JUDGMENT : Suddala Chalapathi Rao, J. 1. The instant appeals are filed by the appellant-assessee challenging the Common Order, dt.31.08.2005, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench “A”, Hyderabad (for short ‘the learned ITAT’) in WTA Nos.13 to 17/HYD/2000, relating to the assessment years 1994-95 to 1998-99. As the assessee is one and the same in all the matters and the issues arose therein were identical though pertaining to different assessment years, the learned ITAT heard the appeals together and disposed of by a common order. 2. Though separate appeals are filed before this Court, as the same question of law and facts arise in these appeals and the orders impugned being a common order, all these appeals were analogously heard and decided by this common order. The brief facts of the case 3. The appellant/assessee namely M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited is a company doing business in manufacturing of AC sheets, and is registered on the rolls of the Additional CIT(Assts) SR-2, Hyderabad. It had purchased an extent of 53,944 sq. meters of land in Road No.13, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, way-back in the year 1962 under a registered sale deed and out of the said total land, the constructed area was 11,913 sq. mtrs., and the remaining was vacant land admeasuring 42,013 sq. mtrs. It is contended by the appellant/assessee that an extent of 42,013 sq. mtrs has been given to Asbestos Centre(recreation centre), a society registered under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act, 1315 Fasli under a registered Irrevocable Power Of Attorney on 28.10.1975 for the use of welfare activities of the employees. 4. Further, the object of the society was to provide a common place for the welfare of the employees and their family members. It is stated by the assessee that in view of the registered irrevocable power of attorney, the land was under active possession and enjoyment of the Asbestos Centre and thus, it ceased to be belong to it thereafter. 5. It is the case of the appellant/assessee that the Assessment Officer determined that the value of the said land was exigible to wealth tax u/s.2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1968 and referred the matter to the Valuation Cell to determine the value of the property as on the said date. 5. It is the case of the appellant/assessee that the Assessment Officer determined that the value of the said land was exigible to wealth tax u/s.2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1968 and referred the matter to the Valuation Cell to determine the value of the property as on the said date. The Assessing Authority pursuant to the report of the Valuation Officer, added the value of the said land as per the valuation report to the wealth of the assessee and passed the impugned assessment order, dt.28.03.2001. 6. Aggrieved thereupon, the appellant/assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (hereinafter referred to as “CIT(A)”), inter alia contending that the property which was transferred to Asbestos Centre vide a registered Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975, it did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, could not be treated as an asset within the meaning of Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. Further it is contended that as the said property was transferred under registered Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975 and dt.26.07.1975, the Asbestos Centre is to be recognized as the holder of the property for the purposes of Urban Land Ceiling proceedings. Further, it is contended that by virtue of Irrevocable Power of Attorney, the property could not vest back with the assessee, and in view of the transfer to a Asbestos Centre for recreational and welfare purpose of the employees, it ought to have been treated as a productive asset under the provision of Section 2(ea) of the Act. 7. After due enquiry and hearing, the learned CIT(A) allowed the appeals of the assessee vide order, dt.15.02.2002, holding that the disputed property had been determined as excess land under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ‘ULC Act’) and, as it is vested with the Government, and does not belong to the assessee, the value of the said land is not exigible to wealth tax. Further, the CIT(A) held that the value of the vacant land payable to the assessee as monetary compensation by the State Government should only be taken for assessing the value of the said vacant land and further held that the excess vacant land falls under the exceptions of urban land for the purposes of wealth tax assessment and in view of the exceptions contained in Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Act, it is not exigible to tax. 8. Assailing the said orders of CIT(A), the respondent/Revenue filed appeals before the learned ITAT for the assessment years 1994-95 to 1998-99, and the learned ITAT after due enquiry and hearing, allowed the appeals of the Revenue and the said orders of the learned ITAT are impugned by the appellant/assessee in the instant appeals. 9. The instant appeals are admitted by this Court on 10.07.2006 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in ignoring the fact that by an Irrevocable Power of Attorney, the Appellant had transferred all its rights in respect of the property Asbestos Centre, and the transferee was enjoying the property adverse to the interests of the Appellant, and in concluding that the Asbestos Centre ‘”belonged” to the Appellant? 2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, having regard to the fact that the substantial part of the land was determined to be in excess of the limits under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in upholding the valuation of the land on the footing that it is the free-hold property of the Appellant? 3. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the entire land was buildable, although admittedly as at the valuation date, the land was declared to be surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 and there was no possibility of the Appellant obtaining any such permission? 4. 4. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the property was not put to productive use although indisputably, the property was being enjoyed by a welfare trust established solely for the benefit of the employees of the Appellant?” 10. The core issue which falls for consideration before this Court in all these appeals is, whether the vacant land at Road No.13, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad is exigible to wealth tax in the hands of the appellant/assessee and whether the vacant land falls under the purview of levying wealth tax by the authorities under Section 2(ea) of the Act. 11. We have heard Sri S.Ravi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant/assessee, and Ms. B.Sapna Reddy, learned Senior Standing Counsel for respondent-Revenue. Contentions of the appellant/assessee: 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/assessee contended that as the entire disputed vacant land was handed over to Asbestos Centre, Hyderabad vide registered Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975, with the object of utilizing the same for the welfare activities of the employees and their family members, and partly as a guest house to the visiting officials. Thus, the vacant land neither belong to it nor the possession of the land is with the appellant/assessee and the Asbestos Centre is in possession for more than 12 years and therefore the assessee-company cannot claim title or possession under Sections 64 & 65 of the Limitation Act, and also it falls outside the purview of the definition of “asset” under Section 2(ea) of the Act and thus, is not exigible to wealth tax. 13. It is further contended that Section 3, Section 2(m) and Section 2(ea) make it clear that assets belonging to a company are assessable to wealth tax subject to certain exceptions. As per Section 2(ea) of the Act, admittedly the vacant land as well as the land occupied by the buildings, which is not used by the company for specific purposes mentioned therein, do not fall in any of clauses 1 to 5 of Section 2(ea)(i), and also falls under exception to Section 2(ea)(v) read with Explanation I(b) which defines “urban land” and is not exigible to wealth tax. 14. Further, it is contended that the Assessing Officer determined that out of the total land held by the assessee, the constructed area is 11,931 sq. 14. Further, it is contended that the Assessing Officer determined that out of the total land held by the assessee, the constructed area is 11,931 sq. mtrs only and the vacant land is 42,013 sq. mtrs, and as the disputed vacant land does not belong to the assessee/company, referring to the Valuation Cell for determination of the value and thereby passing the impugned assessment order taking the market value as on 31.03.1994, are not sustainable under law. 15. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the first appellate authority i.e., the CIT(A) has rightly allowed the appeal holding that the disputed property had been determined as excess land under the ULC Act and as there is prohibition of granting permission for construction as it is vested with the Government extinguishing the title of the assessee, and only the monetary compensation to be paid by the Government is exigible to tax, is proper and that the impugned orders of the learned ITAT in reversing the orders of the CIT(A) are perverse and unsustainable. 16. Learned Senior Counsel also emphasizes the words “belonging to” used in the Wealth Tax Act as against “owner” used in the Income Tax Act and submitted that the vacant land already vested with the Asbestos Centre by virtue of the irrevocable Power of Attorney executed on 28.10.1975, and also as it is declared as excess ceiling land under ULC Act and as the ULC Act prohibits transfer and construction, mere non-filing rejection of application for construction is irrelevant, and therefore the excess vacant land under ULC Act cannot come within the ambit of urban vacant land, and as such contended that it would fall under Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Act, and thus, the findings of the learned ITAT were perverse and liable to be set aside. 17. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan vs Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad , 1986 SCC(Supp.) 700 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the similar issue and observed as under: “ 29. Salmond's conception of “ownership” has been noted. The meaning of the expression “belonging to” has also been noted. We have discussed the cases where the distinction between “belonging to” and “ownership” has been considered. Salmond's conception of “ownership” has been noted. The meaning of the expression “belonging to” has also been noted. We have discussed the cases where the distinction between “belonging to” and “ownership” has been considered. The following facts emerge here: (1) the assessee has parted with the possession which is one of the essentials of ownership. (2) The assessee was disentitled to recover possession from the vendee and assessee alone until the document of title is executed was entitled to sue for possession against others i.e. other than the vendee in possession in this case. The title in rem vested in the assessee. (3) The vendee was in rightful possession against the vendor. (4) The legal title, however, belonged to the vendor. (5) The assessee had not the totality of the rights that constitute title but a mere husk of it and a very important element of the husk. 30. The position is that though all statutes including the statute in question should be equitably interpreted, there is no place of equity as such in taxation laws. The concept of reality in implementing fiscal provision is relevant