect accused immediately took necessary action, however still held him guilty of supervisory negligence without assigning any reason for it. The aforesaid facts clearly reflect that though the Appellate Authority was convinced about the innocence of petitioner but still held him guilty of supervisory negligence just for the sake of holding him guilty. Thus the impugned order deserves to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 12.2.2008 is totally a non speaking order and thus same deserves to be quashed being against the principles of natural justice. Thus the impugned order deserves to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 12.2.2008 is totally a non speaking order and thus same deserves to be quashed being against the principles of natural justice. He also submitted that the actions of respondents are ex-facie against the principles of natural justice and contrary to Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. To support the submissions, counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance upon following judgments:- (i) Gurparkash Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another , 2009 (8) SLR 36, delivered by Punjab and Haryana High Court. (ii) Pratap Singh Vs. The Superintendent of Police and Ors. , 2003 (1) WLC (Raj) 80, delivered by the Coordinate Bench of the Principal Seat at Jodhpur. (iii) Ramdeo Singh Vs. R.S.R.T.C. & Ors., 1992 (5) WLR Raj 696, delivered by by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. 5. Mr. Somitra Chaturvedi, Dy. GC, appearing for the respondents, before submitting parawise reply has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner has made allegations on Mr. Phool Chand, ASI and he has tried to shift the burden on Mr. Phool Chand, ASI but he has not impleaded Mr. Phool Chand, ASI as a party respondent, which is necessary and without the reply of Mr. Phool Chand, ASI, he (Mr. Phool Chand, ASI) cannot be held responsible. The impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities are perfectly legal and warrant no interference of this Court. 6. The petitioner in reply to the writ petition filed a rejoinder in which he controverted the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the respondents and submitted that the order of penalty (Annexure-5) is a non- speaking and unreasoned order and same has been passed without applying the judicious mind. It has also been submitted that the Appellate Authority has committed the same mistake which has been committed by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner in the rejoinder filed by him has replied to the preliminary objection that Mr. Phool Chand, ASI is not a necessary party because it was obligation on the part of the respondents to have called the explanation from Mr. Phool Chand, ASI, which they have failed. The petitioner in the rejoinder filed by him has replied to the preliminary objection that Mr. Phool Chand, ASI is not a necessary party because it was obligation on the part of the respondents to have called the explanation from Mr. Phool Chand, ASI, which they have failed. The counsel further submitted that only the petitioner has been held guilty of supervisory negligence, whereas no one else has been held guilty of any misconduct or negligence. 7. Considered the submissions advanced by both the counsels appearing for the respective parties and scanned and scrutinized the entire material made available to the Court including the judgments cited. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised an issue that once the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner under Rule 16/18 of the Rules of 1958 and the amended Rules of 1983 and lateron after hearing the petitioner it has been concluded that the charges leveled against the petitioner do not find any malicious intention and thereafter for the same charges the respondent- Authority cannot issued a charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules. 9. As per the facts available on the record, the petitioner was initially issued a charge-sheet on 21.02.2005 under Rule 16/18 of the Rules of 1958 and amended Rules of 1983 alleging four charges. The respondent-Authority vide order dated 11.05.2005 (Annex.3) held that there is no necessity for a detailed inquiry into the charges as there is no malicious intention of the petitioner and thereafter issued a fresh charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules with words to words same charges. If the respondent- Authority does not find any malicious intention of the petitioner after hearing the petitioner as regards the charges leveled against him vide charge-sheet dated 21.02.2005, issuing the charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules for the same charges, seems to be unjustified. By issuing a fresh charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules after dropping the proceedings under Rule 16/18 of the Rules of 1958 and amended Rules of 1983 for the same charges, shows the intention of the respondents that they are avoiding a detailed inquiry for the charge-sheet under Rule 16/18 of the Rules of 1958 and amended Rules of1958. 10. 10. In the case of Gurparkash Singh (s), as referred by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed in paras 4, 6 and 7 as under:- “ 4. Mr. S.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that if a charge sheet has been issued then lateron minor penalty cannot be imposed without following the procedure prescribed for imposition of minor penalty. He has further submitted that in the instant case there is a complete departure from this principle which vitiates the whole proceedings. