ORDER : J.C.DOSHI, J. 1. The present Civil Revision Application, preferred under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, calls in question the legality and propriety of the judgment and order dated 30.12.2025 passed by the learned Small Cause Court No. 2 at Ahmedabad in P.S.R.P. No. 18 of 2018, whereby the petition instituted under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 [hereinafter referred to as “ the Act of 1882 ”] came to be allowed, and the present revisionist was directed to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the demised premises. 2. In order to effectively examine the merits of the controversy and to adjudicate upon the issues arising in the present proceedings, it becomes necessary to advert to the relevant factual milieu giving rise to the lis. 2.1. The present revision application arises from proceedings initiated by the respondent herein by way of P.S.R.P. No. 18 of 2018 under Section 41 of the Act of 1882, before the learned Small Cause Court No. 2 at Ahmedabad. By judgment and order dated 30.12.2025, the learned Court allowed the said application and, in exercise of powers under Section 43 of the Act of 1882, directed issuance of a possession warrant against the present applicants. The bailiff of the Court was accordingly ordered to execute the warrant and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises, as described in paragraph 1 of the application, to the respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. 2.2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order, the applicants have preferred the present revision application, inter alia, contending that the proceedings under Section 41 were not maintainable in the factual milieu of the case. It is their case that the learned Small Cause Court failed to properly appreciate the documentary as well as oral evidence on record, while the respondent had allegedly not produced cogent material to substantiate the assertions made in the plaint. A further grievance is that, after conclusion of written arguments, the learned Court amended the issues, thereby causing serious prejudice to the applicants and vitiating the proceedings. On these and other grounds urged in the revision application and at the time of hearing, the applicants seek quashing and setting aside of the impugned judgment and consequential possession warrant. 3. A further grievance is that, after conclusion of written arguments, the learned Court amended the issues, thereby causing serious prejudice to the applicants and vitiating the proceedings. On these and other grounds urged in the revision application and at the time of hearing, the applicants seek quashing and setting aside of the impugned judgment and consequential possession warrant. 3. Learned Advocate for the Revisionists submits that the impugned judgment dated 30.12.2025 is vitiated by non-appreciation of evidence. The respondent alleged that the premises were let out on 29.08.2002, yet no documentary proof was produced. In cross- examination, Respondent No.1 admitted he had no document showing the date of letting and was unaware of the exact date. The finding of tenancy, therefore, rests on no legal evidence. 3.1. The Trial Court wrongly relied upon the rent diary (Exh. 25). The first entry begins only from 12.12.2010, which contradicts the pleaded tenancy of 2002. The diary bears no signature of the applicants or their predecessor, a fact admitted in cross-examination. Such an unproved, self-serving document could not have been relied upon. 3.2. The burden to prove tenancy lay entirely on the respondent. No evidence was led regarding terms of tenancy, duration, rent agreement, or liability for taxes and charges. The alleged admission of possession does not prove lawful tenancy. The Trial Court misdirected itself in shifting the burden onto the applicants. 4. Even assuming a landlord-tenant relationship, mandatory compliance of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act (Gujarat Rent Act) was required before seeking eviction. No statutory notice or valid ground is shown. Alternatively, if the tenancy fell outside the Rent Act, jurisdiction lay with the City Civil Court under the Transfer of Property Act, not the Small Cause Court. The decree is therefore without jurisdiction. Thus, it is submitted to allow the present Civil Revision Application. 5. I am not persuaded by the submissions advanced on behalf of the revisionists. 5.1. Section 41 of the Act of 1882, indubitably confers jurisdiction upon the Small Cause Court to entertain proceedings for recovery of possession of immovable property, provided that the annual value of the premises at rack-rent does not exceed Rs.2,00,000/-. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the annual rack-rent valuation of the demised premises falls within the aforesaid pecuniary threshold. Ergo, the jurisdictional competence of the Small Cause Court cannot be gainsaid. 5.2. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the annual rack-rent valuation of the demised premises falls within the aforesaid pecuniary threshold. Ergo, the jurisdictional competence of the Small Cause Court cannot be gainsaid. 5.2. A plain and meaningful reading of Section 41 of the Act of 1882 further postulates that where a tenancy has been duly determined or withdrawn, and the tenant or any person claiming through or under the tenant, continues to occupy the demised premises and refuses to deliver possession despite a lawful request made by the landlord in that behalf, a petition for recovery of possession is maintainable before the Small Cause Court under the said provision. The statutory scheme thus provides a summary and efficacious remedy to the landlord in circumstances where the continued occupation becomes unauthorized upon determination of tenancy. 