ORDER : J.C.DOSHI, J. 1. The present Second Appeal is preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “ the Code ”), assailing the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2025 rendered by the learned Principal District Judge, Valsad in Regular Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2020, whereby the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment and decree dated 28.12.2017 passed by the learned Trial Court. 2. For the sake of convenience and to avoid prolixity, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance with their original status before the learned Trial Court. BRIEF FACTS:- 3. The respondents herein (original plaintiffs) instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 27 of 2014 before the learned 2nd Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Valsad, asserting that they had purchased the agricultural land bearing Survey No. 198 (New Survey No. 117) by a registered sale deed dated 02.06.2001 from the original owners and had since remained in possession and enjoyment thereof while regularly paying government dues. It was their case that the land adjoining the suit land on the southern side, being Survey No. 199 (New Survey No. 119), belonged to the original defendants. According to the plaintiffs, disputes arose when the defendants, allegedly aggrieved by not having been able to purchase the suit land themselves, began interfering with the boundary and repeatedly altered boundary marks. 3.1. The plaintiffs further averred that upon their application, the District Inspector of Land Records (DILR), Valsad, carried out measurement on 09.03.2005, which allegedly revealed that the defendants had encroached upon 827 sq. meters of the suit land. Despite repeated demands, the defendants allegedly failed to remove the encroachment and instead filed caveats and raised objections regarding the measurement. The plaintiffs also alleged incidents of threats and intimidation in January 2014. On these assertions, they sought removal of the alleged encroachment and protection of their possession. 3.2. The original defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement contending that the plaintiffs had no lawful possession and that the disputed portion in fact fell to their share in a long-standing family arrangement. They asserted continuous, open, and settled possession over the land for several decades, relied upon the existence of old mango trees and a panchanama to support their claim, and disputed the correctness of the DILR measurement. They also raised a plea of limitation. They asserted continuous, open, and settled possession over the land for several decades, relied upon the existence of old mango trees and a panchanama to support their claim, and disputed the correctness of the DILR measurement. They also raised a plea of limitation. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the trial court, by judgment dated 28.12.2017, dismissed the suit holding that encroachment was not proved and that the suit was barred by limitation. In appeal, the learned Principal District Judge, Valsad, by judgment dated 24.09.2025, allowed Regular Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2020 and reversed the trial court’s decree, which has given rise to the present second appeal. 4. The present Second Appeal has been instituted by canvassing the following substantial questions of law, which are asserted to arise for consideration within the narrow compass of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code:- “1. Whether the judgment & decree passed by the Ld. First Appellate Court is vitiated by not framing and deciding appropriate point for determination as required under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court has committed patent error in reading, evaluating and considered the effect of contents of documents and admission in evidence recorded during the trial in the light of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in (2020) 19 SCC 57 , resulting into miscarriage of justice? 3. Whether the Id. First Appellate Court relying upon and referring to inadmissible ratio of law laid down in AIR 2012 SC 1727 in support of his judgment resulting to miscarriage of justices? 4. The Ld. First Appellate Court committed in error in coming into conclusion that, the original defendants was permissive user of the disputed land dehors the pleadings and evidence of the original plaintiff resulting into miscarriage of justice ? 5. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court committed an error in Suo-moto relying upon the provision of section 106 of the Transfer of property act, 1881 de-hors the pleadings and evidence of party to the suit, influencing the impugned judgment by irrelevant consideration, violating the ratio reported AIR 2008 Supreme Court 956, AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1749 and AIR 2014 Supreme Court (Supp.) 1040 in resulting into miscarriage of justice ? 6. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court erred in law in placing reliance upon the DILR measurement report vide Exh. 6. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court erred in law in placing reliance upon the DILR measurement report vide Exh. 17, despite the same being incomplete, unauthenticated, unsigned and not proved in accordance with law? 7. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court overlooked the provisions Sections 96 and 119 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 read with Rule 20 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules in reference to DILR Report? 8. