JUDGMENT : Anand Sharma, J. 1. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the legality, propriety and validity of order dated 27.06.2011 whereby the disciplinary authority imposed upon him the penalty described as “termination from service”, along with all consequential actions taken pursuant thereto. The petitioner has further prayed for relief of reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner is a member of Scheduled Tribe Community. He was initially appointed as Hostel Superintendent (First Class) in Social Welfare Department pursuant to a regular selection conducted by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer. 3. The petitioner was initially married to Smt. Narangi Meena. According to the petitioner, the said marriage stood dissolved on 25.04.1995 in accordance with the customary practices prevailing in the Meena Community. A panchnama evidencing such customary dissolution was prepared. Thereafter, the petitioner informed the competent authorities about the dissolution and by application dated 17.06.1995, sought permission to contract a second marriage. Petitioner has come out with a case that thereafter, reminders were also sent on several occasions over the next few years for seeking permission to perform second marriage, however, none of the communications were ever responded by the respondents. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner solemnised his marriage with Smt. Narayani @ Sudarshana on 26.02.1998. The petitioner duly intimated the department about the marriage repeatedly between 1998 and 2000. However, for the purpose of securing a certificate, the petitioner again solemnised marriage with Smt. Narayani as per Arya Samaj rites on 07.07.2003 and obtained a certificate of marriage. However, while submitting proposals under the Group Personal Accident Insurance Scheme in August 2003 and April 2005, the petitioner’s first wife was erroneously mentioned as nominee and described as “wife”. As per the petitioner, the proposal forms were filled by the clerical staff and signed by him mechanically. Upon noticing the error, he immediately addressed letters seeking correction in September 2003 and May 2005. 5. The petitioner contended that the marital relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Narayani deteriorated during 2005–2006. In this backdrop, a complaint was submitted by Smt. Narayani alleging misconduct, including allegations of sexual abuse and bigamy. Upon noticing the error, he immediately addressed letters seeking correction in September 2003 and May 2005. 5. The petitioner contended that the marital relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Narayani deteriorated during 2005–2006. In this backdrop, a complaint was submitted by Smt. Narayani alleging misconduct, including allegations of sexual abuse and bigamy. Acting on this complaint, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 01.04.2006 and a memorandum of charges was issued on 10.04.2006 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1958'). At the time when the impugned departmental proceedings were initiated, the petitioner was holding the post of District Probation-cum-Social Welfare Officer at Nagaur. 6. It is contended that no preliminary enquiry was conducted before issuing the charge sheet dated 10.04.2006. However, parallel criminal proceedings were also initiated on the same complaint. After a full-fledged trial, the competent criminal court acquitted the petitioner of all charges by judgment dated 03.06.2009. The judgment of acquittal has attained finality. 7. The Petitioner contended that despite submitting so many applications/ representations for seeking copies of relevant documents and raising objections regarding the enquiry officer, the departmental enquiry proceeded further. Material placed by the petitioner was not taken on record; nor were the statements of witnesses recorded in his presence; and ultimately the enquiry officer submitted his report on 09.01.2008 holding the petitioner to be guilty of charge no. 2. The disciplinary authority issued a show- cause notice dated 11.01.2008 while furnishing copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and providing him an opportunity to submit a representation. The petitioner submitted his representation dated 08.02.2008 against the enquiry report. 8. The matter thereafter travelled through various levels of the administration. Opinions were sought from the Department of Personnel, the Law Department and even the Principal Secretary of the Administrative Department and finally from the Chief Secretary. The Law Department opined that in absence of a declaratory decree from a civil court, dissolution of the first marriage could not be accepted. Eventually, despite noting that the CCA Rules do not prescribe “termination” as a penalty, approval was granted by higher authorities. The final order dated 27.06.2011 was issued by the disciplinary authority, imposing a penalty of terminating the services of the petitioner, which was passed by an officer, who had not granted personal hearing to the petitioner. 9. Eventually, despite noting that the CCA Rules do not prescribe “termination” as a penalty, approval was granted by higher authorities. The final order dated 27.06.2011 was issued by the disciplinary authority, imposing a penalty of terminating the services of the petitioner, which was passed by an officer, who had not granted personal hearing to the petitioner. 9. The respondents, in their reply, raised a preliminary objection regarding availability of alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958. On merits, the respondents denied most factual assertions and contended that the petitioner never sought permission for remarriage, nor did he cooperate in the enquiry. Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry strictly as per the procedure contemplated under the Rules of 1958 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Thereafter, statutory approvals were taken by the disciplinary authority and after due application of mind and meticulous examination of record, the punishment order was passed, which looking to the misconduct of the petitioner, can neither be said to be arbitrary, excessive or disproportionate to his guilt. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while pressing the writ petition, submitted that the impugned order dated 27.06.2011 is ex-facie illegal, without jurisdiction and vitiated by malice in law as well as gross violation of principles of natural justice. 11. It was argued that the petitioner belongs to the Meena Community, which is a notified Scheduled Tribe, and therefore the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are not applicable to him in view of Section 2(2) thereof. The first marriage of the petitioner with Smt. Narangi Meena stood dissolved on 25.04.1995 in accordance with the customary practices prevalent in the tribal community. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner informed the department and sought permission to remarry vide application dated 17.06.1995, followed by repeated reminders over the years. The respondents neither rejected the request, nor questioned the validity of the customary divorce. In these circumstances, the subsequent marriage of the petitioner with Smt. Narayani @ Sudarshana on 26.02.1998, which was also duly intimated to the department on several occasions, could not be construed as an act of bigamy. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proposals under the Group Personal Accident Insurance Scheme were filled in by clerical staff and signed by him. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proposals under the Group Personal Accident Insurance Scheme were filled in by clerical staff and signed by him. Due to an inadvertent clerical mistake, the name of the first wife was mentioned as nominee and described as wife in the proposal forms of August 2003 and April 2005. Immediately on noticing the error, the petitioner wrote letters seeking correction. These significant documents were deliberately ignored by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority, and the petitioner was held guilty solely on the basis of the erroneous nomination forms, which cannot be termed as conclusive evidence to infer bigamy by the petitioner. 13. It was also argued that on the same set of allegations as contained in charge no. 1 of the charge sheet, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner, and after a full-fledged trial, he was acquitted on merits by the competent criminal court vide judgment dated 03.06.2009. The acquittal was not on technical grounds, but on appreciation of evidence, including the statement of the complainant herself. 14. Learned counsel further submitted that the departmental enquiry was vitiated by gross violation of principles of natural justice. Relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner despite repeated requests and even the statements of witnesses were recorded in the absence of the petitioner. The enquiry officer proceeded ex-parte while the petitioner’s request for change of enquiry officer on the ground of bias was pending. Furthermore, the documents submitted by the petitioner on 27.12.2007 were not taken on record and the enquiry report was submitted without considering the defence material. It was contended that such an enquiry cannot be regarded as a valid enquiry in the eyes of law. 15. It was also pointed out that although the petitioner submitted a detailed representation dated 08.02.2008 against the enquiry report, yet it was recorded against the record that no such representation was submitted. Learned counsel emphasised that even before granting an effective personal hearing to the petitioner, proposals regarding the penalty were processed and opinions were sought from higher authorities. Though the petitioner was called for personal hearing, yet no effective hearing was ever afforded. Ultimately, the final penalty order was passed by an authority, who had never heard the petitioner personally, which amounts to denial of fair hearing. 16. Though the petitioner was called for personal hearing, yet no effective hearing was ever afforded. Ultimately, the final penalty order was passed by an authority, who had never heard the petitioner personally, which amounts to denial of fair hearing. 16. Learned counsel submitted that the entire decision- making process reflects non-application of mind and abdication of statutory discretion. The disciplinary authority acted under the dictates of higher authorities, including those, who would otherwise have appellate jurisdiction. The record itself shows that even during the process of consultation, an objection was raised that the penalty of “termination” is not prescribed under the Rules of 1958, yet the order was passed merely because approvals had been received from higher quarters. 17. It was emphatically argued that the penalty imposed is wholly without jurisdiction and under the Rules of 1958, removal, dismissal and compulsory retirement are distinct statutory penalties and termination cannot be imposed as a substitute. An order imposing a penalty unknown to law is void ab initio. 