ORDER : Sanjeet Purohit, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed with the following prayers: a) This Writ Petition may kindly be allowed with cost throughout; and b) By an appropriate order, writ direction the impugned order dated 31.03.2022 (Annexure P/6) and 28.07.2022 (Annexure P/8) passed by learned District Judge, Bhilwara in Case No.44/2019 Civil Original (Satya Narayan Derashri vs. Public at large), by which application under Section 152 read with Section 151 of the CPC and application under Section 378 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 was rejected may kindly be quashed and set aside and application dated 09.02.2022 (Annexure P/5) and 11.04.2022 (Annexure P/7) filed by the Petitioner may kindly be allowed as prayed; and c) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which is considered just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. 2. Explaining the facts of the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that an application under Section 372 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“Act of 1925”) was filed for issuance of succession certificate with regard to 265 shares of Super House Leather Limited. The said application was allowed vide judgment dated 05.03.2021 and succession certificate regarding 265 shares was issued in favour of the petitioner. 2.1 Later on, the petitioner preferred an application under Section 152 read with section 151 CPC, mentioning therein that due to typographical error, the number of share has been wrongly mentioned as 265 instead of 330 shares and thus prayed for correction in the order of succession certificate dated 05.03.2021. 2.2 Learned trial Court vide its order dated 31.03.2022, rejected the said application, holding that there has been no clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment, nor any error committed due to any accidental slip or omission as the judgment was based strictly in consonance with the pleadings of the petitioner and evidence adduced in that regard. 2.3 After rejection of the said application, another application under Section 378 of Act of 1925 was filed with request to issue amended certificate, however, the said application also dismissed vide order dated 28.07.2022. Challenging the said orders dated 31.03.2022 and 28.07.2022, present writ petition has been filed. 3. 2.3 After rejection of the said application, another application under Section 378 of Act of 1925 was filed with request to issue amended certificate, however, the said application also dismissed vide order dated 28.07.2022. Challenging the said orders dated 31.03.2022 and 28.07.2022, present writ petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that as a matter of fact, there are 330 shares but the same has wrongly been mentioned as 265 shares in the application preferred under Section 372 of the Act of 1925. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that it is only after receiving the communication from the respective company informing the actual number of shares that the petitioner came to know about the exact number of shares and thus the application for correction in original order dated 05.03.2021 was filed. 3.1 It is contended learned trial Court has failed to take into account the fact that due to clerical or typographical error, the number of shares was wrongly mentioned, and, therefore, the same ought to have been corrected by the learned Court below. 3.2 It is further stated that since the original application of the petitioner under Section 372 of the Act of 1925 has not been contested by any person, therefore, no prejudice was to be caused to any other party and thus the refusal to introduce necessary corrections/modifications was not at all justified. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on record. 5. This Court finds that the orders impugned in the present writ petition are dated 31.03.2022 and 28.07.2022, whereas the present writ petition has been filed on 04.07.2024 i.e. after lapse of two years. 5.1 Bare perusal of the memo of writ petition clearly shows that no explanation with regard to the delay caused in filing the writ petition has been mentioned in the writ petition. The law is well settled that although there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging orders passed by learned Civil Court, however, the same does not provide uncontrolled and unbridled liberty to the petitioner to challenge the orders passed by learned Civil Court at any point of time, that too after gross unexplained delay. 5.2 This observation finds support from the judgment passed by this Court in Moti Lal Dangi Vs. 5.2 This observation finds support from the judgment passed by this Court in Moti Lal Dangi Vs. Madhusudan Janwar and Anr. 2008 (2) WLN 124 (Raj.) wherein the writ petition filed after unexplained delay of 14 months has been dismissed by this Court. The relevant para of the same are quoted below:- “6. It is true that the trial commences from the stage of framing of issues as laid down by the Honble Apex Court and at the same time, Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC gives power to the Courts to allow amendment but on condition of showing due diligence of the party seeking amendment, than it is not a case where the Court lacks power to allow the amendment at all. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that the plea taken by the petitioner is inconsistent. This question will not remain more because of the fact that in certain facts and circumstances, there may be inconsistent and alternate plea also but that depends upon the facts of each case. I do not find any reason to reject this application on this ground. 8. In this case, the plea is a legal plea and could have been taken by learned Counsel for the petitioner who might have drafted the written statement and the Court should be liberal in allowing legal defence in written statement. Therefore, in view of the above reason, it is difficult to blame the petitioner alone for not taking legal defence in original written statement. Therefore, taking a liberal view, the writ petition is allowed, the order of the trial Court dt. 30.08.2007 is set aside and the amendment application is allowed but on payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the respondent.’’ 5.3 Reliance can also be placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Kishan Chand Bothra & Anr. Vs. Lal Chand Bothra & Ors. 2008 (3) DNJ (Raj) 1270 wherein this Court has held that writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the Civil Court ought to be filed within reasonable time and else are liable to be rejected on that count alone. The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below:- “23. Vs. Lal Chand Bothra & Ors. 2008 (3) DNJ (Raj) 1270 wherein this Court has held that writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the Civil Court ought to be filed within reasonable time and else are liable to be rejected on that count alone. The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below:- “23. Profitable it shall be to recall that before amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, even when a revision petition in relation to an interlocutory orders was maintained on the grounds as spelt out in Section 115(1) CPC and when a case was made out of the impugned order resulting in failure of justice or irreparable injury, as per the requirements of proviso (b) to Section 115(1) as inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976, the limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 115 CPC had always been 90 days as per Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963. With the change in the law of procedure as noticed hereinabove, when an interlocutory order passed by a civil Court during the course of a civil litigation is now attempted to be challenged while invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, by the very nature of proceedings, a litigant cannot be acceded the latitude to take up such challenge at any time at his sweet will. 24. Even when no limitation as such is provided for filing a petition for writ yet, for the purpose of the petitions of the present nature, 90 days period as provided for the revision petitions under the Limitation Act could, broadly, be considered to be a reasonable period of time for taking up such challenge, subject to variance on either side of that period in the circumstances of a particular matter. However, and in any case, it cannot be assumed that with amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly to Section 115; and with the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai and Salem Advocate, a litigant has been acceded a freedom to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court at any time, thereby putting into uncertainty the very progress of a civil litigation before the subordinate Court. This Court is of opinion that the writ petitions so filed against the orders passed by the civil Courts ought to conform to the reasonable time limit requirement and else are liable to be rejected on this count alone unless sufficient cause is shown for delay. 