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgement of this Court in the case of Ch. Manphool Singh (supra). Learned counsel has also argued that for a major penalty for which charge sheet had been issued, it was incumbent on the competent authority to order departmental enquiry where the petitioner could have inspected the records, cross-examine the witnesses and brought his version before the Enquiry Officer. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the controversy raised in the instant petition is fully covered by the ratio of the judgement rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. K.G. Tiwari v. State of Haryana and others 2002(4) SLR 329 wherein it has been held that once a charge sheet has been issued then a regular departmental enquiry is required to be held even for inflicting a minor penalty. The view taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court has been approved by the Full Bench in Dr. K.G. Tiwari's case (supra). The rationale of the Full Bench in Dr. K.G. Tiwari's case (supra) appears to be that the State Government cannot take shelter behind the provision providing for minor penalty by avoiding to hold departmental enquiry for the fear of lack of evidence. Therefore, the possibility of not proving the charge cannot result into infliction of minor penalty. The observations made by the Full Bench in para 24 reads thus: “….. Therefore, the possibility of not proving the charge cannot result into infliction of minor penalty. The observations made by the Full Bench in para 24 reads thus: “….. In a case where a charge sheet is issued under Rule 7 for the imposition of a major penalty, if the disciplinary authority, after receiving the reply to the charge sheet, finds that there is no material against the chargesheeted employee and therefore, after holding of a regular enquiry, it will not be in a position to punish the chargesheeted employee, but still, for its own reasons wants to impose some punishment on him, then, the disciplinary authority will chose to adopt the methodology of dropping the procedure contemplated under Rule 7 and simply state that the explanation of the chargesheeted employee has been considered, and impose a minor punishment. This is not the object of having two different sets of procedures in the form of Rule 7 and Rule 8. The object of prescribing these rules for holding disciplinary proceedings is to protect the chargesheeted employee from arbitrary and capricious exercise of power by disciplinary authority and from unjust and illegal punishments. These Rules are intended to safeguard the rights of such chargesheeted employees and to comply with the principles of natural justice.” 7. In view of the above enunciation of law laid down in Dr. K.G. Tiwari's case (supra), the impugned order is violative of the principles laid down therein. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Order dated 6.4.1989 (P.8) is quashed.” 11. Another issue raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Reviewing Authority are not speaking orders and same do not disclose any reasons for coming to the conclusion that the present petitioner is guilty of the charges leveled against him. 12. After issuance of the charge-sheet on 11.05.2005, the petitioner filed a detailed explanation running into 12 pages. 13. The Disciplinary Authority vide its order dated 02.08.2005 (Annex.5) held that the charges leveled against the petitioner are found to be proved. The Disciplinary Authority after quoting the charges and explanation, in brief, held that charges are proved against the petitioner and observed as under:- 14. 13. The Disciplinary Authority vide its order dated 02.08.2005 (Annex.5) held that the charges leveled against the petitioner are found to be proved. The Disciplinary Authority after quoting the charges and explanation, in brief, held that charges are proved against the petitioner and observed as under:- 14. Aggrieved by the punishment order, the petitioner preferred a detailed memo of appeal raising all the grounds giving explanation to the charges leveled against him and also raised a ground that the Disciplinary Authority is also required to give reasons for recording the findings as regards the fact that the charges are proved. The Appellate Authority after quoting the charges and the grounds raised in the memo, in brief, observed that only supervisory negligence of the petitioner is there and modified the order of penalty from withholding of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect to withholding of one annual grade increment without cumulative effect. The order and the observations made by the Appellate Court are quoted as under:- The Appellate Authority has observed that the petitioner has taken due care and soon after receiving the information sent Mr. Phool Chand, ASI for verification and also issued instructions on Wireless for medical aid. The said observations go to show that the charges against the petitioner are baseless. Even then the Appellate Authority in-stead of setting aside the punishment order modified it. The Appellate Authority has also given the reasons regarding its findings. 15. The petitioner then preferred a review petition raising all his grounds to show his innocence and also raised the legal ground that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority has not passed the reasoned and speaking order. 16. The Reviewing Authority dismissed the review petition without due application of mind and without assigning any reasons to the grounds raised by the petitioner in the review petition. 17. It is the basic principle of service jurisprudence that whenever an adverse order to an employee is passed, there should be due application of mind and should have recorded the reasons for coming to the conclusion and those reasons should also show that there is due application of mind as regards the explanation and the submissions of the employee. 