18. Without prejudice to arguments in respect of procedural flaw and violation of principles of natural justice, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even otherwise the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. The petitioner was about 58 years of age and had rendered nearly thirty years of spotless service. Charge no.1 was not proved and the petitioner was acquitted by a criminal court. Charge no.2 rests solely on clerical errors in nomination forms which were promptly sought to be corrected. The doctrine of proportionality has been completely ignored. 19. In conclusion, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that besides being in clear violation of the Rules of 1958, the punishment was premeditated and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, and therefore, warrants interference by this Court. 20. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner has directly approached this Court challenging the order of punishment dated 27.06.2011 without availing the statutory remedy of appeal provided under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958. It was contended that the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy bars invocation of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction and on this ground alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 21. Without prejudice to the aforesaid preliminary objection, learned counsel submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit even on facts. It was contended that the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy bars invocation of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction and on this ground alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 21. Without prejudice to the aforesaid preliminary objection, learned counsel submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit even on facts. It was argued that disciplinary proceedings are conducted by the employer in exercise of its administrative authority to maintain discipline, integrity and efficiency in service. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the decision itself. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction do not sit as appellate authorities over departmental enquiries and cannot re- appreciate evidence or substitute their own conclusions for those of the disciplinary authority. 22. It was contended that the petitioner never submitted any valid or acceptable representation regarding divorce or permission for remarriage prior to contracting a second marriage. According to the respondents, the petitioner submitted certain representations only during the course of the departmental enquiry and at the stage of personal hearing in March 2011. It was also submitted that the documents relied upon by the petitioner were largely obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005, at a later stage and were not part of the departmental enquiry record earlier. 23. Learned counsel further argued that the petitioner himself submitted proposals under the Group Personal Accident Insurance Scheme and that it is incorrect to suggest that the relevant forms were filled in by clerical staff. The nomination forms submitted by the petitioner clearly mentioned his first wife as wife even in the years 2003 and 2005, which, according to the respondents, demonstrated that the petitioner’s first marriage was subsisting. On this basis, the charge of contracting a second marriage during the lifetime of the first wife was framed. 24. It was submitted that upon receipt of a complaint alleging misconduct, including allegations of sexual abuse and bigamy, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 01.04.2006 and a charge-sheet was issued on 10.04.2006 strictly in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. Two charges were framed against the petitioner, namely, sexual abuse of Smt. Narayani Devi Bagaria and contracting a second marriage while the first wife was alive. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings was lawful and justified in view of the seriousness of the allegations. 25. Two charges were framed against the petitioner, namely, sexual abuse of Smt. Narayani Devi Bagaria and contracting a second marriage while the first wife was alive. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings was lawful and justified in view of the seriousness of the allegations. 25. Learned counsel contended that the petitioner did not submit his reply to the charge-sheet within the stipulated time and, therefore, the enquiry officer was appointed vide order dated 24.05.2006. It was further argued that the petitioner did not cooperate with the enquiry proceedings, did not appear for personal hearing after 22.10.2007 and did not produce any documentary evidence, witness or material before the enquiry officer. In such circumstances, the enquiry officer had no option but to proceed and submit the enquiry report on 09.01.2008 based on the available material. 26. It was also submitted that the petitioner did not submit a reply to the show-cause notice dated 11.01.2008. Thereafter, another opportunity was granted to him vide letter dated 21.02.2008, which was received by the petitioner on 25.02.2008. The respondents denied receipt of any reply dated 08.02.2008 or representation dated 21.06.2009 as alleged by the petitioner. 27. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity during the disciplinary proceedings, and allegations of violation of principles of natural justice are unfounded. The allegations of mala fides, bias and non- application of mind were denied in toto. It was contended that the disciplinary authority exercised its powers in accordance with law and the Rules of 1958. 28. In conclusion, learned counsel for the respondents prayed for dismissing the writ petition, both on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy as well as on merits, as the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. 