JUDGMENT : GITA GOPI, J. 1. The State aggrieved by the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.01.1998 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Junagadh in Sessions Case No.116 of 1996, filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’). 2. The trial against three accused was under section 302 and 114 of Indian Penal Code (for short I.P.C.) and under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act (for short B.P. Act). The complaint was filed by Labhuben wife of Dhirajlal Mauajibhai stating that she along with her husband and children were residing separately from the in-laws at Khorasa (Gir) in the house which had come in their share and were deriving their livelihood through agriculture work. She stated that her father- in-law and mother-in-law were staying separately in their own house. Her husband and father-in-law both were looking after the agriculture work. Her father-in-law Mauajibhai since long time was suffering from T.B. and for his treatment her husband had taken him at Jithri village after ‘Bhim Agyaras’ and her husband had stayed in the dispensary for the treatment of father-in-law. 2.1 The complainant, earlier on 22.06.1995 had lodged FIR alleging that after completing her household work she had gone to father-in-law’s house, where her father-in-law and elder father-in-law, who since long time was lonely, were present in the house. She was doing domestic work; at that time, the elder father-in-law Devrajbhai had come with bhala stick and had asked her why she had come there; she replied that it was her father-in-law’s house. According to the complainant, the elder father-in-law Devraj got excited and started abusing her by using foul expression and thereafter, had given blow with Bhala stick, and to protect herself she sat down, the blow therefore caused injuries on the upper part of the left ear towards the head elder father-in-law thereafter had given her kick and fist blows, and she had received injuries on the left shoulder. Therefore, she started shouting and the neighbours Bhika Premji and his wife and Jayanti Puja came there and rescued her. At that time, Devraj pushed her and threatened that if she would come in between she would be done away with life. 2.2 According to the complainant, this incident had occurred at about 11:00 in the afternoon. Therefore, she started shouting and the neighbours Bhika Premji and his wife and Jayanti Puja came there and rescued her. At that time, Devraj pushed her and threatened that if she would come in between she would be done away with life. 2.2 According to the complainant, this incident had occurred at about 11:00 in the afternoon. Thereafter, she went home and then visited her paternal aunt’s house and informed her about the incident. She along with the paternal aunt Puriben were heading for giving the complaint, at that time, the paternal aunt’s son Vithalbhai Bhimji met her to whom she also narrated the incident, who also joined her to give the complaint dated 22.06.1995 under sections 321, 504 and 506(2) I.P.C. The accused was Patel Devraj Ambabhai, the accused No.1 of the present matter. 2.3 The complaint with regard to the incident dated 14.09.1995 of Labhuben wife of deceased Dhirajlal Mavabhai Patel, which had put accused on trial, was with the allegation that accused No.1 – Devabhai Ambabhai, who is the elder paternal uncle of deceased Dhirajlal Mauajibhai and accused No.2, the step mother and accused No.3, the daughter of step mother, all were often asking deceased about their share from the land, which deceased was cultivating in the elder paternal uncle’s land. On 14.09.1995, all the accused at about 7:00 in the evening, when deceased and complainant Labhuben were heading towards their old house carrying the fodder in the cart and were on the backyard of the house to tie the cattle, at that time, all three accused with the common intention came there and with knife caused fatal injury to deceased Dhirajlal Mauajibhai, to be charged for the offence under Section 302 and 114 of the I.P.C. The cause she stated that since Devabhai and step mother Dudhiben were not allowed to cultivate the land, keeping that grudge and to usurp the land the assault was made by all three persons. 3. Learned APP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt submitted that the learned Trial Court Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the eye witnesses to the incident had given consistent version with regard to the murder. 3. Learned APP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt submitted that the learned Trial Court Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the eye witnesses to the incident had given consistent version with regard to the murder. The prosecution witness – Laxmidas @ Bhikhabhai had deposed that he had immediately come at the place of incident and had seen accused No.1 with knife in his hand and had also seen all accused running away from the place of incident. Learned APP submitted that the weapon was in the hands of accused No.1 and the corroborative evidence of Laxmidas proves the presence of accused at the place of incident. 3.1 Learned APP Ms. Bhatt submitted that Laxmidas in his deposition had clearly stated that accused No.1 had given knife blow and learned Judge, thus, was required to consider the deposition as well the dying declaration, which was supported by the deposition of prosecution witness – Dhanji Bhimji and Vajubhai. Ms. Bhatt submitted that the motive of incident also gets clear from the evidence of the Sarpanch since accused wanted to snatch away the land of the elder paternal uncle. 3.2 According to learned APP Ms. Bhatt, the learned Trial Court Judge has erred in not appreciating the evidence of the eye witnesses, which was supported by the F.S.L. report and the medical evidence of Doctor Bhimji Karsanbhai, who clearly stated the cause of injury was blow, which was found of 1¼” on the chest, which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Ms. Bhatt submitted that the contradiction, which has been noticed are minor in nature and does not go to the root of the case and thus, stated that the learned Trial Court Judge has erred in acquitting the accused. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Umang Vyas for the accused, who has been appointed through the Legal Aid Committee of the High Court, submitted that the learned Trial Court Judge has very clearly gone through the evidence of all the witnesses and had found that the motive attributed was malicious. The will in question of the elder paternal uncle was the cause and since the complainant and her husband had eye on the property of the elder paternal uncle, false case has been drawn. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Vyas submitted that the F.S.L. report does not corroborate the fact and the blood group was found not to be matching. The will in question of the elder paternal uncle was the cause and since the complainant and her husband had eye on the property of the elder paternal uncle, false case has been drawn. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Vyas submitted that the F.S.L. report does not corroborate the fact and the blood group was found not to be matching. The third person’s presence was also noted and in spite of that, the investigation has not been conducted in the right way. The Investigating Officer was not fair to bring out true facts. Mr. Vyas stated that the discovery panchnama also becomes doubtful and there has been disparity in the ocular testimony and dying declaration. The weapon, which has alleged to be used also does not get proved in the offence and the expression of the foul abuse does not get proved in the matter. 5. Having heard learned APP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt and learned advocate Mr. Umang Vyas, we perused the record and proceedings and judgment of the learned Trial Court Judge. In the impugned judgment after referring to the incident and hearing the advocates on record, the learned Trial Court Judge has verified the serological report, the panchnama and the evidence of the witnesses. The learned Trial Court Judge has concluded that it is a case of homicidal death, however, had noticed that Doctor – Bhimji Karsanbhai (P.W.1) in his testimony had recorded that on 14.09.1995 at about 9:40 in night Dhirajlal was brought to his hospital at Veraval; at that time his condition was serious and when he had inquired from him, he stated that someone had inflicted knife blow to him, and the Doctor observed that the size of the injury was 1¼” at the chest and a deep injury on the abdomen. 5.1 The injury as recorded on the abdomen was affecting the large intestine and depth of the injury was found as ½ inch. The Doctor in P.M. note has noted the cause of death as “shock due to intra-abdominal hemorrhage resulted from injuries in the liner right kidney and ascending calon by stab wound”. In the cross-examination, the Doctor could state that it was a sharp cutting weapon, which was used for causing the injury. The Doctor in P.M. note has noted the cause of death as “shock due to intra-abdominal hemorrhage resulted from injuries in the liner right kidney and ascending calon by stab wound”. In the cross-examination, the Doctor could state that it was a sharp cutting weapon, which was used for causing the injury. 5.2 Further, on elaborating the evidence of Doctor Bhimji and comparing the evidence with that of complainant Labhuben with the complaint (Exh.20), the learned Trial Court Judge observed that as per the complainant on 14.09.1995, she was heading towards her old house in the cart with fodder, and was tying the cattle in backyard and was coming out on the street to put the fodder. At that time, elder father-in-law Deva Amba, mother-in-law Dudhiben and her daughter Manjula, who were passing by the place and on seeing her husband, had come near him and asked her husband as to why he had come there and asked him to run away from the village. 5.3 According to the complainant, they started abusing and Manjulaben (A3) threatened her that so long she would be there they would not get the land for cultivation, and the complainant stated that the elder father-in-law Devabhai was also not granting them land for cultivation, therefore, all three with common intention had come there and Dudhiben (A-2) and Manjulaben (A-3) had caught hold of her husband and Devabhai (A-1) by removing a knife gave straight blow on the right side; her husband had fallen down in pool of blood while Devabhai was about to give another blow, at that time, she urged Devabhai not to beat her husband, and on hearing the outcry Dhanji Bhimji and Bhika Premji came over there and therefore, all three ran away from the place. According to the complainant the incident had occurred at about 7:00 in the evening. 5.4 The learned Trial Court Judge has noted that according to the Doctor there was only one injury. The injury was entering the stomach through the peritoneum area of the back and the intestine was found cut, and there was scratch on the rear side of the liver. In the cross-examination when the witness was confronted with muddamal knife, the Doctor had deposed about the margin of the injury. The learned Judge thus, went on to explain about the possibility of injury to be caused by the alleged muddamal. In the cross-examination when the witness was confronted with muddamal knife, the Doctor had deposed about the margin of the injury. The learned Judge thus, went on to explain about the possibility of injury to be caused by the alleged muddamal. 