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court committed error in reading the evidence being DILR Report which do not reflect measurement of both the Survey Numbers i.e, Survey/ Block No. 199 (New Survey No.119) and Survey/Block No.198 (New Survey No.117) in light of ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) in in the case of Harsing Kewala Rathod Vs. Ramji s/o Hemla (Second Appeal No.314 of 1990)? 9. Whether the Ld. trial court rightly dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, in light of admission of the Original Plaintiff in his depositions and in his cross-examination at Exh-46, he had knowledge of the dispute since 2001 and did not file suit within the prescribed limitations period of 12 years from the date of knowledge? 10. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court committed a substantial error of law in treating the cause of action as arising from the date of the DILR report ie., 09.03.2005, despite clear admissions of the original plaintiff having acquired knowledge of the alleged defect and lack of possession in the year 2001 itself, thereby ought have confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Trial Court ? 11. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court erred in overruling the Ld. Trial Court findings that the Appellant had established long, continuous, and settled possession with evidence including cultivation, and a Panchnama, while Respondents herein lacked possession at the time of sale? 12. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court was legally justified in reversing a well-reasoned judgment of the Trial Court without demonstrating any perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the findings of the Trial Court? 13. Whether the impugned judgment and decree suffer from non-application of mind, jurisdictional error and misdirection in law, thereby giving rise to substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908?” SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:- 5. 13. Whether the impugned judgment and decree suffer from non-application of mind, jurisdictional error and misdirection in law, thereby giving rise to substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908?” SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:- 5. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that learned First Appellate Court gravely erred in reversing a well-reasoned and legally sound judgment of the Trial Court without demonstrating any perversity, illegality, or material irregularity therein. It is a trite posit of law that reversal of findings of fact must be preceded by proper re-appreciation of the entire evidence and supported by cogent reasons. The impugned judgment, however, proceeds on conjectures and substitutes subjective conclusions in place of judicial analysis, which amounts to non-application of mind and a jurisdictional misdirection, thereby giving rise to a substantial question of law. 5.1. It is further submitted that learned First Appellate Court committed a serious error of law in placing reliance upon Exh.17 , the alleged DILR measurement report, which was never proved in accordance with law. The concerned DILR officer was not examined, the document bears no authenticated signature of a competent authority, and mandatory statutory requirements under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code and Rules were not followed. An unproved public document cannot be treated as substantive evidence. Ergo, the finding of encroachment based solely on such procedurally defective material is legally unsustainable. 5.2. It is further submitted that a lawful determination of encroachment necessarily requires measurement of adjoining survey lands in the presence of parties and compliance with statutory safeguards. The alleged measurement was conducted in absence of proof of notice, participation of adjoining landholders, boundary confirmation, or contemporaneous field records. In absence whereof, the very foundation of the allegations crumbles. The appellate court’s acceptance of such a flawed exercise reflects a patent misapplication of legal principles, warranting interference in Second Appeal. 5.3. The Trial Court had categorically held that the plaintiffs failed to prove possession and that the suit was barred by limitation. These findings were based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The First Appellate Court reversed these conclusions without framing proper points for determination or assigning independent reasons supported by evidence. Such reversal in vacuo, nay without lawful analytical scrutiny, amounts to a substantial error of law, thus paving way for interference under Section 100 of the Code. 5.4. These findings were based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The First Appellate Court reversed these conclusions without framing proper points for determination or assigning independent reasons supported by evidence. Such reversal in vacuo, nay without lawful analytical scrutiny, amounts to a substantial error of law, thus paving way for interference under Section 100 of the Code. 5.4. To fortify the submissions, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed reliance upon the decision rendered in Harsing Kewala Rathod v. Ramji s/o Hemla in Second Appeal No. 314 of 1990 , as delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. ANALYSIS (RE LAW):- 6. I have heard learned advocate for the appellant and perused the records at the outset. 6.1. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Jaichand (Dead) through Lrs and Other v. Sahnulal and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “28. It is thus clear that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.” 