and the legislature in this case has not significantly used the expression “owner” but used the expression “belonging to”. The property in question legally, however, cannot be said to belong to the vendee. The vendee is in rightful possession only against the vendor. Speaking for myself, I have deliberated long on the question whether in interpreting the expression ‘belonging to’ in the Act, we should not import the maxim that “equity looks upon a thing as done which ought to have been done” and though the conveyance had not been executed in favour of the vendee, and the legal title vested with the vendor, the property should be treated as belonging to the vendee and not to the assessee. I had occasion to discuss thoroughly this aspect of the matter with my learned Brother and in view of the position that legal title still vests with the assessee, the authorities we have noted are preponderantly in favour of the view that the property should be treated as belonging to the assessee. In such circumstances, I shall not permit my doubts to prevail upon me to take the view that the property belongs to the vendee and not to the assessee. In such circumstances, I shall not permit my doubts to prevail upon me to take the view that the property belongs to the vendee and not to the assessee. I am conscious that it will work some amount of injustice in such a situation because the assessees would be made liable to bear the tax burden in such situations without having the enjoyment of the property in question. But times perhaps are yet not ripe to transmute equity on this aspect in the interpretation of law — much as I would have personally liked to do that. As Benjamin Cardozo has said: “The judge, even when he be free, is not wholly free”. A judge cannot innovate at pleasure.” 18. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though the assessee had only a husk of title, as against the world still he remained the legal owner, but if a person has use and enjoyment of the property, he would ordinarily be liable. Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits that in the instant case it is the Asbestos Centre who is the user and therefore the user should be held liable, not the assessee. By taking a cue from the said judgment, counsel submits that the Asbestos Centre alone is in actual enjoyment and possession, therefore the property cannot be treated as belonging to the assessee, as they have parted with the land way back in the year 1975. 19. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. DCM Ltd , 2005 SCC Online Del. 124 , wherein it was held that Section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act is the charging section and that Section 2(e) defines “assets” to mean property of every description, movable or immovable, subject to the statutory exclusions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that under Section 2(ea), “urban land” does not include land on which construction is not permissible under any law in force, land occupied by a building duly approved by the competent authority, or land held for industrial purposes for two years from the date of acquisition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that under Section 2(ea), “urban land” does not include land on which construction is not permissible under any law in force, land occupied by a building duly approved by the competent authority, or land held for industrial purposes for two years from the date of acquisition. Relying on this, learned Senior Counsel contends that the ULC Act prohibits both construction and transfer in respect of excess land, and therefore the disputed land falls squarely within the exception and is not exigible to wealth tax. 20. Learned Senior Counsel also places reliance on Gouri Prasad Goenka And Family (Huf) v. Commissioner Of Wealth- Tax , 1991 SCC Online Cal. 348 , wherein the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that once land vests in the State Government under the Land Ceiling Act, exemption under Section 20 of that Act cannot arise, and further held that a person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit cannot dispose of such land and it cannot be sold in an open market. It was noted that excess vacant land does not automatically vest in the State but continues to be held only until a notification under Section 10(3) of the Land Ceiling Act is issued. Learned Senior Counsel therefore contends that since the instant land has been declared as excess under the provisions of ULC Act, it cannot be put to productive use or transferred, and hence cannot be treated as an asset amenable to wealth tax. 21. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Tamil Nadu-II, Madras v. K.S.Ranganatha Mudaliar and others , (1984) 150 ITR 619 (Mad) , wherein it was held that the proper valuation of excess land is the compensation payable by the State Government under Schedule III to the Act, and not the open market value, in view of the statutory restrictions and prohibitions under the Ceiling Act. 22. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amrit Lal Jindal and Sons. v. Wealth Tax Officer , 2009 SCC Online P & H 8595 , wherein it was held that if construction on land is not permissible in law, the land cannot be considered “urban land” and is therefore excluded from the expression “assets”. v. Wealth Tax Officer , 2009 SCC Online P & H 8595 , wherein it was held that if construction on land is not permissible in law, the land cannot be considered “urban land” and is therefore excluded from the expression “assets”. On this basis, it is contended that the disputed land, is non-buildable under the ULC Act, as such is not exigible to wealth tax. Thus, contended that the orders of the learned ITAT are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 23. Further reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court at Goa in Prabhakar Keshav Kunde v. Commissioner of Income Tax and others , 2011 (1) Bom. CR 216 , wherein it was held that where part of a property is buildable and part non-buildable, the non-buildable portion must be segregated, as Section 2(ea) excludes non-buildable land from computation of net wealth. Learned Senior Counsel submits that since the disputed vacant land is rendered non-buildable by reason of the ULC Act, it would fall outside the ambit of “urban land” and thus beyond the scope of wealth tax. 24. Learned Senior Counsel has also drawn support from the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. M/s HP Small Industries & Export Corporation , 2011 SCC OnLine HP 160 wherein it was held that though the language of wealth tax and income tax are may be different, inasmuch as the words used in the Wealth Tax are ‘belonging to’ and in the Income Tax the words used are ‘owner’, there can be no dispute that ‘belonging to has to be given a much wider annotation than owner and in the instant case, the disputed land cannot be said to be ‘belonged to’. 25. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay and Others v. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. & Others, (1997) 226 ITR 625 (SC) , a three-Judge Bench decision, wherein the judgment in Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan (supra) was expressly noticed and distinguished by following the judgment in Podar Cement ’s case(supra),. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the expression “belonging to” must be construed in the light of the Explanation to Section 4 and that the expression “transfer” includes any agreement or arrangement. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the expression “belonging to” must be construed in the light of the Explanation to Section 4 and that the expression “transfer” includes any agreement or arrangement. On the strength of this judicial pronouncement, learned Senior Counsel submits that, by virtue of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed on 28.10.1975, under which possession, control and enjoyment have vested in the Asbestos Centre, the disputed land cannot be said to “belong to” the appellant-assessee and hence cannot be brought to tax under the Wealth Tax Act. 26. Learned Senior Counsel thus submits that in Podar Cement ’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even where legal ownership had not yet passed, the property does not “belonged to” the assessee, since it was not in its domain and control, as the assessee constructed shops on the land with the permission of the State and derived income there from. Drawing support from this reasoning, learned Senior Counsel contends that in the present case, the appellant/assessee had no possession by virtue of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed in 1975, as they have completely parted with possession, control and enjoyment of the disputed land in favour of the Asbestos Centre, which has since been using it for welfare activities of the employees. It is therefore contended that the disputed land cannot be said to “belong to” the appellant/assessee and, consequently, cannot be brought within the ambit of wealth tax, and thus, the orders of the learned ITAT are contrary to the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act, inasmuch as the disputed land clearly falls within Exception(b) to Section 2(ea), and is not exigible to tax, and therefore the appeals deserve to be allowed by setting aside the orders of the learned ITAT. Contentions of the respondent/Revenue: 27. Per contra, Ms. B. Sapna Reddy, learned Senior Standing Counsel, reiterating the submissions advanced in the impugned order, contends that notwithstanding the execution of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in 1975, the land continued to vest in and “belong to” the appellant/assessee. It is contended that power of attorney, irrespective of its nomenclature, does not convey title or any proprietary interest or possession in the property and at the most it would constitute the Asbestos Centre as an agent of the appellant/assessee. It is contended that power of attorney, irrespective of its nomenclature, does not convey title or any proprietary interest or possession in the property and at the most it would constitute the Asbestos Centre as an agent of the appellant/assessee. It is further submitted that the mere declaration of land as excess under the ULC Act does not by itself entitle the assessee to claim exemption under the Wealth Tax Act. 28. Learned Senior Standing Counsel further submits that the terms of the power of attorney make it evident that the assessee- company continued to remain the owner of the property, as the liability to pay taxes and other statutory dues remained with the appellant/assessee being the owner and possessor of the disputed land, and that the Asbestos Centre was only permitted to utilize the land pursuant to a Board Resolution by way of an Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed on 28.10.1975. It is emphasized that such permissive use does not divest the assessee of ownership and possession, in law. Learned Senior Standing Counsel further contends that, unlike Section 22 of the Income Tax Act which taxes the “owner”, the Wealth Tax Act imposes tax on assets “belonging to” a person, the disputed vacant land continued to belong to the assessee. The relevant portion of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan ’s case(supra) relied upon is extracted hereunder: “24. Before concluding this aspect of the matter, there is certain aspect which has to be borne in mind. Reliance was placed as we have mentioned hereinbefore on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CWT v. H.H, Maharaja F.P. Gaekwad [(1983) 144 ITR 304 (Guj)] . It was contended that if the Gujarat High Court's view was correct, then the assessee's contention on this aspect in the instant appeal cannot be accepted. On behalf of the assessee it was submitted that