5.5 The Doctor in his testimony stated that the external injury was stab wound and the margins were clear cut, and in the chief-examination he stated that such injury was possible with the muddamal article no.4. While in the cross- examination, the injury was found to be possible by a weapon, which would have been double edged, and the muddamal article no.4 - knife, was observed to be single edged. Inspite of a clear suggestion that with a double edged weapon the margins and the angles would be clean, the Doctor could not affirm the same. 5.6 The learned Trial Court Judge thus, not finding the opinion of the Doctor consistent with the weapon had observed that considering the muddamal as single edged weapon and considering the injury, the margins on both the sides were clear and therefore, the learned Trial Court Judge declined to appreciate the evidence of the Doctor, hence, came to the conclusion that the injury was not because of muddamal article no.4. The prosecution failed thus to prove the weapon through which the alleged injury was stated to have been caused. 5.7 While analysing the evidence of Labhuben, learned Trial Court Judge noted that while she was carrying fodder, at that time, accused Devabhai had removed the knife and had assaulted her husband. The presence of Labhuben was also questioned by way of panchnama (Exh.24), where it was noted that the place of incident was shown by her and the time of panchnama was 7:00 to 8:00 in the morning, while according to the testimony recorded of Labhuben on 15.09.1995, in the morning till 10:00 O’ clock she was at Veraval, therefore her presence at the time of panchnama became doubtful. By way of cross-examination, it had come on record that at the time of incident, they were staying at the rental house far from accused Devabhai’s house. Therefore, the fact of coming with fodder in the cart to the old house was also not believed on the ground that when the incident had taken place, actually deceased was not staying there. Therefore, the fact of coming with fodder in the cart to the old house was also not believed on the ground that when the incident had taken place, actually deceased was not staying there. 5.8 The panchnama of the knife was drawn at Exh.46 and the learned Trial Court Judge observed that the serological report is in negative, it does not corroborate the fact as the blood group did not match. Further observing the cross-examination of the Doctor, the learned Trial Court Judge concluded that the weapon, as was sent for serological examination was not the same alleged to be used in the incident. 5.9 Further, the fact of the complainant going in the cart to their old house with fodder and at that time her younger brother-in-law, son and daughters were also assisting in unloading the fodder, was the evidence which had come on record, but such fact has not been noted in complaint (Exh.20). While according to the complainant after tying the cattle, her husband had left the place, at that time, the incident had occurred, while in the complaint she stated that when she had tied the cattle and when she was unloading the fodder from the cart, at that time, the incident took place. The learned Trial Court Judge found the contradiction of her statement from the panchnama, where there is no mention of the cattle being tied at the place. The presence of Labhuben thus, had become doubtful at the place of incident. 5.10 The presence of Laxmidas appears to have been brought there by concoction; his presence does not appear to be natural. The fact that deceased in his dying declaration before Laxmidas had alleged that Devabhai (A-1) had inflicted him blow, that fact does not find place in the complaint of Labhuben, nor presence of Laxmidas had been noted in the complaint, thus, it was not believed. In the same way, the learned Trial Court Judge was not ready to believe the version that two women had caught deceased, for the reason that deceased being a man would have certainly tried to release himself from their clutches, and the fact that he had not even tried to escape while Devabhai was inflicting blow and was merely standing there till the time Devabhai would inflict the knife blow was found to be exaggerating, the circumstances was not believable. Even, the learned Judge opined that Labhuben being a woman she could have also restrained two other women and therefore the act was observed to be dramatic. 6. The deposition of P.W.3 – Laxmidas Bhimjibhai, who had come to the place of incident after hearing the outcry, was not believed to be a natural witness. According to him, after hearing the loud noise he had gone to the house of Devraj and at that place, he found the presence of Devraj Amba, Dudhiben Mava and Manjulaben Mavabhai. The wife Labhuben and two daughters of deceased Dhirajlal were present there and the younger brother-in-law Jaman’s presence was also deposed by the witness. According to the witness, Devrajbhai had knife in his hand, which was of black colour handle, and he had seen deceased in the field in a pool of blood. The presence of this witness has not been recorded in the complaint. The observation of the witness of the handle being black in colour, the learned Judge has found the description unbelievable, as it would be almost dark at about 6:30 evening. 6.1 Observing the dying declaration, the contradiction of the complaint was noted, where the witness stated that when he had gone in the backyard, he stated that Devabhai had given him knife blow at the side of his body and it was paining, however, in the Doctor’s testimony, when he had asked about the history, deceased had not named Devabhai inflicting him the knife blow. While in deposition of the Doctor, it came on record that deceased had informed him that some unknown person had given him the knife blow. While Haribhai, Jayantibhai Puja, Bachubhai Ugabhai and Rudabhai, they have not stated that it was Devabapa, who had given the knife blow. 6.2 Referring to the serological report along with knife and blood stains, the blood group was found to be different. Further, the panchas had recorded that at the place of incident, there were nails and blood stains. The witness Narendrabhai stated that it has not occurred that if the panchas could have given the description of the place and he had not recorded so in his sketch. The discrepancies in the panchnama and the sketch was also recorded. Further, the panchas had recorded that at the place of incident, there were nails and blood stains. The witness Narendrabhai stated that it has not occurred that if the panchas could have given the description of the place and he had not recorded so in his sketch. The discrepancies in the panchnama and the sketch was also recorded. The deposition of Labhuben with that of dying declaration, the learned Judge has observed that deceased had not referred to the presence of two women, who alleged to have caught hold of him and thus, found the case unbelievable. 6.3 Further observing the deposition of P.W.4 – Babubhai, the testimony was appreciated to the effect that prior to the incident, Dhirubhai had met him. P.W.4 was a Sarpanch for about two years of Kharasa village and according to him when Dhirubhai had met him, he stated that since his father had died so had asked for assistance of the Sarpanch for partition of the property in the Panchayat, stating that his elder paternal uncle would usurp his land. It was further stated before the Sarpanch that the elder paternal uncle Dhiru Bapuji had created a will of Jaman Nana and, therefore deceased was suspecting that it was the elder paternal uncle, who would take away his land. 7. The dispute with regard to the land was the cause and the witness Labhuben was interested in the land, where it was recorded that out of 25 Bighas, 9 Bigha land was cultivated by her, and because of the step mother, the father-in-law had asked her to get separate, and that as she had a dispute with father-in-law, a writing was executed where it was decided to give Rs.50,000/- and the witness stated that she had not received the money. Out of 25 Bighas land, 9 Bigha was cultivated by her and 16 Bigha was with Jaman. 7.1 In the further statement of the accused, they had produced photocopy of the will and had alleged that because of the enmity, they have been falsely involved. Accused No.1 was observed to be aged and ill and was not in a position to hear and was physically unable to walk. 7.1 In the further statement of the accused, they had produced photocopy of the will and had alleged that because of the enmity, they have been falsely involved. Accused No.1 was observed to be aged and ill and was not in a position to hear and was physically unable to walk. The will was directed to be put in force through the executor, his brother Devrajbhai Amba to his minor son Jamnadas after his death, which fact itself becomes clear that the land was given only to the sole son Jamnadas (Jaman). The dispute with regard to the land and the suit was also recorded. 8. After considering overall analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, the muddamal, the serological report and the dying declaration, the learned Trial Court Judge has disbelieved the prosecution case and has not found the evidence of the witnesses as truthful. 9. In the case of Bhagwan Sahai and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2016) 13 SCC 171 , it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: 8. “...Once the Court came to a finding that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and origin of the occurrence and also failed to explain the injuries on the person of the accused including death of father of the appellants, the only possible and probable course left open was to grant benefit of doubt to the appellants...” 9.1 In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 it was held as under: “41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. [ (2006) 10 SCC 313 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 546 : AIR 2006 SC 831] this Court stated : (SCC pp. 317-18, para 8) “8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court.” 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 9.2 In the case of H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, [ (2023) 9 SCC 581 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “8. In this appeal, we are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment [State of Karnataka v. H.K. Mariyappa, 2010 SCC OnLine Kar 5591] rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarised as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 9.3 In the case of Darshan Singh Vs. State of Punjab [ 2024 (3) SCC 164 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “61. State of Punjab [ 2024 (3) SCC 164 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “61. In a case of acquittal, if the trial court's view is a possible or plausible view, then the Appellate Court or the High Court would not be justified in interfering with it. It is the settled legal position that there is presumption of innocence and that presumption is further fortified with the acquittal of the accused by the trial court. The Appellate Court or the High Court would not be justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal unless it comes to a clear conclusion that the judgment of the trial court is utterly perverse and, on the basis of the evidence on record, no other view is plausible or possible than the one taken by the Appellate Court or the High Court.” 9.4 In the case of Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, it has been held as under:- “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re- appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself on the main question.” 10. In view of the analysis of the evidence on record by the learned Trial Court Judge, we do not find any perversity in the judgment. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself on the main question.” 10. In view of the analysis of the evidence on record by the learned Trial Court Judge, we do not find any perversity in the judgment. The evidence analyzed is consistent with the provisions and the conclusion reached in acquitting the accused is legal. In the result, the present Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. Bail bonds stand discharged. Record and Proceeding be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.