ORDER : BHARGAV D. KARIA, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Rohin Bhatt, appearing on behalf of learned advocate Mr.Anand M. Ranpara for the petitioner. 2. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “A. Issue a writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus calling for the records pertaining to the impugned RFP issued by the Respondent No. 1, and after going through the same, declare that the process, as laid down in the RFP document was not followed, and thus, declare the entire process as being ab initio null and void. B. Issue a writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus calling for records pertaining to the impugned RFP, and after going through the same, quash the Tender Conditions in Clause 3.2 as being arbitrary and unreasonable; C. Issue a writ, order, or direction, further directing that the Respondent No. 2 cancel the impugned RFP and invite bids afresh in line with prayers (a) and (b) herein; D. Pending the hearing and disposal of the present Special Civil Application: i. Direct Respondent No. 1 to abstain from awarding the tender, or moving forward with the tender process until the disposal of the present Special Civil Application; ii. Or in the alternate and without prejudice to the above prayer, issue a direction declaring that if Respondent No. 1 awards the tender to any bidder, the same shall be subject to the outcome of the present proceedings." 3. The brief facts of the case are as under: 3.1 The petitioner is a sole Proprietor for providing the manpower, IT and IT-enabled services for organizations and industries and has started its business operations in the year 2004 and has advanced towards adding manpower consultancy services gradually. 3.2 The respondent has issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) on 13.11.2025 regarding empanelment of agencies for providing “IT Technical Manpower” for various Government Departments/Offices, etc. 3.3 According to the petitioner, the eligibility criteria prescribed in Clause 3.2 of the tender document (RFP) provides for average turnover of the company for three tiers, namely, Tier-1 – Rs. 800 Crore or more, Tier-2 – Rs. 100 Crore or more, and Tier-3 – Rs. 3.3 According to the petitioner, the eligibility criteria prescribed in Clause 3.2 of the tender document (RFP) provides for average turnover of the company for three tiers, namely, Tier-1 – Rs. 800 Crore or more, Tier-2 – Rs. 100 Crore or more, and Tier-3 – Rs. 50 Crore or more, is absurd, as there is no rationale for prescribing such high criteria of average turnover, which is defined in Sub-Clause 6 of Clause 3.1 containing the eligibility compliance sheet. According to Sub-Clause 6 of Clause 3.1, the bidder should have an average annual turnover as per the eligibility conditions for the respective tier in any last three financial years out of the last seven years, i.e. from 2018-2019 to 2024-2025, as per the certificate issued by a Chartered Accountant. 3.4 Admittedly, the petitioner is not fulfilling the criteria of any of the tiers, as the average turnover of the petitioner is Rs. 25 Crores, as stated by the learned advocate for the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has not given any financial data or details in the petition and/or any details with regard as to why the turnover criteria prescribed in the bid document is irrational or absurd. It only appears that as the petitioner is not fulfilling the criteria, the petitioner has approached this Court by challenging the turnover criteria without any basis. It is trite law that while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Writ Court cannot sit in the seat of the employer and cannot decide as to what should be the criteria prescribed for average turnover in the bid document. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Rohin Bhatt, appearing for the petitioner, has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr ., reported in 2025 INSC 1182 , to submit that the respondent, being a State agency, is required to provide reasonable criteria within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India, because though it enjoys the freedom to prescribe conditions in the tender, the respondent could not have exercised that power in a manner that infringes upon the constitutional guarantee by closing the market to the persons like the petitioner. 5. 5. It was submitted that the turnover criteria prescribed in the impugned tender document (RFP) is irrational and absurd. 6. Learned advocate Mr.Rohin Bhatt further submitted that though the petitioner has not participated in the pre- bid meeting, the respondent has uploaded the minutes of the pre-bid meeting on the website. Learned advocate Mr. Rohin invited the attention of the Court to the minutes of the pre-bid meeting to point out that the respondent ought to have given detailed answers to the queries raised during the pre-bid meeting with regard to eligibility criteria prescribed in Clause 3.2 of RFP rather than stating that “replied in the meeting”, which has resulted in arbitrary action on the part of the respondent. 7. Having heard the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, it appears that though the petitioner has not stated any financial details or provided any data in the petition, the learned advocate for the petitioner has candidly submitted that the average turnover of the petitioner is Rs. 25 Crore and that the petitioner is not meeting any of the criteria of any of the tiers prescribed in the bid document (RFP). It appears that as the petitioner is not eligible to apply for the bid in question, the present petition is filed only with a view to slow the tender process initiated by the respondent. 