ORDER : Ravi Chirania, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by a Judicial Officer who has challenged his punishment order dated 05.08.2013, therefore, two observations as made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to judicial service, in two different judgments, being relevant for the case, are quoted as under:- “ Judicial Service is not a service in the sense of an employment. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. Their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation ”. Another observation as made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is “ a Judge holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives. 1.1. Keeping the above two observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as made in two different judgments, this Court proceeds to decide the present writ petition in which challenge has been made to the impugned order dated 05.08.2013, whereby the petitioner was punished with the stoppage of three Annual Grade Increments without cumulative effect by the Full Court of the High Court, communicated to him by the order impugned in the writ petition. 2. Learned Senior counsel Mr.R.B. Mathur assisted by Advocate Ms.Nishita Gambhia submitted that the complete case as set up against the petitioner is baseless and without any foundation. Learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner has an unblemished service record as a Judicial Officer. He further submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) Judicial Magistrate in the year 1996 and since then he is performing his services without any complaint, show cause notice and no departmental enquiry was ever initiated against him as a Judicial Officer. Surprisingly, he was served with the charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ' CCA Rules, 1958 , for short), dated 04.01.2010, whereby three charges were communicated to him by Memorandum dated 04.01.2010. Surprisingly, he was served with the charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ' CCA Rules, 1958 , for short), dated 04.01.2010, whereby three charges were communicated to him by Memorandum dated 04.01.2010. The charges as levelled against him are reproduced as under:- “ 1. That, two Civil Suits bearing No.32/1980 (190/1980) Mandir Shri Nrisinghji Maharaj Vs. Banwari Lal Agrawal & Ors. and No.31/1980 Mandir Shri Nrisinghji Maharaj Vs. Prabhudayal Meena, were pending in the Court of ADJ (FT) No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Shri Banwari Lal Agrawal, your father, was defendant in the first case and was counsel for the defendants in both the cases. 2. That, since your father was defendant in the Civil Suit No.32/1980 (190/1980) Mandir Shri Nrisinghji Maharaj Vs. Banwari Lal Agrawal & Ors. and counsel for the defendant in the Civil Suit No.31/1980 Mandir Shri Nrisinghji Maharaj Vs. Prabhudayal Meena, you approached Shri Mahendra Sharma the presiding Officer of the Court of ADJ (FT) No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur which is evident from the order sheet dated 29.11.2008 drawn in the Civil Suit No.32/1980. Thus, you interfered in the administration of justice and judicial proceedings. 3. That, your above act is misconduct and unbecoming of a judicial officer. Thereby, you failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty which amounts to violation of provisions of Rule 3 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct Rules), 1971. 3. Learned senior counsel submitted that on receipt of the above mentioned charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his explanation on time along-with three affidavits; one of his Father Banwari Lal Agarwal, a practicing Advocate, another of Advocate Dheeraj Gupta, a practicing of District Court and the third affidavit of one PrabhuDayal S/o Gatti Lal. 4. Learned senior counsel further submitted that, in the explanation as submitted, it was specifically stated that the concerned Judicial Officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘ said Judge ’) who was working and posted as ADJ No.5, namely Shri Mahendra Kumar Sharma was an Officer senior to him in the Judicial services and he never tried to approach him directly or indirectly, and therefore, the fact as recorded by the said Judge in a case pending before him in the order sheet dated 29.11.2008, is false and baseless, as he has no knowledge about the same. 5. 5. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner, upon receiving the charge sheet, inquired about the facts from his father, namely Banwari Lal Agarwal, a practicing advocate of the District Court (who is also an advocate as well as litigant in that case), who then applied for the certified copy of the order and informed him the facts, however, his father also denied knowing anything about the order dated 29.11.2008, passed in a pending case, in respect of which, he was issued the impugned charge- sheet. Lastly, in the explanation, it was stated that he is innocent and unaware of any allegation of approaching the said Judge in the mentioned case, and therefore, prayed for dropping the charge sheet by referring to the above-mentioned three affidavits. 6. Learned senior counsel submitted that sufficient justification was stated on oath in the three affidavits, in which it was clearly stated that no attempt or effort was made to approach or influence the said judge in the pending case, and therefore, the allegations are false and baseless. Without properly considering the explanation, three affidavits, and other relevant record/documents, the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge recorded that charge No.1 was factual in nature, however, found the charge Nos.2 and 3 to be partially proved. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge, in his enquiry report dated 17.04.2023, committed a serious mistake and failed to consider the fact that on 29.11.2008, petitioner was not present in Jaipur, rather was performing his duties as a Judicial Officer in District Alwar, where he was posted, and therefore, there was no occasion for him to influence or to approach the said Judge on the said date. 7. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge also failed to consider the fact that the petitioner admittedly, was not known to the said Judge, which he (the said Judge) had also accepted, and further no subordinate officer would ever attempt to approach or influence his Senior Officer. Learned senior counsel fairly admitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge, the then sitting Hon’ble Judge of the High Court, provided sufficient opportunities of hearing to the petitioner, who appeared in person. Learned senior counsel fairly admitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge, the then sitting Hon’ble Judge of the High Court, provided sufficient opportunities of hearing to the petitioner, who appeared in person. Learned senior counsel further submitted that perusal of the order dated 29.11.2008 shows that the said judge did not specifically named the petitioner in the order, and therefore, there was no reason or basis for the respondents to issue him the impugned charge sheet, however, this fact has also not been considered by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in its report. He, therefore, prayed that the punishment imposed upon him of stoppage of three annual grade increments without cumulative effect by the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court, communicated via the impugned order dated 05.08.2013, be quashed and set aside. 8. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principle Seat, Jodhpur in the case of Rakesh Katara Vs. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan , 2016(4) WLN 499 (Raj.) . The referred relevant para Nos.20, 21 & 22 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer & Ors., reported in (1985)3 SCC 378 , held that an Enquiry Officer must assign reason as to why the evidence produced in defence did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. The Enquiry Officer must permit a peep into his mind as to why evidence produced by the management appeal to him in preference to the evidence produced by the delinquent. A report of enquiry must show the reasons for conclusions and it cannot be an ipse-dixit of Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking one in the sense that the conclusion must be supported by cogent reasons that appealed to the Enquiry Officer. It should all the more necessary where quasi-judicial enquiry attaches a stigma to the character of a delinquent. 21. In the case in hand, the allegation against the delinquent officer is very serious. If a judicial officer exerts pressure upon any party before it for his personal gains, then such officer is not a person fit to hold the office. It should all the more necessary where quasi-judicial enquiry attaches a stigma to the character of a delinquent. 21. In the case in hand, the allegation against the delinquent officer is very serious. If a judicial officer exerts pressure upon any party before it for his personal gains, then such officer is not a person fit to hold the office. In the case in hand, though the penalty imposed is not the severest one, but the charge is quite grave and such grave charge deserves to be proved only by definite and cogent evidence. We failed to notice any such cogent and definite evidence in the instant matter to arrive at a conclusion about involvement of the delinquent officer in commission of misconduct. Pertinent to notice that no discussion is made in the enquiry report about the evidence adduced by the witnesses even produced by the prosecution other than to Shri Bhopal Singh. No reason is given as to why Shri Bhopal Singh is found more creditworthy vis- a-vis other witnesses produced by the prosecution itself. No discussion is made even of the evidence adduced by the delinquent officer in defence. 22. An important aspect of the matter is that on basis of the complaints made by the Bar Association, Dantaramgarh the delinquent officer was charged for eight allegations of misconduct, but out of those six were not found sustainable even by Hon'ble the Enquiry Judge. Hon'ble the Enquiry Judge held the delinquent guilty for charges No.6 and 4 only. The Full Court did not accept the findings arrived by Hon'ble the Enquiry Judge relating to charge No.6 and exonerated the delinquent officer from that. This fact clearly indicates that most of the allegations made in the complaints submitted by the Bar Association, Dantaramgarh were ill-founded.” 9. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors. , (2009) 2 SCC 570 , submitted that in the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned punishment order as the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority were not supported by reasons. Punjab National Bank and Ors. , (2009) 2 SCC 570 , submitted that in the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned punishment order as the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority were not supported by reasons. Learned counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment specifically held that the orders which have severe civil consequences must contain appropriate and specific reasons and in absence of the same, they cannot be said to be legal and in accordance with law. The referred relevant para Nos.21, 22 & 23 of the judgment are reproduced below:- “ 21. Yet again in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88 , this Court held: "25. ....Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." 22. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & ors. [ (2007) 1 SCC 566 ], this court followed Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), stating: "12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do." 23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 10. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India and Anr. Vs. R. Periyasamy, (2015) 3 SCC 101 . The referred relevant para Nos.9, 11 & 14 of the judgment are reproduced below:- “ 9. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, this Court observed as follows:- "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India: (1995) 6 SCC 749 , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham: (1997) 7 SCC 463 , Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana: (1999) 5 SCC 76 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. ShashiKant S Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416 )." It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this point. Suffice it to say that the law is well settled in this regard. 11. It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State Bank of India & ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde. More recently, in State Bank of India Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank- officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. 14. In administrative law, it is a settled principle that the onus of proof rests upon the party alleging the invalidity of an order. In other words, there is a presumption that the decision or executive order is properly and validly made, a presumption expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta which means 'all things are presumed to be done in due form” 11. In other words, there is a presumption that the decision or executive order is properly and validly made, a presumption expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta which means 'all things are presumed to be done in due form” 11. On the basis of the arguments as advanced and the above judgments as cited, learned senior counsel prayed that the impugned punishment order be quashed and set aside and the writ petition be allowed. 12. Per contra, learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo assisted by Advocate Mr.Pratyush Sharma appearing for the respondent strongly opposed the submissions. Learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner was rightly issued the impugned charge-sheet, as he tried to influence the said Judge by approaching him in the mentioned case, who recorded the said fact in the order dated 29.11.2008. The order dated 29.11.2008 is reproduced below:- ^^oknh&izkFkhZ ,oa izfroknh Jh cuokjhyky@vizkFkhZ izHkqn;ky ds vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky mifLFkr gSA vkt bu nksuksa ekeyks ls lEcfU/kr fjO;w vkonsu tks mDr izfroknh&vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;s x;s gS] cgl gsrq fu;r FksA gekjs }kjk oknh&izkFkhZ dk vkosnu vUrxZr vkn’sk 22 fu;e 3 lh-ih-lh bl U;k;ky; esa dk;ZHkkj lEHkkyus ls iwoZ ls yfEcr pyk vk jgk Fkk] ftlesa fn- 05-07-2008 dks cgl lqudj fnukad 02-08-2008 dks vkns’k lquk;k x;k FkkA fjO;w vkosnu ds lEcU/k esa mDr izfroknh Jh cuokjh yky@vizkFkhZ ds vf/koDrk Jh cuokjh yky us vius iq= U;kf;d vf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls gesa vizksp djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS] ftl dkj.k ekStwnk ekeys esa vkxs ge dksbZ dk;Zokgh djuk mfpr ugha leÖkrs gSaA vr% ekuuh; ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks mijkDsr izdj.k o vU; lEc+) rhuksa izdj.k vU; U;k;ky; esa vUrfjr djus gsrq fuosnu fd;k tkosA i=koyh okLrs bUrtkj vkns’k fnukad 05-12-2008 dks i’sk gksA** 13. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet for the above misconduct by memorandum dated 04.01.2010 by which three charges were communicated to him. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in which he, at the first instance by his clarification/response , failed to counter the fact as recorded by the said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in which he, at the first instance by his clarification/response , failed to counter the fact as recorded by the said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008. The explanation as submitted by the petitioner, being the relevant is reproduced under:- ^^1- ;g fd eSa Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k QkLVVªsd la[;k&5 t;iqj 'kgj dks O;fDr’k% ugha tkurk uk eSa dHkh muls feyk gwaA Jh 'kekZ lkgc esjs ls nks Js.kh ofj"B vf/kdkjh gSAa eSa rks cgqr NksVk deZpkjh gwaA eSaus dHkh Hkh Jh 'kekZ lkgc ls dksbZ vizksp flQkfj’k izR;{k ;k vizR;{k :i ls ugha dhA esjs fo:) bl izdkj ds vkjksi fcYdqy xyr yxk;s x;s gSaA 2- dfFkr U;k;ky; vknsf’kdk fnukad 29-11-08 dh ckcr eSaus vius firkth Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky] ,MoksdsV ls ekyqe fd;k rks mUgksaus izekf.kr izfrfyfi 18 tuojh 2010 dks udy izkIr dj fn[kkbZ rks fuEu ckrsa izrhr gksrh gS %& ¼v½ & eq> xksfoUn vxzoky dk uke bl vknsf’kdk esa gS gh ughaA Jh cuokjh yky th vxzoky gekjs firk ds ge