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2026 DIGILAW 74 (AP)

Kolkar Sikindar v. Dasari Venkatesh Chandrasekhar

2026-01-20

B.S.BHANUMATHI

body2026
ORDER : B.S. Bhanumathi, J. This revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order, dated 29.12.2023, dismissing I.A.No.891 of 2018 in O.S.No.341 of 2018 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, filed by third parties / petitioners Nos.1 to 6 under Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C. to implead them as defendants Nos.5 to 10 in the suit. 2. The respondents Nos.1 & 2 filed the suit against the respondents Nos.3 to 6 for perpetual injunction. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule property of Ac.3.04 cents in Sy.No.70-3 of Kadiri village and mandal of Anantapur district was originally owned by Vutla Venkata Subbaiah and he sold the same to Smt. G.Sowbhagyavathi, M. Nagarathnamma, T.Aravinda Babu and N. Sreenivasulu Reddy for consideration under a registered sale deed, dated 07.04.2011, and put them in possession of the property; that the purchasers enjoyed the property with absolute rights and subsequently, Smt. Sowbhagyavathi and the three others sold the entire plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 for consideration under a registered sale deed, dated 04.07.2011 and put them in possession. Shortly thereafter, on 18.07.2011, Smt. G.Sowbhagyavathi and the three others executed a registered rectification deed, rectifying the mistake in the name of the plaintiff No.2, i.e., instead of mentioning her name as D.C. Nagamani, it was mentioned as D.V.Nagamani in the registered sale deed, dated 04.07.2011; that mutations were made in the revenue records in the names of the plaintiffs and pattadar passbooks and title deeds were issued to the plaintiffs showing half of the plaint schedule property with demarcated sub-division survey numbers 70-3A and 70-3B; that the plaintiffs got the plaint schedule property converted for non-agricultural use vide proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kadiri in R.Dis.No.2519/2014E, dated 22.08.2014; and that the defendants, having no manner of right and possession, started interfering with the plaint schedule property and made efforts to exert pressure on the plaintiffs to alienate the same to them, but as the plaintiffs declined to do so, the defendants who are realtors, are making all efforts to grab the plaint schedule property in one way or the other including fabrication of revenue records. 3. 3. The defendants filed a written statement denying the case of the plaintiffs and further stating that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to D.Mangamma; that she executed an agreement of sale in favour of Vutla Venkata Subbaiah and Y. Krishna Reddy who filed a suit in O.S.No.370 of 1988 before the Court of the District Munsif, Kadiri, for its specific performance; that the suit was decreed; that decree holders transferred the decree in favour of M.Askar; that the transferee obtained a registered sale deed through Court in execution proceedings in E.P.No.44 of 1992 in O.S.No.370 of 1988; that M. Askar sold the property to the defendants under a registered sale deed, dated 19.07.2007, for a valid consideration and put the purchasers in possession of the property; that D.Mangamma filed an application in E.A.No.66 of 1989 for grant of cheque and received the amount deposited for balance of consideration by accepting the decree; that D.Mangamma could not execute a Will in favour of Vutla Venkata Subbaiah; that when there were rumors in the town that Venkata Subbaiah is going to alienate the property in favour of third parties, the defendants raised an objection setting out the facts to the Sub- Registrar, Kadiri and requesting him not to entertain any deed of alienation in respect of the plaint schedule property and further, the defendants got a notice published in Eenadu daily newspaper on22.04.2011; that Vutla Venkata Subbaiah brought into existence the sale deed in favour of M.Nagarathnamma and others, dated 07.04.2011 without having any right over the property and therefore, the said document is not valid and binding on the defendants; that on coming to know of the sale deed, dated 07.04.2011, the defendants filed a suit in O.S.No.40 of 2011 on the file of the Court of III Additional District Judge, Anantapuramu, for cancellation of the said sale deed; that Venkata Subbaiah filed a written statement, whereas the other defendants did not contest the case and the suit was decreed cancelling the sale deed, dated 07.04.2011, and therefore, the sale deed of the plaintiffs is hit by the principle of lis pendense and the plaintiffs cannot lay any claim and; that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit schedule property and therefore, there is no cause of action to file the suit. 4. 