18. It is the basic principle of service jurisprudence that whenever an adverse order to an employee is passed, there should be due application of mind and should have recorded the reasons for coming to the conclusion and those reasons should also show that there is due application of mind as regards the explanation and the submissions of the employee. 18. In the case of Pratap Singh (supra), as referred by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the Coordinate Bench of the Principal Seat at Jodhpur, in paras 7,8, 12 and 13 has observed as under:- “ 7. From perusing Annex. P/3, it appears that the Disciplinary Authority after mentioning the charge levelled against the petitioner and the reply of the petitioner, in the heading "judgment" observed that perused the reply of the petitioner, record of the case and enquiry report of the SHO and looking to the facts disclosed during personal hearing by four witnesses pertaining to the incident dated 17.3.1995, it is well proved that the petitioner misbehaved with Prem Narain Vishnoi, retired Dy. S.P. and thus, he imposed the punishment of withholding of three annual grade increments without cumulative effect upon the petitioner. This order Annex. P/3 does not controvert any of the submission raised by the petitioner in his reply Annex. P/2 nor does it say that the petitioner misbehaved with Prem Narain Vishnoi, retired Dy. S.P. in a drunken condition , though the charge against the petitioner was that on 17.3.1995 while he was in a drunken condition, he misbehaved with Prem Narian Vishnoi, retired Dy. S.P. Thus, the order Annex. P/3, in my considered opinion, is not a speaking order and no reasons whatsoever have been assigned in it for holding the petitioner guilty of the charge levelled against him. 8. Similarly, the order Annex. P/5 dated 4.9.1995 passed by the Appellate Authority (respondent No. 2 Dy. Inspector General of Police, Bikaner Range, Bikaner) is not a speaking order and no reasons have been assigned in it, except that the charge levelled against the petitioner is proved from the record. There is no discussion of any matter pertaining to the record and the appeal was dismissed. 12. The order of punishment which is passed in quasi-judicial proceedings must contain some reasons. There is no discussion of any matter pertaining to the record and the appeal was dismissed. 12. The order of punishment which is passed in quasi-judicial proceedings must contain some reasons. Mere recording of conclusions is not sufficient for compliance of the requirement of principles of natural justice as well as Rule 14 of the CCA Rules. Merely recording one line conclusion that after going through the record, the charges levelled against the delinquent official are fully proved is not sufficient. The order must contain reasons, which could show application of mind and which could disclose mental application of the competent authority to the contents of the inquiry report and connected record. Apart from this, points raised by the delinquent official in the representation must be considered by the competent authority and good and sufficient reasons must be recorded as to why they were not being acted upon. In this respect, the decisions of this Court in Ramdeo Singh v. R.S.R.T.C. and Ors. WLR 1992 (5) Raj. 696 and Narain Singh v. State of Raj. and Anr. RLR 1992 (1) 558 may be referred to. 13. Placing reliance on the above rulings, if the legality and propriety of the impugned orders Annex. P/3 and Annex. P/5 are examined, it clearly appears that the respondent No. 1 Superintendent of Police, Churu (Disciplinary Authority), who passed the order Annex. P/3 dated 26.6.1995, has mentioned in it charge as well as reply filed by the petitioner, but under heading "judgment" no discussion was made by him and he merely recorded one line conclusion that after going through the reply of the petitioner, record of the case, inquiry report of the SHO and the facts disclosed by the four witnesses pertaining to the incident dated 17.3.1995, the charge levelled against the petitioner was fully proved. It does not controvert the submissions raised by the petitioner through his reply Annex. P/2 and it is not clear what documents he perused and on what basis he drawn the conclusion that the charge against the petitioner was proved. That order does not indicate any reason, which could show application of mind and which could disclose mental application of mind of Disciplinary Authority to the contents of the inquiry report and connected record. Thus, the order Annex. P/3 is not a speaking order and no reasons whatsoever have been assigned in it.” 19. That order does not indicate any reason, which could show application of mind and which could disclose mental application of mind of Disciplinary Authority to the contents of the inquiry report and connected record. Thus, the order Annex. P/3 is not a speaking order and no reasons whatsoever have been assigned in it.” 19. In the case of Ramdeo Singh (supra), as referred by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in the head-notes, it has been observed as under:- “(iii) Non-speaking order & principles of natural justice. The order of punishment which is passed in quasi-judicial proceedings, must contain reasons. Mere recording of conclusions is not sufficient for compliance of the requirement of principles of natural justice. Merely recording one line conclusion that after careful perusal of the inquiry report and the connected papers. The charges levelled against the petitioner delinquent are fully proved. The order does not indicate any reason, which could show application of mind and which could disclose mental application of the competent authority to the contents of the inquiry report and connected record. This is only possible only if specific reasons for recording finding of guilt has been recorded by the competent authority and communicated the same to the petitioner. Mere recording of conclusion is not sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice so far as require-All quasi-judicial orders must contain reasons and bald conclusion of guilt recorded cannot be considered as sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice.” 20. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Narain Singh Rawat v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 1992 (1) RLR 538 , has observed as under:- "11. Even otherwise the impugned order dated 23.1.84 is not sustainable from any point of view. The proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under Rule 17 of 1958 Rules. In response to the notice issued by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes the petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 21.12.83. He was then called upon to submit medical certificate, prescription and bills of medicines. The petitioner submitted the certificate of Doctor on 16.1.84. However, without giving any reason the disciplinary authority has held that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory. None of the facts which have been mentioned in the reply has even been adverted by the Commissioner before passing the order of punishment. 12. Rule 17 of 1958 Rules reads as under- 17. However, without giving any reason the disciplinary authority has held that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory. None of the facts which have been mentioned in the reply has even been adverted by the Commissioner before passing the order of punishment. 12. Rule 17 of 1958 Rules reads as under- 17. Procedure for imposing minor penalties - No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clause (i) and (iii) of rule 14 shall be passed except after: (a) The Government Servant is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken and given an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make; (aa) holding an enquiry, in the manner laid down in Rule 16, in every case, in which it is proposed to with–hold increments of pay for a period exceeding three years, or with cumulative effect for any period or so as to adversely affect the amount of pension payable to him or in which the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary; (b) such representation, if any submitted by the Government Servant under clause (a), and the record of enquiry, if any, held under clause (aa), is taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority; (c) an opportunity of personal hearing is given by the Disciplinary Authority to the Government Servant to explain his case, if so desired by him; (d) The Commission is consulted in cases where such consultation is necessary. (2) The record of proceedings in such cases shall include:– (i) a copy of the intimation to the Government Servant of the proposal to take action against him; (ii) a copy of the statement of allegations communicated to him; (iii) his representation, if any; (iv) the evidence produced during the enquiry; (v) the findings of each allegation; (vi) the advice of the Commission, if any; (vii) the orders on the cases together with the reasons therefore. A bare look at Rule 17(1) (b) shows that the competent authority is required to take into consideration representations, if any, made by the Govt. servant. The word 'consideration' implies of objective application of mind by the competent authority. This objective application of mind must be manifested in the order of punishment itself. A bare look at Rule 17(1) (b) shows that the competent authority is required to take into consideration representations, if any, made by the Govt. servant. The word 'consideration' implies of objective application of mind by the competent authority. This objective application of mind must be manifested in the order of punishment itself. In other words, the order of punishment passed on the basis of a notice issued under Rule 17 must be a speaking order i.e., it must contain reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority or any other competent authority holds that the allegation/s levelled against the Govt. servant have been proved and for good reasons a particular punishment has been imposed. Rule 14 of 1958 Rules begins with the words "the following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, which shall be recorded and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government Servant......". Therefore, before any penalty can be imposed, it is a statutory obligation of the disciplinary authority to record reasons and such reasons must be good and sufficient. This requirement is applicable in all cases where any of the punishments specified in Rule 14 is imposed on the government servant. Recording of good and sufficient reasons constitute a condition precedent for imposition of a punishment. If the word 'consideration' as used in Rule 17(1)(b) is read with the opening words of Rule 14, it becomes clear that the competent authority must take a decision for imposition of any of the penalties specified in Rule 14 only after it feels convinced with (sic that) the explanation submitted by a government servant is not satisfactory and that there are good and sufficient reasons for imposing a penalty while recording of reasons is provided by the Rule itself, principles of natural justice warrant that such reasons must be communicated to the delinquent. It is significant to note that the government servant has a statutory right of appeal against the order of punishment under Rule 23 of the 1958 Rules. If the order of punishment does not contain reasons, much less good and sufficient reasons, the government servant is seriously handicapped in submitting his appeal. At the same-time, the appellate authority is deprived of an opportunity to examine the appeal with reference to the requirements of Rule 23(2) of the 1958 Rules. If the order of punishment does not contain reasons, much