nks iq= gS] nksauksa gh U;kf;d vf/kdkjh gSAa ,slk yxrk gS fd Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ dks fnukad 29-11-08 dh vknsf’kdk fy[krs le; rd uke ekyqe gh ugha FkkA ¼c½& bl vknsf’kdk ls ;g Hkh ekyqe ugha iMrk gS fd dc] dgka fdl izdkj ls Jh 'kekZ lkgc U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks vizksp djus dk iz;kl fd;k rFkk eq>s fn;s x;s vkjksi i= o eseksjsaMe esa Hkh bl izdkj dk mYys[k ugha gSA ¼ l½& bl izdkj Li"V rF;ksa ds fcuk Li"V mRrj Hkh fuosnu djuk laHko ugha gSA 3- ;g gS fd vkjksi i= o eseksjsaMe esa flQZa vknsf’kdk 29-11-08 dks vk/kkjk cuk;k x;k gS vU; fdlh tkap] fjiksVZ c;ku ;k f’kdk;r dk ftØ ugha gSA eq> xksfoUn vxzoky dk uke ckn esa dc] fdl vk/kkj ls bl izdj.k esa fjdkWMZ ij vk;k ;g Hkh mYysf[kr ugha gSA 4- eSaus bl laca/k esa fnukad 16-01-10 dks tfj;s ,d jftLVªh fyQkQk esa Jheku~ jftLVªkj lrdZrk t;iqj ds irs ij ekuuh; Jheku~ U;k;kf/kifr egksn;] Jheku vklksik lkgc dks lackfs/kr djrs gq, i= Hkstdj esjs fo:) f’kdk;r] vkWMZj 'khV 29-11-08 c;ku ;k tkap ;k vU; fjiksVZ dh izfrfyfi gsrq uez fuonsu fd;k Fkk] fodYi eas i=koyh fujh{k.k gsrq Hkh fuosnu fd;k Fkk] ijUrq eq>s bl ckcr dksbZ funsZ’k vHkh rd izkIr ugha gqvk gSA bl dkj.k Li"Vhdj.k Jheku~ th dh lsok eas iw.kZ rF;ksa dh tkudkjh ds vHkko esa fn;k tkuk laHko ugha gSA 5- eSa bl ekeysa esa fcYdqy funksZ"k o vufHkK gwaA ;fn bl ckcr esa vizksp djus dk gh iz;kl fd;k tkrk rks Jheku~ egUsnz dqekj th o mlds iwoZ ds U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ls Hkh fd;k tk ldrk FkkA 6- ;g fd Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ lkgc] us vknsf’kdk 29-11-08 esa ,slk vkjksi yxkus dk vk/kkj esjs firkth Jh cuokjh yky vxzoky }kjk fn;s x;s layXu 'kiFk i=ksa o vU; 'kiFki=kas ls Jheku~ dks Li"V gks tk;sxkA 7- bl lEcU/k esa ;g Hkh fuosnu gS fd Jheku~ eq> izkFkhZ dks O;fDrxr :i ls Hkh mifLFkr gksdj lquokbZ dk volj iznku djus dh Ñik djsaA vr% fuosnu gS fd esjs fo:) tkap fu;e 17 lh-lh-,- ds rgr lekIr djus dh Ñik djsaA** 14. According to learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo, the above explanation failed to counter the specific fact as recorded by the said Judge in the order, however, in support the petitioner also submitted three affidavits; one of his father Banwari Lal Agrawal, Advocate, another of Advocate Dheeraj Gupta, and one of Prabhu Dayal S/o Gatti Lal. According to learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo, the above explanation failed to counter the specific fact as recorded by the said Judge in the order, however, in support the petitioner also submitted three affidavits; one of his father Banwari Lal Agrawal, Advocate, another of Advocate Dheeraj Gupta, and one of Prabhu Dayal S/o Gatti Lal. As the said judge recorded in the order dated 29.11.2008 that father of the petitioner (through him) tried to approach him in the matter and therefore, the affidavit as submitted by father of the petitioner i.e. Advocate Banwari Lal Agarwal also relevant and therefore the same is also reproduced as under:- ^^'kiFk i= eSa cuokjh yky vxzoky ,MoksdsV iq= Lo- Jh lk/kwjke vxzoky tkfr egktu mez 74 lky fuoklh lwjtiksy] vukt e.Mh jksM] t;iqj l’kiFk dFku djrk gwa fd%& 1- esjs o esjs Hkkb;ksa ds fo:) efUnj u`flax th cuke cuokjh yky oxSjg ds uke ls okn U;k;ky; vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k QkLVVªsd la[;k&5 t;iqj 'kgj eas py jgk FkkA 2- ;g fd Jh izHkwn;ky iq= eV~Vhyky eh.kk us ,d fjV fiVh’ku 1978 esa ekuuh; jkt- mPp U;k;ky; esa efUnj ds VªLVh ds fo:) izLrqr dh Fkh fd orZeku dfFkr egUr ukjk;.knkl ds firk nkeksnj nkl efUnj dh lEifRr dks nsoLFkku foHkkx ls fudkydj csp jgs gSaA tks lEifRr csp nh mls fujLr fd;k tk,A eSa cuokjh yky vxzoky ml fjV ;kfpdk esa vf/koDrk FkkA ml ;kfpdk dh tokcnsgh ds fy, Jh izHkwn;ky eh.kk ds fo:) o esjs fo:) nokc o Mj mRiUu djus ds fy, ,d >wBk nkok lu~ 1980 esa bl vkjkis ds lkFk izLrqr dj fn;k fd izHkwn;ky us o cuokjh yky us lu~ 1969 esa okn ds 11&12 o"kZ iwoZ tehu ij dCtk dj edku cuk fy;kA bl nkok dks 30 o"kZ ls tc dHkh efUnj ds egUr ds f[kykQ dk;kZokgh djrs gS a rks vius cpko esa dke eas ysrs jgrs gSAa 3- ;g fd egUr nkeksnj nkl dfFkr ofdZax VªLVh ds nsgkUr ds ckn ukjk;.knkl us mlds LFkku ij ofdZax VªLVh cukus dk ckn esa vkns’k 22 fu;e 3 ds rgr izkFkZuk i= is’k fd;kA bldk fu.kZ; fnukad 02-08-08 dks ikfjr Jheku~ egsUnz dqekj 'kekZ }kjk ikfjr fd;k x;kA 4- bl vkns’k ds laca/k esa nksuksa nkok esa fjV ;kfpdk is’k dh xbZ fjO;w fiVh’ku dks ntZ djrs le; Jheku~ egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ ukjkt gq,A mlds i’pkr~ gj is’kh ij okfil ysus gsrq nokc Mkyrs jgsA 5- ;g fd Jheku 'kekZ lkgc ds ys[k dks ns[kdj fnukad 22-09-08 dks fyf[kr cgl is’k djuh iMhA tks fuEu ifjf’k"V&1 gS bldk isjk la[;k&2 egRoiw.kZ gSA 6- ;g fd dbZ rkjh[k cnyus ds ckn fnukad 29-11-08 dks fjO;w fiVh’ku ij ekSf[kd cgl dh tk jgh FkhA U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ds cgl ds fcUnw ewy i=koyh ds ljcjd dh iq’r ij uksV fd;s FksA cgl ds nkSjku dqN ,sls fof/kd fcUnw fuosnu fd;s tk jgs Fks ftlls fd muds }kjk ikfjr eq[; vkns’k 02-08-08 ds lEcU/k eas FksA blesa Jh 'kekZ lkgc O;fFkr gks x;s vkSj ;kfpdk dks okfil ysus gsrq nokc MkykA ftl ij ;kfpdkdrkZ U;k;ky; dh efgek o 'kkafr ds dkj.k pqi gks x;s o ckgj vk x;sA 7- ;g fd Jh 'kekZ lkgc egsUnz dqekj th vius gh vkns’k ds fo:) fjO;w fiVh’ku ls Hkh O;fFkr FksA 8- ;g fd blh ds dkj.k ls fn- 29-11-08 dh vknsf’kdk xyr :i ls fy[k nhA eSaus vius nksuksa U;kf;d vf/kdkfj;ksa iq=ksa esa ls fdlh iq= ds ek/;e ls Jheku~ egsUnz 'kekZ U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ls vizksp djus dk iz;kl ugha fd;kA** 15. Learned senior counsel submitted that by the affidavit father of the petitioner also fails to satisfactorily counter the specific allegation as recorded by the said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008. The other two affidavits though have been submitted, however, are not relevant. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge provided sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-Judicial Officer, thereafter submitted the report dated 17.04.2013 to the High Court. The said report was placed before the Full Court of the High Court, which after considering the matter resolved to impose the punishment of stoppage of three Annual Grade Increments without cumulative effect. 16. Learned senior counsel specifically argued that the Full Court in its resolution specifically recorded that the report of the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge was considered in depth and after deliberation, the report was accepted and the above mentioned punishment was passed. 17. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the present case is of a Judicial Officer who is required to perform his duties with great care & caution, impeccable integrity, devotion and honesty, however, the conduct of the petitioner, as recorded by the said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008 and also found to be proved by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in the report dated 17.04.2013 was undignified & serious misconduct, and therefore, the punishment was rightly passed by order dated 05.08.2013. 18. Learned senior counsel further submitted that in the entire arguments as raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner, there is no allegation regarding not providing the required documents, denial of sufficient opportunity of hearing, or violation of prescribed procedure in conducting the departmental proceedings and in passing the impugned punishment order. In the absence of any such allegations, and in terms of the law as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court has a limited scope of judicial review in the matters relating to departmental proceedings. 19. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel firstly relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693 . The referred relevant paras 8, 9, 10 & 14 of the judgment are as under:- “8. In Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vs. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel firstly relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693 . The referred relevant paras 8, 9, 10 & 14 of the judgment are as under:- “8. In Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vs. Chief District Medical Officer , Baripada & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1020 , this Court has laid down certain criteria for the Courts, on which it can interfere with an order of compulsory retirement and they include mala fides, if the order is based on no evidence, or if the order is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material, i.e. if it is found to be a perverse order. The Court held as under:– “(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or the Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary- in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material : in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.” (Emphasis added). 9. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Posts and Telegraphs Board & Ors. Vs. C.S.N. Murthy, AIR 1992 SC 1368 ; Sukhdeo Vs. Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati & Anr., (1996) 5 SCC 103 ; I.K. Mishra Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3740 ; M.S. Bindra Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 3058 ; and Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1661 . This Court observed that there was a very limited scope of judicial review in a case of compulsory retirement and it was permissible only on the grounds of non-application of mind; mala fides; or want of material particulars. Power to retire compulsorily a Government servant in terms of Service Rules is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms a bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement is in public interest. 10. In State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529 , this Court held that while considering the case of an employee for compulsory retirement, public interest is of paramount importance. The dishonest, corrupt and dead-wood deserve to be dispensed with. How efficient and honest an employee is, is to be assessed on the basis of the material on record, which may also be ascertained from confidential reports. However, there must be some tangible material against the employee warranting his compulsory retirement. 14. In Nawal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4303 , a similar view has been reiterated. The Court observed as under: “At the outset, it is to be reiterated that the judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4303 , a similar view has been reiterated. The Court observed as under: “At the outset, it is to be reiterated that the judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. Their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. Further, the nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost their utility. If such evaluation is done by the Committee of the High Court Judges and is affirmed in the writ petition, except in very exceptional circumstances, this Court would not interfere with the same, particularly because the order of compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority. …… Further, it is impossible to prove by positive evidence the basis for doubting the integrity of the judicial officer. In the present-day system, reliance is required to be placed on the opinion of the higher officer who had the opportunity to watch the performance of the officer concerned from close quarters and formation of his opinion with regard to the overall reputation enjoyed by the officer concerned would be the basis. …..the lower judiciary is the foundation of the judicial system. We hope that the High Courts would take appropriate steps regularly for weeding out the dead wood or the persons polluting the justice delivery system”. 20. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Registrar General, High Court of Patna Vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors. , (2012) 6 SCC 357 The referred relevant para Nos.13 to 16 of the judgment are quoted hereunder:- “ 13. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors. , (2012) 6 SCC 357 The referred relevant para Nos.13 to 16 of the judgment are quoted hereunder:- “ 13. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao , this Court made the following observations: “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 14. Elaborating on the scope of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial officer by a Committee, approved by the Full Court, in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. this Court noted as follows “As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned or the system and institutions of administration of justice with which we are concerned in this case, by going into the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court of the High Court.” 15. In Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reiterating the principle laid down in Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. In Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reiterating the principle laid down in Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. (supra), this Court observed as follows: “In case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer.” It was further observed that: “If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the order.” 16. In the present case, the recommendation of the Standing Committee to dismiss the first respondent from service was based on the findings in the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer pursuant to the departmental enquiry; his reply to the show cause notice; his ACR and other materials placed before it. The recommendation of the Standing Committee was approved and ratified by the Full Court. There is nothing on record to even remotely suggest that the evaluation made, firstly by the Standing Committee and then by the Full Court, was so arbitrary, capricious or so irrational so as to shock the conscience of the Division Bench to justify its interference with the unanimous opinion of the Full Court. There is nothing on record to even remotely suggest that the evaluation made, firstly by the Standing Committee and then by the Full Court, was so arbitrary, capricious or so irrational so as to shock the conscience of the Division Bench to justify its interference with the unanimous opinion of the Full Court. As regards the observation of the Division Bench on the reputation of the first respondent based on his ACRs, it would suffice to note that apart from the fact that an ACR does not necessarily project the overall profile of a judicial officer, the entire personal file of the respondent was before the Full Court when a conscious unanimous decision was taken to award the punishment of his dismissal from service. It is also well settled that in cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinion, a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no single factor should be allowed to be blown out of proportion either to decry or deify issues to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the very nature of such things, it would be difficult, rather almost impossible to subject such an exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial review, save and except in an extra-ordinary case when the court is convinced that some exceptional thing which ought not to have taken place has really happened and not merely because there could be another possible view or there is some grievance with the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court. [(See: Syed T.A. Naqshbandi (supra)]. 21. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Murti Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. , (2020) 1 SCC 801 . The relevant paras 10, 11, 13 & 14 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. vs State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 592 , considering the scope of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial officer approved by a Full Court, observed as follows: “7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned or the system and institutions of administration of justice with which we are concerned in this case, by going into the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court of the High Court.” 11. The question was again considered in Rajendra Singh Verma (D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) , (2011) 10 SCC 1 , reiterating the principle laid down in High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. , (2000) 1 SCC 416 , this Court observed as follows: “191. … in case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer….” It was further observed that: “192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the order. 