JUDGMENT : Sachin Shankar Magadum, J. The captioned appeal is by the plaintiff assailing the order of the learned trial Court passed in O.S.No.16865/2005, wherein the suit is dismissed at threshold on the ground that the relief sought in the plaint cannot be granted and therefore, suit is dismissed as not maintainable which is now assailed by the plaintiff in the present appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and learned counsel appearing for respondent No.8/defendant No.8. Perused the records. 3. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, reiterating the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal, has vehemently contended that even assuming that prayers (i) and (ii) in the plaint were not maintainable before the Court of first instance, prayer (iii) seeking the relief of perpetual injunction required a full-fledged adjudication on merits. It is submitted that the trial Court, instead of non- suiting the plaintiff at the threshold, ought to have relegated the parties to trial and afforded an opportunity to the plaintiff to establish his entitlement to the discretionary relief of perpetual injunction. In this context, learned counsel would urge that the finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of maintainability is perverse and unsustainable in law, thereby warranting interference by this Court. He would further contend that if the doctrine of priority is applied to the facts of the case, the plaintiff’s title stands on a clear footing and, therefore, even if prayers (i) and (ii) are kept aside, the suit insofar as it relates to injunction was very much maintainable. On this premise, it is contended that the impugned order suffers from perversity and calls for interference. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for defendant No.8 supports the impugned order and submits that the same does not suffer from any illegality or material infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that the core and substantive reliefs sought in the plaint could not have been entertained by the trial Court in view of the clear bar under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On that ground, learned counsel would submit that the trial Court was justified in holding the suit to be not maintainable and, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. 5. On that ground, learned counsel would submit that the trial Court was justified in holding the suit to be not maintainable and, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, the following points arise for consideration: 1) Whether the finding recorded by the trial Court holding that the suit, in the present form, is not maintainable suffers from perversity? 2) What order? Finding on Point No.1: 6. Before this Court adverts to the order impugned, this Court deems it fit to extract the prayer sought in the plaint which reads as under: "i. To revoke the Khatha made in the name of Defendants I, II and III, herein by BMP viz., the Defendant- VI herein. ii. To direct the Defendant-VII herein to transfer Khatha in the name of the plaintiff, in respect of two plots viz., 2 plots located adjacent to each other bearing House List No.114, Khatha No.92, and House List No. 119/1, Khatha No.92, both located at Srinivagilu Village, BegurHobli, Jakkasandra Panchayat, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore and presently said area is identified as Srinivagilu, Ring Road, Kormangala, Bangalore 560 034, morefully described in the schedule written hereunder purchased by him under sale deed dated 25-08-1994 registered as Document No.3598/94-95, Book 1 Volume 3957, at pages 193-198, and under Sale Deed dated 15-07-1994 registered as Document No.2658/94-95, Book 1, Volume 3922, at pages 222-226, in the office of the Sub Registrar, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore, morefully described in the schedule written hereunder: iii. To grant permanent injunction against the Defendant I, II, III & IV interalia restraining them from compelling the plaintiff to sell the suit schedule property to the so called developer or to any person and may be further restrained from receiving any advance on behalf of the plaintiff from the intending purchaser: iv. To revoke all the agreements and writings which the defendants I, II & III have obtained from the parents and brother of the plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property: V. To grant permanent injunction against the Defendant I, II, III & IV, interalia restraining them from interfering with peaceful possession of the suit schedule Property: vi. To revoke all the agreements and writings which the defendants I, II & III have obtained from the parents and brother of the plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property: V. To grant permanent injunction against the Defendant I, II, III & IV, interalia restraining them from interfering with peaceful possession of the suit schedule Property: vi. And prays for such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, including Court costs and the Advocate's Fee and the Cost of this Litigation in the ends of justice and equity." 7. On a careful reading of prayers (i) and (ii) extracted supra, it is manifest that the plaintiff has essentially sought redressal in respect of entries relating to khata standing in the name of defendant Nos.1 to 3, which are admittedly maintained by the municipal authority, namely defendant No.8/BBMP. Such reliefs, in substance, seek revocation, alteration and transfer of khata entries. It is well settled that disputes pertaining to mutation and municipal records, particularly in respect of properties falling within the territorial jurisdiction of BBMP, are matters which fall squarely within the domain of the statutory authorities constituted under the municipal law. The Civil Court does not sit in appeal over administrative or statutory acts of municipal authorities relating to khata entries. If the plaintiff is aggrieved by the change or continuance of khata in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3, the statute itself provides an efficacious and specific remedy. In terms of Section 150 of the Greater Bengaluru Governance Act, 2024, the plaintiff has a statutory remedy before the competent authority to question such entries. Therefore, the plaintiff could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for revocation of khata, as sought under prayer (i). 8. Likewise, prayer (ii), which in effect seeks a direction or mandamus to defendant No.7 to transfer the khata in the name of the plaintiff, is equally untenable before a Civil Court. A Civil Court is not vested with the authority to issue directions to a private party or even to a municipal authority to effect transfer of khata, particularly when such transfer is governed by a complete statutory mechanism. A Civil Court is not vested with the authority to issue directions to a private party or even to a municipal authority to effect transfer of khata, particularly when such transfer is governed by a complete statutory mechanism. The relief sought under prayer (ii) clearly travels beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and trenches upon the exclusive domain of the statutory authority empowered to consider title documents and effect mutation in accordance with law. If the plaintiff asserts that he has acquired valid right, title and interest under registered sale deeds, his remedy lies in approaching the competent authority under the relevant municipal enactment and not by instituting a civil suit seeking directions which the Civil Court is not competent to grant. 9. Though some force is sought to be attached to the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff with regard to prayer (iii), on a closer examination, this Court is of the considered view that even the said relief is not maintainable in the present form. The injunction sought therein is essentially negative in character, whereby the plaintiff seeks to restrain defendant Nos.1 to 4 from allegedly compelling him to sell the suit schedule property to a so-called developer or from receiving any advance on his behalf from an intending purchaser. Such a relief, as framed, is vague, speculative and unenforceable, as it seeks to injunct hypothetical or apprehended acts without laying a clear factual foundation. An injunction cannot be granted to restrain an uncertain or indeterminate act, nor can the Court assume a supervisory role over private negotiations or alleged pressures which are not crystallised into a legally enforceable cause of action. Therefore, even prayer (iii) does not warrant adjudication by the Civil Court. 10. It further emerges from the pleadings that there are rival and competing claims of title, both traced to a common vendor. If the plaintiff asserts that his title is superior by application of the doctrine of priority, the proper course open to him is to work out his remedies before the competent statutory authority insofar as mutation and khata entries are concerned, on the basis of his title documents, or to seek appropriate declaratory relief before a forum competent to adjudicate title, if so advised. In the backdrop of the nature of reliefs claimed and the clear statutory bar operating in respect of prayers (i) and (ii), coupled with the untenability of prayer (iii) in its present form, this Court is of the view that the Court of first instance, upon adverting to the pleadings and the prayers in the plaint, was fully justified in dismissing the suit at the threshold. The finding recorded by the trial Court holding that the suit is not maintainable does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in the negative and against the plaintiff, and the grounds urged in the present appeal do not merit acceptance. Finding on Point No.2: 11. Accordingly, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is dismissed (ii) However, it is made clear that the order passed by the trial Court and the judgment rendered by this Court would not act as an impediment for the plaintiff to seek redressal of his grievances in a manner known to law.