4. The petitioners in I.A.No.891 of 2018 contended that the plaint schedule property of Ac.3.04 cents in Sy.No.70-3 of Kadiri village originally belongs to Devalam Mangamma and she sold the property to Pulamithi Anand Kumar under a registered sale deed, dated 08.01.1985, for valid consideration and put the purchaser in possession; that the said Anand Kumar sold the entire property to Patan Khajamohiddin Khan for valid consideration under a registered sale deed, dated 28.07.1989 and inducted the purchaser in possession of the property; that Patan Khajamohiddin Khan, gifted Ac.1.52 cents with specific boundaries out of the said property to his daughter, Kolkar Khamarunnisa, under registered gift deed, dated 28.02.1991, and delivered possession of the same; that he remained in possession of the rest of Ac.1.52 cents; that the revenue authorities, after conducting enquiry, granted pattadar passbook and title deed to Kolkar Khamarunnisa; that Khamarunnisa, in turn, gifted a single plot of Ac.0-47 ½ cents out of her property of Ac.1.52 cents under a registered gift deed, dated 20.03.2006 to the petitioner No.2 and inducted her in possession of the same; that since then, they have been in possession of their respective properties; while the things stood thus, as (1) Vutla Venkata Subbaiah, (2) Y.Krishna Reddy, (3) M.Askar, (4) M.Arshad Basha @ Munna / respondent No.5, (5) K.Abubakar / respondent No.3, (6) G.Nayazuddin / respondent No.4, (7) S.Aslam Khan / respondent No.6; (8) Guduru Soubhagyavathi, (9) Mannem Nagarathnamma, (10) Thatanagari Aravinda Babu and (11) Naguru Sreenivasulu Reddy tried to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the property by creating false documents, the petitioner No.2 filed suit in O.S.No.386 of 2011 and Kolkar Khamarunnisa filed O.S.No.375 of 2011 before the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, against all the said eleven persons seeking perpetual injunction with regard to their respective properties; that the defendants remained ex parte and decrees have been passed on 21.03.2013 in both the suits; that Kolkar Khamarunnisa died in the year 2016 leaving behind her the petitioners Nos.1 to 6 to succeed her property of Ac.1.04 ½ cents and that apart, the petitioner No.2 is the owner of Ac.0.47 ½ cents and; that therefore, the petitioners have right, title and possession over Ac.1.52 cents out of the plaint schedule property of Ac.3.04 cents and are proper and necessary parties to the suit. 5. The petition was opposed by filing counters. 6. 5. The petition was opposed by filing counters. 6. The respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed a separate counter stating that the petitioners have suppressed the material facts and approached the Court with all false and distorted versions, and reiterated the case pleaded in the plaint and further stated as follows: The respondents Nos.3 to 6, the defendants, have no manner of right and possession over the plaint schedule property at any point of time. In view of the threats of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.341 of 2018 against the respondents Nos.3 to 6, i.e., defendants Nos.1 to 4 seeking permanent injunction along with a petition in I.A.No.784 of 2018 for temporary injunction. The trial Court passed ad-interim injunction order on 25.07.2018 restraining the respondents Nos.3 to 6 from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 over the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.27685 of 2018 before this Court against the State and the local police officials and this Court directed the local police not to interfere in the civil dispute between the respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 and the respondents Nos. 3 to 6 / defendants Nos.1 to 4 till disposal of the writ petition. The respondents Nos.3 to 6, having kept quiet for considerable period and when the respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 purchased the suit property, started to interfere with their possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. The respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 are not parties to the alleged documents and the ex parte decrees referred to above. The petitioners have nothing to do with the plaint schedule property. The suit filed by the respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 against the respondents Nos.3 to 6 / defendants Nos.1 to 4 is one for permanent injunction simplicitor. It is not a declaratory suit to adjudicate upon the so called right, title, possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over part of the suit property. The remedy of the petitioners is to seek appropriate reliefs in a properly framed suit with regard to their alleged rights in part of the suit property. It is not a declaratory suit to adjudicate upon the so called right, title, possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over part of the suit property. The remedy of the petitioners is to seek appropriate reliefs in a properly framed suit with regard to their alleged rights in part of the suit property. The present petition to bring them on record as parties to the suit to adjudicate their right and title to part of the suit property is not at all maintainable. Further, the petitioners are third parties and are not entitled to seek amendment of the plaint filed by the respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2.The petition is mala fide and liable to be dismissed. 7. The respondents Nos.3 to 6 filed a separate counter with the following averments: These respondents alone are the owners of the plaint schedule property and their right was also confirmed by the District Judge, Ananthapuramu. Further, the Sub-Registrar, Kadiri also cancelled the deed as per the directions of the District Judge, Ananthapuramu, in O.S.No.372 of 1988. The possession of the property has been delivered through the agreement of sale. The petitioners colluded with the respondents Nos.1 and 2, i.e., the plaintiffs and filed the petition only to drag on the proceedings. Further, the petitioners have remedy also to file a separate suit. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. After hearing all the parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition holding that the petitioners are not necessary parties and without their presence, the suit can be completely decided. It is further observed that in a suit for perpetual injunction, threat by the defendant to dispossess the plaintiff or with such apprehension, the cause of action for the suit would arise, but in the present suit, there is no such threat from the petitioners and thus, there is no cause of action in the suit against them as defendants. 9. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition was filed by the proposed parties mainly contending that pending the suit, I.A.No.891 of 2018 was filed on 21.08.2018 whereas the written statement was filed on 07.08.2018 and therefore, there is no much delay in the approach of the petitioners to file the petition in I.A.No.891 of 2018. 9. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition was filed by the proposed parties mainly contending that pending the suit, I.A.No.891 of 2018 was filed on 21.08.2018 whereas the written statement was filed on 07.08.2018 and therefore, there is no much delay in the approach of the petitioners to file the petition in I.A.No.891 of 2018. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the petition in spite of the best cause shown by the petitioners and the presence of the petitioners in the suit would facilitate the Court to examine whether there is any negligence or collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos.1 to 4 and that unless the petitioners are impleaded, immense prejudice would be caused to them and that it is necessary to implead them to avoid future litigation in relation to the plaint schedule proeprty. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that even in a suit for perpetual injunction, third parties can be impleded as defendants at their instance as there is no hard and fast rule that a third party cannot be added though such a party is a necessary or proper party for complete / better adjudication of the lis. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Racharla Thirupathi and others Vs. Gundala Shobha Rani and others , 2013 (5) ALT 209 (S.B) and S.M.M.Jahangir Ali Khan Vs. Markazi Qutub Khana (Library), rep. by its President, Mr. Mohammed Abdul Khader and another, 2016 (3) ALT 754 (S.B) a. In Racharla Thirupathi and others (1 supra), it was held at paragraphs Nos.5, 10 and 11 as follows: “5. Order I Rule 10(2) CPC confers discretion on the Court, either to strike out or add parties, at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of any party. The main criterion for addition of parties is to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicateupon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Whether a person is a necessary or a proper party depends upon the nature of the dispute raised and the relief claimed by the plaintiff. 10. In the ultimate analysis, the Court is required to see whether the persons who claim to be impleaded have direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute and whether their presence would help the Court to finally and completely adjudicate the dispute. 11. 10. In the ultimate analysis, the Court is required to see whether the persons who claim to be impleaded have direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute and whether their presence would help the Court to finally and completely adjudicate the dispute. 11. In the instant case, the petitioners have specifically pleaded that they have purchased the plots carved out of Sy. No. 532 and 533. The suit is filed in respect of the land situated in Sy. No. 533/A2. For the mere fact that the petitioners did not specify as to in which of the two survey numbers their plots have fallen, they cannot be non-suited. This aspect needs to be necessarily adjudicated in the suit itself. Having regard to the averments on which the petitioners filed the application for theft; impleadment, it cannot be denied that they have direct interest in the subject matter of the suit. As to what extent they have interest and whether respondent No. 1 / plaintiff is entitled to the grant of injunction or not, need to be examined in the suit. Even if the petitioners are not necessary parties, surely, they are proper parties. Besides respondent No. 1 / plaintiff not suffering any distinct disadvantage due to the impleadment of the petitioners, the latter's impleadment in the suit would, indeed, avoid multiplicity of proceedings, in that, if the plaintiff succeeds in convincing the Court for granting a decree of injunction in the presence of the petitioners, such decree would bind the petitioners as well, obviating the necessity for the plaintiff to face separate civil proceedings that may be initiated by the petitioners if their application for impleadment is dismissed. On a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the petitioners deserved to be impleaded as defendants in the suit.” b. In S.M.M. Jahangir Ali Khan (supra), the plaintiff filed suit against the G.H.M.C. for perpetual injunction to restrain it and its employees from either interfering in any manner with the suit schedule property or demolishing it, either in part or whole and for other reliefs. In the suit, a third party wanted to be impleaded as a defendant being aggrieved by the constructions made by the plaintiff, inter alia contending that such constructions are being made unauthorizedly without obtaining approved