the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Kum. Manna G. Sarabhai [(1972) 86 ITR 153 (Guj)] not having been taken into consideration by the Gujarat High Court in the later decision, the Gujarat High Court judgment on which revenue relied was not correct. On behalf of the assessee it was submitted that the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Kum. Manna G. Sarabhai [(1972) 86 ITR 153 (Guj)] not having been taken into consideration by the Gujarat High Court in the later decision, the Gujarat High Court judgment on which revenue relied was not correct. It is not necessary in the view we have taken on the other aspect of the matter, namely, the use of the expression “belonging to” to discuss this point any further. It was further submitted before us that from the said decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. H.H. Maharaja F.P. Gaekwad [(1983) 144 ITR 304 (Guj)] , a special leave petition was filed by the assessee, which was dismissed by this Court on January 17, 1983. (See in this connection 144 ITR Statute p. 23.) It is, however, well settled that dismissal of special leave petition in limine does not clothe the decision under appeal in special leave petition with the authority of the decision of this Court. See in this connection the observations in Daryao v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1961 SC 1457 ] It may be mentioned as was rightly observed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sahu Govind Prasad v. CIT [ (1983) 144 ITR 851 , 863 (All)] special leave is a discretionary jurisdiction and the dismissal of a special leave petition cannot be construed as affirmation by this Court of the decision from which special leave was sought for.” 29. Learned Senior Standing Counsel also submits that in Poddar Cements ’ case(supra), the distinction between “owner” and “belonging to” was expressly considered, and it is asserted that in the instant case the rights in the disputed vacant land remained vested in the assessee, as the Asbestos Centre had no authority to alienate or transfer the land, and in other words, the power of attorney did not amount to an irrevocable transfer of title, and that the property does not cease to be an asset of the assessee merely because proceedings under the ULC Act were initiated. 30. 30. It is further contended by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that there has been no finality to the ULC proceedings, as the appellate authority has only remanded the matter to the Urban Land Authority for fresh consideration, and the stage contemplated under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act i.e., publication of a notification specifying particulars of the excess land, has not been reached and, until and unless, such a notification is issued, the vacant land cannot vest with the Government. Learned Senior Standing Counsel therefore submits that the land cannot be treated as excess land vested in the Government, nor can wealth tax can be restricted to notional compensation to be granted by the Government. It is also pointed out that the assessee itself preferred an appeal under Section 33, and by order, dt.04.02.2004, it resulted in remanding the matter to the competent authority for fresh consideration. Thus, it is contended that this is not the case of voluntary handing over of possession of the disputed land to the Government, nor the proceedings before the competent authority under ULC Act have attained finality. 31. Learned Senior Standing Counsel also controverts the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/assessee that the Asbestos Centre has perfected adverse possession by virtue of Sections 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as they extinguished their right. It is further contended that under Sections 10 and 14 of the ULC Act, restrictions on transfer of excess land would only be effective after issuance of the notification under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act, and as the proceedings have not yet reached that stage, such contentions are misconceived and untenable. 32. It is finally submitted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that no grounds have been made out for interference with the well-reasoned findings of the learned ITAT, and that the authorities/judgments relied upon by the appellant/assessee have no application and are distinguishable, on facts in the present case, and thus asserts that the appeals are devoid of merit and prays its dismissal. 33. We have given earnest consideration to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant/assessee and learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for respondent/Revenue, perused the material on record and also the judgments relied upon by both the learned counsel. OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS: 34. 33. We have given earnest consideration to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant/assessee and learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for respondent/Revenue, perused the material on record and also the judgments relied upon by both the learned counsel. OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS: 34. The submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/assessee are of two-fold: 1) Since the disputed vacant land stood transferred in favour of Asbestos Centre on 28.10.1975 by virtue of a registered Irrevocable Power of Attorney. the appellant/ assessee divested itself of all rights, title, and interest in the property, as a result, the land ceased to vest in the appellant/assessee from that date, and thus, question of appellant/assessee exigible to wealth tax does not arise as no liability could be fastened upon the appellant/assessee in respect of the said disputed vacant land, as the disputed vacant land no more belongs to the appellant/assessee; and 2) As the subject land has been declared as excess vacant land under Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1956, and that, by reason of such declaration, construction upon the said land is statutorily prohibited, and therefore, the disputed land squarely falls within the exception contemplated under Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, which excludes from the definition of “urban land” any land on which the construction of a building is not permissible under any law, and thus, the disputed vacant land is not exigible to wealth tax basing upon the valuation report. 