7. In the present case, certain foundational facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff is the lawful owner of land bearing Block No. 198, having acquired the same from its erstwhile owner by way of a duly executed and registered sale deed upon payment of full and valid sale consideration. Consequently, the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the said parcel of land admeasuring 0-63-74 hectares. The revenue records, which carry a presumption of correctness, also reflect Block No. 198 with the very same measurement, thereby fortifying the plaintiff’s claim as to title and extent. 7.1. It is the consistent case of the plaintiff that, on several occasions, he called upon the defendant to rectify the boundary alignment and to vacate the portion allegedly encroached upon from Block No. 198. 7.1. It is the consistent case of the plaintiff that, on several occasions, he called upon the defendant to rectify the boundary alignment and to vacate the portion allegedly encroached upon from Block No. 198. According to the averments made in the plaint, although the defendant at one stage appeared to have corrected the boundary, he subsequently re-encroached upon the plaintiff’s land, thus giving rise to a recurring and continuing cause of action. 7.2. In order to place the controversy beyond the pale of doubt, the plaintiff caused the land to be measured on 09.03.2005 through the office of the District Inspector of Land Records (DILR) (Exh.17). The official survey report revealed that the defendant, being the occupier of adjoining Block No. 199, had encroached upon the plaintiff’s land bearing Block No. 198 to the extent of 827 square metres. The plaintiff thereafter requested the defendant to remove the encroachment and to restore the boundary in accordance with the survey measurement. However, the defendant flatly refused to comply, as evidenced from his stance dated 31.01.2013, thereby constraining the plaintiff to institute the present suit. 7.3. It is indeed noteworthy that the defendant, in a rather contradictory posture, issued a notice dated 25.11.2013 to the plaintiff demanding demarcation and delivery of possession of 20 gunthas of land, thereby precipitating the present lis and bringing the boundary dispute squarely before the Court. 7.4. Upon the rival pleadings being completed, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues for determination:– “1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have illegally encroached upon the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs? (2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have agreed to remove the encroachment made in the suit property? (3) What order and decree?” 8. Issue No.1 came to be answered in the affirmative, whereas Issue No.2 was answered in the negative; resultantly, under Issue No.3, the learned Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the suit. 8.1. However, a holistic and critical reading of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned Trial Court appears to have been unduly swayed by the defence set up by the defendant, namely, that he had remained in possession of the disputed parcel of land admeasuring 827 square metres for nearly three to three-and-a-half decades, and that the mango trees standing thereon were of considerable age, purportedly indicative of long-standing possession. The learned Trial Court also attached considerable evidentiary weight to Exhibit 64, being a panchkyas and sketch map prepared by the Talati-cum-Mantri in the presence of local villagers, which records that the defendant was in possession of the said 827 square metres and was allegedly managing and administering the land. 8.2. The learned Trial Court further appears to have lent credence to the plea that the defendant’s grandfather had, by way of an alleged oral partition, divided the land into three equal portions. The overall tone and tenor of the judgment unmistakably suggest that the Court below allowed itself to be guided predominantly by the defence narrative, while failing to accord due and proper weight to Exhibit 17, namely the official measurement report of the DILR, which carried significant statutory presumptive value. 8.3. In contradistinction, the learned First Appellate Court, upon framing the requisite points for determination, re-appreciated the evidence on record and addressed the issues in controversy by assigning detailed and cogent reasons, as reflected in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its judgment, which read thus:– “11) On perusal o the deposition of the plaintiff, at Exhibit 30, it has been satisfactorily proved that the plaintiff purchased the suit property, i.e., land bearing Plot No. 198 admeasuring 0-63-74, from the original owner, Mr. Ranjitsinh Kalidas, by way of a registered sale-deed which is not under dispute, Dispute is only regarding an encroachment in said land by the defendants. It is also pleaded that the defendants were creating disputes regarding boundaries, and therefore, the plaintiffs had the land measured through the DILR on 09.03.2005. The Ld. Trial Court noted that this version of the plaintiff was not supported by any documentary evidence. However, from the record, it is found that the plaintiff produced a copy of the registered sale-deed vide Ex-16, and village forms 8A and 7 vide Ex-14 & 15, which reflect in the revenue record that Survey No. 198 stands in the name of the plaintiffs. Further, the report of DILR dated 09.03.2005 was produced vide Ex- 17. In