less good and sufficient reasons, the government servant is seriously handicapped in submitting his appeal. At the same-time, the appellate authority is deprived of an opportunity to examine the appeal with reference to the requirements of Rule 23(2) of the 1958 Rules. Unless reasons are communicated to the delinquent employee so that he can effectively assail that order in appeal the right of appeal conferred upon the Govt. servant will be reduced to farce. In Gujarat Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai . A Full Bench of Gujarat High Court had an occasion to examine the requirements of passing of a speaking order by a quasi judicial authority. After examining the American and English Law on the subject Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) observed that recording of reasons and communication thereof constitute an integral part of the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships observed that merely by giving reasons or by keeping silence the quasi judicial authority cannot frustrate or stultify the power of judicial review vest on the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution and on the Supreme Court under Art. 137 of the Constitution. There has been several decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of speaking orders but it would be sufficient to refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India wherein a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has after examination of almost all earlier decisions of the Supreme Court stated thus- "39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. 40. We may now come to the second part of the question, namely, whether the confirming authority is required to record its reasons for confirming the finding and sentence of the court- martial and the Central Government or the competent authority entitled to deal with the post-confirmation petition is required to record its reasons for the order passed by it on such petition. For that purpose it will be necessary to determine whether the Act or the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') expressly or by necessary implication dispense with the requirement of recording reasons. For that purpose it will be necessary to determine whether the Act or the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') expressly or by necessary implication dispense with the requirement of recording reasons. We propose to consider this aspect in a broader perspective to include the findings and sentences of the court-martial and examine whether reasons are required to be recorded at the stage of (i) recording of findings and sentence by the court-martial (ii) confirmation of the findings and sentence of the court-material and (iii)consideration of post-confirmation petition." 13. In the case of minor penalty this Court has in Vedpal Krishna Dheer v. The State of Rajasthan and another held that the disciplinary authority is required to record and communicate the reasons to the delinquent even in the cases where punishment specified in Rule 14(i) and (ii) is imposed. In addition to what has been held in Vedpal Krishna Dheer's case, I would observe that even the Court is entitled to examine on merits whether the reasons given by the disciplinary authority for imposing a particular punishment are legally sustainable or not and as to whether there is sufficient justification for imposition of a particular penalty. By failing to record reasons or by failing to communicate the same to the delinquent, the disciplinary authority cannot take away the right of employees to seek effective judicial review of the order of penalty." 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer, Kathagudem & Ors. v. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469 , has observed in para 19 as under:- "19. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also having regard to the detailed manner in which the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had dealt with the matter, including the explanation given regarding the disbursement of the money received by the respondent, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal and endorsed by the High Court. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. He too did not consider the defence case as made out by the respondent herein and simply endorsed the punishment of dismissal though reducing it to removal from service." 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Vashney & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 240 in para 9 has observed as under:- "9. No doubt, in S. N. Mukherjee's case (supra), it has been observed that: (SCC p. 613, para 36) “..The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.” The above observation, in our opinion, really means that the order of affirmance need not contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority." 23. This Court in the case of Raghuveer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 Supreme (Rajasthan), has observed in paras 23 and 24 as under:- "23. The basic feature of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 is that the concerned Disciplinary Authority before passing order imposing penalty of ‘Censure’ has to disclose the petitioner the intention of the authorities of initiating disciplinary action against him i.e. by issuing a charge-sheet giving out the details of the allegations and has to be given an opportunity to make any representation, meaning-thereby the delinquent person is to be given an opportunity of submitting explanation for the allegations levelled against him. The intention of Rule Framing Authorities while making Rule 17, from the language of the Rule, very clearly is of the view that before taking any action against a Government servant he should be informed and the intention of disciplinary action against him by