13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. 13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter. The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judge holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives. 14. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, has the first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level of subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have serious repercussions not only on that individual but can have its fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith at this level and no impression can be afforded to be given to a litigant which may even create a perception to the contrary as the consequences can be very damaging. The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we must also observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself.” 22. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Airports Authority of India Vs. A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself.” 22. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Airports Authority of India Vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee , (2025) 4 SCC 111 . The referred relevant para Nos. 35 to 38 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “35. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, wherein it was held: 11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. 36. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the Respondent. 37. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 38. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 38. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in the Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, wherein this Court held as follows: 15. . . . A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the Respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction Under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court…….” 23. On the basis of the arguments and the judgments as cited, learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo supported the impugned order dated 05.08.2013 and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 25. This Court is cognizant of the fact that in the matter of disciplinary proceedings, power of judicial review is very limited. In the matter of departmental proceedings, the constitutional courts while exercising the power of judicial review cannot act as an appellate authority while examining the orders of the disciplinary authority, however, the difference can be made where the court notes that the prescribed procedure under the law was not followed, the enquiry report was contrary to the documents & facts, the Enquiry Officer was biased and the complete exercise, which culminated into passing the impugned punishment order is palpably arbitrary, unreasonable, unjustified, principles of natural justice were not followed or the enquiry was conducted by an incompetent authority. 26. 26. The facts of the present case, as noted from the pleadings and arguments as advanced, shows that the petitioner, a judicial officer, was issued a charge-sheet under 17 of the CCA Rules, 1958 under which three charges were levelled against him as the senior judge of the District Court, in respect of a case pending before him recorded in the order dated 29.11.2008 that father of the petitioner, through the petitioner tried to influence, as he approached the said Judge in the case. The justification/explanation given by the petitioner on receiving the charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules, 1989, as reproduced in the previous paras has also been examined by this Court, is insufficient and unsatisfactory and goes on to show that the petitioner, through his explanation along-with three affidavits as submitted, tried to question the said judge who pass the order dated 29.11.2008. This Court also noted that the petitioner through his explanation failed to answer in clear and justified words that allegations as levelled against him are baseless and there was no basis to connect him. 27. This Court further noted that the explanation as submitted by the said Judge, who passed the order dated 29.11.2008, noted that the said Judge specifically stated in his explanation/reply dated 22.05.2009 that prior to 29.11.2008 the petitioner herein met him, which amounts to approaching in the pending judicial case in which his father, Advocate Banwari Lal Agarwal, is a litigant as well as lawyer. Relevant part is quoted below:- ^^fnukad 29-11-2008 dh rkjh[k is’kh ij cgl ds nkSjku mDr vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky us [kqys U;k;ky; esa v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks ;g dgk Fkk fd os ;g tkurs gSa fd muds fo#) lEcfU/kr vkns’k D;ksa ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] tcfd gdhdr esa fnukad 29-11- 2008 dh is’kh ls iwoZ Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky vf/koDrk ds iq= Jh xksfoUn vxzoky] tks vyoj esa vij eq[; U;kf;d eftLVªsV ds in ij dk;Zjr gSa] v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ ls feys Fks] ftl dkj.k v|ksgLrkk{kjdrkZ us mijksDr frfFk dh vknsf’kdk esa ;g rF; vafdr fd;k gS fd vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky us vius iq= U;kf;d vf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks ,izksp djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS] ftl dkj.k os ekStwnk ekeys esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh djuk mfpr ugha le>rs gSa vkSj nksuksa i=kofy;ka e; fjO;w vkosnuksa ds vU; U;k;ky;ksa esa vUrfjr djus gsrq ekuuh; ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks fuosnu fd;k x;k] tks fuosnu Lohdkj dj ekuuh; ftyk ,oa lS’ku U;k;k/kh’k egksn; us lEcfU/kr i=kofy;ka fo}ku vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k QkLV Vªsd Øe&6] t;iqj uxj] t;iqj ds U;k;ky; esa vUrfjr dh gSa vkSj vc lEcfU/kr izdj.k mDr U;k;ky; esa yfEcr gSaA** 28. This Court also considered the fact as admitted by the petitioner as well as the respondent both, that the said Judge was not known to either the petitioner or his father, a practicing advocate of the district court, and therefore, there was no basis for the said Judge to make any false or baseless allegation as mentioned in the order dated 29.11.2008 and who also specifically stated the said fact in his explanation dated 22.05.2009. This Court has also considered the enquiry report dated 17.04.2013 as submitted by Hon’ble Enquiry Judge of the High Court and finds that no procedural irregularity or illegality was committed while conducting the enquiry. This Court also noted from the record of the case that the petitioner was allowed to inspect the relevant record, and therefore, the complete procedure was duly followed by the respondents. 29. This Court also noted from the record of the case that the petitioner was allowed to inspect the relevant record, and therefore, the complete procedure was duly followed by the respondents. 29. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner during the entire arguments also failed to point out that there was any non- compliance or violation of any procedure in conducting the departmental proceedings and passing of the punishment order, however, all the arguments were confined to the factual aspect, which cannot be looked into by this Court under its power of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, where the Court has to judicially review the orders/judgments etc. strictly in terms of law as cited above. 30. The recent judgment as cited before this Court by learned Senior counsel for respondent passed in the case of Ram Murti Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the previous law with regard to conduct of the said Judge & the scope of judicial review, clearly sound a caution that judicial service is not like other services. The person performing judicial services stands on a different pedestal as it acts on behalf of the state in discharge of its sovereign function. 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that dispensation of justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, the standards of probity, conduct, integrity that are relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a Judicial Officer. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that a judge holds the office of a public trust and must acts with impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core with no space for any compromise in performing the judicial duties. 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering its earlier judgments on the scope of judicial review, in the matters of Judicial Officer in the case of disciplinary proceedings, held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not a Court of appeal over the departmental authorities. Judicial review is permissible only where the Court finds that the prescribed process in reaching to the decision was not duly followed. Judicial review is permissible only where the Court finds that the prescribed process in reaching to the decision was not duly followed. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the constitutional courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, is neither permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officer concerned or the system and institutions of the administration of justice. 33. The serious observations as made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Murti Yadav (supra) and the other relevant judgment as cited before this Court has settled the law that performing the duties as Judicial Officer are not comparable with any other services and the standard of integrity, devotion, standards of ethics integrity are very high which does not permit any kind of compromise. In a democratic country like India people have great faith in judicial system, of which the district Judiciary is the strong backbone. If any conduct, which lower downs the image of the Judiciary in the mind of the common litigant, erodes the faith, then the same should not go unnoticed and deserves no leniency. The observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as quoted by this Court in the beginning of this judgment and the conduct of the petitioner which is before this Court, minutely examined by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge and imposition of punishment by the Full Court after deliberation proved the conduct of the petitioner as a Judicial Officer. Unimpeachable integrity, honesty, found to be seriously lacking and missing in the case of the petitioner as the said Judge noted his conduct in its order which he failed to counter as also examined by this Court in the above discussion. 34. This Court after considering the law as settled with regard to interference of the decisions of the Full Court in the matter of Judicial Officer is not inclined to exercise its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present case. 35. Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed. 36. No order as to costs.