5.3. Section 47 of the Act of 1882, in tandem with Section 41, engrafts a further safeguard. It mandates that where an application under Section 41 is instituted, the occupant may, upon furnishing a bond with two solvent sureties in such sum as the Small Cause Court deems reasonable, having regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the contemplated litigation—undertake to institute, without delay, a suit before the competent Civil Court against the applicant for compensation on the ground of alleged trespass. Upon such compliance, the Small Cause Court is enjoined to stay the proceedings under Section 41 until the civil suit is finally decided. Conversely, failure to prosecute such suit diligently or an adverse adjudication therein would entail liability to bear the costs, as statutorily envisaged. 5.4. Thus, the legislative framework under Sections 41 and 47, read conjointly, strikes a balance between the summary jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court and the occupant’s right to agitate title or other substantive civil claims before a competent court, while ensuring that such recourse is not pursued in vacuo or as a dilatory stratagem. 6. Taking cue from the aforesaid statutory provisions and applying the same to the factual matrix of the case, the learned Small Cause Court proceeded to frame the following issues for determination:– “1. Whether the applicants prove that the opponents are the tenants of the application premises ? (Added as per order passed below Exh.54 dated 24-12-2025) 2 Whether this application is maintainable under Section 41 of PSCC Act, 1882? 3. Whether the applicants prove that the opponents are the tenants of the application premises ? (Added as per order passed below Exh.54 dated 24-12-2025) 2 Whether this application is maintainable under Section 41 of PSCC Act, 1882? 3. Whether the applicants are entitled to get relief as prayed for ? 4. What order ?” 7. Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 came to be answered in the affirmative. Insofar as Issue No. 4 is concerned, the learned Small Cause Court proceeded to pass an order for issuance of a warrant of possession. 8. The entire controversy, along with the appreciation of the evidence and the attendant reasoning, has been comprehensively discussed by the learned Small Cause Court in paragraphs 8.1 to 8.4 of the impugned order, which read thus:– “8.1. The applicant has stated in the main application that he is owner of the disputed premises and further the applicants that the disputed premises was let cut to the opponents on 29/08/2002 upon receiving a security deposit of Rs.10,000/- and on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/-, for residential purposes. The applicants have issued notice against the opponent and thereby terminated the tenancy of the opponent. The said notice has been produced at Exh.56. The opponents have filed their written statement at Exh. 12, wherein they have admitted that there is no dispute regarding the ownership of the property described in the application. On perusal of the statement made by the opponents in his written statement, it is proved that the applicant is the owner of the application premises and the opponets are the tenants of the application premises. Further, the opponents have stated that the disputed premises was originally taken on rent by the husband of Opponent No.l and the father of Opponent Nos.2 and 3, namely Mr. Baburao Ramrao Kale, from the original owner and the deceased father of the applicants, Mr.Ialjibhai Chaudhary, on 01/05/2001 at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/-. But on perusal the para no.1 on page no.4 of the cross- examination of the applicant below Exh.14, the applicant has specifically stated that the application premises were originally taken on rent by Baburao Ramrao Kale (the husband of Opponent No.1 and the father of Opponent Nos.2 and 3,) on 09/08/2002. 1,500/-. But on perusal the para no.1 on page no.4 of the cross- examination of the applicant below Exh.14, the applicant has specifically stated that the application premises were originally taken on rent by Baburao Ramrao Kale (the husband of Opponent No.1 and the father of Opponent Nos.2 and 3,) on 09/08/2002. Therefore, as per the above statement made by the applicant in his cross-examination, applicant has specificially denied that the application premies was given on rent on 1/5/2001 and he has stated that the application premises was given on rent on 9/8/2002. | Further, the learned advocate of the opponent has failed to prove the contention made in his written statement during the cross-examination of the applicant that the opponents have kept on rent the applicant premises on 1/5/2001 but it is proved that the predecessor of the opponents Late Baburao Ramrao Kale has taken on rent the application premises on 1/5/2001. 8.2. Further, applicant Montubhai Laljibhai Chaudhary has produced his chief-examination at Exh. 14, wherein he is reiterated the facts of the Exh.1 application. Therefore, to avoid the repitition, the said facts are not repeated. The opponent has cross-examined the said applicant. On perusal the cross-examination of the applicant, it is proved that the opponent is the tenant of the application premises because learned advocate of the opponent has voulentary asked question that about the relationship between the applicants and the opponents as the Landlord and Tenants. Further, the learned advocate of the opponents has asked question to the applicant that the oppoents have paid rent of the application premises to the applicant. Therefore, as per the above cross- examination of the applicant, it is proved that application premises was given on rent to the father of the opponents on 09-08-2002. Further, the learned advocate of the opponent has failed to prove the contention made in his written statement during the cross-examination of the applicant that the opponents have kept on rent the applicant premises on 1/5/2001 but it is proved that the predecessor of the opponents Late Baburao Ramrao Kale has taken on rent the application premises on 1/5/2001. 