35. 35. Before going into the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to extract Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Act, which are the exceptions, and it reads as under: “Explanation I: (a) ‘jewellery’ includes – xxxxxx (b) “urban land” means land situate— xxxxxxx but does not include land classified as agricultural land in the records of the Government and used for agricultural purposes or land on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the time being in force in the area in which such land is situated or the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority or any unused land held by the assessee for industrial purposes for a period of two years from the date of its acquisition by him or any land held by the assessee as stock-in-trade for a period of ten years from the date of its acquisition.” 36. Insofar as the first contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/assessee that the land had already been handed over to Asbestos Centre under a registered Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975, and thereby ceased to belong to the appellant/assessee, a thorough examination of the record makes it abundantly clear that the said document merely appointed Asbestos Centre as an agent of the appellant/assessee. The authority conferred under the instrument was only in the nature of an agency and did not convey any transfer of title, interest, ownership or possession in the immovable property. It is settled principle of law that an agent, even under an irrevocable power of mandate, does not acquire ownership rights or possessory rights and at all times, the principal remains the owner and possessor of the property. In such view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the disputed land continued to vest in the appellant/assessee, and the expression “belonging to” employed in the Wealth Tax Act squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant/assessee had ceased to be the owner and no more belonged to the appellant/assessee by virtue of alleged Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of Asbestos Centre, is not tenable and hence, rejected. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant/assessee had ceased to be the owner and no more belonged to the appellant/assessee by virtue of alleged Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of Asbestos Centre, is not tenable and hence, rejected. More so, permission to use or deal with the property does not, in law, extinguish or divest the ownership or transfer possession of the appellant/assessee. 37. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ld.Tr.Dir vs State Of Haryana & Anr , (2012) 1 SCC 656 reinforced the principle by holding that a power of attorney does not, by its execution, create or transfer any right in immovable property. In the present case as well, the ownership, title, and proprietary interest in the disputed land continued to vest in the appellant/assessee and the Asbestos Centre had no independent right to retain the property, except being an agent of the principal and at the best can convey the property to the prospective buyer under the instructions of the principal. Accordingly, in our considered view, the land continued to “belong to” the appellant/assessee within the meaning of the Wealth Tax Act, and the first contention, therefore, does not merit to be accepted and accordingly rejected. 38. Coming to the second limb of the argument that the land having been declared as excess under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1956, no construction could be made thereon and thus the disputed vacant land falls within the exception carved out in Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, for better understanding, we deem it appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of ULC Act, 1955. “ Section 9 . “ Section 9 . After the disposal of the objections, if any, received under sub-section (4) of section 8, the competent authority shall make the necessary alterations in the draft statement in accordance with the orders passed on the objections aforesaid and shall determine the vacant land held by the person concerned in excess of the ceiling limit and cause a copy of the draft statement as so altered to be served in the manner referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8 on the person concerned and where such vacant land is held under a lease, or a mortgage, or a hire-purchase agreement, or an irrevocable power of attorney, also on the owner of such vacant land. Section 10 (1) As soon as may be after the service of the statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that— (i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government ; and (ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, to be published for the information of the general public in the Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed. (2) After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. (3) At any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) the competent authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. (4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3): (i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. (5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. Explanation : In this section, in sub-section (1) of section 11 and in sections 14 and 23, "State Government", in relation to— (a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government, means the Central Government; (b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and situated in a Union territory or within the local limits of a cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), means that State Government.” 39. From a perusal of the record, it is clear that though the land was declared as excess land, the proceedings did not reach concluding stage, as the statutory requirements under Sections 9, 10(1), 10(3), and 10(6) of the ULC Act had not been completed. No notification under Section 10(3) had been issued to vest the land in the State Government, and no document is produced to show that possession had been taken under Section 10(6). No notification under Section 10(3) had been issued to vest the land in the State Government, and no document is produced to show that possession had been taken under Section 10(6). Till these steps are fulfilled, vesting of the land in favour of the Government does not arise and the land cannot be treated as one where construction is prohibited under the provisions of the ULC Act. Consequently, the mere pendency of ULC proceedings cannot bring the land within the exclusion under Explanation I(b), thus, the second contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/assessee is also untenable and hence, rejected. 40. Further as seen from the record, the appellant/assessee had preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the ULC Act, and by order dt.04.02.2004, the matter was remanded to the competent authority for fresh consideration as on that date and it is not the case of the appellant/assessee that they themselves voluntarily surrendered the excess land to the Government, so as to result in its automatic vesting in the State, and more so, even as on the date of filing of the appeal either before the learned ITAT or before this Court, no proceeding/notification issued under Section 10(3) or 10(6) of the Act is filed, and the said act stood repealed by the Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh adopted the Repeal Act with effect from 27.03.2008. In such circumstances, the question of the land vesting in favour of the Government and adopting the value of any compensation that might eventually be sanctioned by the Government for the purpose of computation or levy under the Wealth Tax Act, are misconceived and untenable. 41. In such circumstances, the question of the land vesting in favour of the Government and adopting the value of any compensation that might eventually be sanctioned by the Government for the purpose of computation or levy under the Wealth Tax Act, are misconceived and untenable. 41. It is rightly contended by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue that the land is not falling under Explanation I(b) of Section 2(ea) of the Act, in the light of the judgment in Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan ’s case( supra) wherein the distinction between ‘belonging to’ and ‘ownership’ has been considered which determine whether the land belonged to the assessee, i.e., (1) the assessee has parted with the possession which is one of the essentials of ownership; (2) the assessee was disentitled to recover possession from the vendee and until document of title is executed, assessee alone was entitled to sue for possession against others i.e., if the land was in possession of other than the vendee. The title in rem vested in the assessee; (3) the vendee was in rightful possession against the vendor; (4) the legal title, however, belonged to the vendor; and (5) the assessee had not the totality of the rights that constitute title but a mere husk of it and a very important element of the husk. 42. Further, in the instant case on hand, the assessee had not parted with possession and legal ownership, and the Asbestos Centre was in permissive possession as agent and actual possession remained with the assessee, and such residual rights are sufficient for the property to be treated as “belonging to” the assessee for wealth tax purposes and more so, the ownership rights also vested with the appellant/assessee. 43. The statutory use of the expression “belonging to” in Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, instead of “owner”, is deliberate and significant. As such, in the present case, the legal title admittedly continues with the appellant/assessee, as there has been no transfer of title or interest to Asbestos Centre, and the disputed vacant land has not vested in State, thus the proceedings under ULC Act have not attained finality. Therefore, the land, on law as well as in factual matrix, continued to belong to the appellant/assessee, and thus, the contentions of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent/Revenue, appear to be germane and valid. 44. Therefore, the land, on law as well as in factual matrix, continued to belong to the appellant/assessee, and thus, the contentions of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent/Revenue, appear to be germane and valid. 44. Insofar as the finding of the learned ITAT that there was no proceeding filed by the appellant/assessee showing rejection of construction application for construction of a building on the disputed land, though not well founded, is of limited relevance in the light of the aforesaid findings. Further, it is also not the case of the assessee that the land is used for industrial purposes, nor does it fall within any statutory exceptions, including the two-year limit showing the disputed land held as stock-in-trade. 45. Having gone into the rival contentions of both sides in the foremost paras, we have appreciated the judgments placed by the both the learned counsel and opine as follows: 46. So far as the judgment relied by the learned senior counsel for appellant in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. DCM Limited (supra) the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi dealt with circumstances where construction was legally impermissible, thereby excluding the land from the definition of “urban land.” In the present case, although the land was declared excess, the proceedings had not attained finality. Hence, the said precedent is factually distinguishable with the instant case. Likewise, the decision of the Madras High Court in K.S.Ranganatha Mudaliar ’s case(supra), relied upon by the assessee, only clarifies that for wealth-tax purposes, valuation must be based on compensation payable by the State and not on market value. However, the facts in the instant case do not attract that principle, as the ULC proceedings are not concluded and the land did not vest with the Government, and thus, the said judgments are distinguishable on facts. 47. Further, the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Gouri Prasad Goenka ’s case(supra) categorically held that vacant land does not vest in the State unless a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act is issued and the owner will hold it subject to certain conditions until a notification is issued under Section 10(3). Once the land is vested with the State, no exemption under Section 20 can be sought. In that case, such a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act has been issued. As such, the factual matrix is materially different. 48. Once the land is vested with the State, no exemption under Section 20 can be sought. In that case, such a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act has been issued. As such, the factual matrix is materially different. 48. In the case cited on the file of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amrit Lal Jindal and Sons ’s case(supra it was held that the land on which construction is completely prohibited or impermissible in law, such land would not be treated as “urban land” or an asset for wealth tax purposes. In the instant case, as already stated supra, there is no complete prohibition, as the urban land proceedings are not yet completed and the proceedings under section 20 of the Act were not yet issued, and thus, apparently there is no prohibition in totality. As such, said ruling is distinguishable and is of no assistance to appellant/assessee. 49. So also the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in M/s HP Small Industries ’ case(supra), only interpreted the expression ‘belonging to’ to read with the explanation to Section (4), and the expression ‘transfer’ was held to include any agreement or arrangement. In the said case, the land was allotted by the state government to the assessee, which thus held to be falling under ‘belonging to’ the assessee, and by interpreting the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. ’s case and Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan ’s case( supra), the Hon’ble High Court held that as the assets were under the domain and control of the assessee, even if legal ownership has not passed on to the assessee, the property in question belonged to it. In the instant case, neither there was any transfer of property or vacant land in favour of Absenters Center nor the appellant/assessee extinguished its possession on the land and as such the land continues to vest with the appellant/assessee. 50. In the instant case, neither there was any transfer of property or vacant land in favour of Absenters Center nor the appellant/assessee extinguished its possession on the land and as such the land continues to vest with the appellant/assessee. 50. Insofar as the judgment of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay at Goa in the case of Prabhakar Keshav Kunde ’s case(supra), the only principle held was that the price of the property which was not buildable was required to be segregated from the price of the property which is buildable because under Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, the non buildable property was not liable to be included while computing the wealth/assets under the wealth tax act and that in the present case, the land is vacant land as such, the question of segregation of buildable area is not applicable in the present case. 51. Insofar as the judgment relied by the learned Senior Standing Counsel in Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan ’s case( supra), in the said judgment it is categorically stated that in of taxing laws, the interpretation should be strictly done and it is also held that the words ‘belonging to’ used in the wealth tax denotes domain or lawful control over the property, which is sufficient to hold that it is exigible to wealth tax and the said case is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 52. In view of the above analysis and findings, we are of the considered view that neither ownership nor any interest in the property was transferred to the Asbestos Centre and the appellant/assessee has neither parted with the ownership or possession and the disputed vacant land still belong to it, and also as no notification under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act was issued, the proceedings under ULC Act have not attained finality and the land has not vested in the Government. Thus, the findings arrived by the learned ITAT are proper, legal, and justified and there is no perversity in the said findings of the learned ITAT. 53. In view of the above findings, we are of the considered view, that the appellant/assessee has not made out any grounds for interference of this Court with the well-considered orders of the learned ITAT. 53. In view of the above findings, we are of the considered view, that the appellant/assessee has not made out any grounds for interference of this Court with the well-considered orders of the learned ITAT. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant/assessee and in favour of the respondent/Revenue. The appeals are therefore liable to be rejected. 54. Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.