ORDER : M. NAGAPRASANNA, J. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 4 are at the doors of this Court calling in question the proceedings in CC.No.1517/2021 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. 2. Heard Sri V.B.Siddaramaiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State. 3. The complainant though served long ago, remains unrepresented even today. 4. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:- Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 purchase the subject properties through a registered sale deed dated 09.01.1997, and get an order of conversion and develop it into a layout and on 11.05.2011. When the khatha is sought to be transferred at the hands of the Tahsildar, the Tahsildar endorses that the khatha cannot be changed since the land has already been converted. 4.1. When things stood thus, after 23 years of sale, a family member of the vendor of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 registers a complaint on 18.11.2020, which becomes a crime in Crime No.292/2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 354, 506, 504 read with 34 of the IPC. 4.2. The Police, after investigation, file a chargesheet dropping all the other offences and retaining Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. It is this that has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the offences even if taken on its face value would not amount to the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. The crime while being registered was glorified by registering several offences, but what remains is the offence of criminal intimidation and nothing else. Learned counsel would further submit that the family member of the vendor of petitioner Nos.1 and 2, after 23 years, is wanting to settle a score with the petitioners for the purpose of extortion. He would further submit that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have instituted a suit in O.S.No.207/2020 seeking permanent injunction against the complainant. After the institution of the suit comes the impugned complaint. Therefore, he would seek quashment of the proceedings. 6. Learned High Court Government Pleader would admit the fact that the civil suit is pending in O.S.No.207/2020, wherein petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have sought for the relief of permanent injunction against respondent No.2. 7. The complainant remains unrepresented though served long ago. Therefore, he would seek quashment of the proceedings. 6. Learned High Court Government Pleader would admit the fact that the civil suit is pending in O.S.No.207/2020, wherein petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have sought for the relief of permanent injunction against respondent No.2. 7. The complainant remains unrepresented though served long ago. Learned High Court Government Pleader would admit the fact of pendency of the civil suit, but would nonetheless submit that the chargesheet is filed and therefore, the trial is permitted to be continued. Hence, it is for the petitioners to come out clean in such full-blown trial. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The facts are all a matter of record. The purchase of the petition subject properties happens on 09.01.1997, the complainant is the family member of the vendor of petitioner Nos.1 and 2, who sell the properties to petitioner Nos.1 and 2, 23 years ago. The complaint emerges on 18.11.2020. The backdrop of the complaint is the institution of a suit by petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in O.S.No.207/2020. These facts are also not in dispute. Since the entire issue is now triggered from the registration of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint, which reads as under: The Police thereafter conduct investigation and file the chargesheet. The summary of the chargesheet as obtaining in column No.17 reads as under: (Emphasis added) 10. The summary of the chargesheet is contradictory to the facts. The chargesheet indicates that when the complainant was ploughing the land, the petitioners have entered and intimidated the complainant which would become an offence punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. The said finding in the chargesheet runs counter to the endorsement of the Tahsildar way back in the year 2011, rejecting the change of khatha on the score that the land has already been converted and a layout is formed. It is ununderstandable as to how the complainant ploughs the land in a layout that is formed after conversion, when it has lost its status of being an agricultural land. Therefore, the very chargesheet so filed suffers from want of bona fides at the hands of the complainant's pleas. 11. It is ununderstandable as to how the complainant ploughs the land in a layout that is formed after conversion, when it has lost its status of being an agricultural land. Therefore, the very chargesheet so filed suffers from want of bona fides at the hands of the complainant's pleas. 11. Be that as it may, the chargesheet nowhere indicates the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC have its ingredients in Section 503 of the IPC. Section 503 of the IPC is considered by the Apex Court in the case of MOHD. WAJID v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 , wherein it is held as under: “…. …. …. Sections 503, 504 and 506 IPC 25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. Section 503 reads thus: “ 503. Criminal intimidation .—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 26. Section 504 reads thus: “ 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace .—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 27. Section 506 reads thus: “ 506. Section 506 reads thus: “ 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation .— Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc .—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 28. An offence under Section 503 has the following essentials: (1) Threatening a person with any injury; ( i ) to his person, reputation or property; or ( ii ) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. (2) The threat must be with intent; ( i ) to cause alarm to that person; or ( ii ) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or ( iii ) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. 30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504 IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504 IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504 IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [ King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that: “ To constitute an offence under Section 504 IPC it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds .” (emphasis supplied) 32. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. 34. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present .” (Emphasis supplied) 12. The summary of the chargesheet is considered on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the case of MOHD. WAJID quoted supra. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present .” (Emphasis supplied) 12. The summary of the chargesheet is considered on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the case of MOHD. WAJID quoted supra. If further proceedings are permitted to be continued against these petitioners in the teeth of the aforesaid facts, it would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of INDER CHAND BAGRI v. JAGADISH PRASAD BAGRI , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2529 , wherein it is held as under: “…. …. …. 24. The complainant/respondent No. 1 has an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit to set aside the sale deed dated 20.06.2011 and claim damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which he is already pursuing vide Title Suit No. 160 of 2012 against the appellant-accused which is currently pending adjudication and hence the route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The appellant-accused therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant-accused are unsustainable. 25. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami , it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings against the appellant-accused herein would cause undue harassment to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 of the IPC is made out. 26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed: “102. 26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellant-accused herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant-accused herein have been made with a mala-fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal extracted above, squarely applies to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue. 28. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2024) 14 SCC 112 wherein it was observed that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 1 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts. (Emphasis supplied) 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal petition is allowed. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts. (Emphasis supplied) 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.1517/2021 (Crime No.292/2020) pending before the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Hunsur, stand quashed, qua these petitioners; (iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of these petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings against the other accused pending before any other fora.