8. Even otherwise, on perusal of the tender document (RFP), we are not able to find as to how the eligibility criteria for average turnover prescribed in the tender document (RFP) is irrational or absurd. Moreover, Sub- Clause 8 of the Clause 3.2 of the tender document clearly provides for resources on roll for the past one year as per each tier being 2500–500–50 respectively, and Sub-Sub Clause 8.1 of Sub-Clause 8 of the Clause 3.2 further provides for qualification as per the criteria for each tier being 500–100-25 respectively. Similarly, the work experience also commensurates with the turnover as per Sub-Clause 9 of Clause 3.2 of the eligibility conditions, which read as under: “3.2 E LIGIBILITY C ONDITION Eligibility Conditions are to be met as per the respective criteria mentioned above in the Eligibility Compliance Sheet 9. Similarly, the work experience also commensurates with the turnover as per Sub-Clause 9 of Clause 3.2 of the eligibility conditions, which read as under: “3.2 E LIGIBILITY C ONDITION Eligibility Conditions are to be met as per the respective criteria mentioned above in the Eligibility Compliance Sheet 9. Work Experience 9.1 IT Project (design, development, implementation of software application, mobile application, website development, ERP Solution Development and implementation etc / Manpower) 03(three) IT Domain projects, each of project value INR 05 Crores or more 03(three) IT Domain projects each of project value INR 50 Lakhs or more 03(three) IT Domain projects, each of project value INR 50 Lakhs or more 9. From the above details, it is emerging that the tender document has taken care of the supply of the manpower by giving opportunity to the companies having the turnover of Rs. 800 Crores, Rs. 100 Crores, and Rs. 50 Crores, respectively, for each of the tiers and only because the petitioner was not meeting the criteria of average turnover, it cannot be said that the same is either irrational or absurd. 10. The reliance placed by the learned advocate for the petitioner on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same would not be applicable to the facts of the present case because in the facts before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the issue was with regard to the conditions restricting the eligibility of the bidders by prescribing that the bidders must have supplied sports goods worth Rs. 6 Crores to State Government Agencies of Chhattisgarh in the last three financial years. Such condition was held to be contrary to Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India by the Apex Court by observing as under: “20. Such a restriction, therefore, cannot be justified as reasonable within the meaning of 19(6) of the Constitution of India. The State while it enjoys the freedom to prescribe the conditions in the tender, cannot exercise that power in a manner that infringes upon constitutional guarantees, by closing the market to outsiders without just cause. The doctrine of level playing field requires that gates of competition be opened to all who are equally placed. The State while it enjoys the freedom to prescribe the conditions in the tender, cannot exercise that power in a manner that infringes upon constitutional guarantees, by closing the market to outsiders without just cause. The doctrine of level playing field requires that gates of competition be opened to all who are equally placed. The impugned tender condition excludes the competent and experienced suppliers, who may have executed contracts of far greater magnitude in other States or for the Central Government departments, from participating in the tender and has the impact of promoting cartelisation. The impugned condition operates as a closed door to outsiders and restricts the wider participation of bidders and restricts competition. The impugned tender condition, therefore, is violative of Article 14 and also offends Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.” 11. Whereas, in the facts of the present case, the only criteria prescribed by the respondent in Clause 3.2 is with regard to the average turnover of the company, prescribing the eligibility criteria together with the work experience and the persons on roll of the concerned company, which commensurate with the requirement. Moreover, in the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , it has been held as under: “69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender: 1. It must be unconditional. 2. Must be made at the proper place. 3. Must conform to the terms of obligation. 4. Must be made at the proper time. 5. Must be made in the proper form. 6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention". 92. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention". 92. In Sterling Computers Limited v. M&N Publications Ltd. this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 455, para 12) "In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognised by courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because many of the Government Undertakings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of 'play in the joints' to the executive." 94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles. 2. Whether the selection is vitiated by arbitrariness?” 12. In view of the above dictum of law and considering the facts of the case, no case is made out by the petitioner to interfere with the tender issued by the respondent. The petition, therefore, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed.