ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 15.01.2025 (Annexure-15), whereby the petitioner’s claim for fixation of salary, pay, and other consequential benefits was rejected. The petitioner also sought a direction to the respondents to regularize and confirm his services on the post of Teacher, Grade-III, from the date of his initial appointment, along with all consequential benefits. 2. The sum and substance of the case of the petitioner is that he was initially appointed to the post of Teacher, Grade-III in the office of Panchayat Samiti, Bhadesar, District Chittorgarh, on 31.08.1970. Subsequently, vide order dated 15.09.1971, the petitioner was appointed on an urgent temporary basis at the Primary School, Bordiya. Thereafter, the petitioner participated in the selection process conducted by Panchayat Samiti, Arnod, for the post of Teacher and was declared successful. Vide proceedings dated 30.06.1972, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Teacher, Grade-III on probation for a period of two years, and he joined his duties on 01.07.1972. The District Collector, Chittorgarh, in pursuance of the Standing Committee meeting held on 16.01.1976, vide letter dated 12.03.1976, confirmed the services of the petitioner upon completion of probation, treating his appointment as effective from 20.09.1971. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that his appointment to the post of Teacher, Grade-III was wrongly reckoned as 20.09.1971 instead of 31.08.1970. In effect, the petitioner seeks regularization of his services from the date he was initially appointed on an urgent temporary basis. The proceedings of the District Collector, Chittorgarh, dated 12.03.1976, clearly indicate that the petitioner’s date of appointment was taken as 20.09.1971 and not 31.08.1970. The petitioner retired from service upon attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2008, and his pension was fixed on the basis of the appointment date of 20.09.1971. However, the petitioner has been making representations before the respondent authorities to rectify the discrepancy in pay fixation. According to the petitioner, his date of appointment ought to be reckoned as 31.08.1970 and not 20.09.1971. 4. By the impugned proceedings, the respondent authorities rejected the petitioner’s claim to reckon his date of appointment as 31.08.1970 instead of 20.09.1971. The service record of the petitioner reflects his initial appointment to the substantive post as 20.09.1971. According to the petitioner, his date of appointment ought to be reckoned as 31.08.1970 and not 20.09.1971. 4. By the impugned proceedings, the respondent authorities rejected the petitioner’s claim to reckon his date of appointment as 31.08.1970 instead of 20.09.1971. The service record of the petitioner reflects his initial appointment to the substantive post as 20.09.1971. Although an endorsement in the last pay certificate indicates that the petitioner had worked in Panchayat Samiti, Bhadesar, such endorsement was treated as doubtful in nature and was therefore not relied upon. 5. The case of the respondents is that the pay fixation and pension granted to the petitioner were rightly determined on the basis of his service record, wherein his initial appointment to the regular cadre post was reckoned as 20.09.1971. The petitioner’s claim for confirmation of service for the period prior to his appointment to the substantive post cannot be considered, as such service was rendered only on an urgent temporary basis. Furthermore, the service tenure rendered by the petitioner prior to his appointment on the substantive post cannot be agitated at this belated stage. The petitioner’s claim for regularization of service for the period from 31.08.1970 to 20.09.1971 cannot be entertained after a lapse of more than 40 years, particularly when such claim had already been rejected by the District Collector, Chittorgarh, in the year 1976. Had the petitioner been aggrieved by the said order of the District Collector, he ought to have challenged it at the relevant time in 1976. The alleged discrepancy pointed out by the petitioner arises solely from his claim that the date of appointment should be treated as 31.08.1970 instead of 20.09.1971. The pay fixation and pensionary benefits were correctly granted by treating the appointment date as 20.09.1971, and there is no error in such calculation if the appointment date is so reckoned. Therefore, they prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner at admission stage. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manoj Khandelwal & ors. Vs. State of Raj. & Ors. [D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3446/2017] decided on 08.02.2018. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner at admission stage. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manoj Khandelwal & ors. Vs. State of Raj. & Ors. [D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3446/2017] decided on 08.02.2018. It is also his submission that the respondents have unjustly denied the regularization of the petitioner’s service rendered prior to his appointment to the substantive post, which was on an urgent temporary basis, despite the fact that such recruitment was made by following due process. According to the petitioner, the date of appointment ought to have been taken as 31.08.1970 and not 20.09.1971. 8. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and carefully perused the material on record. 9. The issue involved in the present writ petition is regularization of services allegedly rendered by the petitioner on urgent temporary basis by virtue of appointment order dated 31.08.1970 by the Panchayat Samiti, Bhadesar, Distt. Chittorgarh. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed to the substantive post vide order dated 15.09.1971 and that he assumed charge on 20.09.1971. However, the petitioner claimed that his appointment order was dated 31.08.1970. The proceedings of the District Collector dated 12.03.1976 clearly demonstrate that the Standing Committee took a decision on 16.01.1976 treating the petitioner’s appointment to the post of Teacher, Grade-III as having been made on 20.09.1971. These proceedings of the District Collector were never challenged. Furthermore, the petitioner never set up any case for regularization prior to his retirement, i.e., on 31.10.2008. The petitioner raised such a claim for regularization for the first time only after his pay was fixed and pension was granted in the year 2008. The petitioner thereafter made various representations to the authorities requesting them to treat his date of appointment as 31.08.1970 instead of 20.09.1971. Even assuming that the petitioner’s claim is meritorious and he is entitled to regularization of the service rendered on an urgent temporary basis, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 10. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of Apex Court rendered in the case of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 883. 10. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of Apex Court rendered in the case of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 883. The relevant para 21 of the said judgment reads hereunder:- 21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by fi ling a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 “Delay, laches and acquiescence” 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles fi nd place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. “Laches” 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff , while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (Emphasis supplied) (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301 “36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. xxx 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 ] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 ] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC 417 (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC 417 (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury’s Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 12-13) “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part. (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant’s part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for fi ling the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have fi led writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107 ] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justifi ed in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34 ] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and 419 express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the fi ling of the appeal, and not for the period post fi ling of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. From close reading of the above decision, it is clear that where there is unreasonable delay and negligence in pursuing a claim involving equitable relief, such a claim is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. However, there is an exception to this principle. The exception applies where there is a continuing wrong. There is a further exception to this exception: even in cases of delay, relief may be granted if such relief does not affect the rights of third parties. In the present case, the petitioner seeks regularization of service rendered on an urgent temporary basis. Grant of such relief would inevitably give rise to similar claims by other similarly situated persons and would also affect the seniority of other employees. Thus, it would have consequences on the rights of third parties. The writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of acquiescence. The Collector’s order dated 12.03.1976 fixed the petitioner’s appointment date as 20.09.1971. The petitioner acquiesced in this order and never raised any claim for regularization of the service rendered on an urgent temporary basis. The judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Manoj Kumar Khandelwal (cited supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. In view of the above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. 13. In the circumstances, no order as to costs. 14. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.