29. I have heard rival submissions put forward by learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. 30. As regards the objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents regarding alternative remedy, it is sufficient to observe that record reveals that prior to passing of penalty order, during the consultation process, file has travelled to the Law Secretary, the Chief Secretary and even to the Principal Secretary of the Administrative Department; and only after approval by the highest authority, impugned penalty order inflicting penalty of dismissal was passed by the disciplinary authority. Under such circumstances, filing of appeal against the penalty order would be an eyewash and asking the petitioner to complete empty formalities, as such appeal may not yield a proper legal and fair consideration and would be totally an unnecessary ritual. It is well settled that availability of an alternative remedy does not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction where the impugned action is ex facie without jurisdiction, in violation of principles of natural justice, or where fundamental rights are infringed. In the present case, the penalty imposed with approval of higher authority, is itself not prescribed under the Rules of 1958 and there are apparent allegations of violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, relegating the petitioner to an appellate remedy would be neither efficacious, nor justified. 31. Coming to the merits, the first and most glaring illegality lies in the nature of punishment imposed. The Rules of 1958 enumerate specific penalties. “Termination” is not one of them. Termination may be a consequence flowing from certain penalties, such as removal or dismissal, but it cannot be imposed as a standalone penalty dehors the Rules of 1958. An order imposing a penalty not contemplated by the statutory rules is patently without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Administrative approval from higher authorities cannot cure a foundational lack of statutory power. 32. Further, on perusal of charge sheet and enquiry report it would come out that charge no. 1 was relating to sexual abuse of Narayani @ Sudarshana, however, since in relation to the similar allegations, the petitioner was also facing criminal trial before the criminal court, hence, the outcome of enquiry relating to charge no. 1 was left by the enquiry officer subject to decision of the criminal trial and as per record of the writ petition, the petitioner has been acquitted by the criminal court from such charges vide judgment dated 03.06.2009. Even perusal of the penalty order dated 27.06.2011 would also reveal that the petitioner has not been punished in respect of aforesaid charge no. 1 and in fact, penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner on account of the fact that the enquiry officer has found the petitioner guilty of charge no. 2, which was relating to performing second marriage during currency of first marriage without permission of the State Government. Thus, under these circumstances, when there is no penalty against the petitioner in respect of charge no. 2, which was relating to performing second marriage during currency of first marriage without permission of the State Government. Thus, under these circumstances, when there is no penalty against the petitioner in respect of charge no. 1, then there would be apparently no requirement to discuss niceties of charge no. 1. 33. So far as charge no. 2 relating to bigamy is concerned, the same is based upon Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1971'), which reads as under: " 25. Restriction regarding marriage: – (1) No Government servant shall enter into, or contract a marriage with a person having a spouse living. (2) No Government servant having a spouse living, shall enter into, or contract, a marriage with any person. Provided that the Government may permit a Government servant to enter into or contract, any such marriage as is referred to in sub–rule (1) or sub–rule (2) if it is satisfied that: (a) such marriage is permissible under the personal law applicable to such Government servant and the other party to the marriage; and (b) there are other grounds for so doing. (3) A Government servant who has married or marries a person other than of Indian Nationality shall forthwith intimate the fact to the Government." 34. Allegations levelled against the petitioner in charge no. 2 of Charge sheet dated 10.04.2006 are that on 25.08.2003, in the proposal form submitted under the Group Personal Accident Insurance Scheme, he nominated his first wife Smt. Narangi Meena, which established that she was alive. However, without obtaining permission from the State Government, the petitioner contracted a second marriage on 07.07.2003 at Arya Samaj Mandir, Nindar, with Ms. Narayani Bagaria, daughter of Shri Bhuralal Bagaria. As he was a government servant, this act was contrary to the provisions of Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Conduct Rules, 1971, and amounted to misconduct. Therefore, it is apparent that the second charge was framed against the petitioner for having violated Rule 25 of the Rules of 1971. 35. This Court finds that in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case as well as on the basis of record, the charge of bigamy itself is legally unsustainable. The petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe Community. 