disclosing the allegations against him and allowing an opportunity to submit his explanation to the allegations and only thereafter the order imposing penalty can be passed if after considering the allegations levelled against the Government servant and the explanation submitted by that Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority comes to the conclusion that allegations against the Government servant are found to be proved based on the material available on record to support the allegations. The satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority is to be disclosed in the order imposing the penalty by a speaking order i.e. by giving reasons for not accepting the explanation submitted by the Government servant discussing the material allegations which could prove or disprove the allegations. Disciplinary Authority merely stating that the explanation submitted by the Government servant is not satisfactory, is not sufficient of the Rule 14. In view of the language of Rule 14, the Disciplinary Authority is under an obligation to make an observation giving out the reasons for not accepting the explanation submitted by the petitioner. In the present case the petitioner has submitted explanation with the specific averments which have not been even discussed by the Disciplinary Authority in the order imposing the penalty. The provision in rules for allowing opportunity to show cause and hearing also includes that the explanation and submission made during personal hearing should be considered mindfully by giving reasons. 24. On perusal of the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and Reviewing Authority, it is found that the order shave been passed on the same pattern as has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority without disclosing and giving out the reasons in not accepting the explanation of the petitioner. 24. This Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Agarwal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14908/2016) decided on January 13 2026, has observed in paras 24 and 25 as under:- “24. On consideration of the law cited and referred to above and the relevant rules, this Court fully agrees with the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the petitioner. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14908/2016) decided on January 13 2026, has observed in paras 24 and 25 as under:- “24. On consideration of the law cited and referred to above and the relevant rules, this Court fully agrees with the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority or the Reviewing Authority is under an obligation to pass a reasoned and speaking order giving out good and sufficient reasons for imposing the penalty because it is a mandate of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 which governs the disciplinary proceedings. Since this Court has already observed that the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority is lacking good and sufficient reasons for recording the findings of guilty imposing the penalty upon the petitioner. Merely saying that the authority passing the order has made due application of mind in the facts and circumstances of this case, is not sufficient when the Officer of the Department in his comments has already observed that the punishment order deserves to be set aside giving out the specific reasons, is not sufficient. The authorities are under an obligation to specify the reasons for not accepting the explanation or the favourable comments made by the Authority of the Department. Passing any order relying upon a report which has never been disclosed to the petitioner so that he may, if requires, counter the same, is also violative of principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice demands that before passing any adverse order against a government servant, he must know what is being relied upon against him so that he may have full opportunity to counter the same. The Appellate Authority after having personal hearing of the petitioner has called a report from the Director General of Police and in response to that the Dy. Inspector General of Police (Vigilance), sent a report and both the things i.e. calling of report and submitting of the report were never disclosed to the petitioner and relying upon the said report for dismissing the appeal is also a gross violation of principles of natural justice. 25. Inspector General of Police (Vigilance), sent a report and both the things i.e. calling of report and submitting of the report were never disclosed to the petitioner and relying upon the said report for dismissing the appeal is also a gross violation of principles of natural justice. 25. In view of the discussion made above, this Court can safely held that the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority are non-speaking, unreasoned, illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and therefore, the same deserve to be quashed and set aside.” 25. Having gone through the impugned orders, which in the opinion of the Court, are unreasonable and non- speaking orders as they do not disclose that the authorities passing the orders impugned have made due application of mind and taking into consideration the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the High Court, as quoted above, this Court can safely held that the orders impugned are non-speaking, unreasonable, illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and therefore, they deserve to be quashed and set aside. 26. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The impugned orders dated 02.08.2005 (Annex.5), 26.07.2006 (Annex.7) and12.02.2008 (Annex.10) are quashed and set aside. 27. Consequences to follow. 28. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the stay application and pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.