JUDGMENT : Farjand Ali, J. Grievance 1. By way of filing the instant appeal, the appellant assails the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (Sessions Court) for P.C. Act Cases, Udaipur in Criminal Case No. 16/2009, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo two years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and, in default thereof, to further undergo two months’ additional imprisonment, which judgment and sentence are arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law and are liable to be quashed and set aside. Facts of the Case 2. The brief facts of the present appeal are that on 03.07.2008, the complainant Bapu Lal submitted a handwritten complaint before the Additional Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti- Corruption Bureau, Banswara. In the said complaint, he alleged that an FIR had earlier been lodged at Police Station Kalinjara by one Anita D/o Nangu, accusing his younger brother Suresh S/o Shambhu Lal, resident of Makadichor, of kidnapping and committing rape. In connection with the said case, the then Station House Officer, Kalinjara, namely Hagama Lal, arrested the complainant’s brother Suresh, his father Shambhu Lal, his uncle Prabhu Lal, and his maternal uncle Devi Lal, and sent them to judicial custody. It was further alleged that the said SHO intended to arrest the complainant’s brother-in-law, Roop Lal (Master), and upon enquiry, the complainant was informed by the SHO that a bribe of Rs.5,000/- would be required for not effecting the said arrest. The complainant stated that an amount of Rs.7,000/- had already been paid, and since he was unwilling to pay any further bribe, he sought action to catch the accused red-handed. He further asserted that he bore no enmity against the accused and requested initiation of proceedings. 3. Upon receipt of the complaint, Police Inspector Arijendra Singh Bhati, ACB, Banswara, conducted verification proceedings, during which the demand of illegal gratification by the accused was allegedly confirmed. Thereafter, trap proceedings were organized in the presence of motbir witnesses. It is alleged that when the accused accepted the bribe amount of Rs.5,000/-, and upon suspecting the presence of the ACB team, he fled from the spot. 4. Consequently, FIR No. 168/2008 was registered at ACB Chowki, Banswara, and investigation commenced. Thereafter, trap proceedings were organized in the presence of motbir witnesses. It is alleged that when the accused accepted the bribe amount of Rs.5,000/-, and upon suspecting the presence of the ACB team, he fled from the spot. 4. Consequently, FIR No. 168/2008 was registered at ACB Chowki, Banswara, and investigation commenced. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused-appellant for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 201 IPC. Charges were framed accordingly, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. During trial, the prosecution examined 19 witnesses and produced documentary evidence marked as Exhibits P-1 to P-33. The statement of the accused-appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the prosecution allegations, claimed false implication, and asserted that he neither demanded nor accepted any bribe. 6. After hearing arguments from both sides and upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned trial court concluded that the prosecution had proved the charge under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, vide judgment dated 27.10.2015, the accused-appellant was convicted under Section 7 of the P.C. Act and sentenced to undergo two years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.20,000/-, and in default thereof, to further undergo two months’ imprisonment. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2015, the accused-appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 8. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials. Observations of the Court 9. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the Bar and has minutely examined the entire oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, including the impugned judgment of the learned trial court, the depositions of prosecution witnesses, the trap proceedings, the alleged transcript of the electronic recording, and the findings recorded while acquitting the accused under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 10.At the outset, it is significant to note that the prosecution case rests primarily on the alleged demand of illegal gratification, as no recovery of tainted money from the possession of the accused-appellant has been effected. 10.At the outset, it is significant to note that the prosecution case rests primarily on the alleged demand of illegal gratification, as no recovery of tainted money from the possession of the accused-appellant has been effected. The law is well settled that in prosecutions under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of demand is sine qua non, and mere allegation or suspicion cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hostile Witnesses and Collapse of Prosecution Version 11.A careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the complainant-cum-decoy witness, P.W.3 Bapu Lal, as well as motbir witnesses P.W.2 Bhura Lal and P.W.5 Baneshwar, have not supported the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. These witnesses were the very foundation of the trap proceedings, and their hostility strikes at the root of the prosecution story. 12.The complainant Bapu Lal, in his deposition before the trial court, has categorically denied the demand of bribe by the accused and has not corroborated the prosecution version regarding the alleged demand or acceptance of Rs.5,000/-. Once the complainant himself disowns the allegation of demand, the prosecution case is rendered highly doubtful. Similarly, both independent motbir witnesses have failed to support the prosecution story. They have specifically stated that they did not see the accused accepting any bribe amount, nor was the accused apprehended at the spot during trap proceedings. In corruption cases, the role of independent witnesses assumes great importance, and when such witnesses turn hostile, the Court is required to scrutinize the remaining evidence with greater circumspection. The learned trial court failed to appreciate that when all material witnesses to the trap proceedings turn hostile, the prosecution cannot fall back upon conjectures or assumptions to sustain conviction. In the absence of trustworthy corroboration, the entire prosecution version becomes fragile and unreliable. Failure of Trap Proceedings and Absence of Recovery 13.It is an admitted position on record that at the time of trap proceedings, the accused-appellant was not caught red- handed, nor was any bribe amount recovered from his possession. None of the members of the trap party have deposed that they had seen the accused accepting the alleged trap money. The absence of recovery of tainted money creates a serious dent in the prosecution case, especially when the charge under Section 13 of the P.C. Act has already resulted in acquittal. None of the members of the trap party have deposed that they had seen the accused accepting the alleged trap money. The absence of recovery of tainted money creates a serious dent in the prosecution case, especially when the charge under Section 13 of the P.C. Act has already resulted in acquittal. 