this report, it has been categorically noted that Block No. 198 emerged from Survey No. 62/1 with a measurement sheet dated 12.01.1926, the boundaries of Block No. 198 are permanent, and the possessor of adjacent Block No. 199 has encroached upon 827 sq. Further, the report of DILR dated 09.03.2005 was produced vide Ex- 17. In this report, it has been categorically noted that Block No. 198 emerged from Survey No. 62/1 with a measurement sheet dated 12.01.1926, the boundaries of Block No. 198 are permanent, and the possessor of adjacent Block No. 199 has encroached upon 827 sq. m., marked as "A." It is also noted that an area marked as "B" is part of adjacent Block No. 197, wherein the plaintiffs have encroached 52 sq. m. (12) As per settled law, possession follows title. In the present case, the title of Block No. 198 has neither been denied nor disproved by the defendants. The Plaintiffs, being the lawful owners of Block No. 198, are entitled to its possession. Whoever has encroached upon their land is bound to remove such encroachment, and likewise, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to release any land not forming part of their Block number, It is pertinent to note that the appellant has purchased the block no.198 by registered sale deed with the all rights, it has been clarified in sale deed fundamental principle in property law that when land is sold, all the rights and appurtenances attached to it such as trees, buildings and access rights like pathways or easements are also transferred to the purchaser, unless specifically excluded in the sale agreement. This means that the purchaser acquires not only the physical soil but also everything that is permanently affixed to it and legally considered part of the land. This principle ensures the full and fair transfer of ownership and use rights, maintaining clarity and security in property transactions. Thus, the Id. The Trial Court erred in not properly appreciating the documentary evidence already on record and wrongly decided Issue No.1 against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have denied that there are trees on the encroached 827 sq. m. for the last 35 to 40 years. It is true that the plaintiffs had not measured the suit land prior to its purchase. However, mere failure to measure the land before purchase is no ground to reject their claim.” 9. It is an admitted position that the measurement of the disputed land was undertaken at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to which the official surveyor demarcated the boundaries of Block Nos. However, mere failure to measure the land before purchase is no ground to reject their claim.” 9. It is an admitted position that the measurement of the disputed land was undertaken at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to which the official surveyor demarcated the boundaries of Block Nos. 198 and 199 in consonance with the revenue records maintained by the office of the District Inspector of Land Records (DILR). Upon such scientific and official measurement, it was found that the occupier of Block No. 199 had extended his possession into Block No. 198, resulting in an encroachment admeasuring 827 square metres. This constitutes a categorical and unambiguous finding recorded by a public functionary in the discharge of statutory duties. 9.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to advert to the evidentiary value of such material. Section 36 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 declares that statements of fact made in maps or plans, generally offered for public sale, or made under the authority of the Government, are relevant facts. Likewise, Section 35 of the said Act postulates that entries in any public or official register, record, or electronic record, made by a public servant in the discharge of official duty, are themselves relevant and admissible in evidence. 9.2. These provisions, which now find their corresponding place in Sections 29 and 30 respectively of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, lend statutory credence to official survey records and demarcation reports prepared by competent revenue authorities. Ergo, the survey report prepared by the DILR, being a document generated in the regular course of official duty, carries substantial probative value and cannot be lightly brushed aside. 9.3. Sections 35 and 36 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (corresponding to Sections 29 and 30 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) read as under:– “35. An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. 36. 36. Statements of facts in issue or relevant facts, made in published maps or charts generally offered for public sale, or in maps or plans made under the authority of the Central Government or any State Government, as to matters usually represented or stated in such maps, charts or plans, are themselves relevant facts.” 10. It is noteworthy that, despite the adverse observations recorded in Exhibit 17, being the measurement report prepared by the office of the District Inspector of Land Records (DILR), a statutory authority whose official acts carry evidentiary value as relevant facts, the defendant did not seek any reassessment or re- measurement of Block Nos. 198 and 199. On the contrary, in the written statement, the defendant candidly admitted that he was in possession of the disputed parcel admeasuring 827 square metres and sought to justify such possession by setting up a plea of title perfected by adverse possession. 10.1. In view of the aforesaid admission, the contention that the DILR measurement was allegedly conducted unilaterally and not in the presence of both parties, and therefore cannot be relied upon to establish encroachment of 827 square metres, is wholly devoid of merit. Such a submission, in the face of the defendant’s own pleadings and the statutory presumptive value attaching to official survey records, pales into insignificance and deserves to be rejected outright. 11. When the defendant set up a defence that he had perfected title over the disputed parcel of land admeasuring 827 square metres by way of adverse possession, in answer to the plaintiff’s allegation of encroachment, the burden squarely lay upon him to plead and prove the classic ingredients of adverse possession. It is trite that such a plea must be established by clear, cogent and unequivocal evidence demonstrating hostile, open, continuous and uninterrupted possession to the knowledge of the true owner for the statutory period. 11.1. In the present case, both the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the defendant fall woefully short of satisfying these foundational requirements. The basic canons governing the plea of adverse possession remain wholly unsubstantiated. The learned appellate Court has, therefore, rightly observed that the invocation of adverse possession in the facts of the present case appears to be part of the growing tendency to usurp the property of the rightful owner under the guise of long possession. 11.2. The basic canons governing the plea of adverse possession remain wholly unsubstantiated. The learned appellate Court has, therefore, rightly observed that the invocation of adverse possession in the facts of the present case appears to be part of the growing tendency to usurp the property of the rightful owner under the guise of long possession. 11.2. The right of the plaintiff to recover possession of the encroached land cannot be said to have been extinguished under Section 27 of the Limitation Act unless and until the defendant discharges the onerous burden of proving that his possession had indeed become adverse to the plaintiff’s title. A conjoint reading of Section 27 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act makes it pellucid that, until possession assumes a hostile character and is held adversely to the true owner, such possession is deemed to be in subordination to the title of the rightful owner. 11.3. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned appellate Court, upon a comprehensive re-appreciation and reanalysis of the entire evidentiary record, has rendered a well-reasoned and legally sound judgment, which warrants no interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 12. Lastly, it was faintly contended by the learned advocate for the appellant that the learned appellate Court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code inasmuch as it did not frame specific points for determination. This submission does not commend acceptance. The seminal legal issue before both the Courts below was whether the defendant had encroached upon the plaintiff’s land bearing Block No. 198 to the extent of 827 square metres. Apart from this core issue, no other substantial controversy survived for adjudication. 12.1. The learned appellate Court has addressed this issue in depth, re-evaluated the entire evidence on record, and assigned independent and cogent reasons for reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. The mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code thus stands substantially complied with, and the impugned judgment cannot be faulted on this score. 13. At this point, it is apposite to refer the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Os. The mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code thus stands substantially complied with, and the impugned judgment cannot be faulted on this score. 13. At this point, it is apposite to refer the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Os. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 849 , where the Supreme Court has examined the issue of compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of “the Code” and observed that, if the learned appellate Court has extracted the issues framed by the Trial Court in extenso and if no separate point of determination is framed in the appeal, but if the arguments of the parties are referred and discussed the issue on merits, it is sufficient compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of “the Code”. 14. In Gurudev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others, (2007) 1 SCC 546 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intent underlying Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has held in unequivocal terms that the Legislature, in its wisdom, never envisaged the second appeal to metamorphose into a “third trial on facts” or to afford the litigant “one more throw of the dice in the gamble of litigation.” The object, inter alia, was to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the High Court to substantial questions of law of real and enduring significance, and not to permit a reappreciation of evidence as if sitting in appeal over concurrent findings of fact. 15. As a sequel to the above discussion, the present Second Appeal, having failed to demonstrate the existence of any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code, merits no indulgence of this Court. Consequently, the Second Appeal stands dismissed in limine at the admission stage. 15.1. Interim relief granted earlier, if any, is discontinued. 15.2. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to concernd Court fortwith.