plan and without leaving setbacks and without proper foundation endangering the lives of the neighbours. The third party, who filed the impleadment petition submitted a representation to G.H.M.C. and complained to the police authorities. When the authorities failed to act upon, the third party filed writ petition in W.P.No.15703 of 2015 before the High Court. The High Court directed G.H.M.C. to take further action. The plaintiff who is a party to the writ petition, filed the suit immediately after the order in the writ petition, without impleading the writ petitioner as a party to the suit and obtained status quo order in the interlocutory application filed along with the suit. The petition for impleading third party was resisted by the plaintiff. The third party / petitioner contended that though the plaintiff is a dominant litigant, a Court can direct impleadment of such party and placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [ (1992) 2 SCC 524 ], wherein the Supreme Court held that a Court in its discretion can direct a plaintiff, though dominant litigant, to implead a person as a necessary party if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. In that backdrop, the High Court allowed impleadment of third party as a defendant for effective adjudication of the suit. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 / plaintiffs submitted that the petitioners can file a separate suit, if at all, they have any grievance and that in a suit for perpetual injunction, they are not necessary or proper parties and therefore, the trial Court dismissed the petition. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and others, (2010) 7 Supreme Court Cases 417. In paragraph No.15 of the said decision, the phrases, ‘necessary party’ and ‘proper party’ are explained as follows: “A 'necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. In paragraph No.15 of the said decision, the phrases, ‘necessary party’ and ‘proper party’ are explained as follows: “A 'necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a 'necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of oragainst whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right / interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.” After thorough examination of the decisions in the previous decided cases and the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, it was held that appellant was neither a necessary party nor a proper party as he is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein and relief was sought by the plaintiff against the appellant. It was also observed that an effective decree can be passed even in the absence of the appellant. 12. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners distinguished the application of the decision in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited (supra), on the ground that it was rendered in a suit for specific performance, whereas the present case is a suit for perpetual injunction and that each case is to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances. 13. As can be seen from the above discussion and the decisions referred by the revision petitioners, there is no absolute bar against the impleadment of a third party in a suit for perpetual injunction in spite of resistance by the plaintiffs. What is to be examined is the necessity to implead a party to the suit. 14. 13. As can be seen from the above discussion and the decisions referred by the revision petitioners, there is no absolute bar against the impleadment of a third party in a suit for perpetual injunction in spite of resistance by the plaintiffs. What is to be examined is the necessity to implead a party to the suit. 14. The case pleaded by both the parties to the suit and the petitioners, as indicated above, clearly make out that the contention of the petitioners is not frivolous, but needs a detailed trial. The relief of perpetual injunction being a discretionary relief, a party can show that a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief claimed. As such, though the plaintiff does not choose to seek any relief against the defendant alleging threat of dispossession, a third party who has a good case to resist the relief of the plaintiff can be added as a proper party. In a suit for perpetual injunction, though the question of possession is primary and essential, question of title is incidental and assumes significance in many aspects. It is often argued that the proposed party can lay a separate suit, if at all has a good case in a suit for perpetual injunction. However, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting approaches and meanwhile, creating chaos in the rights over the property further leading to multiplicity of proceedings, in a given case, if necessary, a third party can be allowed to be impleaded even in a suit for perpetual injunction. 15. The case on hand is one such case where the impleadment of third party can be allowed for better and complete adjudication of the lis. Without appreciating the subject in a proper perspective, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the petition and therefore, the order impugned in the revision is liable to be set aside. 16. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. The order, dated 29.12.2023, in I.A.No.891 of 2018 in O.S.No.341 of 2018 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, is set aside.As a sequel, I.A.No.891 of 2018 is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.