14.It further emerges that a mobile phone was allegedly recovered from behind the police station, and on that basis, the prosecution sought to connect the accused with the alleged demand. However, the record clearly shows that the said mobile phone did not belong to the accused-appellant, and no credible evidence has been led to establish its ownership or exclusive possession. Electronic Evidence and Transcript: Non-Compliance with Legal Protocol 15.The prosecution heavily relied upon the alleged transcript of a tape-recorded conversation. However, this Court finds that the mandatory legal protocol governing electronic evidence has not been followed. No certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act has been produced in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, AIR 2020 SC 4908, has categorically held that compliance with Section 65B is mandatory, and electronic evidence without such certification is inadmissible in evidence. 16.In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish: the authenticity of the recording device, the manner of recording, the chain of custody, and the integrity of the electronic record. 17.More importantly, even a perusal of the alleged transcript reveals that there is no clear and unequivocal demand of Rs.5,000/- recorded therein. The transcript, therefore, does not advance the prosecution case and cannot be relied upon to sustain conviction. Demand Under Section 7 of the P.C. Act: Legal Requirement Not Satisfied 18. It is a settled proposition of law that demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mere acceptance or recovery, even if assumed, without proof of demand, is insufficient to bring home the charge. At best, any indication of demand stated during pre-charge or verification proceedings may only serve a limited purpose at the threshold stage. The law is clear that such pre-charge statements or verification notes cannot, by themselves, constitute substantive proof unless converted into legally admissible evidence during trial, and that too through the testimony of the very person from whom the demand was made. 19. The law is clear that such pre-charge statements or verification notes cannot, by themselves, constitute substantive proof unless converted into legally admissible evidence during trial, and that too through the testimony of the very person from whom the demand was made. 19. In the present case, the prosecution has utterly failed to establish such legally admissible proof of demand. The complainant himself has denied the demand before the Court, and no independent witness has corroborated the same. While the verification officer may state that he was informed during pre-trap proceedings that the accused demanded money, such assertion can serve only as an initial basis to proceed with verification or trap, but cannot substitute the complainant’s substantive evidence in Court. In some cases, proof of demand may be established through other legally recognized modes; however, this must be supported by sound and admissible evidence, not by inference or hearsay declarations of police officials. 20. The mere assertion of a police officer that “the complainant told me he was asked for money” is legally insufficient to establish demand unless the complainant himself, or any other competent witness, affirms this fact in Court. Such a statement squarely falls within the definition of hearsay evidence and is inadmissible to prove the truth of the fact asserted. Therefore, the prosecution cannot rely merely on the verification officer’s narration of what he was told, in the absence of direct, primary, admissible evidence of demand. Hearsay Evidence: Limited Scope and No Conviction Possible 21.Hearsay evidence, by its very nature, is secondary and derivative. While it may, in limited circumstances, be used for corroborative purposes, it cannot form the sole basis for conviction, particularly in criminal jurisprudence where the burden on the prosecution is to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 22.The learned trial court committed a serious error in placing reliance upon such hearsay statements to uphold conviction under Section 7 of the P.C. Act. In the absence of direct, cogent, and reliable evidence of demand, conviction cannot be sustained merely on the basis of hearsay assertions of official witnesses. Contradiction in Trial Court’s Findings 23.It is also noteworthy that the learned trial court itself has acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under Section 13 of the P.C. Act, holding that misuse of official position and obtaining pecuniary advantage was not proved. Contradiction in Trial Court’s Findings 23.It is also noteworthy that the learned trial court itself has acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under Section 13 of the P.C. Act, holding that misuse of official position and obtaining pecuniary advantage was not proved. Once the trial court found the prosecution case deficient to sustain conviction under Section 13, it was legally inconsistent and impermissible to record conviction under Section 7 on the very same set of evidence, particularly when demand, the core ingredient, remained unproved. 24.The trial court has ignored material contradictions, hostile testimonies, procedural lapses, and inadmissibility of electronic evidence, and has proceeded to convict the accused under Section 7 on assumptions rather than legal proof. Allegation Regarding Roop Lal 25.The prosecution case is further weakened by the fact that the alleged demand was stated to have been made for not arresting Roop Lal, who admittedly was not an accused in the concerned case. This factual inconsistency creates serious doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution story. The complainant Bapu Lal has also not corroborated the statement of Roop Lal regarding the alleged demand, and therefore, the prosecution version lacks internal consistency and reliability. Overall Appreciation 26.From the cumulative assessment of evidence, it is evident that: the complainant and motbir witnesses have turned hostile, no recovery of bribe money has been made, electronic evidence is inadmissible, demand is not proved, reliance is placed on hearsay evidence, and the prosecution story is riddled with contradictions and procedural infirmities. 27.In criminal law, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution has failed to establish its case against the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Conclusion 28.In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has erred in law and on facts in convicting the accused-appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2015 are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. 29.Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Result 30.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. 31.The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (P.C. Act Cases), Udaipur, in Criminal Case No. 16/2009, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is hereby quashed and set aside. 29.Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Result 30.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. 31.The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (P.C. Act Cases), Udaipur, in Criminal Case No. 16/2009, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is hereby quashed and set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of all charges. 32. The appellant is on bail. He need not to surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged.