ORDER : Since the grievance of the petitioner in both these matters is inter se connected with each other, they are taken up together and being disposed of by this common order. 2) Heard Sri P.Suresh Reddy, learned senior counsel, representing Sri G.Raman Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Services-I appearing for respondents 1 to 3, and Sri G.Narayana, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for respondents 4 and 5. 3) Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that an Article of Charge vide G.O.Rt.No.81, MA & UD (Vig.II) Department, dated 18.02.2016, was issued by respondent No.2 to the petitioner alleging that while the petitioner was working on deputation as Forest Range Officer in the office of respondent No.4 during the period from 06.09.2008 to 03.12.2009 he has not put the date under his initial recorded in the Measurement Book at a few places during check measurement of four works out of many works, without jurisdiction and after a lapse of 8 years, for which, the petitioner has submitted his explanation denying the charge. However, without considering the said explanation, an enquiry was ordered. The Enquiry Officer has conducted the enquiry in violation of Rule 20 of Telangana Civil Services (CCA) Rule, 1991 (in short ‘CCA Rules, 1991’) and submitted the Enquiry Report dated 05.03.2023 holding that the charge against the petitioner is proved. But, so far, no final orders are passed, pursuant to the Enquiry Report. Learned senior counsel has contended that though the petitioner is eligible for promotion to the post of Deputy Conservator of Forests, the respondents are not considering his case for promotion on the ground that departmental enquiry is still pending. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the very initiation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner is violative of Rule 2 of CCA Rules, 1991, inasmuch as Respondent No.2 is neither the Appointing Authority nor Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner. Learned senior counsel has also contended that in case of the petitioner, respondent Nos.1 and 3 are the appointing authorities. Therefore, the impugned G.O.Rt.No.81 dated 18.02.2023 lacks jurisdiction and therefore liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on: a) Union of India v. J.Ahmed , AIR 1979 SC 1022 b) Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. Learned senior counsel has also contended that in case of the petitioner, respondent Nos.1 and 3 are the appointing authorities. Therefore, the impugned G.O.Rt.No.81 dated 18.02.2023 lacks jurisdiction and therefore liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on: a) Union of India v. J.Ahmed , AIR 1979 SC 1022 b) Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi , (2007) 4 SCC 566 c) Order dated 17.04.2025 passed by this Court in W.P.No.29066 of 2024; and d) J.Ramachandraiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh , (2012 SCC OnLine AP 730 4) Per contra, the learned Government Pleader has submitted that based on the Alert Note No.118 (C.No.l087/V&E/NR.2/11), dated 15.04.2014, respondent No.2 has issued an Article of Charge to the petitioner vide G.O.Rt.No.81, Municipal Administration and Urban Development, (Vig.II) Department, dated 18.02.2016, in respect of the error caused by the petitioner in not putting the date under the initial recorded in the measurement book during check measurement while working as Forest Range Officer, Director Urban Forestry, GHMC, Hyderabad, on deputation basis. Further, the petitioner himself has agreed that he has made negligible error in his affidavit. As such, the Article of Charge has been issued by the Government in tune with the Rules and Regulations. It is further submitted that the Enquiry Officer has conducted enquiry, the Inquiry Report was sent by respondent No.4 vide endorsement dated 19.01.2024 to the PCCF (HoFF), Hyderabad, dated 13.03.2024, and the same was acknowledged by the petitioner on 10.04.2024. However, the petitioner has not submitted his written representation/further defence statement to the findings in the Inquiry Report. Therefore, the petitioner himself delayed finalization of the case. However, on the other hand he is claiming for promotion without reference to charge memo as well as challenging the charge memo on the ground of delay. Therefore, owing to delay in conclusion of charges, the charges cannot be set aside and the charges have to be concluded on their own merit. 5) It is further contended that as per Rule 12 of CCA Rules, 1991, the Government in MA&UD is empowered to issue Article of Charge to the petitioner. Hence, the issuance of Article of Charge to the petitioner is valid and is in conformity to the CCA Rules, 1991. 5) It is further contended that as per Rule 12 of CCA Rules, 1991, the Government in MA&UD is empowered to issue Article of Charge to the petitioner. Hence, the issuance of Article of Charge to the petitioner is valid and is in conformity to the CCA Rules, 1991. Therefore, it is vehemently contended by the learned Government Pleader that there is no violation of Rules in issuance of Article of Charge to the petitioner and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits and thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. Reliance has been placed on: a) Order dated 04.06.2010 passed in W.P.No.22714 of 2009 & batch; b) Order dated 16.06.2025 in W.P.No.12329 of 2023; and 6) On 14.08.2024, this Court while issuing notice before admission to the respondents has passed interim orders directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Deputy Conservator of Forests, without reference to pendency of charge memo dated 18.02.2016 issued by respondent No.2. 7) Alleging non-compliance and willful disobedience of the said interim order dated 14.08.2024, the petitioner has filed Contempt Case No.2047 of 2025. 8) This Court has taken note of the submissions made by respective counsel and perused the material on record. 9) A perusal of the record reveals that admittedly the petitioner is an employee of Forest Department having appointed by respondent Nos.1 and 3. While so, he worked on deputation basis as Forest Range Officer in the office of respondent No.4 from 06.09.2008 to 03.12.2009. Thereafter, he was repatriated to his parent department i.e. Forest Department. Further, an Article of Charge vide G.O.Rt.No.81, dated 18.02.2016, was issued by respondent No.2 after a lapse of 8 years alleging that he exhibited lack of integrity, devotion to duty, to which, the petitioner has submitted his reply denying the charge. However, an Enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report, but, so far, no final orders are passed. 10) Learned senior counsel has attacked the impugned proceedings mainly on two grounds viz., (1) competency of respondent No.2 in issuing the impugned G.O.Rt.No.81, dated 18.02.2016; and (2) delay in conclusion of proceedings. However, an Enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report, but, so far, no final orders are passed. 10) Learned senior counsel has attacked the impugned proceedings mainly on two grounds viz., (1) competency of respondent No.2 in issuing the impugned G.O.Rt.No.81, dated 18.02.2016; and (2) delay in conclusion of proceedings. 11) For adjudicating the first ground, it is necessary to refer Rule 2 (a) of CCA Rules, 1991, which reads as under: “ ‘appointing authority in relation to a Government Servant’ means (i) the authority which actually made the temporary or officiating or substantive appointment, as the case may be, of the Government Servant, to the post held by him at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings; or (ii) the authority which is, under the rules regulating the recruitment to the post which the Government servant for the time being holds, competent to make an appointment. whichever authority is higher;” 12) Further, Rule 11 of CCA Rules, 1991, stipulates the Disciplinary Authorities in respect of State Services. As per sub- clause (26) (a) thereof, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests i.e. respondent No.3 herein may impose on Assistant Conservator of Forest any of the penalties specified in clause (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 9. 13) The specific assertion of the learned Government Pleader is that as per Rule 12 of the CCA Rules, 1991, respondent No.2 is empowered to issue the charge memo. To adjudicate upon this contention, the said provision of law is extracted hereunder: “ Rule 12. Government’s power to impose penalties on members of State Services :- Notwithstanding anything in Rule 11, the Government may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 9 on members of the State Services.” 14) On perusal of the above provisions of law, this Court is of the view that as the petitioner being the employee of Forest Department, the powers vested under Rule 12 of CCA Rules, 1991, are conferred on respondent No.1 only but not on respondent No.2, as contended by the respondents for the reason that the Government means the Principal Secretary of the concerned department i.e. respondent No.1 in case of the petitioner, as admittedly his parent department is Forest Department. 15) In the case on hand, admittedly, the charge memo has been issued by respondent No.2 in respect of the incident pertaining to the period 2009 while the petitioner was working on deputation basis in the office of respondent No.4. Admittedly, on the date of issuance of the impugned Charge Memo, the petitioner is working under the control of respondent Nos.1 and 3 only. 16) It is relevant to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in B.L. Satyarthi v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another , 2015 (1) MP LJ 153 wherein the Division Bench has elaborately interpreted Rule 20 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966, which is per se analogous to the Rule 20 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The relevant portion of the said decision is extracted hereunder: “ 12. Rule 20 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 as applicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh and reproduced hereinabove gives power to the borrowing department to take disciplinary action against a Government servant who is on deputation and the powers to the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority are conferred on the borrowing department. The Rule contemplates that the borrowing department shall have the powers of the Appointing Authority for the purpose of placing the government servant under suspension and for taking disciplinary action against him but the proviso contemplates that the action taken has to be forthwith communicated to the parent Department. When power is given to any authority to suspend a Government servant or initiate disciplinary action against him an assumption has to be drawn that the power can be exercised so long as the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee subsists or the contract of employment is in existence. Once the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee or the contract of service itself comes to an end, the question would be as to how disciplinary action or power to suspend can be exercised by an authority with whom the contract of employment of the employee concerned is no more in existence. Once the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee or the contract of service itself comes to an end, the question would be as to how disciplinary action or power to suspend can be exercised by an authority with whom the contract of employment of the employee concerned is no more in existence. Rule 20 therefore, has to be interpreted by holding that the power conferred under Rule 20 to the borrowing department or authority to suspend a Government servant or to take a disciplinary action against him can be exercised only if the relationship of master and servant or the contract of employment between the borrowing department and the deputationist employee subsists. When an employee who is a government servant and holds a lien in a Government department is sent on deputation to Foreign Department or a Corporation, then during the period of deputation a temporary contract of service is brought into force between the borrowing department and the employee concerned and so long as its contract of employment subsists the borrowing department can invoke the provision of Rule 20 but once the employee is repatriated back to the foreign department then the contract of employment temporarily created during the period of deputation ceases and if that be the position, then the borrowing department does not have any authority to take action against the employee concerned. Apart from the above a perusal of Rule 20(2) and the proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) and (iii) also clarifies the position. After the departmental proceeding initiated by the Borrowing Department is completed and the finding of enquiry is recorded, in the light of the finding if the Borrowing Department wants to impose any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of Rule 10, then after consultation with the lending department the punishment can be imposed. However, the proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) indicates that if there is any difference of opinion between the Borrowing Department and lending department that the service of the employee has to be replaced at the disposal of the lending department. This clearly shows that action under these Rules can be taken only when the employee is on deputation not otherwise as the stipulation in proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) speaks about replacement of the employee to the lending department. This clearly shows that action under these Rules can be taken only when the employee is on deputation not otherwise as the stipulation in proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) speaks about replacement of the employee to the lending department. Similarly in Rule 20(2)(i) and proviso thereto also it is clearly provided that if the punishment to be imposed is a major punishment as provided in Rule 10(v) to (ix), then the employee has to be replaced to the lending department and it is only the lending department which can take action. The stipulation in this part of the rule for replacement of the employee to the parent department clearly indicates the intention of the rule maker. In case Rule 20 was applicable to a employee who is already repatriated to the parent (lending) department then the provision for replacement of the employee to the lending department as contained in both the provisos to Rule 20(2)(i)(iii) would not provide for replace the service of the government employee to the lending department. This in our considered view would be the interpretation which can be given to the powers that may be exercised by the borrowing department under Rule 20.” (Emphasis supplied) 17) From the above it is clear that the contract of employment, which was temporarily created during the period of deputation, ceases automatically once the employee is repatriated back to his foreign department. In view of the same, the issuance of impugned charge memo by respondent No.2 to the petitioner after completion of deputation period, cannot be sustained. 18) As regards the ground of delay, it is gathered from the record that admittedly, the charge memo was issued in the year 2016 in respect of the incident pertaining to the year 2009 i.e. after a lapse of 7 years and till date the proceedings are not concluded. The Government, from time to time, has issued Government Orders directing the early conclusion of disciplinary cases and to adhere to the time schedule. Vide G.O.Ms.No.679, General Administration (Services-C) Department, dated 01.11.2008, the Government has stipulated as under: “On allegations made against the Government employees disciplinary cases are initiated in accordance with the rules in force, and wherever necessary inquiring authorities are appointed to inquire into articles of charge against such employees. Vide G.O.Ms.No.679, General Administration (Services-C) Department, dated 01.11.2008, the Government has stipulated as under: “On allegations made against the Government employees disciplinary cases are initiated in accordance with the rules in force, and wherever necessary inquiring authorities are appointed to inquire into articles of charge against such employees. Instructions were issued for expeditious completion of the inquiries and normal time of 3 months and 6 months is allowed in simple and complicated cases, respectively. Government of the administrative Department concerned at Government level shall review all the disciplinary cases against employees in respect of Head of the Departments under his control and also at the field level and shall submit a note to the Chief Secretary to Government duly recording the reasons for non-completion of the enquires and to circulate the same to the Hon’ble Chief Minister. It is also the responsibility of the inquiring authority to complete the inquiry within the allowed time, otherwise, such inquiring authority shall be held responsible for the delay, which deserves penal action. 2….. 3. Government direct that the disciplinary cases initiated against the Government employees shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and the existing instructions read above shall be adhered to. The Departments of Secretariat shall review the status position of the pending disciplinary cases against all the employees with which they are concerned and submit a note to the Chief Secretary to Government as per the instructions in force. It is also the responsibility of the inquiring authorities to complete the inquiry as per the allowed time. The Competent Authority, after receipt of the inquiry report shall conclude the disciplinary proceedings within 6 months of its initiation and in case of abnormal delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings; action shall be initiated against concerned inquiring authority. 19) Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal , (1995) 2 SCC 570 has held that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the alleged irregularities are committed and if the delay is too long, the charges are liable to be quashed. 20) In the instant case, admittedly, the charge memo was issued in the year 2016 for the incident pertaining to the year 2009. 20) In the instant case, admittedly, the charge memo was issued in the year 2016 for the incident pertaining to the year 2009. The only ground urged by the respondents for the delay is that though the Enquiry Report was furnished to the petitioner on 10.04.2024, the petitioner himself has failed to submit his defence statement. But, the said ground cannot be countenanced for the reason that while communicating the Enquiry Report, admittedly, the respondents have not directed the petitioner to submit his objections, if any. Therefore, the respondents are restrained from taking the said plea for the delay caused as the respondents are admittedly empowered to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law even in the absence of any such defense statement from the delinquent employee. Hence, the impugned proceedings are hit by delay. 21) Further, the learned Government Pleader has urged that the petitioner himself has admitted in his affidavit that he committed negligible error and therefore the disciplinary proceedings are sustainable under the law. Here, it is relevant to state that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, Ex- Constable , (1992) 4 SCC 54 has observed as under: “5. Misconduct has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. At p.999, thus: ‘A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness’. Misconduct in office has been defined as: ‘Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. Term embraces acts which the office-holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act.” 22) Further, in P.Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., at p.3027, the term “misconduct” has been defined as under: “The term ‘misconduct’ implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word ‘misconduct’ is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word ‘misconduct’ is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. ‘Misconduct’ literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct.” 23) Relying on the above definitions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.Ahemd’s case (referred supra) , has held as under: “11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Supdt. Central Rly., Nagpur Dvision, Nagpur [(1959) 61 Bom LR 1956] and Satubha K.Vaghela v. Moosa Raza [10 Guj LR 23]. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary which runs as under: “Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.” 24) Coming to the case on hand, the following charge has been framed against the petitioner: “That Sri A. Venkateswarlu the then Forest Range Officer, Urban Forestry, Circle-10, GHMC as a recording officer for the works pertaining at circle No-10 has made signatures without date. He failed to record the date of commencement of work and date of completion of work in the M. Book, and thus he violated the procedure as per AP Public Works Accounts Code and by this above act he has exhibited lack of integrity, devotion to duty conduct unbecoming of Government Servant and thereby contravened Rule 3 91) and (2) of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964.” 25) Thus, the allegation against the petitioner is that he made signatures without mentioning the date and failed to record date of commencement of work and date of completion of work in the M.Book, which can be construed as negligible error on the part of the petitioner and same do not constitute any misconduct. 26) For the afore-mentioned reasons, the impugned charge memo dated 18.02.2016 is not sustainable under the law and therefore liable to be set aside. 27) Accordingly, the impugned G.O.Rt.No.81, MA & UD (Vig.II) Department, dated 18.02.2016, issued by respondent No.2 is set aside. 28) Insofar as the Contempt Case is concerned, as the respondents have filed Interlocutory Application seeking to vacate the interim order dated 14.08.2024 and the main writ petition itself is disposed, this Court is not inclined to entertain the Contempt Case. 29) In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and the Contempt Case is closed. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.