8.3) The opponent no.2 Minakshiben Baburao Kale has filed her Affidavit of Chief-examination at Exh. 36 and mainly reiterated the facts of his written statement. Therefore, it is not repeated to avoid repetition. The learned advocate of the applicant has cross-examined the opponent no.2. 8.3) The opponent no.2 Minakshiben Baburao Kale has filed her Affidavit of Chief-examination at Exh. 36 and mainly reiterated the facts of his written statement. Therefore, it is not repeated to avoid repetition. The learned advocate of the applicant has cross-examined the opponent no.2. As per the corss-examination of the opponent no.2, it is proved that father of the applicant Laljibhai Chaudhary has let out the application premies to Baburao Ramrao Kale who is father of the opponents. Further, on perusal of the para-3 and 4 of the page no.1 of the cross-examination of the opponent no.2, it is proved that they have not produced any evidence to prove that they have. taken on rent the application premises on 1/5/2001 and further it is proved that she has not. any evidence to prove that they were residing in the application premises during May-2001 to August-2002. Therefore, above admission made by the opponent no.2 in his cross- examination read with the written statement produced by the opponents vide Exh. 12, the opponents have failed to prove that the application premises was taken on rent by the father of the opponent no.2 on 1/5/2001. Further, on perusal of the para 5 on page no.2 of the cross-examination of opponent no.2, it is proved opponent no.2 had never gone to pay the rent during life of her father. Further, it is proved that no any proceedings has been done about the non issuance of rent receipt. Further, it is proved that opponent no.2 has not got any rent receipt from the person of father of applicant. Further, on perusal of the para 5 on page no.3 of the cross- examination of the opponet no.2, it is proved that applicant no.1 has given notice for vacating the application premises and opponents have received the said notice. The said notice has been produced on record vide Exh.56. Further, it is proved that after receiving the said notice, the opponents had not shown their willigness to vacat the application premises. The said notice has been produced on record vide Exh.56. Further, it is proved that after receiving the said notice, the opponents had not shown their willigness to vacat the application premises. -Therefore, on perusal of the coss-examination of opponent no.2, it is proved that the father of the applicant has given on rent the application premises to the father of the opponent and further it is proved that opponents have failed to prove that they have regularly paid rent of the application premises to the applicants and their father and further it is proved that applicant no.1 has given notice to vacate the application premises and said notice was duly received by the opponents which has been produced on record vide Exh.56, but the opponents have not given willingness to vacate the premises. (8.4) It is a well-settled principle of law that an admission is the best evidence that can be relied upon, unless it is successfully rebutted. An admission, if clear and unambiguous, is substantive evidence and can be relied upon even without further proof. Therefore, in view of the admission made by the opponent no.2, relationship of landlord and tenant between the applicants and the opponents are established. Therefore, as per the above detailed discussion of the point no.1, applicants have succeeded to prove that opponents are tenants of the suit premises. Therefore; I answer the issue no.l in the affirmative.” 9. In paragraph 8.2, the learned Small Cause Court, upon due consideration of the precedents of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has rightly concluded that it possessed the requisite jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Act of 1882, and has proceeded to pass the impugned order. 9.1. This Court, in Pradipkumar Gordhandas Patel v. Chandrakant Jivanlal Patel (Civil Revision Application No. 40 of 2020) , has also undertaken an elaborate exposition of the scope and ambit of jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Act of 1882. The reasoning articulated therein applies pari passu to the factual matrix of the present case and lends substantial support to the conclusion reached by the learned Small Cause Court. 9.2. Moreover, it is an admitted and categorical pleading of the plaintiff that the tenancy of the occupant stood terminated with effect from 20.01.2018, on account of the occupant’s refusal to agree to the enhancement of rent by 10% as mutually agreed between the parties. 9.2. Moreover, it is an admitted and categorical pleading of the plaintiff that the tenancy of the occupant stood terminated with effect from 20.01.2018, on account of the occupant’s refusal to agree to the enhancement of rent by 10% as mutually agreed between the parties. In response to such termination, the occupant instituted HRP Suit No. 24 of 2018 before the Small Cause Court and obtained an interim injunction against the landlord. However, as fairly submitted by the learned advocate for the applicant upon a specific query by this Court, the said HRP Suit No. 24 of 2018 has since been dismissed by the Small Cause Court, and no revision or further challenge has been preferred against the said judgment and order. 9.3. In view of the aforesaid, once the tenancy of the occupant stood validly determined by the landlord, the landlord became entitled to seek recovery of possession by invoking Section 41 of the Act of 1882. 9.4. This Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Small Cause Court has not committed any error, much less an error of law going to the root of the matter, warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 10. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present Civil dismissed Revision Application stands. 10.1. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. Record and Proceedings, if received, be transmitted back to the concerned Court below without delay.