35. This Court finds that in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case as well as on the basis of record, the charge of bigamy itself is legally unsustainable. The petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe Community. Section 2(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 expressly excludes its applicability to members of Scheduled Tribes unless notified otherwise. This Court finds that customary divorce prevalent in a tribe is valid, and no declaratory decree from a civil court is mandatory to recognise such dissolution in a departmental enquiry, until and unless such dissolution of marriage is disputed by the affected spouse, which is admittedly not there in the present case. Undisputedly, the first wife neither complained, nor asserted subsistence of marriage. On the contrary, the complainant wife herself claimed to be the legally wedded wife. In such circumstances, the finding of bigamy based merely on erroneous entries in insurance nomination forms is perverse. The nomination form cannot be treated as conclusive and irrefutable evidence of survival of first marriage, moreso, when the information along with proof of customary divorce with his first wife as per customs prevailing in Meena Community (a Schedule Tribe) was already submitted by the petitioner to his higher authorities. 36. That apart, bare reading of Rule 25 of the Rules of 1971 would also reveal that the aforesaid rule does not absolutely prohibit second marriage even during survival of first marriage and spouse. Rather, the rule states that despite having a first spouse living, Government may permit a Government servant to enter into or contract, any such marriage if the Government is satisfied that such marriage is permissible under the personal law applicable to such Government servant and the other party to the marriage. In the present matter, case of the petitioner falls at far better footing, for the reason that he has placed on record the material to show that he divorced his first wife as per customary law prevailing in his community and only after obtaining such divorce, when the first marriage was not surviving by virtue of customary divorce, he sought permission of the competent authority on number of occasions to contract second marriage. Such applications were neither accepted, nor rejected by the Respondent-Government authorities by passing any specific order in this regard. Such applications were neither accepted, nor rejected by the Respondent-Government authorities by passing any specific order in this regard. Hence, it cannot be said to be violation of Rule 25 of the Rules of 1971 and the petitioner cannot be held guilty of charge relating to violation of such rule. 37. It is also noteworthy that Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Prakash Babu Bajpai vs Union of India & Ors., 1995 (3) WLC (Raj.) 307, has held that although plural marriages by the Government servant is a misconduct, yet no presumption with regard to bigamy can be drawn in a departmental enquiry and it was not proper on departmental authorities to take upon themselves such onerous task of deciding legal questions requiring specialised knowledge of law. Departmental authorities ought to have left questions of such complicated nature for determination by general courts of law. The above view has been followed by the another Co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of Harvir Singh vs. Union of India & Others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6400/2002 decided on 08.02.2019). 38. Besides this, the record unmistakably reflects non- application of mind and abdication of statutory discretion by the disciplinary authority. The final decision was driven by opinions and approvals of higher authorities, some of whom would have been appellate authorities. The officer, who ultimately passed the order, neither heard the petitioner, nor independently evaluated the matter. Such an order is contrary to law. 39. In addition to above, this court finds that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. The petitioner had rendered about three decades of unblemished service. The charges do not relate to corruption, moral turpitude in public office or financial misconduct. Even assuming some procedural lapse, the extreme penalty imposed cannot withstand judicial scrutiny under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 40. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is satisfied that impugned order dated 27.06.2011 is arbitrary, without jurisdiction, violative of principles of natural justice and unjustified. 41. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 27.06.2011 passed by the respondents is quashed and set aside. 40. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is satisfied that impugned order dated 27.06.2011 is arbitrary, without jurisdiction, violative of principles of natural justice and unjustified. 41. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 27.06.2011 passed by the respondents is quashed and set aside. Since the petitioner, during the pendency of the writ petition, has attained the age of superannuation, therefore, the respondents are directed to grant benefits to the petitioner treating him to be in service on the date of his superannuation, with all consequential benefits, including continuity of service and notional fixation of pay. Accordingly, order of retirement of the petitioner with effect from his date of superannuation be issued forthwith; and all the retiral benefits like pension, gratuity etc. be also granted to the petitioner alongwith arrears, which shall be sanctioned and released by the respondents within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment, failing which the aforesaid amount shall carry interest @ 9% per annum. 42. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.