25. It is noticed that in the present matters, the petitioners in the first place filed a revision petition against the order dated 26.04.2007 as passed in Civil Suit No.44/2005, of course within limitation, but did not put any challenge to the other two orders of the even date for long despite having obtained the certified copies of the three orders more or less simultaneously, a few days from the date of the order; and, only after notices were issued in the revision petition on 30.10.2007 that the petitioners proceeded to file the writ petitions in other two matters. Noticeable it is, as pointed hereinbefore, that the writ petitions contain even the ground that is relevant for the revision petition.’’ 5.4 In view of the peculiar facts of the present case and in light of the law laid down by this Court in the judgments cited above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition, having been filed after a lapse of around two years without any justifiable explanation for the delay, is not maintainable. 6. There apart, while examining the merits of the challenge laid by the petitioner, this Court finds that admittedly the petitioner himself, by way of filing the application under Section 372 of the Act of 1925, has prayed for issuance of succession certificate in relation to 265 shares. Even in the affidavit filed and evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner, the prayer is made with regard to 265 shares only. Accordingly, the order for grant of succession certificate has been passed in relation to 265 shares only. The order so passed by the learned trial Court on 05.03.2021 was wholly justified and strictly in consonance with the pleadings and evidence available on record. Accordingly, the order for grant of succession certificate has been passed in relation to 265 shares only. The order so passed by the learned trial Court on 05.03.2021 was wholly justified and strictly in consonance with the pleadings and evidence available on record. 6.1 Though Section 152 of CPC provides the learned trial Court with the power to amend the judgment, decree or order in case any clerical or arithmetical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission occurs, however, in the present case there has been no clerical, typographical or arithmetical mistake in the order dated 05.03.2021 passed by the learned trial Court as the same was based on the pleadings and evidence available on record. 6.2 Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined in its scope to the correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions in judgments, decrees, or orders of the Court. It is not intended to serve as a mechanism for rectifying substantive errors, omissions, or lapses attributable to the petitioner in the conduct of his own suit or in the evidence led by him. This Court is of the considered view that permitting the invocation of Section 152 of the CPC to cure defects or mistakes committed by a party in the pleadings or affidavits would amount to reopening the adjudicatory process. Such an approach would undermine the finality and sanctity of the adjudication rendered by the learned Civil Court and would defeat the very purpose of orderly and conclusive judicial proceedings. Thus, the rejection of the first application vide order dated 31.03.2022 was wholly justified. 6.3 The said order was not challenged by the petitioner at that point of time and the same has attained finality. Thereafter, the petitioner himself filed another application under Section 378 of the Indian Succession Act, with the same averments and praying for the same relief, thus the said application was also rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 28.07.2022. 6.4 Learned trial Court has rightly observed that once the application of similar nature under Section 151 and 152 CPC was already rejected, no such application of similar nature can be entertained at the subsequent stage. 6.4 Learned trial Court has rightly observed that once the application of similar nature under Section 151 and 152 CPC was already rejected, no such application of similar nature can be entertained at the subsequent stage. It is the settled position of law that where an aspect has already been decided by Civil Court, the same cannot be allowed to be re-agitated as the principle of res-judicata operates at each stage of the proceedings. In this view of the matter, the rejection of the subsequent application of similar nature vide order dated 28.07.2022 is wholly justified. 7. The petitioner has failed to establish any error apparent on the face of the record or any jurisdictional error being committed by the learned trial Court in passing the order impugned, warranting the interference of this Court. The scope of interference by this Court under its supervisory jurisdiction is very limited. The contours of Article 227 of the Constitution of India have well being delineated ad nauseum and reference may be made for the purpose to some salutary pronouncements such as Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 . Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 385 . Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 - instead of burdening this judgment with copious quotes therefrom. It has been broadly held therein that the interlocutory orders of the courts below not be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution of India unless such orders are palpably vitiated by capriciousness, perversity, error of jurisdiction or such like root causes leading to manifest injustice. The amendment to Section 115 CPC effective 1.7.2002 vide the Code of Civil Procedure (Amended) Act, 1999 was intended to be a prescription to overcome delays in trials of civil suits which delays are notorious and adversely commented on publically. The salutary provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to be casually invoked to circumvent legislative intent clear from the CPC amendment effective 1.7.2002. No doubt the court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is ever present but its exercise has to be guarded and confined to situations referred to above. None of the aforesaid situations obtain in the instant case. No doubt the court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is ever present but its exercise has to be guarded and confined to situations referred to above. None of the aforesaid situations obtain in the instant case. The scope of interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very much limited and looking to the peculiar facts of the present case, more particularly the conduct of the petitioner in filing the application of similar nature, so also filing the present writ petition after gross unexplained delay of two years, this Court does not find the present writ petition a fit case for interference. 8. Thus the present writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed. 9. All pending application(s), if any, hereby stand(s) disposed of.